---
_id: '30940'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: "We analyse the two-dimensional Nash bargaining solution (NBS) by deploying\r\nthe
standard labour market negotiations model of McDonald and Solow (1981).\r\nWe
show that the two-dimensional bargaining problem can be decomposed into two\r\none-dimensional
problems, such that the two solutions together replicate the solution\r\nof the
two-dimensional problem if the NBS is applied. The axiom of\r\nIndependence of
Irrelevant Alternatives is shown to be crucial for this type\r\nof decomposability.
\ This result has significant implications for actual\r\nnegotiations because
it allows for the decomposition of a multi-dimensional bargaining\r\nproblem into
one-dimensional problems---and thus helps to facilitate real-world\r\nnegotiations."
article_type: original
author:
- first_name: Claus-Jochen
full_name: Haake, Claus-Jochen
id: '20801'
last_name: Haake
- first_name: Thorsten
full_name: Upmann, Thorsten
last_name: Upmann
- first_name: Papatya
full_name: Duman, Papatya
id: '72752'
last_name: Duman
citation:
ama: 'Haake C-J, Upmann T, Duman P. Wage Bargaining and Employment Revisited: Separability
and Efficiency in Collective Bargaining. Scandinavian Journal of Economics.
2022;125(2):403-440. doi:https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12518'
apa: 'Haake, C.-J., Upmann, T., & Duman, P. (2022). Wage Bargaining and Employment
Revisited: Separability and Efficiency in Collective Bargaining. Scandinavian
Journal of Economics, 125(2), 403–440. https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12518'
bibtex: '@article{Haake_Upmann_Duman_2022, title={Wage Bargaining and Employment
Revisited: Separability and Efficiency in Collective Bargaining}, volume={125},
DOI={https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12518},
number={2}, journal={Scandinavian Journal of Economics}, publisher={Wiley}, author={Haake,
Claus-Jochen and Upmann, Thorsten and Duman, Papatya}, year={2022}, pages={403–440}
}'
chicago: 'Haake, Claus-Jochen, Thorsten Upmann, and Papatya Duman. “Wage Bargaining
and Employment Revisited: Separability and Efficiency in Collective Bargaining.”
Scandinavian Journal of Economics 125, no. 2 (2022): 403–40. https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12518.'
ieee: 'C.-J. Haake, T. Upmann, and P. Duman, “Wage Bargaining and Employment Revisited:
Separability and Efficiency in Collective Bargaining,” Scandinavian Journal
of Economics, vol. 125, no. 2, pp. 403–440, 2022, doi: https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12518.'
mla: 'Haake, Claus-Jochen, et al. “Wage Bargaining and Employment Revisited: Separability
and Efficiency in Collective Bargaining.” Scandinavian Journal of Economics,
vol. 125, no. 2, Wiley, 2022, pp. 403–40, doi:https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12518.'
short: C.-J. Haake, T. Upmann, P. Duman, Scandinavian Journal of Economics 125 (2022)
403–440.
date_created: 2022-04-22T14:10:44Z
date_updated: 2023-06-08T16:42:31Z
ddc:
- '330'
department:
- _id: '205'
- _id: '475'
doi: https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12518
funded_apc: '1'
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: ' 125'
issue: '2'
jel:
- J52
- J41
- C78
keyword:
- Labour market negotiations
- efficient bargains
- Nash bargaining solution
- sequential bargaining
- restricted bargaining games
language:
- iso: eng
main_file_link:
- url: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/sjoe.12518
page: 403-440
project:
- _id: '7'
grant_number: '160364472'
name: 'SFB 901 - A3: SFB 901 - Subproject A3'
- _id: '2'
name: 'SFB 901 - A: SFB 901 - Project Area A'
- _id: '1'
grant_number: '160364472'
name: 'SFB 901: SFB 901'
publication: Scandinavian Journal of Economics
publication_identifier:
eissn:
- 0347-0520
publication_status: published
publisher: Wiley
quality_controlled: '1'
status: public
title: 'Wage Bargaining and Employment Revisited: Separability and Efficiency in Collective
Bargaining'
type: journal_article
user_id: '20801'
volume: 125
year: '2022'
...
---
_id: '15202'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: In this paper, we analyze the two-dimensional Nash bargaining solution (NBS)
deploying a standard labor market negotiations model (see McDonald and Solow,
1981; Creedy and McDonald, 1991). We show that the two-dimensional bargaining
problem can be decomposed into two one-dimensional problems such that the (Cartesian)
product of the solutions of these problems replicates the solution of the two-dimensional
problem, if the NBS is applied. However, this decomposition fails for any solution
concept that does not satisfy the axiom of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives
(IIA axiom). Our decomposition result has significant implications for actual
negotiations, as it allows for the decomposition of a multi-issue bargaining problem
into a set of simpler problems, in particular a set of single-issue bargaining
problems. In this way, the decomposition may help facilitate negotiations in labor
markets and also in other environments.
author:
- first_name: Claus-Jochen
full_name: Haake, Claus-Jochen
id: '20801'
last_name: Haake
- first_name: Thorsten
full_name: Upmann, Thorsten
last_name: Upmann
- first_name: Papatya
full_name: Duman, Papatya
id: '72752'
last_name: Duman
citation:
ama: Haake C-J, Upmann T, Duman P. The Decomposability of the Nash Bargaining
Solution in Labor Markets. Vol 128. CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University;
2019.
apa: Haake, C.-J., Upmann, T., & Duman, P. (2019). The Decomposability of
the Nash Bargaining Solution in Labor Markets (Vol. 128). CIE Working Paper
Series, Paderborn University.
bibtex: '@book{Haake_Upmann_Duman_2019, series={Working Papers CIE}, title={The
Decomposability of the Nash Bargaining Solution in Labor Markets}, volume={128},
publisher={CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University}, author={Haake, Claus-Jochen
and Upmann, Thorsten and Duman, Papatya}, year={2019}, collection={Working Papers
CIE} }'
chicago: Haake, Claus-Jochen, Thorsten Upmann, and Papatya Duman. The Decomposability
of the Nash Bargaining Solution in Labor Markets. Vol. 128. Working Papers
CIE. CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2019.
ieee: C.-J. Haake, T. Upmann, and P. Duman, The Decomposability of the Nash Bargaining
Solution in Labor Markets, vol. 128. CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University,
2019.
mla: Haake, Claus-Jochen, et al. The Decomposability of the Nash Bargaining Solution
in Labor Markets. Vol. 128, CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University,
2019.
short: C.-J. Haake, T. Upmann, P. Duman, The Decomposability of the Nash Bargaining
Solution in Labor Markets, CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2019.
date_created: 2019-11-28T09:49:08Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:52:16Z
ddc:
- '040'
department:
- _id: '205'
- _id: '475'
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: stela
date_created: 2019-11-28T09:50:10Z
date_updated: 2019-11-28T09:50:10Z
file_id: '15203'
file_name: WP - The Decomposability of the Nash Bargaining Solution in Labor Markets.pdf
file_size: 1068284
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2019-11-28T09:50:10Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: ' 128'
keyword:
- Labor market negotiations
- Efficient bargains
- Nash bargaining solution
- Sequential bargaining
- Restricted bargaining games
language:
- iso: eng
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
publisher: CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University
series_title: Working Papers CIE
status: public
title: The Decomposability of the Nash Bargaining Solution in Labor Markets
type: working_paper
user_id: '477'
volume: 128
year: '2019'
...