@article{58473,
  abstract     = {{Using a large unique longitudinal survey data set from Germany covering more than 5,000 households, we analyze stated intentions and actual implementations of both flood-proofing and heat stress reduction measures to assess the intention behavior gap (IBG) in climate change adaptation. Our results do not only reveal a substantial IBG for most stated intentions, but also show their limits in serving as a good predictor for realized actions later. Moreover, the IBG itself can hardly be explained by observable household data characteristics. While we do find some similarities in explanatory variables affecting both intentions and implementations, these variables provide only little insights into the actual levels of implemented actions. In line with regret theory, the IBG in our data can be partly explained by anticipated regret caused by a feeling of having invested in vain in cases where adaptation measures are installed, but extreme weather events do not occur for the time being. Our results are informative for adaptation-related communication campaigns and public policy interventions, especially in the aftermath of natural disasters.}},
  author       = {{Osberghaus, Daniel and Botzen, Wouter and Kesternich, Martin}},
  journal      = {{Ecological Economics }},
  keywords     = {{Intention-behavior gap, Adaptation, Climate Change, Flooding, Heat}},
  title        = {{{The intention-behavior gap in climate change adaptation: Evidence from longitudinal survey data}}},
  year         = {{2025}},
}

@article{47093,
  abstract     = {{We experimentally test a theoretically promising amendment to the ratchet-up mechanism of the Paris Agreement. The ratchet-up mechanism prescribes that parties’ commitments to the global response to climate change cannot decrease over time, and our results show that its effect is detrimental. We design a public goods game to study whether cooperation is promoted by an amendment to the mechanism that stipulates that all agents must contribute at least a collectively chosen minimum based on the principle of the lowest common denominator. We find that binding collective minimum contributions improve the effectiveness of the ratchet-up mechanism. Non-binding minimum contributions, by contrast, do not encourage cooperation. Our data indicate that the difference is attributable to conditional cooperative dynamics. If other participants contribute less than the collective minimum contribution, even initially cooperative participants start to negatively reciprocate this form of non-compliance by contributing less.}},
  author       = {{Alt, Marius and Kesternich, Martin and Gallier, Carlo and Sturm, Bodo}},
  issn         = {{1556-5068}},
  journal      = {{Journal of Environmental Economics and Management}},
  keywords     = {{global public goods, climate change, institutions, ratchet-up mechanism, minimum contributions, laboratory experiment}},
  title        = {{{Collective Minimum Contributions to Counteract the Ratchet Effect in the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods}}},
  doi          = {{10.2139/ssrn.4288327}},
  year         = {{2023}},
}