---
_id: '44092'
abstract:
- lang: eng
  text: "We study how competition between physicians affects the provision of medical
    care. In\r\nour theoretical model, physicians are faced with a heterogeneous patient
    population, in which patients\r\nsystematically vary with regard to both their
    responsiveness to the provided quality of care and their\r\nstate of health. We
    test the behavioral predictions derived from this model in a controlled laboratory\r\nexperiment.
    In line with the model, we observe that competition significantly improves patient
    benefits\r\nas long as patients are able to respond to the quality provided. For
    those patients, who are not able\r\nto choose a physician, competition even decreases
    the patient benefit compared to a situation without\r\ncompetition. This decrease
    is in contrast to our theoretical prediction implying no change in benefits for\r\npassive
    patients. Deviations from patient-optimal treatment are highest for passive patients
    in need of\r\na low quantity of medical services. With repetition, both, the positive
    effects of competition for active\r\npatients as well as the negative effects
    of competition for passive patients become more pronounced. Our\r\nresults imply
    that competition can not only improve but also worsen patient outcome and that
    patients’\r\nresponsiveness to quality is decisive."
article_type: original
author:
- first_name: Jeannette
  full_name: Brosig-Koch, Jeannette
  last_name: Brosig-Koch
- first_name: Burkhard
  full_name: Hehenkamp, Burkhard
  id: '37339'
  last_name: Hehenkamp
- first_name: Johanna
  full_name: Kokot, Johanna
  last_name: Kokot
citation:
  ama: Brosig-Koch J, Hehenkamp B, Kokot J. Who benefits from quality competition
    in health care? A theory and a laboratory experiment on the relevance of patient
    characteristics. <i>Health Economics</i>. Published online 2023. doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.1002/hec.4689">10.1002/hec.4689</a>
  apa: Brosig-Koch, J., Hehenkamp, B., &#38; Kokot, J. (2023). Who benefits from quality
    competition in health care? A theory and a laboratory experiment on the relevance
    of patient characteristics. <i>Health Economics</i>. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1002/hec.4689">https://doi.org/10.1002/hec.4689</a>
  bibtex: '@article{Brosig-Koch_Hehenkamp_Kokot_2023, title={Who benefits from quality
    competition in health care? A theory and a laboratory experiment on the relevance
    of patient characteristics}, DOI={<a href="https://doi.org/10.1002/hec.4689">10.1002/hec.4689</a>},
    journal={Health Economics}, author={Brosig-Koch, Jeannette and Hehenkamp, Burkhard
    and Kokot, Johanna}, year={2023} }'
  chicago: Brosig-Koch, Jeannette, Burkhard Hehenkamp, and Johanna Kokot. “Who Benefits
    from Quality Competition in Health Care? A Theory and a Laboratory Experiment
    on the Relevance of Patient Characteristics.” <i>Health Economics</i>, 2023. <a
    href="https://doi.org/10.1002/hec.4689">https://doi.org/10.1002/hec.4689</a>.
  ieee: 'J. Brosig-Koch, B. Hehenkamp, and J. Kokot, “Who benefits from quality competition
    in health care? A theory and a laboratory experiment on the relevance of patient
    characteristics,” <i>Health Economics</i>, 2023, doi: <a href="https://doi.org/10.1002/hec.4689">10.1002/hec.4689</a>.'
  mla: Brosig-Koch, Jeannette, et al. “Who Benefits from Quality Competition in Health
    Care? A Theory and a Laboratory Experiment on the Relevance of Patient Characteristics.”
    <i>Health Economics</i>, 2023, doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.1002/hec.4689">10.1002/hec.4689</a>.
  short: J. Brosig-Koch, B. Hehenkamp, J. Kokot, Health Economics (2023).
date_created: 2023-04-20T17:02:41Z
date_updated: 2023-04-20T17:16:14Z
department:
- _id: '280'
- _id: '475'
doi: 10.1002/hec.4689
jel:
- I11
- D43
- C91
keyword:
- physician competition
- patient characteristics
- heterogeneity in quality responses
- fee-for-service
- laboratory experiment
language:
- iso: eng
project:
- _id: '1'
  name: 'SFB 901: SFB 901'
- _id: '2'
  name: 'SFB 901 - A: SFB 901 - Project Area A'
- _id: '7'
  name: 'SFB 901 - A3: SFB 901 - Subproject A3'
publication: Health Economics
quality_controlled: '1'
status: public
title: Who benefits from quality competition in health care? A theory and a laboratory
  experiment on the relevance of patient characteristics
type: journal_article
user_id: '37339'
year: '2023'
...
