---
_id: '62738'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: 'Vulnerability disclosures are necessary to improve the security of our digital
ecosystem. However, they can also be challenging for researchers: it may be hard
to find out who the affected parties even are, or how to contact them. Researchers
may be ignored or face adversity when disclosing vulnerabilities. We investigate
researchers'' experiences with vulnerability disclosures, extract best practices,
and make recommendations for researchers, institutions that employ them, industry,
and regulators to enable effective vulnerability disclosures.'
author:
- first_name: Harshini
full_name: Sri Ramulu, Harshini
id: '99000'
last_name: Sri Ramulu
orcid: 0000-0002-0000-5843
- first_name: Anna Lena
full_name: Rotthaler, Anna Lena
id: '97843'
last_name: Rotthaler
- first_name: Jost
full_name: Rossel, Jost
id: '58331'
last_name: Rossel
orcid: 0000-0002-3182-4059
- first_name: Rachel
full_name: Gonzalez Rodriguez, Rachel
last_name: Gonzalez Rodriguez
- first_name: Dominik
full_name: Wermke, Dominik
last_name: Wermke
- first_name: Sascha
full_name: Fahl, Sascha
last_name: Fahl
- first_name: Tadayoshi
full_name: Kohno, Tadayoshi
last_name: Kohno
- first_name: Juraj
full_name: Somorovsky, Juraj
id: '83504'
last_name: Somorovsky
orcid: 0000-0002-3593-7720
- first_name: Yasemin
full_name: Acar, Yasemin
id: '94636'
last_name: Acar
citation:
ama: 'Sri Ramulu H, Rotthaler AL, Rossel J, et al. Poster: Computer Security Researchers’
Experiences with Vulnerability Disclosures. In: Proceedings of the 2025 ACM
SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security. ACM; 2025. doi:10.1145/3719027.3760723'
apa: 'Sri Ramulu, H., Rotthaler, A. L., Rossel, J., Gonzalez Rodriguez, R., Wermke,
D., Fahl, S., Kohno, T., Somorovsky, J., & Acar, Y. (2025). Poster: Computer
Security Researchers’ Experiences with Vulnerability Disclosures. Proceedings
of the 2025 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security.
https://doi.org/10.1145/3719027.3760723'
bibtex: '@inproceedings{Sri Ramulu_Rotthaler_Rossel_Gonzalez Rodriguez_Wermke_Fahl_Kohno_Somorovsky_Acar_2025,
title={Poster: Computer Security Researchers’ Experiences with Vulnerability Disclosures},
DOI={10.1145/3719027.3760723},
booktitle={Proceedings of the 2025 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications
Security}, publisher={ACM}, author={Sri Ramulu, Harshini and Rotthaler, Anna Lena
and Rossel, Jost and Gonzalez Rodriguez, Rachel and Wermke, Dominik and Fahl,
Sascha and Kohno, Tadayoshi and Somorovsky, Juraj and Acar, Yasemin}, year={2025}
}'
chicago: 'Sri Ramulu, Harshini, Anna Lena Rotthaler, Jost Rossel, Rachel Gonzalez
Rodriguez, Dominik Wermke, Sascha Fahl, Tadayoshi Kohno, Juraj Somorovsky, and
Yasemin Acar. “Poster: Computer Security Researchers’ Experiences with Vulnerability
Disclosures.” In Proceedings of the 2025 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer
and Communications Security. ACM, 2025. https://doi.org/10.1145/3719027.3760723.'
ieee: 'H. Sri Ramulu et al., “Poster: Computer Security Researchers’ Experiences
with Vulnerability Disclosures,” 2025, doi: 10.1145/3719027.3760723.'
mla: 'Sri Ramulu, Harshini, et al. “Poster: Computer Security Researchers’ Experiences
with Vulnerability Disclosures.” Proceedings of the 2025 ACM SIGSAC Conference
on Computer and Communications Security, ACM, 2025, doi:10.1145/3719027.3760723.'
short: 'H. Sri Ramulu, A.L. Rotthaler, J. Rossel, R. Gonzalez Rodriguez, D. Wermke,
S. Fahl, T. Kohno, J. Somorovsky, Y. Acar, in: Proceedings of the 2025 ACM SIGSAC
Conference on Computer and Communications Security, ACM, 2025.'
conference:
end_date: 2025-10-17
start_date: 2025-10-13
date_created: 2025-12-02T08:48:00Z
date_updated: 2025-12-02T08:54:18Z
doi: 10.1145/3719027.3760723
keyword:
- software vulnerabilities
- vulnerability disclosure
- security research
language:
- iso: eng
main_file_link:
- open_access: '1'
url: https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3719027.3760723
oa: '1'
publication: Proceedings of the 2025 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications
Security
publication_status: published
publisher: ACM
status: public
title: 'Poster: Computer Security Researchers'' Experiences with Vulnerability Disclosures'
type: conference
user_id: '58331'
year: '2025'
...
---
_id: '53811'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: Persistent security challenges plague DevOps teams due to a deficiency in
expertise regarding security tools and methods, as evidenced by frequent security
incidents. Existing maturity models fail to adequately address the specific needs
of DevOps teams. In response, this paper proposes "Security Belts," a novel maturity
model inspired by martial arts ranking systems. This model aims to assist DevOps
teams in enhancing their security capabilities by providing a structured approach,
starting with fundamental activities and progressing to more advanced techniques.
Drawing from the experiences of monitoring 21 teams, the paper presents lessons
learned and offers actionable advice for refining maturity models tailored to
software quality improvement.
author:
- first_name: Samira
full_name: Taaibi, Samira
id: '55800'
last_name: Taaibi
- first_name: Stefan
full_name: Dziwok, Stefan
id: '3901'
last_name: Dziwok
orcid: http://orcid.org/0000-0002-8679-6673
- first_name: Lars
full_name: Hermerschmidt, Lars
last_name: Hermerschmidt
- first_name: Thorsten
full_name: Koch, Thorsten
id: '13616'
last_name: Koch
- first_name: Sven
full_name: Merschjohann, Sven
id: '11394'
last_name: Merschjohann
- first_name: Mark
full_name: Vollmary, Mark
last_name: Vollmary
citation:
ama: 'Taaibi S, Dziwok S, Hermerschmidt L, Koch T, Merschjohann S, Vollmary M. Security
Belts: A Maturity Model for DevOps Teams to Increase the Software Security of
their Product - An Experience Report.'
apa: 'Taaibi, S., Dziwok, S., Hermerschmidt, L., Koch, T., Merschjohann, S., &
Vollmary, M. (n.d.). Security Belts: A Maturity Model for DevOps Teams to Increase
the Software Security of their Product - An Experience Report. 30th Americas
Conference on Information Systems, Salt Lake City.'
bibtex: '@inproceedings{Taaibi_Dziwok_Hermerschmidt_Koch_Merschjohann_Vollmary,
title={Security Belts: A Maturity Model for DevOps Teams to Increase the Software
Security of their Product - An Experience Report}, author={Taaibi, Samira and
Dziwok, Stefan and Hermerschmidt, Lars and Koch, Thorsten and Merschjohann, Sven
and Vollmary, Mark} }'
chicago: 'Taaibi, Samira, Stefan Dziwok, Lars Hermerschmidt, Thorsten Koch, Sven
Merschjohann, and Mark Vollmary. “Security Belts: A Maturity Model for DevOps
Teams to Increase the Software Security of Their Product - An Experience Report,”
n.d.'
ieee: 'S. Taaibi, S. Dziwok, L. Hermerschmidt, T. Koch, S. Merschjohann, and M.
Vollmary, “Security Belts: A Maturity Model for DevOps Teams to Increase the Software
Security of their Product - An Experience Report,” presented at the 30th Americas
Conference on Information Systems, Salt Lake City.'
mla: 'Taaibi, Samira, et al. Security Belts: A Maturity Model for DevOps Teams
to Increase the Software Security of Their Product - An Experience Report.'
short: 'S. Taaibi, S. Dziwok, L. Hermerschmidt, T. Koch, S. Merschjohann, M. Vollmary,
in: n.d.'
conference:
end_date: 2024-08-17
location: Salt Lake City
name: ' 30th Americas Conference on Information Systems'
start_date: 2024-08-15
date_created: 2024-05-02T08:57:52Z
date_updated: 2024-08-09T08:55:49Z
ddc:
- '000'
department:
- _id: '662'
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: staaibi
date_created: 2024-05-02T08:54:21Z
date_updated: 2024-05-02T08:54:21Z
file_id: '53812'
file_name: AMCIS2024_final_submission_maturity model security belt paper.pdf
file_size: 540990
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2024-05-02T08:54:21Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
keyword:
- Software security
- maturity model
language:
- iso: eng
publication_status: accepted
status: public
title: 'Security Belts: A Maturity Model for DevOps Teams to Increase the Software
Security of their Product - An Experience Report'
type: conference
user_id: '55800'
year: '2024'
...
---
_id: '48012'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: '3D printing is a well-established technology with rapidly increasing usage
scenarios both in the industry and consumer context. The growing popularity of
3D printing has also attracted security researchers, who have analyzed possibilities
for weakening 3D models or stealing intellectual property from 3D models. We extend
these important aspects and provide the first comprehensive security analysis
of 3D printing data formats. We performed our systematic study on the example
of the 3D Manufacturing Format (3MF), which offers a large variety of features
that could lead to critical attacks. Based on 3MF’s features, we systematized
three attack goals: Data Exfiltration (dex), Denial of Service, and UI Spoofing
(uis). We achieve these goals by exploiting the complexity of 3MF, which is based
on the Open Packaging Conventions (OPC) format and uses XML to define 3D models.
In total, our analysis led to 352 tests. To create and run these tests automatically,
we implemented an open-source tool named 3MF Analyzer (tool), which helped us
evaluate 20 applications.'
author:
- first_name: Jost
full_name: Rossel, Jost
id: '58331'
last_name: Rossel
orcid: 0000-0002-3182-4059
- first_name: Vladislav
full_name: Mladenov, Vladislav
last_name: Mladenov
- first_name: Juraj
full_name: Somorovsky, Juraj
id: '83504'
last_name: Somorovsky
orcid: 0000-0002-3593-7720
citation:
ama: 'Rossel J, Mladenov V, Somorovsky J. Security Analysis of the 3MF Data Format.
