[{"title":"Negotiating weights for burden sharing rules in international climate negotiations: an empirical analysis","doi":"10.1007/s10018-020-00289-0","date_updated":"2023-09-15T07:36:45Z","publisher":"Springer Science and Business Media LLC","volume":23,"author":[{"first_name":"Martin","id":"98922","full_name":"Kesternich, Martin","last_name":"Kesternich"},{"first_name":"Andreas","last_name":"Löschel","full_name":"Löschel, Andreas"},{"first_name":"Andreas","last_name":"Ziegler","full_name":"Ziegler, Andreas"}],"date_created":"2023-06-13T09:31:01Z","year":"2020","intvolume":"        23","page":"309-331","citation":{"short":"M. Kesternich, A. Löschel, A. Ziegler, Environmental Economics and Policy Studies 23 (2020) 309–331.","bibtex":"@article{Kesternich_Löschel_Ziegler_2020, title={Negotiating weights for burden sharing rules in international climate negotiations: an empirical analysis}, volume={23}, DOI={<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10018-020-00289-0\">10.1007/s10018-020-00289-0</a>}, number={2}, journal={Environmental Economics and Policy Studies}, publisher={Springer Science and Business Media LLC}, author={Kesternich, Martin and Löschel, Andreas and Ziegler, Andreas}, year={2020}, pages={309–331} }","mla":"Kesternich, Martin, et al. “Negotiating Weights for Burden Sharing Rules in International Climate Negotiations: An Empirical Analysis.” <i>Environmental Economics and Policy Studies</i>, vol. 23, no. 2, Springer Science and Business Media LLC, 2020, pp. 309–31, doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10018-020-00289-0\">10.1007/s10018-020-00289-0</a>.","apa":"Kesternich, M., Löschel, A., &#38; Ziegler, A. (2020). Negotiating weights for burden sharing rules in international climate negotiations: an empirical analysis. <i>Environmental Economics and Policy Studies</i>, <i>23</i>(2), 309–331. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10018-020-00289-0\">https://doi.org/10.1007/s10018-020-00289-0</a>","chicago":"Kesternich, Martin, Andreas Löschel, and Andreas Ziegler. “Negotiating Weights for Burden Sharing Rules in International Climate Negotiations: An Empirical Analysis.” <i>Environmental Economics and Policy Studies</i> 23, no. 2 (2020): 309–31. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10018-020-00289-0\">https://doi.org/10.1007/s10018-020-00289-0</a>.","ieee":"M. Kesternich, A. Löschel, and A. Ziegler, “Negotiating weights for burden sharing rules in international climate negotiations: an empirical analysis,” <i>Environmental Economics and Policy Studies</i>, vol. 23, no. 2, pp. 309–331, 2020, doi: <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10018-020-00289-0\">10.1007/s10018-020-00289-0</a>.","ama":"Kesternich M, Löschel A, Ziegler A. Negotiating weights for burden sharing rules in international climate negotiations: an empirical analysis. <i>Environmental Economics and Policy Studies</i>. 2020;23(2):309-331. doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10018-020-00289-0\">10.1007/s10018-020-00289-0</a>"},"publication_identifier":{"issn":["1432-847X","1867-383X"]},"publication_status":"published","issue":"2","keyword":["Management","Monitoring","Policy and Law","Economics and Econometrics"],"language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"_id":"45586","user_id":"98922","abstract":[{"text":"<jats:title>Abstract</jats:title><jats:p>We have collected data from a world-wide survey among COP delegates to empirically investigate preferences for certain burden sharing rules among key groups in a setting that reflects the possibility of observing concessions from negotiating partners. In our survey, the participants had the opportunity to select and combine up to eight (pre-defined) burden sharing rules and to assign relative weights to the selected rules in their preferred bundle. We examine whether such a mechanism helps to overcome the currently strictly (self-interested) strategic claims on equity in the negotiation process. We observe that delegates from different groups of countries show a general willingness for concessions. However, the degree to which different burden sharing rules are taken into consideration partly differs between countries. As a key insight we report that the individual assessment of the polluter-pays rule based on current emissions does not only stress the persistence of the traditional Annex-B/Non-Annex-B division but also suggests tendencies for a more fragmented grouping with different positions between, for example, delegates from developing countries (i.e. G77 members) and emerging countries (i.e. BASIC). At the same time, we observe tendencies for a more harmonized view among key groups towards the ability-to-pay rule in a setting of weighted burden sharing rules.</jats:p>","lang":"eng"}],"status":"public","publication":"Environmental Economics and Policy Studies","type":"journal_article"}]