---
_id: '30940'
abstract:
- lang: eng
  text: "We analyse the two-dimensional Nash bargaining solution (NBS) by deploying\r\nthe
    standard labour market negotiations model of McDonald and Solow (1981).\r\nWe
    show that the two-dimensional bargaining problem can be decomposed into two\r\none-dimensional
    problems, such that the two solutions together replicate the solution\r\nof the
    two-dimensional problem if the NBS is applied.  The axiom of\r\nIndependence of
    Irrelevant Alternatives is shown to be crucial for this type\r\nof decomposability.
    \ This result has significant implications for actual\r\nnegotiations because
    it allows for the decomposition of a multi-dimensional bargaining\r\nproblem into
    one-dimensional problems---and thus helps to facilitate real-world\r\nnegotiations."
article_type: original
author:
- first_name: Claus-Jochen
  full_name: Haake, Claus-Jochen
  id: '20801'
  last_name: Haake
- first_name: Thorsten
  full_name: Upmann, Thorsten
  last_name: Upmann
- first_name: Papatya
  full_name: Duman, Papatya
  id: '72752'
  last_name: Duman
citation:
  ama: 'Haake C-J, Upmann T, Duman P. Wage Bargaining and Employment Revisited: Separability
    and Efficiency in Collective Bargaining. <i>Scandinavian Journal of Economics</i>.
    2022;125(2):403-440. doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12518">https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12518</a>'
  apa: 'Haake, C.-J., Upmann, T., &#38; Duman, P. (2022). Wage Bargaining and Employment
    Revisited: Separability and Efficiency in Collective Bargaining. <i>Scandinavian
    Journal of Economics</i>, <i>125</i>(2), 403–440. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12518">https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12518</a>'
  bibtex: '@article{Haake_Upmann_Duman_2022, title={Wage Bargaining and Employment
    Revisited: Separability and Efficiency in Collective Bargaining}, volume={125},
    DOI={<a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12518">https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12518</a>},
    number={2}, journal={Scandinavian Journal of Economics}, publisher={Wiley}, author={Haake,
    Claus-Jochen and Upmann, Thorsten and Duman, Papatya}, year={2022}, pages={403–440}
    }'
  chicago: 'Haake, Claus-Jochen, Thorsten Upmann, and Papatya Duman. “Wage Bargaining
    and Employment Revisited: Separability and Efficiency in Collective Bargaining.”
    <i>Scandinavian Journal of Economics</i> 125, no. 2 (2022): 403–40. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12518">https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12518</a>.'
  ieee: 'C.-J. Haake, T. Upmann, and P. Duman, “Wage Bargaining and Employment Revisited:
    Separability and Efficiency in Collective Bargaining,” <i>Scandinavian Journal
    of Economics</i>, vol. 125, no. 2, pp. 403–440, 2022, doi: <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12518">https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12518</a>.'
  mla: 'Haake, Claus-Jochen, et al. “Wage Bargaining and Employment Revisited: Separability
    and Efficiency in Collective Bargaining.” <i>Scandinavian Journal of Economics</i>,
    vol. 125, no. 2, Wiley, 2022, pp. 403–40, doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12518">https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12518</a>.'
  short: C.-J. Haake, T. Upmann, P. Duman, Scandinavian Journal of Economics 125 (2022)
    403–440.
date_created: 2022-04-22T14:10:44Z
date_updated: 2023-06-08T16:42:31Z
ddc:
- '330'
department:
- _id: '205'
- _id: '475'
doi: https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12518
funded_apc: '1'
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: '       125'
issue: '2'
jel:
- J52
- J41
- C78
keyword:
- Labour market negotiations
- efficient bargains
- Nash bargaining solution
- sequential bargaining
- restricted bargaining games
language:
- iso: eng
main_file_link:
- url: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/sjoe.12518
page: 403-440
project:
- _id: '7'
  grant_number: '160364472'
  name: 'SFB 901 - A3: SFB 901 - Subproject A3'
- _id: '2'
  name: 'SFB 901 - A: SFB 901 - Project Area A'
- _id: '1'
  grant_number: '160364472'
  name: 'SFB 901: SFB 901'
publication: Scandinavian Journal of Economics
publication_identifier:
  eissn:
  - 0347-0520
publication_status: published
publisher: Wiley
quality_controlled: '1'
status: public
title: 'Wage Bargaining and Employment Revisited: Separability and Efficiency in Collective
  Bargaining'
type: journal_article
user_id: '20801'
volume: 125
year: '2022'
...