In: Proceedings of the 26th International Symposium on Research in Attacks,
Intrusions and Defenses. ACM; 2023. doi:10.1145/3607199.3607216'
apa: Rossel, J., Mladenov, V., & Somorovsky, J. (2023). Security Analysis of
the 3MF Data Format. Proceedings of the 26th International Symposium on Research
in Attacks, Intrusions and Defenses. 26th International Symposium on Research
in Attacks, Intrusions and Defenses, Hongkong. https://doi.org/10.1145/3607199.3607216
bibtex: '@inproceedings{Rossel_Mladenov_Somorovsky_2023, title={Security Analysis
of the 3MF Data Format}, DOI={10.1145/3607199.3607216},
booktitle={Proceedings of the 26th International Symposium on Research in Attacks,
Intrusions and Defenses}, publisher={ACM}, author={Rossel, Jost and Mladenov,
Vladislav and Somorovsky, Juraj}, year={2023} }'
chicago: Rossel, Jost, Vladislav Mladenov, and Juraj Somorovsky. “Security Analysis
of the 3MF Data Format.” In Proceedings of the 26th International Symposium
on Research in Attacks, Intrusions and Defenses. ACM, 2023. https://doi.org/10.1145/3607199.3607216.
ieee: 'J. Rossel, V. Mladenov, and J. Somorovsky, “Security Analysis of the 3MF
Data Format,” presented at the 26th International Symposium on Research in Attacks,
Intrusions and Defenses, Hongkong, 2023, doi: 10.1145/3607199.3607216.'
mla: Rossel, Jost, et al. “Security Analysis of the 3MF Data Format.” Proceedings
of the 26th International Symposium on Research in Attacks, Intrusions and Defenses,
ACM, 2023, doi:10.1145/3607199.3607216.
short: 'J. Rossel, V. Mladenov, J. Somorovsky, in: Proceedings of the 26th International
Symposium on Research in Attacks, Intrusions and Defenses, ACM, 2023.'
conference:
end_date: 2023-10-18
location: Hongkong
name: 26th International Symposium on Research in Attacks, Intrusions and Defenses
start_date: 2023-10-16
date_created: 2023-10-11T13:42:09Z
date_updated: 2025-07-16T11:06:49Z
ddc:
- '000'
department:
- _id: '632'
doi: 10.1145/3607199.3607216
file:
- access_level: open_access
content_type: application/pdf
creator: jrossel
date_created: 2023-10-16T03:48:08Z
date_updated: 2024-09-05T11:14:40Z
file_id: '48065'
file_name: Security_Analysis_of_the_3mf_Data_Format.pdf
file_size: 1054999
relation: main_file
file_date_updated: 2024-09-05T11:14:40Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
keyword:
- Data Format Security
- 3D Manufacturing Format
- 3D Printing
- Additive Manufacturing
language:
- iso: eng
main_file_link:
- url: https://dl.acm.org/doi/abs/10.1145/3607199.3607216
oa: '1'
publication: Proceedings of the 26th International Symposium on Research in Attacks,
Intrusions and Defenses
publication_status: published
publisher: ACM
quality_controlled: '1'
status: public
title: Security Analysis of the 3MF Data Format
type: conference
user_id: '58331'
year: '2023'
...
---
_id: '29769'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: 'Wettstreit zwischen der Entwicklung neuer Hardwaretrojaner und entsprechender
Gegenmaßnahmen beschreiten Widersacher immer raffiniertere Wege um Schaltungsentwürfe
zu infizieren und dabei selbst fortgeschrittene Test- und Verifikationsmethoden
zu überlisten. Abgesehen von den konventionellen Methoden um einen Trojaner in
eine Schaltung für ein Field-programmable Gate Array (FPGA) einzuschleusen, können
auch die Entwurfswerkzeuge heimlich kompromittiert werden um einen Angreifer dabei
zu unterstützen einen erfolgreichen Angriff durchzuführen, der zum Beispiel Fehlfunktionen
oder ungewollte Informationsabflüsse bewirken kann. Diese Dissertation beschäftigt
sich hauptsächlich mit den beiden Blickwinkeln auf Hardwaretrojaner in rekonfigurierbaren
Systemen, einerseits der Perspektive des Verteidigers mit einer Methode zur Erkennung
von Trojanern auf der Bitstromebene, und andererseits derjenigen des Angreifers
mit einer neuartigen Angriffsmethode für FPGA Trojaner. Für die Verteidigung gegen
den Trojaner ``Heimtückische LUT'''' stellen wir die allererste erfolgreiche Gegenmaßnahme
vor, die durch Verifikation mittels Proof-carrying Hardware (PCH) auf der Bitstromebene
direkt vor der Konfiguration der Hardware angewendet werden kann, und präsentieren
ein vollständiges Schema für den Entwurf und die Verifikation von Schaltungen
für iCE40 FPGAs. Für die Gegenseite führen wir einen neuen Angriff ein, welcher
bösartiges Routing im eingefügten Trojaner ausnutzt um selbst im fertigen Bitstrom
in einem inaktiven Zustand zu verbleiben: Hierdurch kann dieser neuartige Angriff
zur Zeit weder von herkömmlichen Test- und Verifikationsmethoden, noch von unserer
vorher vorgestellten Verifikation auf der Bitstromebene entdeckt werden.'
- lang: eng
text: The battle of developing hardware Trojans and corresponding countermeasures
has taken adversaries towards ingenious ways of compromising hardware designs
by circumventing even advanced testing and verification methods. Besides conventional
methods of inserting Trojans into a design by a malicious entity, the design flow
for field-programmable gate arrays (FPGAs) can also be surreptitiously compromised
to assist the attacker to perform a successful malfunctioning or information leakage
attack. This thesis mainly focuses on the two aspects of hardware Trojans in reconfigurable
systems, the defenders perspective which corresponds to the bitstream-level Trojan
detection technique, and the attackers perspective which corresponds to a novel
FPGA Trojan attack. From the defender's perspective, we introduce a first-ever
successful pre-configuration countermeasure against the ``Malicious LUT''-hardware
Trojan, by employing bitstream-level Proof-Carrying Hardware (PCH) and present
the complete design-and-verification flow for iCE40 FPGAs. Likewise, from an attackers
perspective, we present a novel attack that leverages malicious routing of the
inserted Trojan circuit to acquire a dormant state even in the generated and transmitted
bitstream. Since the Trojan is injected in a post-synthesis step and remains unconnected
in the bitstream, the presented attack can currently neither be prevented by conventional
testing and verification methods nor by bitstream-level verification techniques.
author:
- first_name: Qazi Arbab
full_name: Ahmed, Qazi Arbab
id: '72764'
last_name: Ahmed
orcid: 0000-0002-1837-2254
citation:
ama: Ahmed QA. Hardware Trojans in Reconfigurable Computing. Paderborn University,
Paderborn, Germany; 2022. doi:10.17619/UNIPB/1-1271
apa: Ahmed, Q. A. (2022). Hardware Trojans in Reconfigurable Computing. Paderborn
University, Paderborn, Germany. https://doi.org/10.17619/UNIPB/1-1271
bibtex: '@book{Ahmed_2022, place={Paderborn}, title={Hardware Trojans in Reconfigurable
Computing}, DOI={10.17619/UNIPB/1-1271},
publisher={ Paderborn University, Paderborn, Germany}, author={Ahmed, Qazi Arbab},
year={2022} }'
chicago: 'Ahmed, Qazi Arbab. Hardware Trojans in Reconfigurable Computing.
Paderborn: Paderborn University, Paderborn, Germany, 2022. https://doi.org/10.17619/UNIPB/1-1271.'
ieee: 'Q. A. Ahmed, Hardware Trojans in Reconfigurable Computing. Paderborn: Paderborn
University, Paderborn, Germany, 2022.'
mla: Ahmed, Qazi Arbab. Hardware Trojans in Reconfigurable Computing. Paderborn
University, Paderborn, Germany, 2022, doi:10.17619/UNIPB/1-1271.
short: Q.A. Ahmed, Hardware Trojans in Reconfigurable Computing, Paderborn University,
Paderborn, Germany, Paderborn, 2022.
date_created: 2022-02-07T14:02:36Z
date_updated: 2022-11-30T13:39:01Z
ddc:
- '004'
department:
- _id: '78'
doi: 10.17619/UNIPB/1-1271
has_accepted_license: '1'
keyword:
- FPGA Security
- Hardware Trojans
- Bitstream-level Trojans
- Bitstream Verification
language:
- iso: eng
main_file_link:
- open_access: '1'
url: "\turn:nbn:de:hbz:466:2-40303"
oa: '1'
place: Paderborn
project:
- _id: '1'
name: 'SFB 901: SFB 901'
- _id: '4'
name: 'SFB 901 - C: SFB 901 - Project Area C'
- _id: '14'
name: 'SFB 901 - C2: SFB 901 - Subproject C2'
publication_status: published
publisher: ' Paderborn University, Paderborn, Germany'
status: public
supervisor:
- first_name: Marco
full_name: Platzner, Marco
id: '398'
last_name: Platzner
title: Hardware Trojans in Reconfigurable Computing
type: dissertation
user_id: '477'
year: '2022'
...
