---
_id: '58473'
abstract:
- lang: eng
  text: Using a large unique longitudinal survey data set from Germany covering more
    than 5,000 households, we analyze stated intentions and actual implementations
    of both flood-proofing and heat stress reduction measures to assess the intention
    behavior gap (IBG) in climate change adaptation. Our results do not only reveal
    a substantial IBG for most stated intentions, but also show their limits in serving
    as a good predictor for realized actions later. Moreover, the IBG itself can hardly
    be explained by observable household data characteristics. While we do find some
    similarities in explanatory variables affecting both intentions and implementations,
    these variables provide only little insights into the actual levels of implemented
    actions. In line with regret theory, the IBG in our data can be partly explained
    by anticipated regret caused by a feeling of having invested in vain in cases
    where adaptation measures are installed, but extreme weather events do not occur
    for the time being. Our results are informative for adaptation-related communication
    campaigns and public policy interventions, especially in the aftermath of natural
    disasters.
article_type: original
author:
- first_name: Daniel
  full_name: Osberghaus, Daniel
  last_name: Osberghaus
- first_name: Wouter
  full_name: Botzen, Wouter
  last_name: Botzen
- first_name: Martin
  full_name: Kesternich, Martin
  id: '98922'
  last_name: Kesternich
  orcid: 0000-0002-0653-7680
citation:
  ama: 'Osberghaus D, Botzen W, Kesternich M. The intention-behavior gap in climate
    change adaptation: Evidence from longitudinal survey data. <i>Ecological Economics
    </i>. Published online 2025.'
  apa: 'Osberghaus, D., Botzen, W., &#38; Kesternich, M. (2025). The intention-behavior
    gap in climate change adaptation: Evidence from longitudinal survey data. <i>Ecological
    Economics </i>.'
  bibtex: '@article{Osberghaus_Botzen_Kesternich_2025, title={The intention-behavior
    gap in climate change adaptation: Evidence from longitudinal survey data}, journal={Ecological
    Economics }, author={Osberghaus, Daniel and Botzen, Wouter and Kesternich, Martin},
    year={2025} }'
  chicago: 'Osberghaus, Daniel, Wouter Botzen, and Martin Kesternich. “The Intention-Behavior
    Gap in Climate Change Adaptation: Evidence from Longitudinal Survey Data.” <i>Ecological
    Economics </i>, 2025.'
  ieee: 'D. Osberghaus, W. Botzen, and M. Kesternich, “The intention-behavior gap
    in climate change adaptation: Evidence from longitudinal survey data,” <i>Ecological
    Economics </i>, 2025.'
  mla: 'Osberghaus, Daniel, et al. “The Intention-Behavior Gap in Climate Change Adaptation:
    Evidence from Longitudinal Survey Data.” <i>Ecological Economics </i>, 2025.'
  short: D. Osberghaus, W. Botzen, M. Kesternich, Ecological Economics  (2025).
date_created: 2025-01-31T14:20:46Z
date_updated: 2025-02-03T12:04:07Z
keyword:
- Intention-behavior gap
- Adaptation
- Climate Change
- Flooding
- Heat
language:
- iso: eng
publication: 'Ecological Economics '
status: public
title: 'The intention-behavior gap in climate change adaptation: Evidence from longitudinal
  survey data'
type: journal_article
user_id: '98922'
year: '2025'
...
---
_id: '47093'
abstract:
- lang: eng
  text: We experimentally test a theoretically promising amendment to the ratchet-up
    mechanism of the Paris Agreement. The ratchet-up mechanism prescribes that parties’
    commitments to the global response to climate change cannot decrease over time,
    and our results show that its effect is detrimental. We design a public goods
    game to study whether cooperation is promoted by an amendment to the mechanism
    that stipulates that all agents must contribute at least a collectively chosen
    minimum based on the principle of the lowest common denominator. We find that
    binding collective minimum contributions improve the effectiveness of the ratchet-up
    mechanism. Non-binding minimum contributions, by contrast, do not encourage cooperation.
    Our data indicate that the difference is attributable to conditional cooperative
    dynamics. If other participants contribute less than the collective minimum contribution,
    even initially cooperative participants start to negatively reciprocate this form
    of non-compliance by contributing less.
author:
- first_name: Marius
  full_name: Alt, Marius
  last_name: Alt
- first_name: Martin
  full_name: Kesternich, Martin
  id: '98922'
  last_name: Kesternich
- first_name: Carlo
  full_name: Gallier, Carlo
  last_name: Gallier
- first_name: Bodo
  full_name: Sturm, Bodo
  last_name: Sturm
citation:
  ama: Alt M, Kesternich M, Gallier C, Sturm B. Collective Minimum Contributions to
    Counteract the Ratchet Effect in the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods. <i>Journal
    of Environmental Economics and Management</i>. Published online 2023. doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4288327">10.2139/ssrn.4288327</a>
  apa: Alt, M., Kesternich, M., Gallier, C., &#38; Sturm, B. (2023). Collective Minimum
    Contributions to Counteract the Ratchet Effect in the Voluntary Provision of Public
    Goods. <i>Journal of Environmental Economics and Management</i>. <a href="https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4288327">https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4288327</a>
  bibtex: '@article{Alt_Kesternich_Gallier_Sturm_2023, title={Collective Minimum Contributions
    to Counteract the Ratchet Effect in the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods},
    DOI={<a href="https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4288327">10.2139/ssrn.4288327</a>},
    journal={Journal of Environmental Economics and Management}, author={Alt, Marius
    and Kesternich, Martin and Gallier, Carlo and Sturm, Bodo}, year={2023} }'
  chicago: Alt, Marius, Martin Kesternich, Carlo Gallier, and Bodo Sturm. “Collective
    Minimum Contributions to Counteract the Ratchet Effect in the Voluntary Provision
    of Public Goods.” <i>Journal of Environmental Economics and Management</i>, 2023.
    <a href="https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4288327">https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4288327</a>.
  ieee: 'M. Alt, M. Kesternich, C. Gallier, and B. Sturm, “Collective Minimum Contributions
    to Counteract the Ratchet Effect in the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods,”
    <i>Journal of Environmental Economics and Management</i>, 2023, doi: <a href="https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4288327">10.2139/ssrn.4288327</a>.'
  mla: Alt, Marius, et al. “Collective Minimum Contributions to Counteract the Ratchet
    Effect in the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods.” <i>Journal of Environmental
    Economics and Management</i>, 2023, doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4288327">10.2139/ssrn.4288327</a>.
  short: M. Alt, M. Kesternich, C. Gallier, B. Sturm, Journal of Environmental Economics
    and Management (2023).
date_created: 2023-09-16T11:52:21Z
date_updated: 2023-12-04T12:27:27Z
department:
- _id: '791'
- _id: '681'
doi: 10.2139/ssrn.4288327
keyword:
- global public goods
- climate change
- institutions
- ratchet-up mechanism
- minimum contributions
- laboratory experiment
language:
- iso: eng
publication: Journal of Environmental Economics and Management
publication_identifier:
  issn:
  - 1556-5068
publication_status: published
status: public
title: Collective Minimum Contributions to Counteract the Ratchet Effect in the Voluntary
  Provision of Public Goods
type: journal_article
user_id: '46138'
year: '2023'
...