@article{51006,
  abstract     = {{<jats:title>Abstract</jats:title>
               <jats:p>There is a growing consensus that Emilie Du Châtelet's challenging essay “On Freedom” defends compatibilism. I offer an alternative, libertarian reading of the essay I lay out the prima facie textual evidence for such a reading. I also explain how apparently compatibilist remarks in “On Freedom” can be read as aspects of a sophisticated type of libertarianism that rejects blind or arbitrary choice. To this end, I consider the historical context of Du Châtelet's essay, and especially the dialectic between various strands of eighteenth-century libertarianism and compatibilism.</jats:p>}},
  author       = {{Wells, Aaron}},
  issn         = {{0740-0675}},
  journal      = {{History of Philosophy Quarterly}},
  keywords     = {{Philosophy}},
  number       = {{3}},
  pages        = {{219--241}},
  publisher    = {{University of Illinois Press}},
  title        = {{{Du Châtelet's Libertarianism}}},
  doi          = {{10.5406/21521026.38.3.02}},
  volume       = {{38}},
  year         = {{2022}},
}