@inbook{3098,
  abstract     = {{One of the fundamental problems in applications of methods and results
from mechanism design and implementation theory is the effective enforcement of
theoretically established equilibria by which social choice rules are implemented.
Hurwicz (2008) and Myerson (2009) introduce different concepts of formalizing
enforcement of institutional rules via the introduction of legal and illegal games. In
this note the relation of their concepts with that of a social system defined inDebreu
(1952) is analyzed and its potential of being instrumental for modelling institution
design is discussed. The existence proof for such a system, also known as generalized
game or abstract economy had been the basis for the existence proof of a
competitive equilibrium of an economy.}},
  author       = {{Trockel, Walter and Haake, Claus-Jochen}},
  booktitle    = {{Studies in Economic Design}},
  editor       = {{Laslier, Jean-Francois and Moulin, Herve and Sanver, Remzi and Zwicker, William}},
  issn         = {{2510-3970}},
  publisher    = {{Springer}},
  title        = {{{Thoughts on Social Design}}},
  volume       = {{(n.d.)}},
  year         = {{2018}},
}