---
_id: '44093'
abstract:
- lang: eng
  text: We consider a model where for-profit providers compete in quality in a price-regulated
    market that has been opened to competition, and where the incumbent is located
    at the center of the market, facing high costs of relocation. The model is relevant
    in markets such as public health care, education and schooling, or postal services.
    We find that, when the regulated price is low or intermediate, the entrant strategically
    locates towards the corner of the market to keep the incumbent at the low monopoly
    quality level. For a high price, the entrant locates at the corner of the market
    and both providers implement higher quality compared to a monopoly. In any case,
    the entrant implements higher quality than the incumbent provider. Social welfare
    is always higher in a duopoly if the cost of quality is low. For higher cost levels
    welfare is non-monotonic in the price and it can be optimal to the regulator not
    to use its entire budget. Therefore, the welfare effect of entry depends on the
    price and the size of the entry cost, and the regulator should condition the decision
    to allow entry on an assessment of the entry cost.
author:
- first_name: Burkhard
  full_name: Hehenkamp, Burkhard
  id: '37339'
  last_name: Hehenkamp
- first_name: Oddvar M.
  full_name: Kaarbøe, Oddvar M.
  last_name: Kaarbøe
citation:
  ama: Hehenkamp B, Kaarbøe OM. <i>Price Regulation, Quality Competition and Location
    Choice with Costly Relocation</i>.
  apa: Hehenkamp, B., &#38; Kaarbøe, O. M. (n.d.). <i>Price Regulation, Quality Competition
    and Location Choice with Costly Relocation</i>.
  bibtex: '@book{Hehenkamp_Kaarbøe, title={Price Regulation, Quality Competition and
    Location Choice with Costly Relocation}, author={Hehenkamp, Burkhard and Kaarbøe,
    Oddvar M.} }'
  chicago: Hehenkamp, Burkhard, and Oddvar M. Kaarbøe. <i>Price Regulation, Quality
    Competition and Location Choice with Costly Relocation</i>, n.d.
  ieee: B. Hehenkamp and O. M. Kaarbøe, <i>Price Regulation, Quality Competition and
    Location Choice with Costly Relocation</i>. .
  mla: Hehenkamp, Burkhard, and Oddvar M. Kaarbøe. <i>Price Regulation, Quality Competition
    and Location Choice with Costly Relocation</i>.
  short: B. Hehenkamp, O.M. Kaarbøe, Price Regulation, Quality Competition and Location
    Choice with Costly Relocation, n.d.
date_created: 2023-04-20T17:12:18Z
date_updated: 2023-04-20T17:16:24Z
department:
- _id: '280'
- _id: '475'
jel:
- D43
- L13
- L51
keyword:
- Quality competition
- Price regulation
- Location choice
- Product differentiation
language:
- iso: eng
project:
- _id: '1'
  name: 'SFB 901: SFB 901'
- _id: '2'
  name: 'SFB 901 - A: SFB 901 - Project Area A'
- _id: '7'
  name: 'SFB 901 - A3: SFB 901 - Subproject A3'
publication_status: submitted
status: public
title: Price Regulation, Quality Competition and Location Choice with Costly Relocation
type: report
user_id: '37339'
year: '2023'
...
---
_id: '5101'
abstract:
- lang: eng
  text: Prior literature finds that International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS)
    adopters enjoy lower financing costs subsequent to IFRS adoption. We predict and
    find that mandatory IFRS adopters exploit lower financing costs to increase market
    share vis-à-vis non-adopters. This effect is robust across several different model
    specifications in a sample capturing the universe of public and private firms
    in the EU, in a matched sample of public and private firms, and in a public firm
    sample comparing mandatory and voluntary IFRS adopters. We further find that IFRS
    is associated with an increase (decrease) in industry sales concentration (competition),
    consistent with large public firms increasing market share. In supplemental analyses,
    we find that mandatory adopters issue more equity and debt after IFRS adoption
    and that larger market share gains accrue to those mandatory IFRS adopters that
    issue more equity and debt after IFRS adoption. Overall, we provide evidence of
    unintended product market consequences of IFRS adoption.
author:
- first_name: Jimmy F
  full_name: Downes, Jimmy F
  last_name: Downes
- first_name: Vanessa
  full_name: Flagmeier, Vanessa
  id: '8084'
  last_name: Flagmeier
- first_name: David
  full_name: Godsell, David
  last_name: Godsell
citation:
  ama: Downes JF, Flagmeier V, Godsell D. Product market effects of IFRS adoption.
