[{"status":"public","type":"journal_article","article_type":"original","funded_apc":"1","file_date_updated":"2024-10-08T11:53:39Z","project":[{"name":"SFB 901 - A3: SFB 901 - Der Markt für Services: Anreize, Algorithmen, Implementation (Teilprojekt A3)","_id":"7","grant_number":"160364472"},{"grant_number":"160364472","_id":"1","name":"SFB 901: SFB 901: On-The-Fly Computing - Individualisierte IT-Dienstleistungen in dynamischen Märkten "},{"name":"SFB 901 - A: SFB 901 - Projektbereich A: Algorithmische und ökonomische Grundlagen für die Organisation großer, dynamischer Märkte","_id":"2"}],"_id":"56420","user_id":"477","department":[{"_id":"200"}],"jel":["C78","D47"],"citation":{"apa":"Stroh-Maraun, N. (2024). Weighted school choice problems and the weighted top trading cycles mechanism. <i>Mathematical Social Sciences</i>, <i>132</i>, 49–56. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.09.001\">https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.09.001</a>","bibtex":"@article{Stroh-Maraun_2024, title={Weighted school choice problems and the weighted top trading cycles mechanism}, volume={132}, DOI={<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.09.001\">10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.09.001</a>}, journal={Mathematical Social Sciences}, publisher={Elsevier BV}, author={Stroh-Maraun, Nadja}, year={2024}, pages={49–56} }","mla":"Stroh-Maraun, Nadja. “Weighted School Choice Problems and the Weighted Top Trading Cycles Mechanism.” <i>Mathematical Social Sciences</i>, vol. 132, Elsevier BV, 2024, pp. 49–56, doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.09.001\">10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.09.001</a>.","short":"N. Stroh-Maraun, Mathematical Social Sciences 132 (2024) 49–56.","ama":"Stroh-Maraun N. Weighted school choice problems and the weighted top trading cycles mechanism. <i>Mathematical Social Sciences</i>. 2024;132:49-56. doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.09.001\">10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.09.001</a>","ieee":"N. Stroh-Maraun, “Weighted school choice problems and the weighted top trading cycles mechanism,” <i>Mathematical Social Sciences</i>, vol. 132, pp. 49–56, 2024, doi: <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.09.001\">10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.09.001</a>.","chicago":"Stroh-Maraun, Nadja. “Weighted School Choice Problems and the Weighted Top Trading Cycles Mechanism.” <i>Mathematical Social Sciences</i> 132 (2024): 49–56. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.09.001\">https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.09.001</a>."},"intvolume":"       132","page":"49-56","publication_status":"published","has_accepted_license":"1","publication_identifier":{"issn":["0165-4896"]},"main_file_link":[{"url":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165489624000817?via%3Dihub","open_access":"1"}],"doi":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.09.001","date_updated":"2025-02-28T11:33:48Z","oa":"1","author":[{"full_name":"Stroh-Maraun, Nadja","id":"13264","last_name":"Stroh-Maraun","first_name":"Nadja"}],"volume":132,"abstract":[{"lang":"eng","text":"There are a number of school choice problems in which students are heterogeneous according to the number of seats they occupy at the school they are assigned to. We propose a weighted school choice problem by assigning each student a so-called weight and formulate the weighted top trading cycles algorithm (WTTC) to find a matching. The WTTC is strategy-proof and results in a Pareto efficient matching. While the WTTC is a robust extension of the TTC when weights are introduced, it is no longer guaranteed that each student gets a seat at a school even if the overall capacity exceeds the sum of weights. Additionally, the WTTC introduces a trade-off between weights and priorities as a student with a higher weight has a disadvantage to be matched to a particular school compared to a student with the same schools’ priorities but a smaller weight."}],"file":[{"success":1,"relation":"main_file","content_type":"application/pdf","file_size":611017,"file_name":"1-s2.0-S0165489624000817-main.pdf","file_id":"56421","access_level":"closed","date_updated":"2024-10-08T11:53:39Z","date_created":"2024-10-08T11:53:39Z","creator":"nmaraun"}],"publication":"Mathematical Social Sciences","ddc":["330"],"keyword":["Matching","School choice","College admission problems","Top trading cycles","Pareto efficiency","Strategy-proofness"],"language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"year":"2024","title":"Weighted school choice problems and the weighted top trading cycles mechanism","publisher":"Elsevier BV","date_created":"2024-10-08T11:52:59Z"}]