---
_id: '15202'
abstract:
- lang: eng
  text: In this paper, we analyze the two-dimensional Nash bargaining solution (NBS)
    deploying a standard labor market negotiations model (see McDonald and Solow,
    1981; Creedy and McDonald, 1991). We show that the two-dimensional bargaining
    problem can be decomposed into two one-dimensional problems such that the (Cartesian)
    product of the solutions of these problems replicates the solution of the two-dimensional
    problem, if the NBS is applied. However, this decomposition fails for any solution
    concept that does not satisfy the axiom of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives
    (IIA axiom). Our decomposition result has significant implications for actual
    negotiations, as it allows for the decomposition of a multi-issue bargaining problem
    into a set of simpler problems, in particular a set of single-issue bargaining
    problems. In this way, the decomposition may help facilitate negotiations in labor
    markets and also in other environments.
author:
- first_name: Claus-Jochen
  full_name: Haake, Claus-Jochen
  id: '20801'
  last_name: Haake
- first_name: Thorsten
  full_name: Upmann, Thorsten
  last_name: Upmann
- first_name: Papatya
  full_name: Duman, Papatya
  id: '72752'
  last_name: Duman
citation:
  ama: Haake C-J, Upmann T, Duman P. <i>The Decomposability of the Nash Bargaining
    Solution in Labor Markets</i>. Vol 128. CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University;
    2019.
  apa: Haake, C.-J., Upmann, T., &#38; Duman, P. (2019). <i>The Decomposability of
    the Nash Bargaining Solution in Labor Markets</i> (Vol. 128). CIE Working Paper
    Series, Paderborn University.
  bibtex: '@book{Haake_Upmann_Duman_2019, series={Working Papers CIE}, title={The
    Decomposability of the Nash Bargaining Solution in Labor Markets}, volume={128},
    publisher={CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University}, author={Haake, Claus-Jochen
    and Upmann, Thorsten and Duman, Papatya}, year={2019}, collection={Working Papers
    CIE} }'
  chicago: Haake, Claus-Jochen, Thorsten Upmann, and Papatya Duman. <i>The Decomposability
    of the Nash Bargaining Solution in Labor Markets</i>. Vol. 128. Working Papers
    CIE. CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2019.
  ieee: C.-J. Haake, T. Upmann, and P. Duman, <i>The Decomposability of the Nash Bargaining
    Solution in Labor Markets</i>, vol. 128. CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University,
    2019.
  mla: Haake, Claus-Jochen, et al. <i>The Decomposability of the Nash Bargaining Solution
    in Labor Markets</i>. Vol. 128, CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University,
    2019.
  short: C.-J. Haake, T. Upmann, P. Duman, The Decomposability of the Nash Bargaining
    Solution in Labor Markets, CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2019.
date_created: 2019-11-28T09:49:08Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:52:16Z
ddc:
- '040'
department:
- _id: '205'
- _id: '475'
file:
- access_level: closed
  content_type: application/pdf
  creator: stela
  date_created: 2019-11-28T09:50:10Z
  date_updated: 2019-11-28T09:50:10Z
  file_id: '15203'
  file_name: WP - The Decomposability of the Nash Bargaining Solution in Labor Markets.pdf
  file_size: 1068284
  relation: main_file
  success: 1
file_date_updated: 2019-11-28T09:50:10Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: '       128'
keyword:
- Labor market negotiations
- Efficient bargains
- Nash bargaining solution
- Sequential bargaining
- Restricted bargaining games
language:
- iso: eng
project:
- _id: '1'
  name: SFB 901
- _id: '7'
  name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
- _id: '2'
  name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
publisher: CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University
series_title: Working Papers CIE
status: public
title: The Decomposability of the Nash Bargaining Solution in Labor Markets
type: working_paper
user_id: '477'
volume: 128
year: '2019'
...