    <i>Journal of Accounting and Public Policy</i>. 2018;37(5):376-401. doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2018.09.004">10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2018.09.004</a>
  apa: Downes, J. F., Flagmeier, V., &#38; Godsell, D. (2018). Product market effects
    of IFRS adoption. <i>Journal of Accounting and Public Policy</i>, <i>37</i>(5),
    376–401. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2018.09.004">https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2018.09.004</a>
  bibtex: '@article{Downes_Flagmeier_Godsell_2018, title={Product market effects of
    IFRS adoption}, volume={37}, DOI={<a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2018.09.004">10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2018.09.004</a>},
    number={5}, journal={Journal of Accounting and Public Policy}, publisher={Elsevier},
    author={Downes, Jimmy F and Flagmeier, Vanessa and Godsell, David}, year={2018},
    pages={376–401} }'
  chicago: 'Downes, Jimmy F, Vanessa Flagmeier, and David Godsell. “Product Market
    Effects of IFRS Adoption.” <i>Journal of Accounting and Public Policy</i> 37,
    no. 5 (2018): 376–401. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2018.09.004">https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2018.09.004</a>.'
  ieee: J. F. Downes, V. Flagmeier, and D. Godsell, “Product market effects of IFRS
    adoption,” <i>Journal of Accounting and Public Policy</i>, vol. 37, no. 5, pp.
    376–401, 2018.
  mla: Downes, Jimmy F., et al. “Product Market Effects of IFRS Adoption.” <i>Journal
    of Accounting and Public Policy</i>, vol. 37, no. 5, Elsevier, 2018, pp. 376–401,
    doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2018.09.004">10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2018.09.004</a>.
  short: J.F. Downes, V. Flagmeier, D. Godsell, Journal of Accounting and Public Policy
    37 (2018) 376–401.
date_created: 2018-10-31T06:59:36Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:01:38Z
department:
- _id: '551'
- _id: '189'
doi: 10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2018.09.004
intvolume: '        37'
issue: '5'
jel:
- D43
- G32
- G38
keyword:
- Financial reporting regulationProduct market competition
language:
- iso: eng
page: 376-401
publication: Journal of Accounting and Public Policy
publication_status: published
publisher: Elsevier
status: public
title: Product market effects of IFRS adoption
type: journal_article
user_id: '64756'
volume: 37
year: '2018'
...
---
_id: '17654'
author:
- first_name: Gleb
  full_name: Polevoy, Gleb
  id: '83983'
  last_name: Polevoy
- first_name: M.M.
  full_name: de Weerdt, M.M.
  last_name: de Weerdt
citation:
  ama: 'Polevoy G, de Weerdt MM. Competition between Cooperative Projects. In: <i>Proceedings
    of the 29th Benelux Conference on Artificial Intelligence</i>. CCIS. Springer;
    2017.'
  apa: Polevoy, G., &#38; de Weerdt, M. M. (2017). Competition between Cooperative
    Projects. In <i>Proceedings of the 29th Benelux Conference on Artificial Intelligence</i>.
    Springer.
  bibtex: '@inproceedings{Polevoy_de Weerdt_2017, series={CCIS}, title={Competition
    between Cooperative Projects}, booktitle={Proceedings of the 29th Benelux Conference
    on Artificial Intelligence}, publisher={Springer}, author={Polevoy, Gleb and de
    Weerdt, M.M.}, year={2017}, collection={CCIS} }'
  chicago: Polevoy, Gleb, and M.M. de Weerdt. “Competition between Cooperative Projects.”
    In <i>Proceedings of the 29th Benelux Conference on Artificial Intelligence</i>.
    CCIS. Springer, 2017.
  ieee: G. Polevoy and M. M. de Weerdt, “Competition between Cooperative Projects,”
    in <i>Proceedings of the 29th Benelux Conference on Artificial Intelligence</i>,
    2017.
  mla: Polevoy, Gleb, and M. M. de Weerdt. “Competition between Cooperative Projects.”
