---
_id: '15202'
abstract:
- lang: eng
  text: In this paper, we analyze the two-dimensional Nash bargaining solution (NBS)
    deploying a standard labor market negotiations model (see McDonald and Solow,
    1981; Creedy and McDonald, 1991). We show that the two-dimensional bargaining
    problem can be decomposed into two one-dimensional problems such that the (Cartesian)
    product of the solutions of these problems replicates the solution of the two-dimensional
    problem, if the NBS is applied. However, this decomposition fails for any solution
    concept that does not satisfy the axiom of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives
    (IIA axiom). Our decomposition result has significant implications for actual
    negotiations, as it allows for the decomposition of a multi-issue bargaining problem
    into a set of simpler problems, in particular a set of single-issue bargaining
    problems. In this way, the decomposition may help facilitate negotiations in labor
    markets and also in other environments.
author:
- first_name: Claus-Jochen
  full_name: Haake, Claus-Jochen
  id: '20801'
  last_name: Haake
- first_name: Thorsten
  full_name: Upmann, Thorsten
  last_name: Upmann
- first_name: Papatya
  full_name: Duman, Papatya
  id: '72752'
  last_name: Duman
citation:
  ama: Haake C-J, Upmann T, Duman P. <i>The Decomposability of the Nash Bargaining
    Solution in Labor Markets</i>. Vol 128. CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University;
    2019.
  apa: Haake, C.-J., Upmann, T., &#38; Duman, P. (2019). <i>The Decomposability of
    the Nash Bargaining Solution in Labor Markets</i> (Vol. 128). CIE Working Paper
    Series, Paderborn University.
  bibtex: '@book{Haake_Upmann_Duman_2019, series={Working Papers CIE}, title={The
    Decomposability of the Nash Bargaining Solution in Labor Markets}, volume={128},
    publisher={CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University}, author={Haake, Claus-Jochen
    and Upmann, Thorsten and Duman, Papatya}, year={2019}, collection={Working Papers
    CIE} }'
  chicago: Haake, Claus-Jochen, Thorsten Upmann, and Papatya Duman. <i>The Decomposability
    of the Nash Bargaining Solution in Labor Markets</i>. Vol. 128. Working Papers
    CIE. CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2019.
  ieee: C.-J. Haake, T. Upmann, and P. Duman, <i>The Decomposability of the Nash Bargaining
    Solution in Labor Markets</i>, vol. 128. CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University,
    2019.
  mla: Haake, Claus-Jochen, et al. <i>The Decomposability of the Nash Bargaining Solution
    in Labor Markets</i>. Vol. 128, CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University,
    2019.
  short: C.-J. Haake, T. Upmann, P. Duman, The Decomposability of the Nash Bargaining
    Solution in Labor Markets, CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2019.
date_created: 2019-11-28T09:49:08Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:52:16Z
ddc:
- '040'
department:
- _id: '205'
- _id: '475'
file:
- access_level: closed
  content_type: application/pdf
  creator: stela
  date_created: 2019-11-28T09:50:10Z
  date_updated: 2019-11-28T09:50:10Z
  file_id: '15203'
  file_name: WP - The Decomposability of the Nash Bargaining Solution in Labor Markets.pdf
  file_size: 1068284
  relation: main_file
  success: 1
file_date_updated: 2019-11-28T09:50:10Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: '       128'
keyword:
- Labor market negotiations
- Efficient bargains
- Nash bargaining solution
- Sequential bargaining
- Restricted bargaining games
language:
- iso: eng
project:
- _id: '1'
  name: SFB 901
- _id: '7'
  name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
- _id: '2'
  name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
publisher: CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University
series_title: Working Papers CIE
status: public
title: The Decomposability of the Nash Bargaining Solution in Labor Markets
type: working_paper
user_id: '477'
volume: 128
year: '2019'
...