---
_id: '65066'
abstract:
- lang: eng
  text: "<jats:title>Abstract</jats:title>\r\n                  <jats:p>We investigate
    whether the recently approved reforms of the apportionment of parliamentary seats
    to parties in the German Bundestag affects the parties’ political influence measured
    by power indices. We find that under neither reform the underlying simple game,
    which describes the possibilities to form governments, remains unchanged and as
    a result the Shapley-Shubik and the Banzhaf index are unaltered. As a consequence,
    the major change resulting from the reforms is the reduction of the Bundestag’s
    size to 630 seats.</jats:p>"
article_type: original
author:
- first_name: Papatya
  full_name: Duman, Papatya
  last_name: Duman
- first_name: Claus-Jochen
  full_name: Haake, Claus-Jochen
  id: '20801'
  last_name: Haake
citation:
  ama: 'Duman P, Haake C-J. A Note on the Size Reduction Reform in the German Parliament:
    A Game Theoretic Analysis of Power Indices. <i>Review of Economics</i>. 2026;76(3):241-270.
    doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.1515/roe-2024-0048">10.1515/roe-2024-0048</a>'
  apa: 'Duman, P., &#38; Haake, C.-J. (2026). A Note on the Size Reduction Reform
    in the German Parliament: A Game Theoretic Analysis of Power Indices. <i>Review
    of Economics</i>, <i>76</i>(3), 241–270. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1515/roe-2024-0048">https://doi.org/10.1515/roe-2024-0048</a>'
  bibtex: '@article{Duman_Haake_2026, title={A Note on the Size Reduction Reform in
    the German Parliament: A Game Theoretic Analysis of Power Indices}, volume={76},
    DOI={<a href="https://doi.org/10.1515/roe-2024-0048">10.1515/roe-2024-0048</a>},
    number={3}, journal={Review of Economics}, publisher={Walter de Gruyter GmbH},
    author={Duman, Papatya and Haake, Claus-Jochen}, year={2026}, pages={241–270}
    }'
  chicago: 'Duman, Papatya, and Claus-Jochen Haake. “A Note on the Size Reduction
    Reform in the German Parliament: A Game Theoretic Analysis of Power Indices.”
    <i>Review of Economics</i> 76, no. 3 (2026): 241–70. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1515/roe-2024-0048">https://doi.org/10.1515/roe-2024-0048</a>.'
  ieee: 'P. Duman and C.-J. Haake, “A Note on the Size Reduction Reform in the German
    Parliament: A Game Theoretic Analysis of Power Indices,” <i>Review of Economics</i>,
    vol. 76, no. 3, pp. 241–270, 2026, doi: <a href="https://doi.org/10.1515/roe-2024-0048">10.1515/roe-2024-0048</a>.'
  mla: 'Duman, Papatya, and Claus-Jochen Haake. “A Note on the Size Reduction Reform
    in the German Parliament: A Game Theoretic Analysis of Power Indices.” <i>Review
    of Economics</i>, vol. 76, no. 3, Walter de Gruyter GmbH, 2026, pp. 241–70, doi:<a
    href="https://doi.org/10.1515/roe-2024-0048">10.1515/roe-2024-0048</a>.'
  short: P. Duman, C.-J. Haake, Review of Economics 76 (2026) 241–270.
date_created: 2026-03-19T13:51:12Z
date_updated: 2026-03-19T13:56:59Z
department:
- _id: '205'
- _id: '475'
- _id: '200'
doi: 10.1515/roe-2024-0048
intvolume: '        76'
issue: '3'
jel:
- D72
- C71
keyword:
- Bundestag reform
- Banzhaf power index
- Shapley-Shubik power index
language:
- iso: eng
main_file_link:
- open_access: '1'
  url: https://www.degruyterbrill.com/document/doi/10.1515/roe-2024-0048/html
oa: '1'
page: 241-270
publication: Review of Economics
publication_identifier:
  issn:
  - 0948-5139
  - 2366-035X
publication_status: published
publisher: Walter de Gruyter GmbH
quality_controlled: '1'
status: public
title: 'A Note on the Size Reduction Reform in the German Parliament: A Game Theoretic
  Analysis of Power Indices'
type: journal_article
user_id: '20801'
volume: 76
year: '2026'
...