    <i>Proceedings of the 29th Benelux Conference on Artificial Intelligence</i>,
    Springer, 2017.
  short: 'G. Polevoy, M.M. de Weerdt, in: Proceedings of the 29th Benelux Conference
    on Artificial Intelligence, Springer, 2017.'
date_created: 2020-08-06T15:20:19Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:53:16Z
department:
- _id: '63'
- _id: '541'
extern: '1'
keyword:
- agents
- projects
- contribute
- shared effort game
- competition
- quota
- threshold
- Nash equilibrium
- social welfare
- efficiency
- price of anarchy
- price of stability
language:
- iso: eng
publication: Proceedings of the 29th Benelux Conference on Artificial Intelligence
publisher: Springer
series_title: CCIS
status: public
title: Competition between Cooperative Projects
type: conference
user_id: '83983'
year: '2017'
...
---
_id: '2570'
abstract:
- lang: eng
  text: On an intermediate goods market we consider vertical and horizontal product
    differentiation and analyze the impact of simultaneous competition for resources
    and the demand of customers on the market outcome. Asymmetries between intermediaries
    may arise due to distinct product qualities as well as by reasons of different
    production technologies. The intermediaries compete on the output market by choosing
    production quantities sequentially and for the supplies of a monopolistic input
    supplier on the input market. It turns out that there exist differences in product
    quality and productivities such that an intermediary being the Stackelberg leader
    has no incentive to procure inputs, whereas in the role of the Stackelberg follower
    will participate in the market. Moreover, we find that given an intermediary is
    more competitive, his equilibrium output quantity is higher when being the leader
    than when being the follower. Interestingly, if the intermediary is less competitive
    and goods are complements, there may exist asymmetries such that an intermediary
    being in the position of the Stackelberg follower offers higher output quantities
    in equilibrium than when being in the position of the Stackelberg leader.
author:
- first_name: Jochen
  full_name: Manegold, Jochen
  last_name: Manegold
citation:
  ama: Manegold J. <i>Stackelberg Competition among Intermediaries in a Differentiated
    Duopoly with Product Innovation</i>. Vol 98. CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn
    University; 2016.
  apa: Manegold, J. (2016). <i>Stackelberg Competition among Intermediaries in a Differentiated
    Duopoly with Product Innovation</i> (Vol. 98). CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn
    University.
  bibtex: '@book{Manegold_2016, series={Working Papers CIE}, title={Stackelberg Competition
    among Intermediaries in a Differentiated Duopoly with Product Innovation}, volume={98},
    publisher={CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University}, author={Manegold,
    Jochen}, year={2016}, collection={Working Papers CIE} }'
  chicago: Manegold, Jochen. <i>Stackelberg Competition among Intermediaries in a
    Differentiated Duopoly with Product Innovation</i>. Vol. 98. Working Papers CIE.
    CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2016.
  ieee: J. Manegold, <i>Stackelberg Competition among Intermediaries in a Differentiated
    Duopoly with Product Innovation</i>, vol. 98. CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn
    University, 2016.
  mla: Manegold, Jochen. <i>Stackelberg Competition among Intermediaries in a Differentiated
    Duopoly with Product Innovation</i>. Vol. 98, CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn
    University, 2016.
  short: J. Manegold, Stackelberg Competition among Intermediaries in a Differentiated
    Duopoly with Product Innovation, CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University,
    2016.
date_created: 2018-05-03T08:06:05Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:57:11Z
ddc:
- '040'
department:
- _id: '205'
- _id: '475'
file:
- access_level: closed
  content_type: application/pdf
  creator: stela
  date_created: 2018-10-31T09:16:36Z
  date_updated: 2018-10-31T09:16:36Z
  file_id: '5145'
  file_name: WP - Stackelberg Competition among Intermediaries in a Differentiated
    Duopoly with Product Innovation.pdf
  file_size: 776029
  relation: main_file
  success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-10-31T09:16:36Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: '        98'
keyword:
- Input Market
- Product Quality
- Quantity Competition
- Stackelberg Competition
- Product Innovation
language:
- iso: eng
project:
- _id: '1'
  name: SFB 901
- _id: '2'
  name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
- _id: '7'
  name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
publisher: CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University
series_title: Working Papers CIE
status: public
title: Stackelberg Competition among Intermediaries in a Differentiated Duopoly with
  Product Innovation
type: working_paper
user_id: '65453'
volume: 98
year: '2016'
...
