@techreport{59518,
  abstract     = {{The two-step norm elicitation procedure describes a commonly used tool for measuring normative
expectations in an incentivized way. This study tests some of its design features to determine whether
elicited beliefs and related behaviours vary depending on i) the time of elicitation (before vs after the
decision), ii) incentivizing vs not incentivizing a question about normative expectations, and iii)
questioning subjects on their beliefs about the action of interest alone or combined with an alternative
action. An online experiment is conducted via Prolific comprising a dictator game and the elicitation of
fairness beliefs. A pretest reveals that applying role uncertainty does not alter beliefs and behaviours
compared to a baseline treatment without it. Subsequently, three treatments are implemented. Contrary
to previous studies, results indicate that varying the time of elicitation does not significantly alter the
money-share decision. However, incentivizing the question about normative expectations significantly
increases the fit with the actual majority norm. Finally, asking about a fair share and an unfair share
instead of only about fair sharing does not alter personal normative beliefs or normative expectations,
but it increases the empirical expectations that other dictators have provided a fair share.}},
  author       = {{Plaß, Sabrina}},
  keywords     = {{Social Norms, Normative Expectations, Elicitation, Economic Experiment}},
  title        = {{{Variations in the Two-Step Norm Elicitation Procedure}}},
  year         = {{2025}},
}

@techreport{59520,
  abstract     = {{Normative expectations – beliefs about what others perceive as appropriate – have been shown to influence behavioural choices across various domains. We examine this concept in the context of whistleblowing, where potential whistleblowers face two competing norms: promoting fairness by reporting wrongdoing versus maintaining loyalty to peers by staying silent. We investigate how normative expectations about these two mutually exclusive actions affect reporting decisions. Specifically, we test whether providing information on the majority beliefs about either the appropriateness of whistleblowing, or of staying silent, or about both behaviours together, differentially affects the whistleblowing decision. Using an incentivized experiment with UK employees on Prolific, our study yields four key findings: First, employees are more likely to report misconduct when they believe that the majority considers whistleblowing to be appropriate. Second, they are less likely to blow the whistle when they believe staying silent is deemed appropriate. Third, this effect prevails for a particularly important subgroup: among employees who believe that the majority supports whistleblowing, the reporting probability increases substantially when they simultaneously expect that staying silent is deemed inappropriate. Fourth, providing information about both normative dimensions combined or only about the inappropriateness of staying silent significantly increases whistleblowing compared to the (no information) baseline and to information about whistleblowing appropriateness alone. These findings demonstrate the importance of normative expectations about both behavioural options for accurately predicting whistleblowing behaviour, and that social information interventions are most effective when they target behaviours where appropriateness beliefs about conflicting options are dispersed. }},
  author       = {{Mir Djawadi, Behnud and Plaß, Sabrina and Loer, Sabrina}},
  keywords     = {{Whistleblowing, Normative Expectations, Social Information Intervention, Social Norms, Economic Experiment}},
  title        = {{{Multiple Normative Expectations and Interventions -Experimental Evidence on Whistleblowing Behaviour}}},
  year         = {{2024}},
}