---
_id: '37157'
author:
- first_name: Kaan
full_name: Eyilmez, Kaan
last_name: Eyilmez
- first_name: Ali Sercan
full_name: Basyurt, Ali Sercan
last_name: Basyurt
- first_name: Stefan
full_name: Stieglitz, Stefan
last_name: Stieglitz
- first_name: Christoph
full_name: Fuchss, Christoph
last_name: Fuchss
- first_name: Marc-André
full_name: Kaufhold, Marc-André
last_name: Kaufhold
- first_name: Christian
full_name: Reuter, Christian
last_name: Reuter
- first_name: Milad
full_name: Mirbabaie, Milad
id: '88691'
last_name: Mirbabaie
citation:
ama: 'Eyilmez K, Basyurt AS, Stieglitz S, et al. A Design Science Artefact for Cyber
Threat Detection and Actor Specific Communication. In: Australasian Conference
on Information Systems (ACIS). AIS Electronic Library (AISel); 2022.'
apa: Eyilmez, K., Basyurt, A. S., Stieglitz, S., Fuchss, C., Kaufhold, M.-A., Reuter,
C., & Mirbabaie, M. (2022). A Design Science Artefact for Cyber Threat Detection
and Actor Specific Communication. Australasian Conference on Information Systems
(ACIS).
bibtex: '@inproceedings{Eyilmez_Basyurt_Stieglitz_Fuchss_Kaufhold_Reuter_Mirbabaie_2022,
title={A Design Science Artefact for Cyber Threat Detection and Actor Specific
Communication}, booktitle={Australasian Conference on Information Systems (ACIS)},
publisher={AIS Electronic Library (AISel)}, author={Eyilmez, Kaan and Basyurt,
Ali Sercan and Stieglitz, Stefan and Fuchss, Christoph and Kaufhold, Marc-André
and Reuter, Christian and Mirbabaie, Milad}, year={2022} }'
chicago: Eyilmez, Kaan, Ali Sercan Basyurt, Stefan Stieglitz, Christoph Fuchss,
Marc-André Kaufhold, Christian Reuter, and Milad Mirbabaie. “A Design Science
Artefact for Cyber Threat Detection and Actor Specific Communication.” In Australasian
Conference on Information Systems (ACIS). AIS Electronic Library (AISel),
2022.
ieee: K. Eyilmez et al., “A Design Science Artefact for Cyber Threat Detection
and Actor Specific Communication,” 2022.
mla: Eyilmez, Kaan, et al. “A Design Science Artefact for Cyber Threat Detection
and Actor Specific Communication.” Australasian Conference on Information Systems
(ACIS), AIS Electronic Library (AISel), 2022.
short: 'K. Eyilmez, A.S. Basyurt, S. Stieglitz, C. Fuchss, M.-A. Kaufhold, C. Reuter,
M. Mirbabaie, in: Australasian Conference on Information Systems (ACIS), AIS Electronic
Library (AISel), 2022.'
date_created: 2023-01-17T15:46:42Z
date_updated: 2023-01-18T07:59:21Z
keyword:
- Student
- Security
- Projekt-CYWARN
language:
- iso: eng
publication: Australasian Conference on Information Systems (ACIS)
publisher: AIS Electronic Library (AISel)
status: public
title: A Design Science Artefact for Cyber Threat Detection and Actor Specific Communication
type: conference
user_id: '80546'
year: '2022'
...
---
_id: '21396'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: "Verifiable random functions (VRFs) are essentially digital signatures with
additional properties, namely verifiable uniqueness and pseudorandomness, which
make VRFs a useful tool, e.g., to prevent enumeration in DNSSEC Authenticated
Denial of Existence and the CONIKS key management system, or in the random committee
selection of the Algorand blockchain.\r\n\r\nMost standard-model VRFs rely on
admissible hash functions (AHFs) to achieve security against adaptive attacks
in the standard model. Known AHF constructions are based on error-correcting codes,
which yield asymptotically efficient constructions. However, previous works do
not clarify how the code should be instantiated concretely in the real world.
The rate and the minimal distance of the selected code have significant impact
on the efficiency of the resulting cryptosystem, therefore it is unclear if and
how the aforementioned constructions can be used in practice.\r\n\r\nFirst, we
explain inherent limitations of code-based AHFs. Concretely, we assume that even
if we were given codes that achieve the well-known Gilbert-Varshamov or McEliece-Rodemich-Rumsey-Welch
bounds, existing AHF-based constructions of verifiable random functions (VRFs)
can only be instantiated quite inefficiently. Then we introduce and construct
computational AHFs (cAHFs). While classical AHFs are information-theoretic, and
therefore work even in presence of computationally unbounded adversaries, cAHFs
provide only security against computationally bounded adversaries. However, we
show that cAHFs can be instantiated significantly more efficiently. Finally, we
use our cAHF to construct the currently most efficient verifiable random function
with full adaptive security in the standard model."
author:
- first_name: Tibor
full_name: Jager, Tibor
last_name: Jager
- first_name: David
full_name: Niehues, David
id: '36113'
last_name: Niehues
citation:
ama: 'Jager T, Niehues D. On the Real-World Instantiability of Admissible Hash Functions
and Efficient Verifiable Random Functions. In: Lecture Notes in Computer Science.
Cham; 2020. doi:10.1007/978-3-030-38471-5_13'
apa: Jager, T., & Niehues, D. (2020). On the Real-World Instantiability of Admissible
Hash Functions and Efficient Verifiable Random Functions. In Lecture Notes
in Computer Science. Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-38471-5_13
bibtex: '@inbook{Jager_Niehues_2020, place={Cham}, title={On the Real-World Instantiability
of Admissible Hash Functions and Efficient Verifiable Random Functions}, DOI={10.1007/978-3-030-38471-5_13},
booktitle={Lecture Notes in Computer Science}, author={Jager, Tibor and Niehues,
David}, year={2020} }'
chicago: Jager, Tibor, and David Niehues. “On the Real-World Instantiability of
Admissible Hash Functions and Efficient Verifiable Random Functions.” In Lecture
Notes in Computer Science. Cham, 2020. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-38471-5_13.
ieee: T. Jager and D. Niehues, “On the Real-World Instantiability of Admissible
Hash Functions and Efficient Verifiable Random Functions,” in Lecture Notes
in Computer Science, Cham, 2020.
mla: Jager, Tibor, and David Niehues. “On the Real-World Instantiability of Admissible
Hash Functions and Efficient Verifiable Random Functions.” Lecture Notes in
Computer Science, 2020, doi:10.1007/978-3-030-38471-5_13.
short: 'T. Jager, D. Niehues, in: Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Cham, 2020.'
conference:
end_date: 2019-08-16
location: Waterloo, Canada
name: Selected Areas in Cryptography
start_date: 2019-08-12
date_created: 2021-03-08T16:50:31Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:54:58Z
ddc:
- '000'
department:
- _id: '558'
doi: 10.1007/978-3-030-38471-5_13
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: davnie
date_created: 2021-03-08T17:02:37Z
date_updated: 2021-03-08T17:02:37Z
file_id: '21399'
file_name: Jager und Niehues - 2020 - On the Real-World Instantiability of Admissible
Ha.pdf
file_size: 706743
relation: main_file
file_date_updated: 2021-03-08T17:02:37Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
keyword:
- Admissible hash functions
- Verifiable random functions
- Error-correcting codes
- Provable security
language:
- iso: eng
main_file_link:
- url: https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007%252F978-3-030-38471-5_13.pdf
place: Cham
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '4'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area C
- _id: '13'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject C1
publication: Lecture Notes in Computer Science
publication_identifier:
isbn:
- '9783030384708'
- '9783030384715'
issn:
- 0302-9743
- 1611-3349
publication_status: published
quality_controlled: '1'
related_material:
link:
- relation: later_version
url: https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/1335.pdf
status: public
title: On the Real-World Instantiability of Admissible Hash Functions and Efficient
Verifiable Random Functions
type: book_chapter
user_id: '36113'
year: '2020'
...
---
_id: '16249'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: Timing plays a crucial role in the context of information security investments.
We regard timing in two dimensions, namely the time of announcement in relation
to the time of investment and the time of announcement in relation to the time
of a fundamental security incident. The financial value of information security
investments is assessed by examining the relationship between the investment announcements
and their stock market reaction focusing on the two time dimensions. Using an
event study methodology, we found that both dimensions influence the stock market
return of the investing organization. Our results indicate that (1) after fundamental
security incidents in a given industry, the stock price will react more positively
to a firm’s announcement of actual information security investments than to announcements
of the intention to invest; (2) the stock price will react more positively to
a firm’s announcements of the intention to invest after the fundamental security
incident compared to before; and (3) the stock price will react more positively
to a firm’s announcements of actual information security investments after the
fundamental security incident compared to before. Overall, the lowest abnormal
return can be expected when the intention to invest is announced before a fundamental
information security incident and the highest return when actual investing after
a fundamental information security incident in the respective industry.
author:
- first_name: Eva
full_name: Szubartowicz, Eva
last_name: Szubartowicz
- first_name: Guido
full_name: Schryen, Guido
id: '72850'
last_name: Schryen
citation:
ama: 'Szubartowicz E, Schryen G. Timing in Information Security: An Event Study
on the Impact of Information Security Investment Announcements. Journal of
Information System Security. 2020;16(1):3-31.'
apa: 'Szubartowicz, E., & Schryen, G. (2020). Timing in Information Security:
An Event Study on the Impact of Information Security Investment Announcements.
Journal of Information System Security, 16(1), 3–31.'
bibtex: '@article{Szubartowicz_Schryen_2020, title={Timing in Information Security:
An Event Study on the Impact of Information Security Investment Announcements},
volume={16}, number={1}, journal={Journal of Information System Security}, publisher={Information
Institute Publishing, Washington DC, USA}, author={Szubartowicz, Eva and Schryen,
Guido}, year={2020}, pages={3–31} }'
chicago: 'Szubartowicz, Eva, and Guido Schryen. “Timing in Information Security:
An Event Study on the Impact of Information Security Investment Announcements.”
