@article{30940,
  abstract     = {{We analyse the two-dimensional Nash bargaining solution (NBS) by deploying
the standard labour market negotiations model of McDonald and Solow (1981).
We show that the two-dimensional bargaining problem can be decomposed into two
one-dimensional problems, such that the two solutions together replicate the solution
of the two-dimensional problem if the NBS is applied.  The axiom of
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives is shown to be crucial for this type
of decomposability.  This result has significant implications for actual
negotiations because it allows for the decomposition of a multi-dimensional bargaining
problem into one-dimensional problems---and thus helps to facilitate real-world
negotiations.}},
  author       = {{Haake, Claus-Jochen and Upmann, Thorsten and Duman, Papatya}},
  issn         = {{0347-0520}},
  journal      = {{Scandinavian Journal of Economics}},
  keywords     = {{Labour market negotiations, efficient bargains, Nash bargaining solution, sequential bargaining, restricted bargaining games}},
  number       = {{2}},
  pages        = {{403--440}},
  publisher    = {{Wiley}},
  title        = {{{Wage Bargaining and Employment Revisited: Separability and Efficiency in Collective Bargaining}}},
  doi          = {{https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12518}},
  volume       = {{125}},
  year         = {{2022}},
}

@techreport{15202,
  abstract     = {{In this paper, we analyze the two-dimensional Nash bargaining solution (NBS) deploying a standard labor market negotiations model (see McDonald and Solow, 1981; Creedy and McDonald, 1991). We show that the two-dimensional bargaining problem can be decomposed into two one-dimensional problems such that the (Cartesian) product of the solutions of these problems replicates the solution of the two-dimensional problem, if the NBS is applied. However, this decomposition fails for any solution concept that does not satisfy the axiom of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA axiom). Our decomposition result has significant implications for actual negotiations, as it allows for the decomposition of a multi-issue bargaining problem into a set of simpler problems, in particular a set of single-issue bargaining problems. In this way, the decomposition may help facilitate negotiations in labor markets and also in other environments.}},
  author       = {{Haake, Claus-Jochen and Upmann, Thorsten and Duman, Papatya}},
  keywords     = {{Labor market negotiations, Efficient bargains, Nash bargaining solution, Sequential bargaining, Restricted bargaining games}},
  publisher    = {{CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University}},
  title        = {{{The Decomposability of the Nash Bargaining Solution in Labor Markets}}},
  volume       = {{128}},
  year         = {{2019}},
}

@techreport{15204,
  abstract     = {{We criticize some conceptual weaknesses in the recent literature on coalitional TUgames and propose, based on our critics, a new definition of dual TU-games that coincides with the one in the literature on the class of super-additive games. We justify our new definition in four alternative ways: 1. Via an adequate definition of ecient payo vectors. 2. Via a modification of the Bondareva-Shapley duality. 3. Via an explicit consideration of \coalition building". 4. Via associating general TU-games to coalition-production economies. Rather than imputations, we base our analysis on a modification of aspirations.}},
  author       = {{Aslan, Fatma and Duman, Papatya and Trockel, Walter}},
  keywords     = {{TU-games, duality, core, c-Core, cohesive games, complete game efficiency}},
  publisher    = {{CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University}},
  title        = {{{Duality for General TU-games Redefined}}},
  volume       = {{121}},
  year         = {{2019}},
}

@techreport{2565,
  abstract     = {{This note deals with agreeability in nontransferable utility (NTU) differential games. We introduce state feedback Pareto weights to enrich the set of efficient cooperative solutions. The framework is particularly useful if constant weights fail to support agreeability, but cooperation is desired nonetheless. The concept is applied to an adverting differential game.}},
  author       = {{Hoof, Simon}},
  keywords     = {{NTU differential games, variable Pareto weights, agreeability}},
  publisher    = {{CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University}},
  title        = {{{Feedback Pareto weights in cooperative NTU differential games}}},
  volume       = {{112}},
  year         = {{2018}},
}

@inproceedings{17659,
  author       = {{Polevoy, Gleb and Trajanovski, Stojan and de Weerdt, Mathijs M.}},
  booktitle    = {{Proceedings of the 2014 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-agent Systems}},
  isbn         = {{978-1-4503-2738-1}},
  keywords     = {{competition, equilibrium, market, models, shared effort games, simulation}},
  pages        = {{861--868}},
  publisher    = {{International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems}},
  title        = {{{Nash Equilibria in Shared Effort Games}}},
  year         = {{2014}},
}