---
_id: '15207'
abstract:
- lang: eng
  text: 'The purpose of the present study is to experimentally test a version of the
    classical Chain Store Game (CSG) paradox, proposed by Trockel (1986), and determine
    whether one of the two theories of Induction and Deterrence, which were originally
    tested competitively by Selten (1978), may better account for the results. With
    complete and perfect information, the CSG of Selten (1978) was designed to analyze
    the role of reputation in repeated market interactions. Its results were discussed
    in two different ways: one is based on backward induction, and the other is intuitively
    derived from a deterrence argument. As the two explanations are incompatible,
    alternative models have been proposed to understand them better. The alternative
    game proposed by Trockel is an imperfect information version of the CSG in which
    the order of the two players is changed in each round and the ’Out-Aggressive’
    equilibrium is used to build reputation. The existence of more than one equilibrium
    is the basis for the building of reputation. To the best of my knowledge, this
    study is the first attempt to experimentally test this alternative game with the
    same purpose.'
author:
- first_name: Papatya
  full_name: Duman, Papatya
  last_name: Duman
citation:
  ama: Duman P. <i>Does Informational Equivalence Preserve Strategic Behavior? An
    Experimental Study on Trockel’s Game</i>. Vol 117. CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn
    University; 2018.
  apa: Duman, P. (2018). <i>Does Informational Equivalence Preserve Strategic Behavior?
    An Experimental Study on Trockel’s Game</i> (Vol. 117). CIE Working Paper Series,
    Paderborn University.
  bibtex: '@book{Duman_2018, series={Working Papers CIE}, title={Does Informational
    Equivalence Preserve Strategic Behavior? An Experimental Study on Trockel’s Game},
    volume={117}, publisher={CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University}, author={Duman,
    Papatya}, year={2018}, collection={Working Papers CIE} }'
  chicago: Duman, Papatya. <i>Does Informational Equivalence Preserve Strategic Behavior?
    An Experimental Study on Trockel’s Game</i>. Vol. 117. Working Papers CIE. CIE
    Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2018.
  ieee: P. Duman, <i>Does Informational Equivalence Preserve Strategic Behavior? An
    Experimental Study on Trockel’s Game</i>, vol. 117. CIE Working Paper Series,
    Paderborn University, 2018.
  mla: Duman, Papatya. <i>Does Informational Equivalence Preserve Strategic Behavior?
    An Experimental Study on Trockel’s Game</i>. Vol. 117, CIE Working Paper Series,
    Paderborn University, 2018.
  short: P. Duman, Does Informational Equivalence Preserve Strategic Behavior? An
    Experimental Study on Trockel’s Game, CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University,
    2018.
date_created: 2019-11-28T10:06:11Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:52:18Z
ddc:
- '040'
department:
- _id: '205'
- _id: '475'
file:
- access_level: closed
  content_type: application/pdf
  creator: stela
  date_created: 2019-11-28T10:06:57Z
  date_updated: 2019-11-28T10:06:57Z
  file_id: '15208'
  file_name: WP - Does Informational Equivalence Preserve Strategic Behavior_ An Experimental
    Study on Trockel's Game.pdf
  file_size: 678790
  relation: main_file
  success: 1
file_date_updated: 2019-11-28T10:06:57Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: '       117'
keyword:
- Chain Store Game
- reputation building
- entry deterrence
- Trockel's game
language:
- iso: eng
project:
- _id: '1'
  name: SFB 901
- _id: '2'
  name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
- _id: '7'
  name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
publisher: CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University
series_title: Working Papers CIE
status: public
title: Does Informational Equivalence Preserve Strategic Behavior? An Experimental
  Study on Trockel's Game
type: working_paper
user_id: '65453'
volume: 117
year: '2018'
...