Journal of Information System Security 16, no. 1 (2020): 3–31.'
ieee: 'E. Szubartowicz and G. Schryen, “Timing in Information Security: An Event
Study on the Impact of Information Security Investment Announcements,” Journal
of Information System Security, vol. 16, no. 1, pp. 3–31, 2020.'
mla: 'Szubartowicz, Eva, and Guido Schryen. “Timing in Information Security: An
Event Study on the Impact of Information Security Investment Announcements.” Journal
of Information System Security, vol. 16, no. 1, Information Institute Publishing,
Washington DC, USA, 2020, pp. 3–31.'
short: E. Szubartowicz, G. Schryen, Journal of Information System Security 16 (2020)
3–31.
date_created: 2020-03-05T10:29:00Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:52:47Z
ddc:
- '000'
department:
- _id: '277'
file:
- access_level: open_access
content_type: application/pdf
creator: hsiemes
date_created: 2020-03-05T10:26:11Z
date_updated: 2020-03-05T10:35:49Z
file_id: '16250'
file_name: Timing in Information Security - JISSEC format PREPUBLICATION.pdf
file_size: 478056
relation: main_file
file_date_updated: 2020-03-05T10:35:49Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: ' 16'
issue: '1'
keyword:
- Event Study
- Information Security
- Investment Announcements
- Stock Price Reaction
- Value of Information Security Investments
language:
- iso: eng
oa: '1'
page: 3 - 31
publication: Journal of Information System Security
publisher: Information Institute Publishing, Washington DC, USA
status: public
title: 'Timing in Information Security: An Event Study on the Impact of Information
Security Investment Announcements'
type: journal_article
user_id: '61579'
volume: 16
year: '2020'
...
---
_id: '17667'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: 'Resolving distributed attacks benefits from collaboration between networks.
We present three approaches for the same multi-domain defensive action that can
be applied in such an alliance: 1) Counteract Everywhere, 2) Minimize Countermeasures,
and 3) Minimize Propagation. First, we provide a formula to compute efficiency
of a defense; then we use this formula to compute the efficiency of the approaches
under various circumstances. Finally, we discuss how task execution order and
timing influence defense efficiency. Our results show that the Minimize Propagation
approach is the most efficient method when defending against the chosen attack.'
author:
- first_name: Ralph
full_name: Koning, Ralph
last_name: Koning
- first_name: Gleb
full_name: Polevoy, Gleb
id: '83983'
last_name: Polevoy
- first_name: Lydia
full_name: Meijer, Lydia
last_name: Meijer
- first_name: Cees
full_name: de Laat, Cees
last_name: de Laat
- first_name: Paola
full_name: Grosso, Paola
last_name: Grosso
citation:
ama: 'Koning R, Polevoy G, Meijer L, de Laat C, Grosso P. Approaches for Collaborative
Security Defences in Multi Network Environments. In: 2019 6th IEEE International
Conference on Cyber Security and Cloud Computing (CSCloud)/ 2019 5th IEEE International
Conference on Edge Computing and Scalable Cloud (EdgeCom). 2019 6th IEEE International
Conference on Cyber Security and Cloud Computing (CSCloud)/ 2019 5th IEEE International
Conference on Edge Computing and Scalable Cloud (EdgeCom). ; 2019:113-123. doi:10.1109/CSCloud/EdgeCom.2019.000-9'
apa: Koning, R., Polevoy, G., Meijer, L., de Laat, C., & Grosso, P. (2019).
Approaches for Collaborative Security Defences in Multi Network Environments.
In 2019 6th IEEE International Conference on Cyber Security and Cloud Computing
(CSCloud)/ 2019 5th IEEE International Conference on Edge Computing and Scalable
Cloud (EdgeCom) (pp. 113–123). https://doi.org/10.1109/CSCloud/EdgeCom.2019.000-9
bibtex: '@inproceedings{Koning_Polevoy_Meijer_de Laat_Grosso_2019, series={2019
6th IEEE International Conference on Cyber Security and Cloud Computing (CSCloud)/
2019 5th IEEE International Conference on Edge Computing and Scalable Cloud (EdgeCom)},
title={Approaches for Collaborative Security Defences in Multi Network Environments},
DOI={10.1109/CSCloud/EdgeCom.2019.000-9},
booktitle={2019 6th IEEE International Conference on Cyber Security and Cloud
Computing (CSCloud)/ 2019 5th IEEE International Conference on Edge Computing
and Scalable Cloud (EdgeCom)}, author={Koning, Ralph and Polevoy, Gleb and Meijer,
Lydia and de Laat, Cees and Grosso, Paola}, year={2019}, pages={113–123}, collection={2019
6th IEEE International Conference on Cyber Security and Cloud Computing (CSCloud)/
2019 5th IEEE International Conference on Edge Computing and Scalable Cloud (EdgeCom)}
}'
chicago: Koning, Ralph, Gleb Polevoy, Lydia Meijer, Cees de Laat, and Paola Grosso.
“Approaches for Collaborative Security Defences in Multi Network Environments.”
In 2019 6th IEEE International Conference on Cyber Security and Cloud Computing
(CSCloud)/ 2019 5th IEEE International Conference on Edge Computing and Scalable
Cloud (EdgeCom), 113–23. 2019 6th IEEE International Conference on Cyber Security
and Cloud Computing (CSCloud)/ 2019 5th IEEE International Conference on Edge
Computing and Scalable Cloud (EdgeCom), 2019. https://doi.org/10.1109/CSCloud/EdgeCom.2019.000-9.
ieee: R. Koning, G. Polevoy, L. Meijer, C. de Laat, and P. Grosso, “Approaches for
Collaborative Security Defences in Multi Network Environments,” in 2019 6th
IEEE International Conference on Cyber Security and Cloud Computing (CSCloud)/
2019 5th IEEE International Conference on Edge Computing and Scalable Cloud (EdgeCom),
2019, pp. 113–123.
mla: Koning, Ralph, et al. “Approaches for Collaborative Security Defences in Multi
Network Environments.” 2019 6th IEEE International Conference on Cyber Security
and Cloud Computing (CSCloud)/ 2019 5th IEEE International Conference on Edge
Computing and Scalable Cloud (EdgeCom), 2019, pp. 113–23, doi:10.1109/CSCloud/EdgeCom.2019.000-9.
short: 'R. Koning, G. Polevoy, L. Meijer, C. de Laat, P. Grosso, in: 2019 6th IEEE
International Conference on Cyber Security and Cloud Computing (CSCloud)/ 2019
5th IEEE International Conference on Edge Computing and Scalable Cloud (EdgeCom),
2019, pp. 113–123.'
conference:
name: 2019 6th IEEE International Conference on Cyber Security and Cloud Computing
(CSCloud)/ 2019 5th IEEE International Conference on Edge Computing and Scalable
Cloud (EdgeCom)
date_created: 2020-08-06T15:23:23Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:53:16Z
department:
- _id: '63'
- _id: '541'
doi: 10.1109/CSCloud/EdgeCom.2019.000-9
extern: '1'
keyword:
- computer network security
- multinetwork environments
- multidomain defensive action
- task execution order
- timing influence defense efficiency
- distributed attacks
- collaborative security defence approach
- minimize propagation approach
- minimize countermeasure approach
- counteract everywhere approach
- Conferences
- Cloud computing
- Computer crime
- Edge computing
- Security
- Defense Approaches
- Multi-Domain Defense
- Collaborative Defense
- Defense Algorithms
- Computer Networks
language:
- iso: eng
main_file_link:
- url: https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/abstract/document/8854057/authors#authors
page: 113-123
publication: 2019 6th IEEE International Conference on Cyber Security and Cloud Computing
(CSCloud)/ 2019 5th IEEE International Conference on Edge Computing and Scalable
Cloud (EdgeCom)
publication_identifier:
issn:
- 'null'
quality_controlled: '1'
series_title: 2019 6th IEEE International Conference on Cyber Security and Cloud Computing
(CSCloud)/ 2019 5th IEEE International Conference on Edge Computing and Scalable
Cloud (EdgeCom)
status: public
title: Approaches for Collaborative Security Defences in Multi Network Environments
type: conference
user_id: '83983'
year: '2019'
...
---
_id: '17666'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: 'Software Defined Networks (SDN) and Network Function Virtualisation (NFV)
provide the basis for autonomous response and mitigation against attacks on networked
computer infrastructures. We propose a new framework that uses SDNs and NFV to
achieve this goal: Secure Autonomous Response Network (SARNET). In a SARNET, an
agent running a control loop constantly assesses the security state of the network
by means of observables. The agent reacts to and resolves security problems, while
learning from its previous decisions. Two main metrics govern the decision process
in a SARNET: impact and efficiency; these metrics can be used to compare and evaluate
countermeasures and are the building blocks for self-learning SARNETs that exhibit
autonomous response. In this paper we present the software implementation of the
SARNET framework, evaluate it in a real-life network and discuss the tradeoffs
between parameters used by the SARNET agent and the efficiency of its actions.'
author:
- first_name: R.
full_name: Koning, R.
last_name: Koning
- first_name: B.
full_name: de Graaff, B.
last_name: de Graaff
- first_name: Gleb
full_name: Polevoy, Gleb
id: '83983'
last_name: Polevoy
- first_name: R.
full_name: Meijer, R.
last_name: Meijer
- first_name: C.
full_name: de Laat, C.
last_name: de Laat
- first_name: P.
full_name: Grosso, P.
last_name: Grosso
citation:
ama: Koning R, de Graaff B, Polevoy G, Meijer R, de Laat C, Grosso P. Measuring
the efficiency of SDN mitigations against attacks on computer infrastructures.
Future Generation Computer Systems. 2018. doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.future.2018.08.011
apa: Koning, R., de Graaff, B., Polevoy, G., Meijer, R., de Laat, C., & Grosso,
P. (2018). Measuring the efficiency of SDN mitigations against attacks on computer
infrastructures. Future Generation Computer Systems. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.future.2018.08.011
bibtex: '@article{Koning_de Graaff_Polevoy_Meijer_de Laat_Grosso_2018, title={Measuring
the efficiency of SDN mitigations against attacks on computer infrastructures},
DOI={https://doi.org/10.1016/j.future.2018.08.011},
journal={Future Generation Computer Systems}, author={Koning, R. and de Graaff,
B. and Polevoy, Gleb and Meijer, R. and de Laat, C. and Grosso, P.}, year={2018}
}'
chicago: Koning, R., B. de Graaff, Gleb Polevoy, R. Meijer, C. de Laat, and P. Grosso.
