---
_id: '32106'
abstract:
- lang: eng
  text: We study the consequences of modeling asymmetric bargaining power in two-person
    bargaining problems. Comparing application of an asymmetric version of a bargaining
    solution to an upfront modification of the disagreement point, the resulting distortion
    crucially depends on the bargaining solution concept. While for the Kalai-Smorodinsky
    solution weaker players benefit from modifying the disagreement point, the situation
    is reversed for the Nash bargaining solution. There, weaker players are better
    off in the asymmetric bargaining solution. When comparing application of the asymmetric
    versions of the Nash and the Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions, we demonstrate that
    there is an upper bound for the weight of a player, so that she is better off
    with the Nash bargaining solution. This threshold is ultimately determined by
    the relative utilitarian bargaining solution. From a mechanism design perspective,
    our results provide valuable information for a social planner, when implementing
    a bargaining solution for unequally powerful players.
author:
- first_name: Claus-Jochen
  full_name: Haake, Claus-Jochen
  id: '20801'
  last_name: Haake
- first_name: Thomas
  full_name: Streck, Thomas
  id: '33041'
  last_name: Streck
citation:
  ama: Haake C-J, Streck T. <i>Distortion through Modeling Asymmetric Bargaining Power</i>.
    Vol 148.; 2022.
  apa: Haake, C.-J., &#38; Streck, T. (2022). <i>Distortion through modeling asymmetric
    bargaining power</i> (Vol. 148).
  bibtex: '@book{Haake_Streck_2022, series={CIE Working Paper Series}, title={Distortion
    through modeling asymmetric bargaining power}, volume={148}, author={Haake, Claus-Jochen
    and Streck, Thomas}, year={2022}, collection={CIE Working Paper Series} }'
  chicago: Haake, Claus-Jochen, and Thomas Streck. <i>Distortion through Modeling
    Asymmetric Bargaining Power</i>. Vol. 148. CIE Working Paper Series, 2022.
  ieee: C.-J. Haake and T. Streck, <i>Distortion through modeling asymmetric bargaining
    power</i>, vol. 148. 2022.
  mla: Haake, Claus-Jochen, and Thomas Streck. <i>Distortion through Modeling Asymmetric
    Bargaining Power</i>. 2022.
  short: C.-J. Haake, T. Streck, Distortion through Modeling Asymmetric Bargaining
    Power, 2022.
date_created: 2022-06-22T12:12:58Z
date_updated: 2022-11-19T15:42:15Z
department:
- _id: '205'
- _id: '475'
- _id: '200'
intvolume: '       148'
jel:
- C78
- D63
keyword:
- Asymmetric bargaining power
- Nash bargaining solution
- Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution
language:
- iso: eng
page: '17'
project:
- _id: '2'
  name: 'SFB 901 - A: SFB 901 - Project Area A'
- _id: '7'
  name: 'SFB 901 - A3: SFB 901 - Subproject A3'
- _id: '1'
  name: 'SFB 901: SFB 901'
series_title: CIE Working Paper Series
status: public
title: Distortion through modeling asymmetric bargaining power
type: working_paper
user_id: '20801'
volume: 148
year: '2022'
...
---
_id: '30940'
abstract:
- lang: eng
  text: "We analyse the two-dimensional Nash bargaining solution (NBS) by deploying\r\nthe
    standard labour market negotiations model of McDonald and Solow (1981).\r\nWe
    show that the two-dimensional bargaining problem can be decomposed into two\r\none-dimensional
    problems, such that the two solutions together replicate the solution\r\nof the
    two-dimensional problem if the NBS is applied.  The axiom of\r\nIndependence of
    Irrelevant Alternatives is shown to be crucial for this type\r\nof decomposability.
    \ This result has significant implications for actual\r\nnegotiations because
    it allows for the decomposition of a multi-dimensional bargaining\r\nproblem into
    one-dimensional problems---and thus helps to facilitate real-world\r\nnegotiations."
article_type: original
author:
- first_name: Claus-Jochen
  full_name: Haake, Claus-Jochen
  id: '20801'
  last_name: Haake
- first_name: Thorsten
  full_name: Upmann, Thorsten
  last_name: Upmann
- first_name: Papatya
  full_name: Duman, Papatya
  id: '72752'
  last_name: Duman
citation:
  ama: 'Haake C-J, Upmann T, Duman P. Wage Bargaining and Employment Revisited: Separability
    and Efficiency in Collective Bargaining. <i>Scandinavian Journal of Economics</i>.
