[{"citation":{"apa":"Haake, C.-J., &#38; Streck, T. (2022). <i>Distortion through modeling asymmetric bargaining power</i> (Vol. 148).","ieee":"C.-J. Haake and T. Streck, <i>Distortion through modeling asymmetric bargaining power</i>, vol. 148. 2022.","short":"C.-J. Haake, T. Streck, Distortion through Modeling Asymmetric Bargaining Power, 2022.","chicago":"Haake, Claus-Jochen, and Thomas Streck. <i>Distortion through Modeling Asymmetric Bargaining Power</i>. Vol. 148. CIE Working Paper Series, 2022.","mla":"Haake, Claus-Jochen, and Thomas Streck. <i>Distortion through Modeling Asymmetric Bargaining Power</i>. 2022.","ama":"Haake C-J, Streck T. <i>Distortion through Modeling Asymmetric Bargaining Power</i>. Vol 148.; 2022.","bibtex":"@book{Haake_Streck_2022, series={CIE Working Paper Series}, title={Distortion through modeling asymmetric bargaining power}, volume={148}, author={Haake, Claus-Jochen and Streck, Thomas}, year={2022}, collection={CIE Working Paper Series} }"},"abstract":[{"lang":"eng","text":"We study the consequences of modeling asymmetric bargaining power in two-person bargaining problems. Comparing application of an asymmetric version of a bargaining solution to an upfront modification of the disagreement point, the resulting distortion crucially depends on the bargaining solution concept. While for the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution weaker players benefit from modifying the disagreement point, the situation is reversed for the Nash bargaining solution. There, weaker players are better off in the asymmetric bargaining solution. When comparing application of the asymmetric versions of the Nash and the Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions, we demonstrate that there is an upper bound for the weight of a player, so that she is better off with the Nash bargaining solution. This threshold is ultimately determined by the relative utilitarian bargaining solution. From a mechanism design perspective, our results provide valuable information for a social planner, when implementing a bargaining solution for unequally powerful players."}],"project":[{"name":"SFB 901 - A: SFB 901 - Project Area A","_id":"2"},{"_id":"7","name":"SFB 901 - A3: SFB 901 - Subproject A3"},{"name":"SFB 901: SFB 901","_id":"1"}],"date_created":"2022-06-22T12:12:58Z","keyword":["Asymmetric bargaining power","Nash bargaining solution","Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution"],"type":"working_paper","department":[{"_id":"205"},{"_id":"475"},{"_id":"200"}],"status":"public","title":"Distortion through modeling asymmetric bargaining power","year":"2022","jel":["C78","D63"],"author":[{"id":"20801","full_name":"Haake, Claus-Jochen","first_name":"Claus-Jochen","last_name":"Haake"},{"id":"33041","last_name":"Streck","first_name":"Thomas","full_name":"Streck, Thomas"}],"date_updated":"2022-11-19T15:42:15Z","intvolume":"       148","page":"17","series_title":"CIE Working Paper Series","_id":"32106","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"user_id":"20801","volume":148},{"abstract":[{"text":"We analyse the two-dimensional Nash bargaining solution (NBS) by deploying\r\nthe standard labour market negotiations model of McDonald and Solow (1981).\r\nWe show that the two-dimensional bargaining problem can be decomposed into two\r\none-dimensional problems, such that the two solutions together replicate the solution\r\nof the two-dimensional problem if the NBS is applied.  The axiom of\r\nIndependence of Irrelevant Alternatives is shown to be crucial for this type\r\nof decomposability.  This result has significant implications for actual\r\nnegotiations because it allows for the decomposition of a multi-dimensional bargaining\r\nproblem into one-dimensional problems---and thus helps to facilitate real-world\r\nnegotiations.","lang":"eng"}],"issue":"2","publication":"Scandinavian Journal of Economics","type":"journal_article","keyword":["Labour market negotiations","efficient bargains","Nash bargaining solution","sequential bargaining","restricted bargaining games"],"department":[{"_id":"205"},{"_id":"475"}],"date_created":"2022-04-22T14:10:44Z","date_updated":"2023-06-08T16:42:31Z","publication_status":"published","intvolume":"       125","article_type":"original","year":"2022","title":"Wage Bargaining and Employment Revisited: Separability and Efficiency in Collective Bargaining","publication_identifier":{"eissn":["0347-0520"]},"author":[{"full_name":"Haake, Claus-Jochen","first_name":"Claus-Jochen","last_name":"Haake","id":"20801"},{"last_name":"Upmann","first_name":"Thorsten","full_name":"Upmann, Thorsten"},{"full_name":"Duman, Papatya","last_name":"Duman","first_name":"Papatya","id":"72752"}],"doi":"https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12518","main_file_link":[{"url":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/sjoe.12518"}],"language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"quality_controlled":"1","project":[{"name":"SFB 901 - A3: SFB 901 - Subproject A3","_id":"7","grant_number":"160364472"},{"_id":"2","name":"SFB 901 - A: SFB 901 - Project Area A"},{"name":"SFB 901: SFB 901","_id":"1","grant_number":"160364472"}],"citation":{"bibtex":"@article{Haake_Upmann_Duman_2022, title={Wage Bargaining and Employment Revisited: Separability and Efficiency in Collective Bargaining}, volume={125}, DOI={<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12518\">https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12518</a>}, number={2}, journal={Scandinavian Journal of Economics}, publisher={Wiley}, author={Haake, Claus-Jochen and Upmann, Thorsten and Duman, Papatya}, year={2022}, pages={403–440} }","ama":"Haake C-J, Upmann T, Duman P. Wage Bargaining and Employment Revisited: Separability and Efficiency in Collective Bargaining. <i>Scandinavian Journal of Economics</i>. 