[{"publication_status":"published","date_updated":"2026-03-19T13:56:59Z","article_type":"original","intvolume":"        76","title":"A Note on the Size Reduction Reform in the German Parliament: A Game Theoretic Analysis of Power Indices","year":"2026","author":[{"last_name":"Duman","first_name":"Papatya","full_name":"Duman, Papatya"},{"id":"20801","first_name":"Claus-Jochen","last_name":"Haake","full_name":"Haake, Claus-Jochen"}],"publication_identifier":{"issn":["0948-5139","2366-035X"]},"doi":"10.1515/roe-2024-0048","main_file_link":[{"url":"https://www.degruyterbrill.com/document/doi/10.1515/roe-2024-0048/html","open_access":"1"}],"language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"abstract":[{"text":"<jats:title>Abstract</jats:title>\r\n                  <jats:p>We investigate whether the recently approved reforms of the apportionment of parliamentary seats to parties in the German Bundestag affects the parties’ political influence measured by power indices. We find that under neither reform the underlying simple game, which describes the possibilities to form governments, remains unchanged and as a result the Shapley-Shubik and the Banzhaf index are unaltered. As a consequence, the major change resulting from the reforms is the reduction of the Bundestag’s size to 630 seats.</jats:p>","lang":"eng"}],"publication":"Review of Economics","issue":"3","type":"journal_article","keyword":["Bundestag reform","Banzhaf power index","Shapley-Shubik power index"],"department":[{"_id":"205"},{"_id":"475"},{"_id":"200"}],"date_created":"2026-03-19T13:51:12Z","status":"public","jel":["D72","C71"],"user_id":"20801","volume":76,"page":"241-270","publisher":"Walter de Gruyter GmbH","_id":"65066","quality_controlled":"1","citation":{"chicago":"Duman, Papatya, and Claus-Jochen Haake. “A Note on the Size Reduction Reform in the German Parliament: A Game Theoretic Analysis of Power Indices.” <i>Review of Economics</i> 76, no. 3 (2026): 241–70. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1515/roe-2024-0048\">https://doi.org/10.1515/roe-2024-0048</a>.","ama":"Duman P, Haake C-J. A Note on the Size Reduction Reform in the German Parliament: A Game Theoretic Analysis of Power Indices. <i>Review of Economics</i>. 2026;76(3):241-270. doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1515/roe-2024-0048\">10.1515/roe-2024-0048</a>","short":"P. Duman, C.-J. Haake, Review of Economics 76 (2026) 241–270.","bibtex":"@article{Duman_Haake_2026, title={A Note on the Size Reduction Reform in the German Parliament: A Game Theoretic Analysis of Power Indices}, volume={76}, DOI={<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1515/roe-2024-0048\">10.1515/roe-2024-0048</a>}, number={3}, journal={Review of Economics}, publisher={Walter de Gruyter GmbH}, author={Duman, Papatya and Haake, Claus-Jochen}, year={2026}, pages={241–270} }","mla":"Duman, Papatya, and Claus-Jochen Haake. “A Note on the Size Reduction Reform in the German Parliament: A Game Theoretic Analysis of Power Indices.” <i>Review of Economics</i>, vol. 76, no. 3, Walter de Gruyter GmbH, 2026, pp. 241–70, doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1515/roe-2024-0048\">10.1515/roe-2024-0048</a>.","apa":"Duman, P., &#38; Haake, C.-J. (2026). A Note on the Size Reduction Reform in the German Parliament: A Game Theoretic Analysis of Power Indices. <i>Review of Economics</i>, <i>76</i>(3), 241–270. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1515/roe-2024-0048\">https://doi.org/10.1515/roe-2024-0048</a>","ieee":"P. Duman and C.-J. Haake, “A Note on the Size Reduction Reform in the German Parliament: A Game Theoretic Analysis of Power Indices,” <i>Review of Economics</i>, vol. 76, no. 3, pp. 241–270, 2026, doi: <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1515/roe-2024-0048\">10.1515/roe-2024-0048</a>."},"oa":"1"},{"citation":{"ama":"Haake C-J, Schneider M. Playing games with QCA: Measuring the explanatory power of single conditions with the Banzhaf index. <i>Journal of International Management</i>. 