@techreport{32106,
  abstract     = {{We study the consequences of modeling asymmetric bargaining power in two-person bargaining problems. Comparing application of an asymmetric version of a bargaining solution to an upfront modification of the disagreement point, the resulting distortion crucially depends on the bargaining solution concept. While for the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution weaker players benefit from modifying the disagreement point, the situation is reversed for the Nash bargaining solution. There, weaker players are better off in the asymmetric bargaining solution. When comparing application of the asymmetric versions of the Nash and the Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions, we demonstrate that there is an upper bound for the weight of a player, so that she is better off with the Nash bargaining solution. This threshold is ultimately determined by the relative utilitarian bargaining solution. From a mechanism design perspective, our results provide valuable information for a social planner, when implementing a bargaining solution for unequally powerful players.}},
  author       = {{Haake, Claus-Jochen and Streck, Thomas}},
  keywords     = {{Asymmetric bargaining power, Nash bargaining solution, Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution}},
  pages        = {{17}},
  title        = {{{Distortion through modeling asymmetric bargaining power}}},
  volume       = {{148}},
  year         = {{2022}},
}

@article{30940,
  abstract     = {{We analyse the two-dimensional Nash bargaining solution (NBS) by deploying
the standard labour market negotiations model of McDonald and Solow (1981).
We show that the two-dimensional bargaining problem can be decomposed into two
one-dimensional problems, such that the two solutions together replicate the solution
of the two-dimensional problem if the NBS is applied.  The axiom of
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives is shown to be crucial for this type
of decomposability.  This result has significant implications for actual
negotiations because it allows for the decomposition of a multi-dimensional bargaining
problem into one-dimensional problems---and thus helps to facilitate real-world
negotiations.}},
  author       = {{Haake, Claus-Jochen and Upmann, Thorsten and Duman, Papatya}},
  issn         = {{0347-0520}},
  journal      = {{Scandinavian Journal of Economics}},
  keywords     = {{Labour market negotiations, efficient bargains, Nash bargaining solution, sequential bargaining, restricted bargaining games}},
  number       = {{2}},
  pages        = {{403--440}},
  publisher    = {{Wiley}},
  title        = {{{Wage Bargaining and Employment Revisited: Separability and Efficiency in Collective Bargaining}}},
  doi          = {{https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12518}},
  volume       = {{125}},
  year         = {{2022}},
}

@techreport{15202,
  abstract     = {{In this paper, we analyze the two-dimensional Nash bargaining solution (NBS) deploying a standard labor market negotiations model (see McDonald and Solow, 1981; Creedy and McDonald, 1991). We show that the two-dimensional bargaining problem can be decomposed into two one-dimensional problems such that the (Cartesian) product of the solutions of these problems replicates the solution of the two-dimensional problem, if the NBS is applied. However, this decomposition fails for any solution concept that does not satisfy the axiom of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA axiom). Our decomposition result has significant implications for actual negotiations, as it allows for the decomposition of a multi-issue bargaining problem into a set of simpler problems, in particular a set of single-issue bargaining problems. In this way, the decomposition may help facilitate negotiations in labor markets and also in other environments.}},
  author       = {{Haake, Claus-Jochen and Upmann, Thorsten and Duman, Papatya}},
  keywords     = {{Labor market negotiations, Efficient bargains, Nash bargaining solution, Sequential bargaining, Restricted bargaining games}},
  publisher    = {{CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University}},
  title        = {{{The Decomposability of the Nash Bargaining Solution in Labor Markets}}},
  volume       = {{128}},
  year         = {{2019}},
}

@techreport{5146,
  abstract     = {{In this paper, we analyze a model in which two divisions negotiate over an intrafirm transfer price for an intermediate product. Formally, we consider bargaining problems under incomplete information, since the upstream division’s (seller's) costs and downstream division's (buyer's) revenues are supposed to be private information. Assuming two possible types for buyer and seller each, we first establish that the bargaining problem is regular, regardless whether incentive and/or efficiency constraints are imposed. This allows us to apply the generalized Nash bargaining solution to determine transfer payments and transfer probabilities. Furthermore, we derive general properties of this solution for the transfer pricing problem and compare the model developed here with the existing literature for negotiated transfer pricing under incomplete information. In particular, we focus on the models presented in Wagenhofer (1994).}},
  author       = {{Brangewitz, Sonja and Haake, Claus-Jochen}},
  keywords     = {{Transfer Pricing, Negotiation, Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution, Incomplete Information}},
  publisher    = {{CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University}},
  title        = {{{Cooperative Transfer Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information}}},
  volume       = {{64}},
  year         = {{2013}},
}