“Measuring the Efficiency of SDN Mitigations against Attacks on Computer Infrastructures.”
Future Generation Computer Systems, 2018. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.future.2018.08.011.
ieee: R. Koning, B. de Graaff, G. Polevoy, R. Meijer, C. de Laat, and P. Grosso,
“Measuring the efficiency of SDN mitigations against attacks on computer infrastructures,”
Future Generation Computer Systems, 2018.
mla: Koning, R., et al. “Measuring the Efficiency of SDN Mitigations against Attacks
on Computer Infrastructures.” Future Generation Computer Systems, 2018,
doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.future.2018.08.011.
short: R. Koning, B. de Graaff, G. Polevoy, R. Meijer, C. de Laat, P. Grosso, Future
Generation Computer Systems (2018).
date_created: 2020-08-06T15:23:11Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:53:16Z
department:
- _id: '63'
- _id: '541'
doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.future.2018.08.011
extern: '1'
keyword:
- Software defined networks
- Network function virtualization
- Cyber attacks
- Cyber security
- Defense efficiency
- Overlay networks
language:
- iso: eng
publication: Future Generation Computer Systems
publication_identifier:
issn:
- 0167-739X
status: public
title: Measuring the efficiency of SDN mitigations against attacks on computer infrastructures
type: journal_article
user_id: '83983'
year: '2018'
...
---
_id: '5586'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: The need to protect resources against attackers is reflected by huge information
security investments of firms worldwide. In the presence of budget constraints
and a diverse set of assets to protect, organizations have to decide in which
IT security measures to invest, how to evaluate those investment decisions, and
how to learn from past decisions to optimize future security investment actions.
While the academic literature has provided valuable insights into these issues,
there is a lack of empirical contributions. To address this lack, we conduct a
theory-based exploratory multiple case study. Our case study reveals that (1)
firms? investments in information security are largely driven by external environmental
and industry-related factors, (2) firms do not implement standardized decision
processes, (3) the security process is perceived to impact the business process
in a disturbing way, (4) both the implementation of evaluation processes and the
application of metrics are hardly existent and (5) learning activities mainly
occur at an ad-hoc basis.
author:
- first_name: Eva
full_name: Weishäupl, Eva
last_name: Weishäupl
- first_name: Emrah
full_name: Yasasin, Emrah
last_name: Yasasin
- first_name: Guido
full_name: Schryen, Guido
id: '72850'
last_name: Schryen
citation:
ama: 'Weishäupl E, Yasasin E, Schryen G. Information Security Investments: An Exploratory
Multiple Case Study on Decision-Making, Evaluation and Learning. Computers
& Security. 2018;77:807-823.'
apa: 'Weishäupl, E., Yasasin, E., & Schryen, G. (2018). Information Security
Investments: An Exploratory Multiple Case Study on Decision-Making, Evaluation
and Learning. Computers & Security, 77, 807–823.'
bibtex: '@article{Weishäupl_Yasasin_Schryen_2018, title={Information Security Investments:
An Exploratory Multiple Case Study on Decision-Making, Evaluation and Learning},
volume={77}, journal={Computers & Security}, publisher={Elsevier}, author={Weishäupl,
Eva and Yasasin, Emrah and Schryen, Guido}, year={2018}, pages={807–823} }'
chicago: 'Weishäupl, Eva, Emrah Yasasin, and Guido Schryen. “Information Security
Investments: An Exploratory Multiple Case Study on Decision-Making, Evaluation
and Learning.” Computers & Security 77 (2018): 807–23.'
ieee: 'E. Weishäupl, E. Yasasin, and G. Schryen, “Information Security Investments:
An Exploratory Multiple Case Study on Decision-Making, Evaluation and Learning,”
Computers & Security, vol. 77, pp. 807–823, 2018.'
mla: 'Weishäupl, Eva, et al. “Information Security Investments: An Exploratory Multiple
Case Study on Decision-Making, Evaluation and Learning.” Computers & Security,
vol. 77, Elsevier, 2018, pp. 807–23.'
short: E. Weishäupl, E. Yasasin, G. Schryen, Computers & Security 77 (2018)
807–823.
date_created: 2018-11-14T11:24:37Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:02:03Z
ddc:
- '000'
department:
- _id: '277'
extern: '1'
file:
- access_level: open_access
content_type: application/pdf
creator: hsiemes
date_created: 2018-12-07T11:26:53Z
date_updated: 2018-12-13T15:06:10Z
file_id: '6022'
file_name: JOURNAL VERSION.pdf
file_size: 809490
relation: main_file
file_date_updated: 2018-12-13T15:06:10Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: ' 77'
keyword:
- Information Security Investments
- Multiple Case Study
- Organizations
- Single Loop Learning
- Double Loop Learning
language:
- iso: eng
oa: '1'
page: 807 - 823
publication: Computers & Security
publisher: Elsevier
status: public
title: 'Information Security Investments: An Exploratory Multiple Case Study on Decision-Making,
Evaluation and Learning'
type: journal_article
user_id: '61579'
volume: 77
year: '2018'
...
---
_id: '20719'
author:
- first_name: Philipp
full_name: Holzinger, Philipp
last_name: Holzinger
- first_name: Stefan
full_name: Triller, Stefan
last_name: Triller
- first_name: Alexandre
full_name: Bartel, Alexandre
last_name: Bartel
- first_name: Eric
full_name: Bodden, Eric
id: '59256'
last_name: Bodden
orcid: 0000-0003-3470-3647
citation:
ama: 'Holzinger P, Triller S, Bartel A, Bodden E. An In-Depth Study of More Than
Ten Years of Java Exploitation. In: Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference
on Computer and Communications Security. CCS ’16. ; 2016:779-790. doi:http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/2976749.2978361'
apa: Holzinger, P., Triller, S., Bartel, A., & Bodden, E. (2016). An In-Depth
Study of More Than Ten Years of Java Exploitation. Proceedings of the 2016
ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security, 779–790. http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/2976749.2978361
bibtex: '@inproceedings{Holzinger_Triller_Bartel_Bodden_2016, series={CCS ’16},
title={An In-Depth Study of More Than Ten Years of Java Exploitation}, DOI={http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/2976749.2978361},
booktitle={Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications
Security}, author={Holzinger, Philipp and Triller, Stefan and Bartel, Alexandre
and Bodden, Eric}, year={2016}, pages={779–790}, collection={CCS ’16} }'
chicago: Holzinger, Philipp, Stefan Triller, Alexandre Bartel, and Eric Bodden.
“An In-Depth Study of More Than Ten Years of Java Exploitation.” In Proceedings
of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security,
779–90. CCS ’16, 2016. http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/2976749.2978361.
ieee: 'P. Holzinger, S. Triller, A. Bartel, and E. Bodden, “An In-Depth Study of
More Than Ten Years of Java Exploitation,” in Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC
Conference on Computer and Communications Security, 2016, pp. 779–790, doi:
http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/2976749.2978361.'
mla: Holzinger, Philipp, et al. “An In-Depth Study of More Than Ten Years of Java
Exploitation.” Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and
Communications Security, 2016, pp. 779–90, doi:http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/2976749.2978361.
short: 'P. Holzinger, S. Triller, A. Bartel, E. Bodden, in: Proceedings of the 2016
ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security, 2016, pp. 779–790.'
date_created: 2020-12-14T11:58:33Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:54:34Z
department:
- _id: '76'
doi: http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/2976749.2978361
keyword:
- ATTRACT
- access control
- exploits
- java security
- security analysis
- ITSECWEBSITE
language:
- iso: eng
page: 779-790
publication: Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications
Security
publication_identifier:
isbn:
- 978-1-4503-4139-4
series_title: CCS '16
status: public
title: An In-Depth Study of More Than Ten Years of Java Exploitation
type: conference
user_id: '5786'
year: '2016'
...
---
_id: '5588'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: The protection of information technology (IT) has become and is predicted
to remain a key economic challenge for organizations. While research on IT security
investment is fast growing, it lacks a theoretical basis for structuring research,
explaining economic-technological phenomena and guide future research. We address
this shortcoming by suggesting a new theoretical model emerging from a multi-theoretical
perspective adopt-ing the Resource-Based View and the Organizational Learning
Theory. The joint appli-cation of these theories allows to conceptualize in one
theoretical model the organiza-tional learning effects that occur when the protection
of organizational resources through IT security countermeasures develops over
time. We use this model of IT security invest-ments to synthesize findings of
a large body of literature and to derive research gaps. We also discuss managerial
implications of (closing) these gaps by providing practical ex-amples.
author:
- first_name: Eva
full_name: Weishäupl, Eva
last_name: Weishäupl
- first_name: Emrah
full_name: Yasasin, Emrah
last_name: Yasasin
- first_name: Guido
full_name: Schryen, Guido
id: '72850'
last_name: Schryen
citation:
ama: 'Weishäupl E, Yasasin E, Schryen G. A Multi-Theoretical Literature Review on
Information Security Investments using the Resource-Based View and the Organizational
Learning Theory. In: International Conference on Information Systems. ;
2015.'
apa: Weishäupl, E., Yasasin, E., & Schryen, G. (2015). A Multi-Theoretical Literature
Review on Information Security Investments using the Resource-Based View and the
Organizational Learning Theory. In International Conference on Information
Systems.
bibtex: '@inproceedings{Weishäupl_Yasasin_Schryen_2015, title={A Multi-Theoretical
Literature Review on Information Security Investments using the Resource-Based
View and the Organizational Learning Theory}, booktitle={International Conference
on Information Systems}, author={Weishäupl, Eva and Yasasin, Emrah and Schryen,
Guido}, year={2015} }'
chicago: Weishäupl, Eva, Emrah Yasasin, and Guido Schryen. “A Multi-Theoretical
Literature Review on Information Security Investments Using the Resource-Based
View and the Organizational Learning Theory.” In International Conference on
Information Systems, 2015.
ieee: E. Weishäupl, E. Yasasin, and G. Schryen, “A Multi-Theoretical Literature
Review on Information Security Investments using the Resource-Based View and the
Organizational Learning Theory,” in International Conference on Information
Systems, 2015.
mla: Weishäupl, Eva, et al. “A Multi-Theoretical Literature Review on Information
Security Investments Using the Resource-Based View and the Organizational Learning
Theory.” International Conference on Information Systems, 2015.
short: 'E. Weishäupl, E. Yasasin, G. Schryen, in: International Conference on Information
Systems, 2015.'
date_created: 2018-11-14T11:25:38Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:02:03Z
ddc:
- '000'
department:
- _id: '277'
extern: '1'
file:
- access_level: open_access
content_type: application/pdf
creator: hsiemes
date_created: 2018-12-07T11:45:31Z
date_updated: 2018-12-13T15:09:32Z
file_id: '6038'
file_name: ICIS PROCEEDINGS PAPER - Security Investments.pdf
file_size: 958019
relation: main_file
file_date_updated: 2018-12-13T15:09:32Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
keyword:
- Information Security
- Investment
- Literature review
- Resource-based View
- Organi-zational Learning Theory
- Multi-theoretical Perspective
language:
- iso: eng
oa: '1'
publication: International Conference on Information Systems
status: public
title: A Multi-Theoretical Literature Review on Information Security Investments using
the Resource-Based View and the Organizational Learning Theory
type: conference
user_id: '61579'
year: '2015'
...
