---
_id: '29763'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: "Modern-day communication has become more and more digital. While this comes
with many advantages such as a more efficient economy, it has also created more
and more opportunities for various adversaries to manipulate communication or
eavesdrop on it. The Snowden revelations in 2013 further highlighted the seriousness
of these threats. To protect the communication of people, companies, and states
from such threats, we require cryptography with strong security guarantees.\r\nDifferent
applications may require different security properties from cryptographic schemes.
For most applications, however, so-called adaptive security is considered a reasonable
minimal requirement of security. Cryptographic schemes with adaptive security
remain secure in the presence of an adversary that can corrupt communication partners
to respond to messages of the adversaries choice, while the adversary may choose
the messages based on previously observed interactions.\r\nWhile cryptography
is associated the most with encryption, this is only one of many primitives that
are essential for the security of digital interactions. This thesis presents novel
identity-based encryption (IBE) schemes and verifiable random functions (VRFs)
that achieve adaptive security as outlined above. Moreover, the cryptographic
schemes presented in this thesis are proven secure in the standard model. That
is without making use of idealized models like the random oracle model."
author:
- first_name: David
full_name: Niehues, David
id: '36113'
last_name: Niehues
citation:
ama: Niehues D. More Efficient Techniques for Adaptively-Secure Cryptography.;
2022. doi:10.25926/rdtq-jw45
apa: Niehues, D. (2022). More Efficient Techniques for Adaptively-Secure Cryptography.
https://doi.org/10.25926/rdtq-jw45
bibtex: '@book{Niehues_2022, title={More Efficient Techniques for Adaptively-Secure
Cryptography}, DOI={10.25926/rdtq-jw45},
author={Niehues, David}, year={2022} }'
chicago: Niehues, David. More Efficient Techniques for Adaptively-Secure Cryptography,
2022. https://doi.org/10.25926/rdtq-jw45.
ieee: D. Niehues, More Efficient Techniques for Adaptively-Secure Cryptography.
2022.
mla: Niehues, David. More Efficient Techniques for Adaptively-Secure Cryptography.
2022, doi:10.25926/rdtq-jw45.
short: D. Niehues, More Efficient Techniques for Adaptively-Secure Cryptography,
2022.
date_created: 2022-02-07T13:29:07Z
date_updated: 2022-02-07T13:32:28Z
ddc:
- '000'
department:
- _id: '558'
doi: 10.25926/rdtq-jw45
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: davnie
date_created: 2022-02-07T13:26:05Z
date_updated: 2022-02-07T13:26:05Z
file_id: '29764'
file_name: de2107.pdf
file_size: 1542089
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2022-02-07T13:26:05Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
keyword:
- public-key cryptography
- lattices
- pairings
- verifiable random functions
- identity-based encryption
language:
- iso: eng
main_file_link:
- open_access: '1'
url: https://elpub.bib.uni-wuppertal.de/servlets/DerivateServlet/Derivate-14686/de2107.pdf
oa: '1'
project:
- _id: '1'
name: 'SFB 901: SFB 901'
- _id: '4'
name: 'SFB 901 - C: SFB 901 - Project Area C'
- _id: '13'
name: 'SFB 901 - C1: SFB 901 - Subproject C1'
publication_status: published
status: public
supervisor:
- first_name: Tibor
full_name: Jager, Tibor
id: '64669'
last_name: Jager
- first_name: Anja
full_name: Lehmann, Anja
last_name: Lehmann
title: More Efficient Techniques for Adaptively-Secure Cryptography
type: dissertation
user_id: '36113'
year: '2022'
...
---
_id: '20533'
author:
- first_name: Stefan
full_name: Krüger, Stefan
last_name: Krüger
- first_name: Johannes
full_name: Späth, Johannes
last_name: Späth
- first_name: Karim
full_name: Ali, Karim
last_name: Ali
- first_name: Eric
full_name: Bodden, Eric
id: '59256'
last_name: Bodden
orcid: 0000-0003-3470-3647
- first_name: Mira
full_name: Mezini, Mira
last_name: Mezini
citation:
ama: 'Krüger S, Späth J, Ali K, Bodden E, Mezini M. CrySL: An Extensible Approach
to Validating the Correct Usage of Cryptographic APIs. IEEE Transactions on
Software Engineering. Published online 2019:1-1. doi:10.1109/TSE.2019.2948910'
apa: 'Krüger, S., Späth, J., Ali, K., Bodden, E., & Mezini, M. (2019). CrySL:
An Extensible Approach to Validating the Correct Usage of Cryptographic APIs.
IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering, 1–1. https://doi.org/10.1109/TSE.2019.2948910'
bibtex: '@article{Krüger_Späth_Ali_Bodden_Mezini_2019, title={CrySL: An Extensible
Approach to Validating the Correct Usage of Cryptographic APIs}, DOI={10.1109/TSE.2019.2948910},
journal={IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering}, author={Krüger, Stefan and
Späth, Johannes and Ali, Karim and Bodden, Eric and Mezini, Mira}, year={2019},
pages={1–1} }'
chicago: 'Krüger, Stefan, Johannes Späth, Karim Ali, Eric Bodden, and Mira Mezini.