    2022;125(2):403-440. doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12518">https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12518</a>'
  apa: 'Haake, C.-J., Upmann, T., &#38; Duman, P. (2022). Wage Bargaining and Employment
    Revisited: Separability and Efficiency in Collective Bargaining. <i>Scandinavian
    Journal of Economics</i>, <i>125</i>(2), 403–440. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12518">https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12518</a>'
  bibtex: '@article{Haake_Upmann_Duman_2022, title={Wage Bargaining and Employment
    Revisited: Separability and Efficiency in Collective Bargaining}, volume={125},
    DOI={<a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12518">https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12518</a>},
    number={2}, journal={Scandinavian Journal of Economics}, publisher={Wiley}, author={Haake,
    Claus-Jochen and Upmann, Thorsten and Duman, Papatya}, year={2022}, pages={403–440}
    }'
  chicago: 'Haake, Claus-Jochen, Thorsten Upmann, and Papatya Duman. “Wage Bargaining
    and Employment Revisited: Separability and Efficiency in Collective Bargaining.”
    <i>Scandinavian Journal of Economics</i> 125, no. 2 (2022): 403–40. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12518">https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12518</a>.'
  ieee: 'C.-J. Haake, T. Upmann, and P. Duman, “Wage Bargaining and Employment Revisited:
    Separability and Efficiency in Collective Bargaining,” <i>Scandinavian Journal
    of Economics</i>, vol. 125, no. 2, pp. 403–440, 2022, doi: <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12518">https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12518</a>.'
  mla: 'Haake, Claus-Jochen, et al. “Wage Bargaining and Employment Revisited: Separability
    and Efficiency in Collective Bargaining.” <i>Scandinavian Journal of Economics</i>,
    vol. 125, no. 2, Wiley, 2022, pp. 403–40, doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12518">https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12518</a>.'
  short: C.-J. Haake, T. Upmann, P. Duman, Scandinavian Journal of Economics 125 (2022)
    403–440.
date_created: 2022-04-22T14:10:44Z
date_updated: 2023-06-08T16:42:31Z
ddc:
- '330'
department:
- _id: '205'
- _id: '475'
doi: https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12518
funded_apc: '1'
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: '       125'
issue: '2'
jel:
- J52
- J41
- C78
keyword:
- Labour market negotiations
- efficient bargains
- Nash bargaining solution
- sequential bargaining
- restricted bargaining games
language:
- iso: eng
main_file_link:
- url: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/sjoe.12518
page: 403-440
project:
- _id: '7'
  grant_number: '160364472'
  name: 'SFB 901 - A3: SFB 901 - Subproject A3'
- _id: '2'
  name: 'SFB 901 - A: SFB 901 - Project Area A'
- _id: '1'
  grant_number: '160364472'
  name: 'SFB 901: SFB 901'
publication: Scandinavian Journal of Economics
publication_identifier:
  eissn:
  - 0347-0520
publication_status: published
publisher: Wiley
quality_controlled: '1'
status: public
title: 'Wage Bargaining and Employment Revisited: Separability and Efficiency in Collective
  Bargaining'
type: journal_article
user_id: '20801'
volume: 125
year: '2022'
...
---
_id: '15202'
abstract:
- lang: eng
  text: In this paper, we analyze the two-dimensional Nash bargaining solution (NBS)
    deploying a standard labor market negotiations model (see McDonald and Solow,
    1981; Creedy and McDonald, 1991). We show that the two-dimensional bargaining
    problem can be decomposed into two one-dimensional problems such that the (Cartesian)
    product of the solutions of these problems replicates the solution of the two-dimensional
    problem, if the NBS is applied. However, this decomposition fails for any solution
    concept that does not satisfy the axiom of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives
    (IIA axiom). Our decomposition result has significant implications for actual
    negotiations, as it allows for the decomposition of a multi-issue bargaining problem
    into a set of simpler problems, in particular a set of single-issue bargaining
    problems. In this way, the decomposition may help facilitate negotiations in labor
    markets and also in other environments.
author:
- first_name: Claus-Jochen
  full_name: Haake, Claus-Jochen
  id: '20801'
  last_name: Haake
- first_name: Thorsten
  full_name: Upmann, Thorsten
  last_name: Upmann
- first_name: Papatya
  full_name: Duman, Papatya
  id: '72752'
  last_name: Duman
citation:
  ama: Haake C-J, Upmann T, Duman P. <i>The Decomposability of the Nash Bargaining
    Solution in Labor Markets</i>. Vol 128. CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University;
    2019.
  apa: Haake, C.-J., Upmann, T., &#38; Duman, P. (2019). <i>The Decomposability of
    the Nash Bargaining Solution in Labor Markets</i> (Vol. 128). CIE Working Paper
    Series, Paderborn University.
  bibtex: '@book{Haake_Upmann_Duman_2019, series={Working Papers CIE}, title={The
    Decomposability of the Nash Bargaining Solution in Labor Markets}, volume={128},
    publisher={CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University}, author={Haake, Claus-Jochen
    and Upmann, Thorsten and Duman, Papatya}, year={2019}, collection={Working Papers
    CIE} }'
  chicago: Haake, Claus-Jochen, Thorsten Upmann, and Papatya Duman. <i>The Decomposability
    of the Nash Bargaining Solution in Labor Markets</i>. Vol. 128. Working Papers
    CIE. CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2019.