2024;30(2).","bibtex":"@article{Haake_Schneider_2024, title={Playing games with QCA: Measuring the explanatory power of single conditions with the Banzhaf index}, volume={30}, number={2}, journal={Journal of International Management}, publisher={Elsevier}, author={Haake, Claus-Jochen and Schneider, Martin}, year={2024} }","mla":"Haake, Claus-Jochen, and Martin Schneider. “Playing Games with QCA: Measuring the Explanatory Power of Single Conditions with the Banzhaf Index.” <i>Journal of International Management</i>, vol. 30, no. 2, Elsevier, 2024.","chicago":"Haake, Claus-Jochen, and Martin Schneider. “Playing Games with QCA: Measuring the Explanatory Power of Single Conditions with the Banzhaf Index.” <i>Journal of International Management</i> 30, no. 2 (2024).","short":"C.-J. Haake, M. Schneider, Journal of International Management 30 (2024).","apa":"Haake, C.-J., &#38; Schneider, M. (2024). Playing games with QCA: Measuring the explanatory power of single conditions with the Banzhaf index. <i>Journal of International Management</i>, <i>30</i>(2).","ieee":"C.-J. Haake and M. Schneider, “Playing games with QCA: Measuring the explanatory power of single conditions with the Banzhaf index,” <i>Journal of International Management</i>, vol. 30, no. 2, 2024."},"quality_controlled":"1","project":[{"_id":"1","grant_number":"160364472","name":"SFB 901: SFB 901"},{"name":"SFB 901 - A: SFB 901 - Project Area A","_id":"2"},{"name":"SFB 901 - A3: SFB 901 - Subproject A3","_id":"7","grant_number":"160364472"}],"_id":"34114","funded_apc":"1","publisher":"Elsevier","user_id":"20801","volume":30,"status":"public","date_created":"2022-11-19T15:33:27Z","type":"journal_article","keyword":["Qualitative comparative analysis","Banzhaf power index","causality","explanatory power"],"department":[{"_id":"205"},{"_id":"475"},{"_id":"178"},{"_id":"185"}],"issue":"2","publication":"Journal of International Management","abstract":[{"text":"Qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) enables researchers in international management to better understand how the impact of a single explanatory factor depends on the context of other factors. But the analytical toolbox of QCA does not include a parameter for the explanatory power of a single explanatory factor or “condition”. In this paper, we therefore reinterpret the Banzhaf power index, originally developed in cooperative game theory, to establish a goodness-of-fit parameter in QCA. The relative Banzhaf index we suggest measures the explanatory power of one condition averaged across all sufficient combinations of conditions. The paper argues that the index is especially informative in three situations that are all salient in international management and call for a context-sensitive analysis of single conditions, namely substantial limited diversity in the data, the emergence of strong INUS conditions in the analysis, and theorizing with contingency factors. The paper derives the properties of the relative Banzhaf index in QCA, demonstrates how the index can be computed easily from a rudimentary truth table, and explores its insights by revisiting selected papers in international management that apply fuzzy-set QCA. It finally suggests a three-step procedure for utilizing the relative Banzhaf index when the causal structure involves both contingency effects and configurational causation.\r\n","lang":"eng"}],"language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"year":"2024","title":"Playing games with QCA: Measuring the explanatory power of single conditions with the Banzhaf index","author":[{"id":"20801","first_name":"Claus-Jochen","last_name":"Haake","full_name":"Haake, Claus-Jochen"},{"id":"471","full_name":"Schneider, Martin","last_name":"Schneider","first_name":"Martin","orcid":"https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6961-3716"}],"publication_status":"published","date_updated":"2024-04-24T12:58:51Z","article_type":"original","intvolume":"        30"}]