---
_id: '5590'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: 'Nowadays, providing employees with failure-free access to various systems,
applications and services is a crucial factor for organizations? success as disturbances
potentially inhibit smooth workflows and thereby harm productivity. However, it
is a challenging task to assign access rights to employees? accounts within a
satisfying time frame. In addition, the management of multiple accounts and identities
can be very onerous and time consuming for the responsible administrator and therefore
expensive for the organization. In order to meet these challenges, firms decide
to invest in introducing an Identity and Access Management System (IAMS) that
supports the organization by using policies to assign permissions to accounts,
groups, and roles. In practice, since various versions of IAMSs exist, it is a
challenging task to decide upon introduction of an IAMS. The following study proposes
a first attempt of a decision support model for practitioners which considers
four alternatives: Introduction of an IAMS with Role-based Access Control RBAC)
or without and no introduction of IAMS again with or without RBAC. To underpin
the practical applicability of the proposed model, we parametrize and operationalize
it based on a real world use case using input from an expert interview.'
author:
- first_name: Eva
full_name: Weishäupl, Eva
last_name: Weishäupl
- first_name: Michael
full_name: Kunz, Michael
last_name: Kunz
- first_name: Emrah
full_name: Yasasin, Emrah
last_name: Yasasin
- first_name: Gerit
full_name: Wagner, Gerit
last_name: Wagner
- first_name: Julian
full_name: Prester, Julian
last_name: Prester
- first_name: Guido
full_name: Schryen, Guido
id: '72850'
last_name: Schryen
- first_name: Günther
full_name: Pernul, Günther
last_name: Pernul
citation:
ama: 'Weishäupl E, Kunz M, Yasasin E, et al. Towards an Economic Approach to Identity
and Access Management Systems Using Decision Theory. In: 2nd International
Workshop on Security in Highly Connected IT Systems (SHCIS?15). ; 2015.'
apa: Weishäupl, E., Kunz, M., Yasasin, E., Wagner, G., Prester, J., Schryen, G.,
& Pernul, G. (2015). Towards an Economic Approach to Identity and Access Management
Systems Using Decision Theory. In 2nd International Workshop on Security in
highly connected IT Systems (SHCIS?15).
bibtex: '@inproceedings{Weishäupl_Kunz_Yasasin_Wagner_Prester_Schryen_Pernul_2015,
title={Towards an Economic Approach to Identity and Access Management Systems
Using Decision Theory}, booktitle={2nd International Workshop on Security in highly
connected IT Systems (SHCIS?15)}, author={Weishäupl, Eva and Kunz, Michael and
Yasasin, Emrah and Wagner, Gerit and Prester, Julian and Schryen, Guido and Pernul,
Günther}, year={2015} }'
chicago: Weishäupl, Eva, Michael Kunz, Emrah Yasasin, Gerit Wagner, Julian Prester,
Guido Schryen, and Günther Pernul. “Towards an Economic Approach to Identity and
Access Management Systems Using Decision Theory.” In 2nd International Workshop
on Security in Highly Connected IT Systems (SHCIS?15), 2015.
ieee: E. Weishäupl et al., “Towards an Economic Approach to Identity and
Access Management Systems Using Decision Theory,” in 2nd International Workshop
on Security in highly connected IT Systems (SHCIS?15), 2015.
mla: Weishäupl, Eva, et al. “Towards an Economic Approach to Identity and Access
Management Systems Using Decision Theory.” 2nd International Workshop on Security
in Highly Connected IT Systems (SHCIS?15), 2015.
short: 'E. Weishäupl, M. Kunz, E. Yasasin, G. Wagner, J. Prester, G. Schryen, G.
Pernul, in: 2nd International Workshop on Security in Highly Connected IT Systems
(SHCIS?15), 2015.'
date_created: 2018-11-14T11:27:20Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:02:04Z
ddc:
- '000'
department:
- _id: '277'
extern: '1'
file:
- access_level: open_access
content_type: application/pdf
creator: hsiemes
date_created: 2018-12-07T11:46:28Z
date_updated: 2018-12-13T15:09:54Z
file_id: '6040'
file_name: Towards an Economic Approach to IAMS.PDF
file_size: 166015
relation: main_file
file_date_updated: 2018-12-13T15:09:54Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
keyword:
- Identity and Access Management
- Economic Decision Making
- Information Systems
- Information Security Investment
- Decision Theory
language:
- iso: eng
oa: '1'
publication: 2nd International Workshop on Security in highly connected IT Systems
(SHCIS?15)
status: public
title: Towards an Economic Approach to Identity and Access Management Systems Using
Decision Theory
type: conference
user_id: '61579'
year: '2015'
...
---
_id: '5621'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: Remote voting through the Internet provides convenience and access to the
electorate. At the same time, the security concerns facing any distributed application
are magnified when the task is so crucial to democratic society. In addition,
some of the electoral process loses transparency when it is encapsulated in information
technology. In this paper, we examine the public record of three recent elections
that used Internet voting. Our specific goal is to identify any potential flaws
that security experts would recognize, but may have not been identified in the
rush to implement technology. To do this, we present a multiple exploratory case
study, looking at elections conducted between 2006 and 2007 in Estonia, Netherlands,
and Switzerland. These elections were selected as particularly interesting and
accessible, and each presents its own technical and security challenges. The electoral
environment, technical design and process for each election are described, including
reconstruction of details which are implied but not specified within the source
material. We found that all three elections warrant significant concern about
voter security, verifiability, and transparency. Usability, our fourth area of
focus, seems to have been well-addressed in these elections. While our analysis
is based on public documents and previously published reports, and therefore lacking
access to any confidential materials held by electoral officials, this comparative
analysis provides interesting insight and consistent questions across all these
cases. Effective review of Internet voting requires an aggressive stance towards
identifying potential security and operational flaws, and we encourage the use
of third party reviews with critical technology skills during design, programming,
and voting to reduce the changes of failure or fraud that would undermine public
confidence.
author:
- first_name: Guido
full_name: Schryen, Guido
id: '72850'
last_name: Schryen
- first_name: Eliot
full_name: Rich, Eliot
last_name: Rich
citation:
ama: 'Schryen G, Rich E. Security in Large-Scale Internet Elections: A Retrospective
Analysis of Elections in Estonia, The Netherlands, and Switzerland. IEEE Transactions
on Information Forensics \& Security. 2009;4(4 Part):729-744.'
apa: 'Schryen, G., & Rich, E. (2009). Security in Large-Scale Internet Elections:
A Retrospective Analysis of Elections in Estonia, The Netherlands, and Switzerland.
IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics \& Security, 4(4
Part), 729–744.'
bibtex: '@article{Schryen_Rich_2009, title={Security in Large-Scale Internet Elections:
A Retrospective Analysis of Elections in Estonia, The Netherlands, and Switzerland},
volume={4}, number={4 Part}, journal={IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics
\& Security}, publisher={IEEE}, author={Schryen, Guido and Rich, Eliot}, year={2009},
pages={729–744} }'
chicago: 'Schryen, Guido, and Eliot Rich. “Security in Large-Scale Internet Elections:
A Retrospective Analysis of Elections in Estonia, The Netherlands, and Switzerland.”
IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics \& Security 4, no. 4 Part
(2009): 729–44.'
ieee: 'G. Schryen and E. Rich, “Security in Large-Scale Internet Elections: A Retrospective
Analysis of Elections in Estonia, The Netherlands, and Switzerland,” IEEE Transactions
on Information Forensics \& Security, vol. 4, no. 4 Part, pp. 729–744,
2009.'
mla: 'Schryen, Guido, and Eliot Rich. “Security in Large-Scale Internet Elections:
A Retrospective Analysis of Elections in Estonia, The Netherlands, and Switzerland.”
IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics \& Security, vol. 4, no.
4 Part, IEEE, 2009, pp. 729–44.'
short: G. Schryen, E. Rich, IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics \& Security
4 (2009) 729–744.
date_created: 2018-11-14T14:06:44Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:02:12Z
ddc:
- '000'
department:
- _id: '277'
extern: '1'
file:
- access_level: open_access
content_type: application/pdf
creator: hsiemes
date_created: 2018-12-18T13:16:07Z
date_updated: 2018-12-18T13:16:07Z
file_id: '6316'
file_name: JOURNAL VERSION.pdf
file_size: 1544790
relation: main_file
file_date_updated: 2018-12-18T13:16:07Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: ' 4'
issue: 4 Part
keyword:
- e-voting
- Internet voting
- Internet election
- security
- verifiability
- RIES
- Estonia
- Neuch{\^a}tel
language:
- iso: eng
oa: '1'
page: 729-744
publication: IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics \& Security
publisher: IEEE
status: public
title: 'Security in Large-Scale Internet Elections: A Retrospective Analysis of Elections
in Estonia, The Netherlands, and Switzerland'
type: journal_article
user_id: '61579'
volume: 4
year: '2009'
...
