@article{30917,
  abstract     = {{We study lobby group formation in a two-stage model where the players rst form lobby
groups that then engage in a rent-seeking contest to inuence the legislator. However, the
outcome of the contest aects all players according to the ideological distance between the
implemented policy and the players' preferences. The players can either lobby by themselves,
form a coalition of lobbyists or free ride. We nd that free coalition formation is reasonable
if either players with moderate preferences face lobby groups with extreme preferences, or if
there are two opposing coalitions with an equal number of members. Otherwise, there are
always free riders among the players.}},
  author       = {{Block, Lukas}},
  journal      = {{Quick And Easy Journal Title}},
  keywords     = {{Group formation, Rent-seeking, Free riding}},
  title        = {{{Coalition formation versus free riding in rent-seeking contests}}},
  year         = {{2022}},
}