  ieee: C.-J. Haake, T. Upmann, and P. Duman, <i>The Decomposability of the Nash Bargaining
    Solution in Labor Markets</i>, vol. 128. CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University,
    2019.
  mla: Haake, Claus-Jochen, et al. <i>The Decomposability of the Nash Bargaining Solution
    in Labor Markets</i>. Vol. 128, CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University,
    2019.
  short: C.-J. Haake, T. Upmann, P. Duman, The Decomposability of the Nash Bargaining
    Solution in Labor Markets, CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2019.
date_created: 2019-11-28T09:49:08Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:52:16Z
ddc:
- '040'
department:
- _id: '205'
- _id: '475'
file:
- access_level: closed
  content_type: application/pdf
  creator: stela
  date_created: 2019-11-28T09:50:10Z
  date_updated: 2019-11-28T09:50:10Z
  file_id: '15203'
  file_name: WP - The Decomposability of the Nash Bargaining Solution in Labor Markets.pdf
  file_size: 1068284
  relation: main_file
  success: 1
file_date_updated: 2019-11-28T09:50:10Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: '       128'
keyword:
- Labor market negotiations
- Efficient bargains
- Nash bargaining solution
- Sequential bargaining
- Restricted bargaining games
language:
- iso: eng
project:
- _id: '1'
  name: SFB 901
- _id: '7'
  name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
- _id: '2'
  name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
publisher: CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University
series_title: Working Papers CIE
status: public
title: The Decomposability of the Nash Bargaining Solution in Labor Markets
type: working_paper
user_id: '477'
volume: 128
year: '2019'
...
---
_id: '5146'
abstract:
- lang: eng
  text: In this paper, we analyze a model in which two divisions negotiate over an
    intrafirm transfer price for an intermediate product. Formally, we consider bargaining
    problems under incomplete information, since the upstream division’s (seller's)
    costs and downstream division's (buyer's) revenues are supposed to be private
    information. Assuming two possible types for buyer and seller each, we first establish
    that the bargaining problem is regular, regardless whether incentive and/or efficiency
    constraints are imposed. This allows us to apply the generalized Nash bargaining
    solution to determine transfer payments and transfer probabilities. Furthermore,
    we derive general properties of this solution for the transfer pricing problem
    and compare the model developed here with the existing literature for negotiated
    transfer pricing under incomplete information. In particular, we focus on the
    models presented in Wagenhofer (1994).
author:
- first_name: Sonja
  full_name: Brangewitz, Sonja
  last_name: Brangewitz
- first_name: Claus-Jochen
  full_name: Haake, Claus-Jochen
  id: '20801'
  last_name: Haake
citation:
  ama: Brangewitz S, Haake C-J. <i>Cooperative Transfer Price Negotiations under Incomplete
    Information</i>. Vol 64. CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University; 2013.
  apa: Brangewitz, S., &#38; Haake, C.-J. (2013). <i>Cooperative Transfer Price Negotiations
    under Incomplete Information</i> (Vol. 64). CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn
    University.
  bibtex: '@book{Brangewitz_Haake_2013, series={Working Papers CIE}, title={Cooperative
    Transfer Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information}, volume={64}, publisher={CIE
    Working Paper Series, Paderborn University}, author={Brangewitz, Sonja and Haake,
    Claus-Jochen}, year={2013}, collection={Working Papers CIE} }'
  chicago: Brangewitz, Sonja, and Claus-Jochen Haake. <i>Cooperative Transfer Price
    Negotiations under Incomplete Information</i>. Vol. 64. Working Papers CIE. CIE
    Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2013.
  ieee: S. Brangewitz and C.-J. Haake, <i>Cooperative Transfer Price Negotiations
    under Incomplete Information</i>, vol. 64. CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn
    University, 2013.
  mla: Brangewitz, Sonja, and Claus-Jochen Haake. <i>Cooperative Transfer Price Negotiations
    under Incomplete Information</i>. Vol. 64, CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn
    University, 2013.
  short: S. Brangewitz, C.-J. Haake, Cooperative Transfer Price Negotiations under
    Incomplete Information, CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2013.
date_created: 2018-10-31T09:20:15Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:01:39Z
ddc:
- '040'
department:
- _id: '205'
- _id: '475'
file:
- access_level: closed
  content_type: application/pdf
  creator: stela
  date_created: 2018-10-31T09:22:19Z
  date_updated: 2018-10-31T09:22:19Z
  file_id: '5148'
  file_name: WP - Cooperative Transfer Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information.pdf
  file_size: 430826
  relation: main_file
  success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-10-31T09:22:19Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: '        64'
keyword:
- Transfer Pricing
- Negotiation
- Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution
- Incomplete Information
language:
- iso: eng
project:
- _id: '1'
  name: SFB 901
- _id: '2'
  name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
- _id: '7'
  name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
publisher: CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University
series_title: Working Papers CIE
status: public
title: Cooperative Transfer Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information
type: working_paper
user_id: '477'
volume: 64
year: '2013'
...