[{"_id":"29763","project":[{"name":"SFB 901: SFB 901","_id":"1"},{"name":"SFB 901 - C: SFB 901 - Project Area C","_id":"4"},{"name":"SFB 901 - C1: SFB 901 - Subproject C1","_id":"13"}],"department":[{"_id":"558"}],"user_id":"36113","file_date_updated":"2022-02-07T13:26:05Z","type":"dissertation","status":"public","date_updated":"2022-02-07T13:32:28Z","oa":"1","author":[{"first_name":"David","last_name":"Niehues","id":"36113","full_name":"Niehues, David"}],"supervisor":[{"first_name":"Tibor","last_name":"Jager","id":"64669","full_name":"Jager, Tibor"},{"first_name":"Anja","last_name":"Lehmann","full_name":"Lehmann, Anja"}],"doi":"10.25926/rdtq-jw45","main_file_link":[{"url":"https://elpub.bib.uni-wuppertal.de/servlets/DerivateServlet/Derivate-14686/de2107.pdf","open_access":"1"}],"has_accepted_license":"1","publication_status":"published","citation":{"short":"D. Niehues, More Efficient Techniques for Adaptively-Secure Cryptography, 2022.","bibtex":"@book{Niehues_2022, title={More Efficient Techniques for Adaptively-Secure Cryptography}, DOI={<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.25926/rdtq-jw45\">10.25926/rdtq-jw45</a>}, author={Niehues, David}, year={2022} }","mla":"Niehues, David. <i>More Efficient Techniques for Adaptively-Secure Cryptography</i>. 2022, doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.25926/rdtq-jw45\">10.25926/rdtq-jw45</a>.","apa":"Niehues, D. (2022). <i>More Efficient Techniques for Adaptively-Secure Cryptography</i>. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.25926/rdtq-jw45\">https://doi.org/10.25926/rdtq-jw45</a>","chicago":"Niehues, David. <i>More Efficient Techniques for Adaptively-Secure Cryptography</i>, 2022. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.25926/rdtq-jw45\">https://doi.org/10.25926/rdtq-jw45</a>.","ieee":"D. Niehues, <i>More Efficient Techniques for Adaptively-Secure Cryptography</i>. 2022.","ama":"Niehues D. <i>More Efficient Techniques for Adaptively-Secure Cryptography</i>.; 2022. doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.25926/rdtq-jw45\">10.25926/rdtq-jw45</a>"},"keyword":["public-key cryptography","lattices","pairings","verifiable random functions","identity-based encryption"],"ddc":["000"],"language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"abstract":[{"lang":"eng","text":"Modern-day communication has become more and more digital. While this comes with many advantages such as a more efficient economy, it has also created more and more opportunities for various adversaries to manipulate communication or eavesdrop on it. The Snowden revelations in 2013 further highlighted the seriousness of these threats. To protect the communication of people, companies, and states from such threats, we require cryptography with strong security guarantees.\r\nDifferent applications may require different security properties from cryptographic schemes. For most applications, however, so-called adaptive security is considered a reasonable minimal requirement of security. Cryptographic schemes with adaptive security remain secure in the presence of an adversary that can corrupt communication partners to respond to messages of the adversaries choice, while the adversary may choose the messages based on previously observed interactions.\r\nWhile cryptography is associated the most with encryption, this is only one of many primitives that are essential for the security of digital interactions. This thesis presents novel identity-based encryption (IBE) schemes and verifiable random functions (VRFs) that achieve adaptive security as outlined above. Moreover, the cryptographic schemes presented in this thesis are proven secure in the standard model. That is without making use of idealized models like the random oracle model."