---
_id: '5625'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: The increasing availability and deployment of open source software in personal
and commercial environments makes open source software highly appealing for hackers,
and others who are interested in exploiting software vulnerabilities. This deployment
has resulted in a debate ?full of religion? on the security of open source software
compared to that of closed source software. However, beyond such arguments, only
little quantitative analysis on this research issue has taken place. We discuss
the state-of-the-art of the security debate and identify shortcomings. Based on
these, we propose new metrics, which allows to answer the question to what extent
the review process of open source and closed source development has helped to
fix vulnerabilities. We illustrate the application of some of these metrics in
a case study on OpenOffice (open source software) vs. Microsoft Office (closed
source software).
author:
- first_name: Guido
full_name: Schryen, Guido
id: '72850'
last_name: Schryen
- first_name: Rouven
full_name: Kadura, Rouven
last_name: Kadura
citation:
ama: 'Schryen G, Kadura R. Open Source vs. Closed Source Software: Towards Measuring
Security. In: 24th Annual ACM Symposium on Applied Computing. ; 2009.'
apa: 'Schryen, G., & Kadura, R. (2009). Open Source vs. Closed Source Software:
Towards Measuring Security. In 24th Annual ACM Symposium on Applied Computing.'
bibtex: '@inproceedings{Schryen_Kadura_2009, title={Open Source vs. Closed Source
Software: Towards Measuring Security}, booktitle={24th Annual ACM Symposium on
Applied Computing}, author={Schryen, Guido and Kadura, Rouven}, year={2009} }'
chicago: 'Schryen, Guido, and Rouven Kadura. “Open Source vs. Closed Source Software:
Towards Measuring Security.” In 24th Annual ACM Symposium on Applied Computing,
2009.'
ieee: 'G. Schryen and R. Kadura, “Open Source vs. Closed Source Software: Towards
Measuring Security,” in 24th Annual ACM Symposium on Applied Computing,
2009.'
mla: 'Schryen, Guido, and Rouven Kadura. “Open Source vs. Closed Source Software:
Towards Measuring Security.” 24th Annual ACM Symposium on Applied Computing,
2009.'
short: 'G. Schryen, R. Kadura, in: 24th Annual ACM Symposium on Applied Computing,
2009.'
date_created: 2018-11-14T14:12:27Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:02:13Z
ddc:
- '000'
department:
- _id: '277'
extern: '1'
file:
- access_level: open_access
content_type: application/pdf
creator: hsiemes
date_created: 2018-12-18T13:14:09Z
date_updated: 2018-12-18T13:14:09Z
file_id: '6310'
file_name: ACM VERSION.pdf
file_size: 456497
relation: main_file
file_date_updated: 2018-12-18T13:14:09Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
keyword:
- Open source software
- Closed source software
- Security
- Metrics
language:
- iso: eng
oa: '1'
publication: 24th Annual ACM Symposium on Applied Computing
status: public
title: 'Open Source vs. Closed Source Software: Towards Measuring Security'
type: conference
user_id: '61579'
year: '2009'
...
---
_id: '5647'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: Reviewing literature on open source and closed source security reveals that
the discussion is often determined by biased attitudes toward one of these development
styles. The discussion specifically lacks appropriate metrics, methodology and
hard data. This paper contributes to solving this problem by analyzing and comparing
published vulnerabilities of eight open source software and nine closed source
software packages, all of which are widely deployed. Thereby, it provides an extensive
empirical analysis of vulnerabilities in terms of mean time between vulnerability
disclosures, the development of disclosure over time, and the severity of vulnerabilities,
and allows for validating models provided in the literature. The investigation
reveals that (a) the mean time between vulnerability disclosures was lower for
open source software in half of the cases, while the other cases show no differences,
(b) in contrast to literature assumption, 14 out of 17 software packages showed
a significant linear or piecewise linear correlation between time and the number
of published vulnerabilities, and (c) regarding the severity of vulnerabilities,
no significant differences were found between open source and closed source.
author:
- first_name: Guido
full_name: Schryen, Guido
id: '72850'
last_name: Schryen
citation:
ama: 'Schryen G. Security of open source and closed source software: An empirical
comparison of published vulnerabilities. In: 15th Americas Conference on Information
Systems. ; 2009.'
apa: 'Schryen, G. (2009). Security of open source and closed source software: An
empirical comparison of published vulnerabilities. In 15th Americas Conference
on Information Systems.'
bibtex: '@inproceedings{Schryen_2009, title={Security of open source and closed
source software: An empirical comparison of published vulnerabilities}, booktitle={15th
Americas Conference on Information Systems}, author={Schryen, Guido}, year={2009}
}'
chicago: 'Schryen, Guido. “Security of Open Source and Closed Source Software: An
Empirical Comparison of Published Vulnerabilities.” In 15th Americas Conference
on Information Systems, 2009.'
ieee: 'G. Schryen, “Security of open source and closed source software: An empirical
comparison of published vulnerabilities,” in 15th Americas Conference on Information
Systems, 2009.'
mla: 'Schryen, Guido. “Security of Open Source and Closed Source Software: An Empirical
Comparison of Published Vulnerabilities.” 15th Americas Conference on Information
Systems, 2009.'
short: 'G. Schryen, in: 15th Americas Conference on Information Systems, 2009.'
date_created: 2018-11-14T14:41:24Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:02:19Z
ddc:
- '000'
department:
- _id: '277'
extern: '1'
file:
- access_level: open_access
content_type: application/pdf
creator: hsiemes
date_created: 2018-12-18T13:16:39Z
date_updated: 2018-12-18T13:16:39Z
file_id: '6317'
file_name: Security of Open Source and Closed Source Software An Empirical - AMCIS
Version.pdf
file_size: 483690
relation: main_file
file_date_updated: 2018-12-18T13:16:39Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
keyword:
- Vulnerabilities
- security
- open source software
- closed source software
- empirical comparison
language:
- iso: eng
oa: '1'
publication: 15th Americas Conference on Information Systems
status: public
title: 'Security of open source and closed source software: An empirical comparison
of published vulnerabilities'
type: conference
user_id: '61579'
year: '2009'
...
---
_id: '5649'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: The Estonian parliamentary election in 2007 is regarded as a success story
of large-scale Internet elections. I use this election in a single case study
on practical security to show that low quality of security and its management
does not necessarily prevent large-scale Internet elections from being conducted.
I also provide research propositions with regard to future challenges for large-scale
Internet elections.
author:
- first_name: Guido
full_name: Schryen, Guido
id: '72850'
last_name: Schryen
citation:
ama: 'Schryen G. Practical Security of Large-scale Elections: An Exploratory Case
Study of Internet Voting in Estonia. In: 7th Workshop on E-Business (WEB 2008,
AIS Special Interest Group on E-Business). ; 2008.'
apa: 'Schryen, G. (2008). Practical Security of Large-scale Elections: An Exploratory
Case Study of Internet Voting in Estonia. In 7th Workshop on e-Business (WEB
2008, AIS Special Interest Group on E-Business).'
bibtex: '@inproceedings{Schryen_2008, title={Practical Security of Large-scale Elections:
An Exploratory Case Study of Internet Voting in Estonia}, booktitle={7th Workshop
on e-Business (WEB 2008, AIS Special Interest Group on E-Business)}, author={Schryen,
Guido}, year={2008} }'
chicago: 'Schryen, Guido. “Practical Security of Large-Scale Elections: An Exploratory
Case Study of Internet Voting in Estonia.” In 7th Workshop on E-Business (WEB
2008, AIS Special Interest Group on E-Business), 2008.'
ieee: 'G. Schryen, “Practical Security of Large-scale Elections: An Exploratory
Case Study of Internet Voting in Estonia,” in 7th Workshop on e-Business (WEB
2008, AIS Special Interest Group on E-Business), 2008.'
mla: 'Schryen, Guido. “Practical Security of Large-Scale Elections: An Exploratory
Case Study of Internet Voting in Estonia.” 7th Workshop on E-Business (WEB
2008, AIS Special Interest Group on E-Business), 2008.'
short: 'G. Schryen, in: 7th Workshop on E-Business (WEB 2008, AIS Special Interest
Group on E-Business), 2008.'
date_created: 2018-11-14T14:43:23Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:02:20Z
ddc:
- '000'
department:
- _id: '277'
extern: '1'
file:
- access_level: open_access
content_type: application/pdf
creator: hsiemes
date_created: 2018-12-18T13:18:21Z
date_updated: 2018-12-18T13:18:21Z
file_id: '6320'
file_name: Schryen - Practical Security of Large-scale Elections - LNBIP - web version.pdf
file_size: 273231
relation: main_file
file_date_updated: 2018-12-18T13:18:21Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
keyword:
- Internet voting
- large-scale election
- Estonian parliamen- tary election
- security
- security management
language:
- iso: eng
oa: '1'
publication: 7th Workshop on e-Business (WEB 2008, AIS Special Interest Group on E-Business)
status: public
title: 'Practical Security of Large-scale Elections: An Exploratory Case Study of
Internet Voting in Estonia'
type: conference
user_id: '61579'
year: '2008'
...