2022;125(2):403-440. doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12518\">https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12518</a>","mla":"Haake, Claus-Jochen, et al. “Wage Bargaining and Employment Revisited: Separability and Efficiency in Collective Bargaining.” <i>Scandinavian Journal of Economics</i>, vol. 125, no. 2, Wiley, 2022, pp. 403–40, doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12518\">https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12518</a>.","short":"C.-J. Haake, T. Upmann, P. Duman, Scandinavian Journal of Economics 125 (2022) 403–440.","chicago":"Haake, Claus-Jochen, Thorsten Upmann, and Papatya Duman. “Wage Bargaining and Employment Revisited: Separability and Efficiency in Collective Bargaining.” <i>Scandinavian Journal of Economics</i> 125, no. 2 (2022): 403–40. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12518\">https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12518</a>.","ieee":"C.-J. Haake, T. Upmann, and P. Duman, “Wage Bargaining and Employment Revisited: Separability and Efficiency in Collective Bargaining,” <i>Scandinavian Journal of Economics</i>, vol. 125, no. 2, pp. 403–440, 2022, doi: <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12518\">https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12518</a>.","apa":"Haake, C.-J., Upmann, T., &#38; Duman, P. (2022). Wage Bargaining and Employment Revisited: Separability and Efficiency in Collective Bargaining. <i>Scandinavian Journal of Economics</i>, <i>125</i>(2), 403–440. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12518\">https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12518</a>"},"has_accepted_license":"1","status":"public","jel":["J52","J41","C78"],"ddc":["330"],"user_id":"20801","volume":125,"page":"403-440","_id":"30940","publisher":"Wiley","funded_apc":"1"},{"_id":"15202","publisher":"CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University","ddc":["040"],"user_id":"477","volume":128,"status":"public","has_accepted_license":"1","file_date_updated":"2019-11-28T09:50:10Z","citation":{"bibtex":"@book{Haake_Upmann_Duman_2019, series={Working Papers CIE}, title={The Decomposability of the Nash Bargaining Solution in Labor Markets}, volume={128}, publisher={CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University}, author={Haake, Claus-Jochen and Upmann, Thorsten and Duman, Papatya}, year={2019}, collection={Working Papers CIE} }","ama":"Haake C-J, Upmann T, Duman P. <i>The Decomposability of the Nash Bargaining Solution in Labor Markets</i>. Vol 128. CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University; 2019.","mla":"Haake, Claus-Jochen, et al. <i>The Decomposability of the Nash Bargaining Solution in Labor Markets</i>. Vol. 128, CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2019.","chicago":"Haake, Claus-Jochen, Thorsten Upmann, and Papatya Duman. <i>The Decomposability of the Nash Bargaining Solution in Labor Markets</i>. Vol. 128. Working Papers CIE. CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2019.","short":"C.-J. Haake, T. Upmann, P. Duman, The Decomposability of the Nash Bargaining Solution in Labor Markets, CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2019.","ieee":"C.-J. Haake, T. Upmann, and P. Duman, <i>The Decomposability of the Nash Bargaining Solution in Labor Markets</i>, vol. 128. CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2019.","apa":"Haake, C.-J., Upmann, T., &#38; Duman, P. (2019). <i>The Decomposability of the Nash Bargaining Solution in Labor Markets</i> (Vol. 128). CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University."},"project":[{"name":"SFB 901","_id":"1"},{"name":"SFB 901 - Subproject A3","_id":"7"},{"_id":"2","name":"SFB 901 - Project Area A"}],"series_title":"Working Papers CIE","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"title":"The Decomposability of the Nash Bargaining Solution in Labor Markets","year":"2019","author":[{"last_name":"Haake","first_name":"Claus-Jochen","full_name":"Haake, Claus-Jochen","id":"20801"},{"full_name":"Upmann, Thorsten","last_name":"Upmann","first_name":"Thorsten"},{"id":"72752","full_name":"Duman, Papatya","first_name":"Papatya","last_name":"Duman"}],"date_updated":"2022-01-06T06:52:16Z","intvolume":"       128","file":[{"date_created":"2019-11-28T09:50:10Z","creator":"stela","content_type":"application/pdf","success":1,"file_id":"15203","access_level":"closed","file_size":1068284,"file_name":"WP - The Decomposability of the Nash Bargaining Solution in Labor