---
_id: '17659'
author:
- first_name: Gleb
  full_name: Polevoy, Gleb
  id: '83983'
  last_name: Polevoy
- first_name: Stojan
  full_name: Trajanovski, Stojan
  last_name: Trajanovski
- first_name: Mathijs M.
  full_name: de Weerdt, Mathijs M.
  last_name: de Weerdt
citation:
  ama: 'Polevoy G, Trajanovski S, de Weerdt MM. Nash Equilibria in Shared Effort Games.
    In: <i>Proceedings of the 2014 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and
    Multi-Agent Systems</i>. AAMAS ’14. Richland, SC: International Foundation for
    Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems; 2014:861-868.'
  apa: 'Polevoy, G., Trajanovski, S., &#38; de Weerdt, M. M. (2014). Nash Equilibria
    in Shared Effort Games. In <i>Proceedings of the 2014 International Conference
    on Autonomous Agents and Multi-agent Systems</i> (pp. 861–868). Richland, SC:
    International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems.'
  bibtex: '@inproceedings{Polevoy_Trajanovski_de Weerdt_2014, place={Richland, SC},
    series={AAMAS ’14}, title={Nash Equilibria in Shared Effort Games}, booktitle={Proceedings
    of the 2014 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-agent Systems},
    publisher={International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems},
    author={Polevoy, Gleb and Trajanovski, Stojan and de Weerdt, Mathijs M.}, year={2014},
    pages={861–868}, collection={AAMAS ’14} }'
  chicago: 'Polevoy, Gleb, Stojan Trajanovski, and Mathijs M. de Weerdt. “Nash Equilibria
    in Shared Effort Games.” In <i>Proceedings of the 2014 International Conference
    on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems</i>, 861–68. AAMAS ’14. Richland,
    SC: International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2014.'
  ieee: G. Polevoy, S. Trajanovski, and M. M. de Weerdt, “Nash Equilibria in Shared
    Effort Games,” in <i>Proceedings of the 2014 International Conference on Autonomous
    Agents and Multi-agent Systems</i>, 2014, pp. 861–868.
  mla: Polevoy, Gleb, et al. “Nash Equilibria in Shared Effort Games.” <i>Proceedings
    of the 2014 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems</i>,
    International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2014, pp.
    861–68.
  short: 'G. Polevoy, S. Trajanovski, M.M. de Weerdt, in: Proceedings of the 2014
    International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems, International
    Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, Richland, SC, 2014, pp.
    861–868.'
date_created: 2020-08-06T15:21:26Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:53:16Z
department:
- _id: '63'
- _id: '541'
extern: '1'
keyword:
- competition
- equilibrium
- market
- models
- shared effort games
- simulation
language:
- iso: eng
page: 861-868
place: Richland, SC
publication: Proceedings of the 2014 International Conference on Autonomous Agents
  and Multi-agent Systems
publication_identifier:
  isbn:
  - 978-1-4503-2738-1
publisher: International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems
series_title: AAMAS '14
status: public
title: Nash Equilibria in Shared Effort Games
type: conference
user_id: '83983'
year: '2014'
...
---
_id: '17662'
author:
- first_name: Gleb
  full_name: Polevoy, Gleb
  id: '83983'
  last_name: Polevoy
- first_name: Rann
  full_name: Smorodinsky, Rann
  last_name: Smorodinsky
- first_name: Moshe
  full_name: Tennenholtz, Moshe
  last_name: Tennenholtz
citation:
  ama: Polevoy G, Smorodinsky R, Tennenholtz M. Signaling Competition and Social Welfare.
    <i>ACM Trans Econ Comput</i>. 2014;2(1):1:1-1:16. doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.1145/2560766">10.1145/2560766</a>
  apa: Polevoy, G., Smorodinsky, R., &#38; Tennenholtz, M. (2014). Signaling Competition
    and Social Welfare. <i>ACM Trans. Econ. Comput.</i>, <i>2</i>(1), 1:1-1:16. <a
    href="https://doi.org/10.1145/2560766">https://doi.org/10.1145/2560766</a>
  bibtex: '@article{Polevoy_Smorodinsky_Tennenholtz_2014, title={Signaling Competition
    and Social Welfare}, volume={2}, DOI={<a href="https://doi.org/10.1145/2560766">10.1145/2560766</a>},
    number={1}, journal={ACM Trans. Econ. Comput.}, publisher={ACM}, author={Polevoy,
    Gleb and Smorodinsky, Rann and Tennenholtz, Moshe}, year={2014}, pages={1:1-1:16}
    }'
  chicago: 'Polevoy, Gleb, Rann Smorodinsky, and Moshe Tennenholtz. “Signaling Competition
    and Social Welfare.” <i>ACM Trans. Econ. Comput.</i> 2, no. 1 (2014): 1:1-1:16.
