@article{2531, abstract = {{We discuss a model, in which two agents may distribute finitely many objects among themselves. The conflict is resolved by means of a market procedure. Depending on the specifications, this procedure serves to achieve bargaining solutions such as the discrete Raiffa solution, the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution and the Perles-Maschler solution. The latter is axiomatized using the superadditivity axiom, which in the present context is readily interpreted as resolving a specific source of conflict potential.}}, author = {{Haake, Claus-Jochen}}, issn = {{0219-1989}}, journal = {{International Game Theory Review}}, number = {{01}}, pages = {{15--32}}, publisher = {{World Scientific Pub Co Pte Lt}}, title = {{{DIVIDING BY DEMANDING: OBJECT DIVISION THROUGH MARKET PROCEDURES}}}, doi = {{10.1142/s0219198909002121}}, volume = {{11}}, year = {{2009}}, } @article{4161, author = {{Hehenkamp, Burkhard}}, issn = {{0219-1989}}, journal = {{International Game Theory Review}}, number = {{03}}, pages = {{249--262}}, publisher = {{World Scientific Pub Co Pte Lt}}, title = {{{Equilibrium Selection in the Two-Population KMR Model}}}, doi = {{10.1142/s0219198903001045}}, volume = {{05}}, year = {{2003}}, }