Markets.pdf","date_updated":"2019-11-28T09:50:10Z","relation":"main_file"}],"date_created":"2019-11-28T09:49:08Z","type":"working_paper","keyword":["Labor market negotiations","Efficient bargains","Nash bargaining solution","Sequential bargaining","Restricted bargaining games"],"department":[{"_id":"205"},{"_id":"475"}],"abstract":[{"text":"In this paper, we analyze the two-dimensional Nash bargaining solution (NBS) deploying a standard labor market negotiations model (see McDonald and Solow, 1981; Creedy and McDonald, 1991). We show that the two-dimensional bargaining problem can be decomposed into two one-dimensional problems such that the (Cartesian) product of the solutions of these problems replicates the solution of the two-dimensional problem, if the NBS is applied. However, this decomposition fails for any solution concept that does not satisfy the axiom of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA axiom). Our decomposition result has significant implications for actual negotiations, as it allows for the decomposition of a multi-issue bargaining problem into a set of simpler problems, in particular a set of single-issue bargaining problems. In this way, the decomposition may help facilitate negotiations in labor markets and also in other environments.","lang":"eng"}]},{"title":"Cooperative Transfer Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information","year":"2013","author":[{"full_name":"Brangewitz, Sonja","first_name":"Sonja","last_name":"Brangewitz"},{"first_name":"Claus-Jochen","last_name":"Haake","full_name":"Haake, Claus-Jochen","id":"20801"}],"date_updated":"2022-01-06T07:01:39Z","intvolume":"        64","series_title":"Working Papers CIE","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"abstract":[{"text":"In this paper, we analyze a model in which two divisions negotiate over an intrafirm transfer price for an intermediate product. Formally, we consider bargaining problems under incomplete information, since the upstream division’s (seller's) costs and downstream division's (buyer's) revenues are supposed to be private information. Assuming two possible types for buyer and seller each, we first establish that the bargaining problem is regular, regardless whether incentive and/or efficiency constraints are imposed. This allows us to apply the generalized Nash bargaining solution to determine transfer payments and transfer probabilities. Furthermore, we derive general properties of this solution for the transfer pricing problem and compare the model developed here with the existing literature for negotiated transfer pricing under incomplete information. In particular, we focus on the models presented in Wagenhofer (1994).","lang":"eng"}],"file":[{"creator":"stela","date_created":"2018-10-31T09:22:19Z","relation":"main_file","date_updated":"2018-10-31T09:22:19Z","file_name":"WP - Cooperative Transfer Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information.pdf","file_size":430826,"access_level":"closed","file_id":"5148","content_type":"application/pdf","success":1}],"date_created":"2018-10-31T09:20:15Z","type":"working_paper","keyword":["Transfer Pricing","Negotiation","Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution","Incomplete Information"],"department":[{"_id":"205"},{"_id":"475"}],"status":"public","has_accepted_license":"1","_id":"5146","publisher":"CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University","ddc":["040"],"user_id":"477","volume":64,"file_date_updated":"2018-10-31T09:22:19Z","citation":{"apa":"Brangewitz, S., &#38; Haake, C.-J. (2013). <i>Cooperative Transfer Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information</i> (Vol. 64). CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University.","ieee":"S. Brangewitz and C.-J. Haake, <i>Cooperative Transfer Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information</i>, vol. 64. CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2013.","chicago":"Brangewitz, Sonja, and Claus-Jochen Haake. <i>Cooperative Transfer Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information</i>. Vol. 64. Working Papers CIE. CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2013.","short":"S. Brangewitz, C.-J. Haake, Cooperative Transfer Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information, CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2013.","mla":"Brangewitz, Sonja, and Claus-Jochen Haake. <i>Cooperative Transfer Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information</i>. Vol. 64, CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2013.","ama":"Brangewitz S, Haake C-J. <i>Cooperative Transfer Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information</i>. Vol 64. CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University; 2013.","bibtex":"@book{Brangewitz_Haake_2013, series={Working Papers CIE}, title={Cooperative Transfer Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information}, volume={64}, publisher={CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University}, author={Brangewitz, Sonja and Haake, Claus-Jochen}, year={2013}, collection={Working Papers CIE} }"},"project":[{"_id":"1","name":"SFB 901"},{"name":"SFB 901 - Project Area A","_id":"2"},{"_id":"7","name":"SFB 901 - Subproject A3"}]}]