“CrySL: An Extensible Approach to Validating the Correct Usage of Cryptographic
APIs.” IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering, 2019, 1–1. https://doi.org/10.1109/TSE.2019.2948910.'
ieee: 'S. Krüger, J. Späth, K. Ali, E. Bodden, and M. Mezini, “CrySL: An Extensible
Approach to Validating the Correct Usage of Cryptographic APIs,” IEEE Transactions
on Software Engineering, pp. 1–1, 2019, doi: 10.1109/TSE.2019.2948910.'
mla: 'Krüger, Stefan, et al. “CrySL: An Extensible Approach to Validating the Correct
Usage of Cryptographic APIs.” IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering,
2019, pp. 1–1, doi:10.1109/TSE.2019.2948910.'
short: S. Krüger, J. Späth, K. Ali, E. Bodden, M. Mezini, IEEE Transactions on Software
Engineering (2019) 1–1.
date_created: 2020-11-27T10:48:38Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:54:29Z
department:
- _id: '76'
doi: 10.1109/TSE.2019.2948910
keyword:
- Java
- Encryption
- Static analysis
- Tools
- Ciphers
- Semantics
- cryptography
- domain-specific language
- static analysis
language:
- iso: eng
main_file_link:
- url: http://www.bodden.de/pubs/tse19CrySL.pdf
page: 1-1
publication: IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering
publication_identifier:
issn:
- 2326-3881
status: public
title: 'CrySL: An Extensible Approach to Validating the Correct Usage of Cryptographic
APIs'
type: journal_article
user_id: '5786'
year: '2019'
...
---
_id: '19'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: "Version Control Systems (VCS) are a valuable tool for software development\r\nand
document management. Both client/server and distributed (Peer-to-Peer)\r\nmodels
exist, with the latter (e.g., Git and Mercurial) becoming\r\nincreasingly popular.
Their distributed nature introduces complications,\r\nespecially concerning security:
it is hard to control the dissemination of\r\ncontents stored in distributed VCS
as they rely on replication of complete\r\nrepositories to any involved user.\r\n\r\nWe
overcome this issue by designing and implementing a concept for\r\ncryptography-enforced
access control which is transparent to the user. Use\r\nof field-tested schemes
(end-to-end encryption, digital signatures) allows\r\nfor strong security, while
adoption of convergent encryption and\r\ncontent-defined chunking retains storage
efficiency. The concept is\r\nseamlessly integrated into Mercurial---respecting
its distributed storage\r\nconcept---to ensure practical usability and compatibility
to existing\r\ndeployments."
author:
- first_name: Michael
full_name: Lass, Michael
id: '24135'
last_name: Lass
orcid: 0000-0002-5708-7632
- first_name: Dominik
full_name: Leibenger, Dominik
last_name: Leibenger
- first_name: Christoph
full_name: Sorge, Christoph
last_name: Sorge
citation:
ama: 'Lass M, Leibenger D, Sorge C. Confidentiality and Authenticity for Distributed
Version Control Systems - A Mercurial Extension. In: Proc. 41st Conference
on Local Computer Networks (LCN). IEEE; 2016. doi:10.1109/lcn.2016.11'
apa: Lass, M., Leibenger, D., & Sorge, C. (2016). Confidentiality and Authenticity
for Distributed Version Control Systems - A Mercurial Extension. In Proc. 41st
Conference on Local Computer Networks (LCN). IEEE. https://doi.org/10.1109/lcn.2016.11
bibtex: '@inproceedings{Lass_Leibenger_Sorge_2016, title={Confidentiality and Authenticity
for Distributed Version Control Systems - A Mercurial Extension}, DOI={10.1109/lcn.2016.11},
booktitle={Proc. 41st Conference on Local Computer Networks (LCN)}, publisher={IEEE},
author={Lass, Michael and Leibenger, Dominik and Sorge, Christoph}, year={2016}
}'
chicago: Lass, Michael, Dominik Leibenger, and Christoph Sorge. “Confidentiality
and Authenticity for Distributed Version Control Systems - A Mercurial Extension.”
In Proc. 41st Conference on Local Computer Networks (LCN). IEEE, 2016.
https://doi.org/10.1109/lcn.2016.11.
ieee: M. Lass, D. Leibenger, and C. Sorge, “Confidentiality and Authenticity for
Distributed Version Control Systems - A Mercurial Extension,” in Proc. 41st
Conference on Local Computer Networks (LCN), 2016.
mla: Lass, Michael, et al. “Confidentiality and Authenticity for Distributed Version
Control Systems - A Mercurial Extension.” Proc. 41st Conference on Local Computer
Networks (LCN), IEEE, 2016, doi:10.1109/lcn.2016.11.
short: 'M. Lass, D. Leibenger, C. Sorge, in: Proc. 41st Conference on Local Computer
Networks (LCN), IEEE, 2016.'
date_created: 2017-07-25T14:36:16Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:53:56Z
department:
- _id: '27'
- _id: '518'
doi: 10.1109/lcn.2016.11
keyword:
- access control
- distributed version control systems
- mercurial
- peer-to-peer
- convergent encryption
- confidentiality
- authenticity
language:
- iso: eng
publication: Proc. 41st Conference on Local Computer Networks (LCN)
publication_identifier:
isbn:
- 978-1-5090-2054-6
publication_status: published
publisher: IEEE
status: public
title: Confidentiality and Authenticity for Distributed Version Control Systems -
A Mercurial Extension
type: conference
user_id: '24135'
year: '2016'
...