--- _id: '30940' abstract: - lang: eng text: "We analyse the two-dimensional Nash bargaining solution (NBS) by deploying\r\nthe standard labour market negotiations model of McDonald and Solow (1981).\r\nWe show that the two-dimensional bargaining problem can be decomposed into two\r\none-dimensional problems, such that the two solutions together replicate the solution\r\nof the two-dimensional problem if the NBS is applied. The axiom of\r\nIndependence of Irrelevant Alternatives is shown to be crucial for this type\r\nof decomposability. \ This result has significant implications for actual\r\nnegotiations because it allows for the decomposition of a multi-dimensional bargaining\r\nproblem into one-dimensional problems---and thus helps to facilitate real-world\r\nnegotiations." article_type: original author: - first_name: Claus-Jochen full_name: Haake, Claus-Jochen id: '20801' last_name: Haake - first_name: Thorsten full_name: Upmann, Thorsten last_name: Upmann - first_name: Papatya full_name: Duman, Papatya id: '72752' last_name: Duman citation: ama: 'Haake C-J, Upmann T, Duman P. Wage Bargaining and Employment Revisited: Separability and Efficiency in Collective Bargaining. Scandinavian Journal of Economics. 2022;125(2):403-440. doi:https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12518' apa: 'Haake, C.-J., Upmann, T., & Duman, P. (2022). Wage Bargaining and Employment Revisited: Separability and Efficiency in Collective Bargaining. Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 125(2), 403–440. https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12518' bibtex: '@article{Haake_Upmann_Duman_2022, title={Wage Bargaining and Employment Revisited: Separability and Efficiency in Collective Bargaining}, volume={125}, DOI={https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12518}, number={2}, journal={Scandinavian Journal of Economics}, publisher={Wiley}, author={Haake, Claus-Jochen and Upmann, Thorsten and Duman, Papatya}, year={2022}, pages={403–440} }' chicago: 'Haake, Claus-Jochen, Thorsten Upmann, and Papatya Duman. “Wage Bargaining and Employment Revisited: Separability and Efficiency in Collective Bargaining.” Scandinavian Journal of Economics 125, no. 2 (2022): 403–40. https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12518.' ieee: 'C.-J. Haake, T. Upmann, and P. Duman, “Wage Bargaining and Employment Revisited: Separability and Efficiency in Collective Bargaining,” Scandinavian Journal of Economics, vol. 125, no. 2, pp. 403–440, 2022, doi: https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12518.' mla: 'Haake, Claus-Jochen, et al. “Wage Bargaining and Employment Revisited: Separability and Efficiency in Collective Bargaining.” Scandinavian Journal of Economics, vol. 125, no. 2, Wiley, 2022, pp. 403–40, doi:https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12518.' short: C.-J. Haake, T. Upmann, P. Duman, Scandinavian Journal of Economics 125 (2022) 403–440. date_created: 2022-04-22T14:10:44Z date_updated: 2023-06-08T16:42:31Z ddc: - '330' department: - _id: '205' - _id: '475' doi: https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12518 funded_apc: '1' has_accepted_license: '1' intvolume: ' 125' issue: '2' jel: - J52 - J41 - C78 keyword: - Labour market negotiations - efficient bargains - Nash bargaining solution - sequential bargaining - restricted bargaining games language: - iso: eng main_file_link: - url: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/sjoe.12518 page: 403-440 project: - _id: '7' grant_number: '160364472' name: 'SFB 901 - A3: SFB 901 - Subproject A3' - _id: '2' name: 'SFB 901 - A: SFB 901 - Project Area A' - _id: '1' grant_number: '160364472' name: 'SFB 901: SFB 901' publication: Scandinavian Journal of Economics publication_identifier: eissn: - 0347-0520 publication_status: published publisher: Wiley quality_controlled: '1' status: public title: 'Wage Bargaining and Employment Revisited: Separability and Efficiency in Collective Bargaining' type: journal_article user_id: '20801' volume: 125 year: '2022' ... --- _id: '15202' abstract: - lang: eng text: In this paper, we analyze the two-dimensional Nash bargaining solution (NBS) deploying a standard labor market negotiations model (see McDonald and Solow, 1981; Creedy and McDonald, 1991). We show that the two-dimensional bargaining problem can be decomposed into two one-dimensional problems such that the (Cartesian) product of the solutions of these problems replicates the solution of the two-dimensional problem, if the NBS is applied. However, this decomposition fails for any solution concept that does not satisfy the axiom of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA axiom). Our decomposition result has significant implications for actual negotiations, as it allows for the decomposition of a multi-issue bargaining problem into a set of simpler problems, in particular a set of single-issue bargaining problems. In this way, the decomposition may help facilitate negotiations in labor markets and also in other environments. author: - first_name: Claus-Jochen full_name: Haake, Claus-Jochen id: '20801' last_name: Haake - first_name: Thorsten full_name: Upmann, Thorsten last_name: Upmann - first_name: Papatya full_name: Duman, Papatya id: '72752' last_name: Duman citation: ama: Haake C-J, Upmann T, Duman P. The Decomposability of the Nash Bargaining Solution in Labor Markets. Vol 128. CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University; 2019. apa: Haake, C.-J., Upmann, T., & Duman, P. (2019). The Decomposability of the Nash Bargaining Solution in Labor Markets (Vol. 128). CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University. bibtex: '@book{Haake_Upmann_Duman_2019, series={Working Papers CIE}, title={The Decomposability of the Nash Bargaining Solution in Labor Markets}, volume={128}, publisher={CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University}, author={Haake, Claus-Jochen and Upmann, Thorsten and Duman, Papatya}, year={2019}, collection={Working Papers CIE} }' chicago: Haake, Claus-Jochen, Thorsten Upmann, and Papatya Duman. The Decomposability of the Nash Bargaining Solution in Labor Markets. Vol. 128. Working Papers CIE. CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2019. ieee: C.-J. Haake, T. Upmann, and P. Duman, The Decomposability of the Nash Bargaining Solution in Labor Markets, vol. 128. CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2019. mla: Haake, Claus-Jochen, et al. The Decomposability of the Nash Bargaining Solution in Labor Markets. Vol. 128, CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2019. short: C.-J. Haake, T. Upmann, P. Duman, The Decomposability of the Nash Bargaining Solution in Labor Markets, CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2019. date_created: 2019-11-28T09:49:08Z date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:52:16Z ddc: - '040' department: - _id: '205' - _id: '475' file: - access_level: closed content_type: application/pdf creator: stela date_created: 2019-11-28T09:50:10Z date_updated: 2019-11-28T09:50:10Z file_id: '15203' file_name: WP - The Decomposability of the Nash Bargaining Solution in Labor Markets.pdf file_size: 1068284 relation: main_file success: 1 file_date_updated: 2019-11-28T09:50:10Z has_accepted_license: '1' intvolume: ' 128' keyword: - Labor market negotiations - Efficient bargains - Nash bargaining solution - Sequential bargaining - Restricted bargaining games language: - iso: eng project: - _id: '1' name: SFB 901 - _id: '7' name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3 - _id: '2' name: SFB 901 - Project Area A publisher: CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University series_title: Working Papers CIE status: public title: The Decomposability of the Nash Bargaining Solution in Labor Markets type: working_paper user_id: '477' volume: 128 year: '2019' ...