}],"file":[{"date_created":"2022-02-07T13:26:05Z","creator":"davnie","date_updated":"2022-02-07T13:26:05Z","file_id":"29764","file_name":"de2107.pdf","access_level":"closed","file_size":1542089,"content_type":"application/pdf","relation":"main_file","success":1}],"date_created":"2022-02-07T13:29:07Z","title":"More Efficient Techniques for Adaptively-Secure Cryptography","year":"2022"},{"status":"public","publication":"IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering","type":"journal_article","keyword":["Java","Encryption","Static analysis","Tools","Ciphers","Semantics","cryptography","domain-specific language","static analysis"],"language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"_id":"20533","department":[{"_id":"76"}],"user_id":"5786","year":"2019","page":"1-1","citation":{"apa":"Krüger, S., Späth, J., Ali, K., Bodden, E., &#38; Mezini, M. (2019). CrySL: An Extensible Approach to Validating the Correct Usage of Cryptographic APIs. <i>IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering</i>, 1–1. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1109/TSE.2019.2948910\">https://doi.org/10.1109/TSE.2019.2948910</a>","short":"S. Krüger, J. Späth, K. Ali, E. Bodden, M. Mezini, IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering (2019) 1–1.","mla":"Krüger, Stefan, et al. “CrySL: An Extensible Approach to Validating the Correct Usage of Cryptographic APIs.” <i>IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering</i>, 2019, pp. 1–1, doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1109/TSE.2019.2948910\">10.1109/TSE.2019.2948910</a>.","bibtex":"@article{Krüger_Späth_Ali_Bodden_Mezini_2019, title={CrySL: An Extensible Approach to Validating the Correct Usage of Cryptographic APIs}, DOI={<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1109/TSE.2019.2948910\">10.1109/TSE.2019.2948910</a>}, journal={IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering}, author={Krüger, Stefan and Späth, Johannes and Ali, Karim and Bodden, Eric and Mezini, Mira}, year={2019}, pages={1–1} }","ama":"Krüger S, Späth J, Ali K, Bodden E, Mezini M. CrySL: An Extensible Approach to Validating the Correct Usage of Cryptographic APIs. <i>IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering</i>. Published online 2019:1-1. doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1109/TSE.2019.2948910\">10.1109/TSE.2019.2948910</a>","chicago":"Krüger, Stefan, Johannes Späth, Karim Ali, Eric Bodden, and Mira Mezini. “CrySL: An Extensible Approach to Validating the Correct Usage of Cryptographic APIs.” <i>IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering</i>, 2019, 1–1. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1109/TSE.2019.2948910\">https://doi.org/10.1109/TSE.2019.2948910</a>.","ieee":"S. Krüger, J. Späth, K. Ali, E. Bodden, and M. Mezini, “CrySL: An Extensible Approach to Validating the Correct Usage of Cryptographic APIs,” <i>IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering</i>, pp. 1–1, 2019, doi: <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1109/TSE.2019.2948910\">10.1109/TSE.2019.2948910</a>."},"publication_identifier":{"issn":["2326-3881"]},"title":"CrySL: An Extensible Approach to Validating the Correct Usage of Cryptographic APIs","doi":"10.1109/TSE.2019.2948910","main_file_link":[{"url":"http://www.bodden.de/pubs/tse19CrySL.pdf"}],"date_updated":"2022-01-06T06:54:29Z","date_created":"2020-11-27T10:48:38Z","author":[{"full_name":"Krüger, Stefan","last_name":"Krüger","first_name":"Stefan"},{"first_name":"Johannes","last_name":"Späth","full_name":"Späth, Johannes"},{"first_name":"Karim","full_name":"Ali, Karim","last_name":"Ali"},{"first_name":"Eric","last_name":"Bodden","orcid":"0000-0003-3470-3647","full_name":"Bodden, Eric","id":"59256"},{"last_name":"Mezini","full_name":"Mezini, Mira","first_name":"Mira"}]},{"doi":"10.1109/lcn.2016.11","title":"Confidentiality and Authenticity for Distributed Version Control Systems - A Mercurial