[{"jel":["J52","J41","C78"],"status":"public","has_accepted_license":"1","_id":"30940","publisher":"Wiley","funded_apc":"1","page":"403-440","volume":125,"user_id":"20801","ddc":["330"],"citation":{"ieee":"C.-J. Haake, T. Upmann, and P. Duman, “Wage Bargaining and Employment Revisited: Separability and Efficiency in Collective Bargaining,” <i>Scandinavian Journal of Economics</i>, vol. 125, no. 2, pp. 403–440, 2022, doi: <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12518\">https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12518</a>.","apa":"Haake, C.-J., Upmann, T., &#38; Duman, P. (2022). Wage Bargaining and Employment Revisited: Separability and Efficiency in Collective Bargaining. <i>Scandinavian Journal of Economics</i>, <i>125</i>(2), 403–440. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12518\">https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12518</a>","short":"C.-J. Haake, T. Upmann, P. Duman, Scandinavian Journal of Economics 125 (2022) 403–440.","chicago":"Haake, Claus-Jochen, Thorsten Upmann, and Papatya Duman. “Wage Bargaining and Employment Revisited: Separability and Efficiency in Collective Bargaining.” <i>Scandinavian Journal of Economics</i> 125, no. 2 (2022): 403–40. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12518\">https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12518</a>.","mla":"Haake, Claus-Jochen, et al. “Wage Bargaining and Employment Revisited: Separability and Efficiency in Collective Bargaining.” <i>Scandinavian Journal of Economics</i>, vol. 125, no. 2, Wiley, 2022, pp. 403–40, doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12518\">https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12518</a>.","bibtex":"@article{Haake_Upmann_Duman_2022, title={Wage Bargaining and Employment Revisited: Separability and Efficiency in Collective Bargaining}, volume={125}, DOI={<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12518\">https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12518</a>}, number={2}, journal={Scandinavian Journal of Economics}, publisher={Wiley}, author={Haake, Claus-Jochen and Upmann, Thorsten and Duman, Papatya}, year={2022}, pages={403–440} }","ama":"Haake C-J, Upmann T, Duman P. Wage Bargaining and Employment Revisited: Separability and Efficiency in Collective Bargaining. <i>Scandinavian Journal of Economics</i>. 2022;125(2):403-440. doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12518\">https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12518</a>"},"project":[{"name":"SFB 901 - A3: SFB 901 - Subproject A3","grant_number":"160364472","_id":"7"},{"name":"SFB 901 - A: SFB 901 - Project Area A","_id":"2"},{"name":"SFB 901: SFB 901","_id":"1","grant_number":"160364472"}],"quality_controlled":"1","author":[{"id":"20801","first_name":"Claus-Jochen","last_name":"Haake","full_name":"Haake, Claus-Jochen"},{"first_name":"Thorsten","last_name":"Upmann","full_name":"Upmann, Thorsten"},{"last_name":"Duman","first_name":"Papatya","full_name":"Duman, Papatya","id":"72752"}],"publication_identifier":{"eissn":["0347-0520"]},"year":"2022","title":"Wage Bargaining and Employment Revisited: Separability and Efficiency in Collective Bargaining","article_type":"original","intvolume":"       125","publication_status":"published","date_updated":"2023-06-08T16:42:31Z","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"main_file_link":[{"url":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/sjoe.12518"}],"doi":"https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12518","issue":"2","publication":"Scandinavian Journal of Economics","abstract":[{"text":"We analyse the two-dimensional Nash bargaining solution (NBS) by deploying\r\nthe standard labour market negotiations model of McDonald and Solow (1981).\r\nWe show that the two-dimensional bargaining problem can be decomposed into two\r\none-dimensional problems, such that the two solutions together replicate the solution\r\nof the two-dimensional problem if the NBS is applied.  The axiom of\r\nIndependence of Irrelevant Alternatives is shown to be crucial for this type\r\nof decomposability.  