---
_id: '5658'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: 'Email communication is encumbered with a mass of email messages which their
recipients have neither requested nor require. Even worse, the impacts of these
messages are far from being simply an annoyance, as they also involve economic
damage. This manuscript examines the resource ?email addresses?, which is vital
for any potential bulk mailer and spammer. Both a methodology and a honeypot conceptualization
for implementing an empirical analysis of the usage of email addresses placed
on the Internet are proposed here. Their objective is to assess, on a quantitative
basis, the extent of the current harassment and its development over time. This
?framework? is intended to be extensible to measuring the effectiveness of address-obscuring
techniques. The implementation of a pilot honeypot is described, which led to
key findings, some of them being: (1) Web placements attract more than two-thirds
(70\%) of all honeypot spam emails, followed by newsgroup placements (28.6\%)
and newsletter subscriptions (1.4\%), (2) the proportions of spam relating to
the email addresses? top-level domain can be statistically assumed to be uniformly
distributed, (3) More than 43\% of addresses on the web have been abused, whereas
about 27\% was the case for addresses on newsgroups and only about 4\% was the
case for addresses used for a newsletter subscription, (4) Regarding the development
of email addresses? attractiveness for spammers over time, the service ?web sites?
features a negative linear relationship, whereas the service ?Usenet? hows a negative
exponential relationship. (5) Only 1.54\% of the spam emails showed an interrelation
between the topic of the spam email and that of the location where the recipient?s
address was placed, so that spammers are assumed to send their emails in a ?context
insensitive? manner. The results of the empirical analysis motivate the need for
the protection of email addresses through obscuration. We analyze this need by
formulating requirements for address obscuring techniques and we reveal to which
extent today?s most relevant approaches fulfill these requirements.'
author:
- first_name: Guido
full_name: Schryen, Guido
id: '72850'
last_name: Schryen
citation:
ama: Schryen G. The Impact that Placing Email Addresses on the Internet has on the
Receipt of Spam ? An Empirical Analysis. Computers & Security. 2007;2(5):361-372.
apa: Schryen, G. (2007). The Impact that Placing Email Addresses on the Internet
has on the Receipt of Spam ? An Empirical Analysis. Computers & Security,
2(5), 361–372.
bibtex: '@article{Schryen_2007, title={The Impact that Placing Email Addresses on
the Internet has on the Receipt of Spam ? An Empirical Analysis}, volume={2},
number={5}, journal={Computers & Security}, publisher={Elsevier}, author={Schryen,
Guido}, year={2007}, pages={361–372} }'
chicago: 'Schryen, Guido. “The Impact That Placing Email Addresses on the Internet
Has on the Receipt of Spam ? An Empirical Analysis.” Computers & Security
2, no. 5 (2007): 361–72.'
ieee: G. Schryen, “The Impact that Placing Email Addresses on the Internet has on
the Receipt of Spam ? An Empirical Analysis,” Computers & Security,
vol. 2, no. 5, pp. 361–372, 2007.
mla: Schryen, Guido. “The Impact That Placing Email Addresses on the Internet Has
on the Receipt of Spam ? An Empirical Analysis.” Computers & Security,
vol. 2, no. 5, Elsevier, 2007, pp. 361–72.
short: G. Schryen, Computers & Security 2 (2007) 361–372.
date_created: 2018-11-14T14:53:12Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:02:22Z
ddc:
- '000'
department:
- _id: '277'
extern: '1'
file:
- access_level: open_access
content_type: application/pdf
creator: hsiemes
date_created: 2018-12-18T13:27:01Z
date_updated: 2018-12-18T13:27:01Z
file_id: '6326'
file_name: The Impact that Placing Email Addresses on the Internet has on the Receipt
of Spam - An Empirical Analysis - Journal version.pdf
file_size: 3026200
relation: main_file
file_date_updated: 2018-12-18T13:27:01Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: ' 2'
issue: '5'
keyword:
- Address-obfuscating techniques
- email
- empirical analysis
- honeypot
- security by design
- security by obscurity
- spam
language:
- iso: eng
oa: '1'
page: 361-372
publication: Computers & Security
publisher: Elsevier
status: public
title: The Impact that Placing Email Addresses on the Internet has on the Receipt
of Spam ? An Empirical Analysis
type: journal_article
user_id: '61579'
volume: 2
year: '2007'
...
---
_id: '39050'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: Currently, middleware for smart home networks with embedded and mobile devices
are in the focus of several investigations. In this paper, we propose a middleware
for secure management of device and user profiles by integrating a profile database
with a generic authentication scheme for an X.509 enabled ticket management in
the context of the OSGi framework. After the introduction of the individual system
components and their interaction, we also discuss potential system attacks.
author:
- first_name: Max
full_name: Ziegler, Max
last_name: Ziegler
- first_name: Wolfgang
full_name: Müller, Wolfgang
id: '16243'
last_name: Müller
- first_name: Robbie
full_name: Schäfer, Robbie
last_name: Schäfer
- first_name: Chris
full_name: Loeser, Chris
last_name: Loeser
citation:
ama: 'Ziegler M, Müller W, Schäfer R, Loeser C. Secure Profile Management in Smart
Home Networks. In: Proceedings of the 1st International Workshop on Secure
and Ubiquitous Networks (SUN-2005). IEEE; 2005. doi:10.1109/DEXA.2005.171'
apa: Ziegler, M., Müller, W., Schäfer, R., & Loeser, C. (2005). Secure Profile
Management in Smart Home Networks. Proceedings of the 1st International Workshop
on Secure and Ubiquitous Networks (SUN-2005). 16th International Workshop
on Database and Expert Systems Applications (DEXA’05), Copenhagen, Denmark . https://doi.org/10.1109/DEXA.2005.171
bibtex: '@inproceedings{Ziegler_Müller_Schäfer_Loeser_2005, place={Copenhagen, Denmark
}, title={Secure Profile Management in Smart Home Networks}, DOI={10.1109/DEXA.2005.171},
booktitle={Proceedings of the 1st International Workshop on Secure and Ubiquitous
Networks (SUN-2005)}, publisher={IEEE}, author={Ziegler, Max and Müller, Wolfgang
and Schäfer, Robbie and Loeser, Chris}, year={2005} }'
chicago: 'Ziegler, Max, Wolfgang Müller, Robbie Schäfer, and Chris Loeser. “Secure
Profile Management in Smart Home Networks.” In Proceedings of the 1st International
Workshop on Secure and Ubiquitous Networks (SUN-2005). Copenhagen, Denmark
: IEEE, 2005. https://doi.org/10.1109/DEXA.2005.171.'
ieee: 'M. Ziegler, W. Müller, R. Schäfer, and C. Loeser, “Secure Profile Management
in Smart Home Networks,” presented at the 16th International Workshop on Database
and Expert Systems Applications (DEXA’05), Copenhagen, Denmark , 2005, doi: 10.1109/DEXA.2005.171.'
mla: Ziegler, Max, et al. “Secure Profile Management in Smart Home Networks.” Proceedings
of the 1st International Workshop on Secure and Ubiquitous Networks (SUN-2005),
IEEE, 2005, doi:10.1109/DEXA.2005.171.
short: 'M. Ziegler, W. Müller, R. Schäfer, C. Loeser, in: Proceedings of the 1st
International Workshop on Secure and Ubiquitous Networks (SUN-2005), IEEE, Copenhagen,
Denmark , 2005.'
conference:
location: 'Copenhagen, Denmark '
name: 16th International Workshop on Database and Expert Systems Applications (DEXA'05)
date_created: 2023-01-24T08:39:45Z
date_updated: 2023-01-24T08:39:50Z
department:
- _id: '672'
doi: 10.1109/DEXA.2005.171
keyword:
- Intelligent networks
- Smart homes
- Middleware
- Project management
- Data security
- Ubiquitous computing
- Context-aware services
- Computer architecture
- Home automation
- Environmental management
language:
- iso: eng
place: 'Copenhagen, Denmark '
publication: Proceedings of the 1st International Workshop on Secure and Ubiquitous
Networks (SUN-2005)
publication_identifier:
isbn:
- 0-7695-2424-9
publisher: IEEE
status: public
title: Secure Profile Management in Smart Home Networks
type: conference
user_id: '5786'
year: '2005'
...
---
_id: '5667'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: Voting via the Internet is part of electronic government and electronic democracy.
However, there are many obstacles which have to be overcome, especially legal
restrictions have to be transformed into technical and security solutions. In
the first part the article discusses advantages and disadvantages of Internet
elections, shows different application fields, and presents important international
pilot schemes (political and business ones). in the second part, due to democratic
basic principles, technological security aspects are worked out.
author:
- first_name: Guido
full_name: Schryen, Guido
id: '72850'
last_name: Schryen
citation:
ama: 'Schryen G. E-Democracy: Internet Voting. In: Proceedings of the IADIS International
Conference WWW Internet 2003. Vol. 2. Algarve: IADIS Press; 2003:1017-1021.'
apa: 'Schryen, G. (2003). E-Democracy: Internet Voting. In Proceedings of the
IADIS International Conference WWW Internet 2003. vol. 2 (pp. 1017–1021).
Algarve: IADIS Press.'
bibtex: '@inbook{Schryen_2003, place={Algarve}, title={E-Democracy: Internet Voting},
booktitle={Proceedings of the IADIS International Conference WWW Internet 2003.
vol. 2}, publisher={IADIS Press}, author={Schryen, Guido}, year={2003}, pages={1017–1021}
}'
chicago: 'Schryen, Guido. “E-Democracy: Internet Voting.” In Proceedings of the
IADIS International Conference WWW Internet 2003. Vol. 2, 1017–21. Algarve:
IADIS Press, 2003.'
ieee: 'G. Schryen, “E-Democracy: Internet Voting,” in Proceedings of the IADIS
International Conference WWW Internet 2003. vol. 2, Algarve: IADIS Press,
2003, pp. 1017–1021.'
mla: 'Schryen, Guido. “E-Democracy: Internet Voting.” Proceedings of the IADIS
International Conference WWW Internet 2003. Vol. 2, IADIS Press, 2003, pp.
1017–21.'
short: 'G. Schryen, in: Proceedings of the IADIS International Conference WWW Internet
2003. Vol. 2, IADIS Press, Algarve, 2003, pp. 1017–1021.'
date_created: 2018-11-14T15:01:49Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:02:25Z
department:
- _id: '277'
extern: '1'
keyword:
- Internet Voting
- Online polls
- E-Democracy
- Security
language:
- iso: eng
page: 1017-1021
place: Algarve
publication: Proceedings of the IADIS International Conference WWW Internet 2003.
vol. 2
publisher: IADIS Press
status: public
title: 'E-Democracy: Internet Voting'
type: book_chapter
user_id: '61579'
year: '2003'
...