    <a href="https://doi.org/10.1145/2560766">https://doi.org/10.1145/2560766</a>.'
  ieee: G. Polevoy, R. Smorodinsky, and M. Tennenholtz, “Signaling Competition and
    Social Welfare,” <i>ACM Trans. Econ. Comput.</i>, vol. 2, no. 1, pp. 1:1-1:16,
    2014.
  mla: Polevoy, Gleb, et al. “Signaling Competition and Social Welfare.” <i>ACM Trans.
    Econ. Comput.</i>, vol. 2, no. 1, ACM, 2014, pp. 1:1-1:16, doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.1145/2560766">10.1145/2560766</a>.
  short: G. Polevoy, R. Smorodinsky, M. Tennenholtz, ACM Trans. Econ. Comput. 2 (2014)
    1:1-1:16.
date_created: 2020-08-06T15:21:55Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:53:16Z
department:
- _id: '63'
- _id: '541'
doi: 10.1145/2560766
extern: '1'
intvolume: '         2'
issue: '1'
keyword:
- Competition
- efficiency
- equilibrium
- market
- social welfare
language:
- iso: eng
page: 1:1-1:16
publication: ACM Trans. Econ. Comput.
publication_identifier:
  issn:
  - 2167-8375
publisher: ACM
status: public
title: Signaling Competition and Social Welfare
type: journal_article
user_id: '83983'
volume: 2
year: '2014'
...
---
_id: '36021'
abstract:
- lang: eng
  text: 'Using a sample of stock-listed bank holding companies located in Western
    Europe over the period from 1997 to 2008 this paper provides empirical evidence
    that an increase in short-term interest rates as well as an extended period of
    expansionary monetary policy has a negative impact on European stock-listed banks’
    soundness as measured by the Expected Default Frequency. Against this background
    and in order to evaluate interactions between the risk-taking channel of monetary
    policy and the competitiveness of a country’s banking market we find a negative
    impact of an increase in competition in the loan market – proxied by the Boone-indicator
    – on financial soundness. Referring to the structural-conduct performance (SCP)
    paradigm, this paper provides further evidence that an increase in concentration
    in the banking market spurs financial soundness. '
author:
- first_name: Tobias C.
  full_name: Michalak, Tobias C.
  last_name: Michalak
- first_name: André
  full_name: Uhde, André
  id: '36049'
  last_name: Uhde
citation:
  ama: Michalak TC, Uhde A. <i>The Nexus between Monetary Policy, Banking Market Structure
    and Bank Risk Taking</i>. Paderborn University; 2011.
  apa: Michalak, T. C., &#38; Uhde, A. (2011). <i>The Nexus between Monetary Policy,
    Banking Market Structure and Bank Risk Taking</i>. Paderborn University.
  bibtex: '@book{Michalak_Uhde_2011, title={The Nexus between Monetary Policy, Banking
    Market Structure and Bank Risk Taking}, publisher={Paderborn University}, author={Michalak,
    Tobias C. and Uhde, André}, year={2011} }'
  chicago: Michalak, Tobias C., and André Uhde. <i>The Nexus between Monetary Policy,
    Banking Market Structure and Bank Risk Taking</i>. Paderborn University, 2011.
  ieee: T. C. Michalak and A. Uhde, <i>The Nexus between Monetary Policy, Banking
    Market Structure and Bank Risk Taking</i>. Paderborn University, 2011.
  mla: Michalak, Tobias C., and André Uhde. <i>The Nexus between Monetary Policy,
    Banking Market Structure and Bank Risk Taking</i>. Paderborn University, 2011.
  short: T.C. Michalak, A. Uhde, The Nexus between Monetary Policy, Banking Market
    Structure and Bank Risk Taking, Paderborn University, 2011.
date_created: 2023-01-11T11:04:30Z
date_updated: 2024-04-17T13:35:15Z
department:
- _id: '186'
- _id: '188'
jel:
- E43
- E44
- E52
- G01
- G28
keyword:
- risk-taking channel
- competition
- concentration
- bank soundness
- European banking
language:
- iso: eng
publication_status: published
publisher: Paderborn University
status: public
title: The Nexus between Monetary Policy, Banking Market Structure and Bank Risk Taking
type: working_paper
user_id: '21810'
year: '2011'
...