Extension","date_created":"2017-07-25T14:36:16Z","author":[{"orcid":"0000-0002-5708-7632","last_name":"Lass","full_name":"Lass, Michael","id":"24135","first_name":"Michael"},{"last_name":"Leibenger","full_name":"Leibenger, Dominik","first_name":"Dominik"},{"full_name":"Sorge, Christoph","last_name":"Sorge","first_name":"Christoph"}],"publisher":"IEEE","date_updated":"2022-01-06T06:53:56Z","citation":{"ama":"Lass M, Leibenger D, Sorge C. Confidentiality and Authenticity for Distributed Version Control Systems - A Mercurial Extension. In: <i>Proc. 41st Conference on Local Computer Networks (LCN)</i>. IEEE; 2016. doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1109/lcn.2016.11\">10.1109/lcn.2016.11</a>","ieee":"M. Lass, D. Leibenger, and C. Sorge, “Confidentiality and Authenticity for Distributed Version Control Systems - A Mercurial Extension,” in <i>Proc. 41st Conference on Local Computer Networks (LCN)</i>, 2016.","chicago":"Lass, Michael, Dominik Leibenger, and Christoph Sorge. “Confidentiality and Authenticity for Distributed Version Control Systems - A Mercurial Extension.” In <i>Proc. 41st Conference on Local Computer Networks (LCN)</i>. IEEE, 2016. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1109/lcn.2016.11\">https://doi.org/10.1109/lcn.2016.11</a>.","apa":"Lass, M., Leibenger, D., &#38; Sorge, C. (2016). Confidentiality and Authenticity for Distributed Version Control Systems - A Mercurial Extension. In <i>Proc. 41st Conference on Local Computer Networks (LCN)</i>. IEEE. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1109/lcn.2016.11\">https://doi.org/10.1109/lcn.2016.11</a>","bibtex":"@inproceedings{Lass_Leibenger_Sorge_2016, title={Confidentiality and Authenticity for Distributed Version Control Systems - A Mercurial Extension}, DOI={<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1109/lcn.2016.11\">10.1109/lcn.2016.11</a>}, booktitle={Proc. 41st Conference on Local Computer Networks (LCN)}, publisher={IEEE}, author={Lass, Michael and Leibenger, Dominik and Sorge, Christoph}, year={2016} }","mla":"Lass, Michael, et al. “Confidentiality and Authenticity for Distributed Version Control Systems - A Mercurial Extension.” <i>Proc. 41st Conference on Local Computer Networks (LCN)</i>, IEEE, 2016, doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1109/lcn.2016.11\">10.1109/lcn.2016.11</a>.","short":"M. Lass, D. Leibenger, C. Sorge, in: Proc. 41st Conference on Local Computer Networks (LCN), IEEE, 2016."},"year":"2016","publication_identifier":{"isbn":["978-1-5090-2054-6"]},"publication_status":"published","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"keyword":["access control","distributed version control systems","mercurial","peer-to-peer","convergent encryption","confidentiality","authenticity"],"department":[{"_id":"27"},{"_id":"518"}],"user_id":"24135","_id":"19","status":"public","abstract":[{"text":"Version Control Systems (VCS) are a valuable tool for software development\r\nand document management. Both client/server and distributed (Peer-to-Peer)\r\nmodels exist, with the latter (e.g., Git and Mercurial) becoming\r\nincreasingly popular. Their distributed nature introduces complications,\r\nespecially concerning security: it is hard to control the dissemination of\r\ncontents stored in distributed VCS as they rely on replication of complete\r\nrepositories to any involved user.\r\n\r\nWe overcome this issue by designing and implementing a concept for\r\ncryptography-enforced access control which is transparent to the user. Use\r\nof field-tested schemes (end-to-end encryption, digital signatures) allows\r\nfor strong security, while adoption of convergent encryption and\r\ncontent-defined chunking retains storage efficiency. The concept is\r\nseamlessly integrated into Mercurial---respecting its distributed storage\r\nconcept---to ensure practical usability and compatibility to existing\r\ndeployments.","lang":"eng"}],"publication":"Proc. 41st Conference on Local Computer Networks (LCN)","type":"conference"}]