---
_id: '5146'
abstract:
- lang: eng
  text: In this paper, we analyze a model in which two divisions negotiate over an
    intrafirm transfer price for an intermediate product. Formally, we consider bargaining
    problems under incomplete information, since the upstream division’s (seller's)
    costs and downstream division's (buyer's) revenues are supposed to be private
    information. Assuming two possible types for buyer and seller each, we first establish
    that the bargaining problem is regular, regardless whether incentive and/or efficiency
    constraints are imposed. This allows us to apply the generalized Nash bargaining
    solution to determine transfer payments and transfer probabilities. Furthermore,
    we derive general properties of this solution for the transfer pricing problem
    and compare the model developed here with the existing literature for negotiated
    transfer pricing under incomplete information. In particular, we focus on the
    models presented in Wagenhofer (1994).
author:
- first_name: Sonja
  full_name: Brangewitz, Sonja
  last_name: Brangewitz
- first_name: Claus-Jochen
  full_name: Haake, Claus-Jochen
  id: '20801'
  last_name: Haake
citation:
  ama: Brangewitz S, Haake C-J. <i>Cooperative Transfer Price Negotiations under Incomplete
    Information</i>. Vol 64. CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University; 2013.
  apa: Brangewitz, S., &#38; Haake, C.-J. (2013). <i>Cooperative Transfer Price Negotiations
    under Incomplete Information</i> (Vol. 64). CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn
    University.
  bibtex: '@book{Brangewitz_Haake_2013, series={Working Papers CIE}, title={Cooperative
    Transfer Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information}, volume={64}, publisher={CIE
    Working Paper Series, Paderborn University}, author={Brangewitz, Sonja and Haake,
    Claus-Jochen}, year={2013}, collection={Working Papers CIE} }'
  chicago: Brangewitz, Sonja, and Claus-Jochen Haake. <i>Cooperative Transfer Price
    Negotiations under Incomplete Information</i>. Vol. 64. Working Papers CIE. CIE
    Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2013.
  ieee: S. Brangewitz and C.-J. Haake, <i>Cooperative Transfer Price Negotiations
    under Incomplete Information</i>, vol. 64. CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn
    University, 2013.
  mla: Brangewitz, Sonja, and Claus-Jochen Haake. <i>Cooperative Transfer Price Negotiations
    under Incomplete Information</i>. Vol. 64, CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn
    University, 2013.
  short: S. Brangewitz, C.-J. Haake, Cooperative Transfer Price Negotiations under
    Incomplete Information, CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2013.
date_created: 2018-10-31T09:20:15Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:01:39Z
ddc:
- '040'
department:
- _id: '205'
- _id: '475'
file:
- access_level: closed
  content_type: application/pdf
  creator: stela
  date_created: 2018-10-31T09:22:19Z
  date_updated: 2018-10-31T09:22:19Z
  file_id: '5148'
  file_name: WP - Cooperative Transfer Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information.pdf
  file_size: 430826
  relation: main_file
  success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-10-31T09:22:19Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: '        64'
keyword:
- Transfer Pricing
- Negotiation
- Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution
- Incomplete Information
language:
- iso: eng
project:
- _id: '1'
  name: SFB 901
- _id: '2'
  name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
- _id: '7'
  name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
publisher: CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University
series_title: Working Papers CIE
status: public
title: Cooperative Transfer Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information
type: working_paper
user_id: '477'
volume: 64
year: '2013'
...