---
_id: '20883'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: We experimentally compare the consequences for group cooperation of
two decision mechanisms involving the extension of group membership. We analyze
an exogenous decision (random draw) and an endogenous decision (made by a particular
group member) mechanism to extend a temporary agent’s group membership. Our results
reveal that the prospect of group membership extension affects not only the temporary
but also the permanent group members’ contributions with an endogenous mechanism.
article_number: '61'
author:
- first_name: Christian
full_name: Grund, Christian
last_name: Grund
- first_name: Christine
full_name: Harbring, Christine
last_name: Harbring
- first_name: Kirsten
full_name: Thommes, Kirsten
id: '72497'
last_name: Thommes
- first_name: Katja Rebecca
full_name: Tilkes, Katja Rebecca
last_name: Tilkes
citation:
ama: Grund C, Harbring C, Thommes K, Tilkes KR. Decisions on Extending Group Membership—Evidence
from a Public Good Experiment. Games. 2020. doi:10.3390/g11040061
apa: Grund, C., Harbring, C., Thommes, K., & Tilkes, K. R. (2020). Decisions
on Extending Group Membership—Evidence from a Public Good Experiment. Games.
https://doi.org/10.3390/g11040061
bibtex: '@article{Grund_Harbring_Thommes_Tilkes_2020, title={Decisions on Extending
Group Membership—Evidence from a Public Good Experiment}, DOI={10.3390/g11040061},
number={61}, journal={Games}, author={Grund, Christian and Harbring, Christine
and Thommes, Kirsten and Tilkes, Katja Rebecca}, year={2020} }'
chicago: Grund, Christian, Christine Harbring, Kirsten Thommes, and Katja Rebecca
Tilkes. “Decisions on Extending Group Membership—Evidence from a Public Good Experiment.”
Games, 2020. https://doi.org/10.3390/g11040061.
ieee: C. Grund, C. Harbring, K. Thommes, and K. R. Tilkes, “Decisions on Extending
Group Membership—Evidence from a Public Good Experiment,” Games, 2020.
mla: Grund, Christian, et al. “Decisions on Extending Group Membership—Evidence
from a Public Good Experiment.” Games, 61, 2020, doi:10.3390/g11040061.
short: C. Grund, C. Harbring, K. Thommes, K.R. Tilkes, Games (2020).
date_created: 2021-01-07T10:09:51Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:54:41Z
department:
- _id: '178'
- _id: '184'
doi: 10.3390/g11040061
language:
- iso: eng
publication: Games
publication_identifier:
issn:
- 2073-4336
publication_status: published
status: public
title: Decisions on Extending Group Membership—Evidence from a Public Good Experiment
type: journal_article
user_id: '49071'
year: '2020'
...
---
_id: '45561'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: The purpose of this study is to experimentally test Trockel’s game,
which is a modelling of the classical Chain Store Game (CSG), and determine whether
one of the two theories of Equality and Deterrence may better account for the
observed behavior. The CSG is an example of a simple game in extensive form where
the actual behavior of well-informed players cannot be expected to agree with
the clear results of game theoretical reasoning. To explain the disagreement between
the theory and the expected behavior, Trockel’s game is proposed as an alternative
modelling of the scenario. The existence of more than one equilibrium in Trockel’s
game opens a door for reputation building. This study is the first attempt to
experimentally test this alternative game with the same purpose. According to
my data, there is some evidence in favor of both Equality and Deterrence Hypotheses.
However, since the strategies compatible with the Equality Hypothesis are played
more frequently, I observe some patterns which share the same intuition with the
Deterrence Hypothesis.
article_number: '9'
author:
- first_name: Papatya
full_name: Duman, Papatya
id: '72752'
last_name: Duman
citation:
ama: Duman P. Does Informational Equivalence Preserve Strategic Behavior? Experimental
Results on Trockel’s Model of Selten’s Chain Store Story. Games. 2020;11(1).
doi:10.3390/g11010009
apa: Duman, P. (2020). Does Informational Equivalence Preserve Strategic Behavior?
Experimental Results on Trockel’s Model of Selten’s Chain Store Story. Games,
11(1), Article 9. https://doi.org/10.3390/g11010009
bibtex: '@article{Duman_2020, title={Does Informational Equivalence Preserve Strategic
Behavior? Experimental Results on Trockel’s Model of Selten’s Chain Store Story},
volume={11}, DOI={10.3390/g11010009},
number={19}, journal={Games}, publisher={MDPI AG}, author={Duman, Papatya}, year={2020}
}'
chicago: Duman, Papatya. “Does Informational Equivalence Preserve Strategic Behavior?
Experimental Results on Trockel’s Model of Selten’s Chain Store Story.” Games
11, no. 1 (2020). https://doi.org/10.3390/g11010009.
ieee: 'P. Duman, “Does Informational Equivalence Preserve Strategic Behavior? Experimental
Results on Trockel’s Model of Selten’s Chain Store Story,” Games, vol.
11, no. 1, Art. no. 9, 2020, doi: 10.3390/g11010009.'
mla: Duman, Papatya. “Does Informational Equivalence Preserve Strategic Behavior?
Experimental Results on Trockel’s Model of Selten’s Chain Store Story.” Games,
vol. 11, no. 1, 9, MDPI AG, 2020, doi:10.3390/g11010009.
short: P. Duman, Games 11 (2020).
date_created: 2023-06-09T15:31:17Z
date_updated: 2023-06-09T15:33:34Z
doi: 10.3390/g11010009
intvolume: ' 11'
issue: '1'
keyword:
- Applied Mathematics
- Statistics
- Probability and Uncertainty
- Statistics and Probability
language:
- iso: eng
publication: Games
publication_identifier:
issn:
- 2073-4336
publication_status: published
publisher: MDPI AG
status: public
title: Does Informational Equivalence Preserve Strategic Behavior? Experimental Results
on Trockel’s Model of Selten’s Chain Store Story
type: journal_article
user_id: '72752'
volume: 11
year: '2020'
...