This result has significant implications for actual\r\nnegotiations because it allows for the decomposition of a multi-dimensional bargaining\r\nproblem into one-dimensional problems---and thus helps to facilitate real-world\r\nnegotiations.","lang":"eng"}],"date_created":"2022-04-22T14:10:44Z","department":[{"_id":"205"},{"_id":"475"}],"type":"journal_article","keyword":["Labour market negotiations","efficient bargains","Nash bargaining solution","sequential bargaining","restricted bargaining games"]},{"series_title":"Working Papers CIE","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"intvolume":"       128","date_updated":"2022-01-06T06:52:16Z","author":[{"id":"20801","last_name":"Haake","first_name":"Claus-Jochen","full_name":"Haake, Claus-Jochen"},{"first_name":"Thorsten","last_name":"Upmann","full_name":"Upmann, Thorsten"},{"id":"72752","first_name":"Papatya","last_name":"Duman","full_name":"Duman, Papatya"}],"year":"2019","title":"The Decomposability of the Nash Bargaining Solution in Labor Markets","department":[{"_id":"205"},{"_id":"475"}],"type":"working_paper","keyword":["Labor market negotiations","Efficient bargains","Nash bargaining solution","Sequential bargaining","Restricted bargaining games"],"date_created":"2019-11-28T09:49:08Z","file":[{"date_created":"2019-11-28T09:50:10Z","creator":"stela","success":1,"content_type":"application/pdf","file_id":"15203","date_updated":"2019-11-28T09:50:10Z","relation":"main_file","file_size":1068284,"access_level":"closed","file_name":"WP - The Decomposability of the Nash Bargaining Solution in Labor Markets.pdf"}],"abstract":[{"lang":"eng","text":"In this paper, we analyze the two-dimensional Nash bargaining solution (NBS) deploying a standard labor market negotiations model (see McDonald and Solow, 1981; Creedy and McDonald, 1991). We show that the two-dimensional bargaining problem can be decomposed into two one-dimensional problems such that the (Cartesian) product of the solutions of these problems replicates the solution of the two-dimensional problem, if the NBS is applied. However, this decomposition fails for any solution concept that does not satisfy the axiom of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA axiom). Our decomposition result has significant implications for actual negotiations, as it allows for the decomposition of a multi-issue bargaining problem into a set of simpler problems, in particular a set of single-issue bargaining problems. In this way, the decomposition may help facilitate negotiations in labor markets and also in other environments."}],"volume":128,"ddc":["040"],"user_id":"477","publisher":"CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University","_id":"15202","has_accepted_license":"1","status":"public","project":[{"_id":"1","name":"SFB 901"},{"name":"SFB 901 - Subproject A3","_id":"7"},{"_id":"2","name":"SFB 901 - Project Area A"}],"citation":{"mla":"Haake, Claus-Jochen, et al. <i>The Decomposability of the Nash Bargaining Solution in Labor Markets</i>. Vol. 128, CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2019.","ama":"Haake C-J, Upmann T, Duman P. <i>The Decomposability of the Nash Bargaining Solution in Labor Markets</i>. Vol 128. CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University; 2019.","bibtex":"@book{Haake_Upmann_Duman_2019, series={Working Papers CIE}, title={The Decomposability of the Nash Bargaining Solution in Labor Markets}, volume={128}, publisher={CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University}, author={Haake, Claus-Jochen and Upmann, Thorsten and Duman, Papatya}, year={2019}, collection={Working Papers CIE} }","apa":"Haake, C.-J., Upmann, T., &#38; Duman, P. (2019). <i>The Decomposability of the Nash Bargaining Solution in Labor Markets</i> (Vol. 128). CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University.","ieee":"C.-J. Haake, T. Upmann, and P. Duman, <i>The Decomposability of the Nash Bargaining Solution in Labor Markets</i>, vol. 128. CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2019.","short":"C.-J. Haake, T. Upmann, P. Duman, The Decomposability of the Nash Bargaining Solution in Labor Markets, CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2019.","chicago":"Haake, Claus-Jochen, Thorsten Upmann, and Papatya Duman. <i>The Decomposability of the Nash Bargaining Solution in Labor Markets</i>. Vol. 128. Working Papers CIE. CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2019."},"file_date_updated":"2019-11-28T09:50:10Z"},{"ddc":["040"],"user_id":"65453","volume":121,"publisher":"CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University","_id":"15204","has_accepted_license":"1","status":"public","project":[{"_id":"1","name":"SFB 901"},{"name":"SFB 901 - Project Area A","_id":"2"},{"_id":"7","name":"SFB 901 - Subproject A3"}],"file_date_updated":"2019-11-28T10:01:40Z","citation":{"mla":"Aslan, Fatma, et al. <i>Duality for General TU-Games Redefined</i>. Vol. 121, CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2019.","bibtex":"@book{Aslan_Duman_Trockel_2019, series={Working Papers CIE}, title={Duality for General TU-games Redefined}, volume={121}, publisher={CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University}, author={Aslan, Fatma and Duman, Papatya and Trockel, Walter}, year={2019}, collection={Working Papers CIE} }","ama":"Aslan F, Duman P, Trockel W. <i>Duality for General TU-Games Redefined</i>. Vol 121. CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University; 2019.","ieee":"F. Aslan, P. Duman, and W. Trockel, <i>Duality for General TU-games Redefined</i>, vol. 121. CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2019.","apa":"Aslan, F., Duman, P., &#38; Trockel, W. (2019). <i>Duality for General TU-games Redefined</i> (Vol. 121). CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University.","chicago":"Aslan, Fatma, Papatya Duman, and Walter Trockel. <i>Duality for General TU-Games Redefined</i>. Vol. 121. Working Papers CIE. CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2019.","short":"F. Aslan, P. Duman, W. Trockel, Duality for General TU-Games Redefined, CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2019."},"series_title":"Working Papers CIE","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"date_updated":"2022-01-06T06:52:17Z","intvolume":"       121","title":"Duality for General TU-games Redefined","year":"2019","author":[{"full_name":"Aslan, Fatma","last_name":"Aslan","first_name":"Fatma"},{"full_name":"Duman, Papatya","last_name":"Duman","first_name":"Papatya"},{"full_name":"Trockel, Walter","last_name":"Trockel","first_name":"Walter"}],"keyword":["TU-games","duality","core","c-Core","cohesive games","complete game efficiency"],"type":"working_paper","department":[{"_id":"205"},{"_id":"475"}],"file":[{"content_type":"application/pdf","success":1,"file_id":"15205","file_size":369323,"access_level":"closed","file_name":"WP - Duality for General TU-games Redefined.pdf","date_updated":"2019-11-28T10:01:40Z","relation":"main_file","date_created":"2019-11-28T10:01:40Z","creator":"stela"}],"date_created":"2019-11-28T10:00:41Z","abstract":[{"lang":"eng","text":"We criticize some conceptual weaknesses in the recent literature on coalitional TUgames and propose, based on our critics, a new definition of dual TU-games that coincides with the one in the literature on the class of super-additive games. We justify our new definition in four alternative ways: 1. Via an adequate definition of ecient payo vectors. 2. Via a modification of the Bondareva-Shapley duality. 3. Via an explicit consideration of \\coalition building\". 4. Via associating general TU-games to coalition-production economies. Rather than imputations, we base our analysis on a modification of aspirations."}]},{"series_title":"Working Papers CIE","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"date_updated":"2022-01-06T06:57:09Z","intvolume":"       112","year":"2018","title":"Feedback Pareto weights in cooperative NTU differential games","author":[{"last_name":"Hoof","first_name":"Simon","full_name":"Hoof, Simon","id":"59676"}],"type":"working_paper","keyword":["NTU differential games","variable Pareto weights","agreeability"],"department":[{"_id":"205"},{"_id":"475"}],"file":[{"date_created":"2018-09-13T07:29:48Z","creator":"stela","file_id":"4382","success":1,"content_type":"application/pdf","relation":"main_file","date_updated":"2018-09-13T07:29:48Z","file_name":"WP - Feedback Pareto weights in cooperative NTU differential games.pdf","file_size":263766,"access_level":"closed"}],"date_created":"2018-05-03T07:50:57Z","abstract":[{"text":"This note deals with agreeability in nontransferable utility (NTU) differential games. We introduce state feedback Pareto weights to enrich the set of efficient cooperative solutions. The framework is particularly useful if constant weights fail to support agreeability, but cooperation is desired nonetheless. The concept is applied to an adverting differential game.","lang":"eng"}],"user_id":"65453","ddc":["040"],"volume":112,"publisher":"CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University","_id":"2565","has_accepted_license":"1","status":"public","project":[{"_id":"1","name":"SFB 901"},{"_id":"2","name":"SFB 901 - Project Area A"},{"_id":"7","name":"SFB 901 - Subproject A3"}],"file_date_updated":"2018-09-13T07:29:48Z","citation":{"mla":"Hoof, Simon. <i>Feedback Pareto Weights in Cooperative NTU Differential Games</i>. Vol. 112, CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2018.","ama":"Hoof S. <i>Feedback Pareto Weights in Cooperative NTU Differential Games</i>. Vol 112. CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University; 2018.","bibtex":"@book{Hoof_2018, series={Working Papers CIE}, title={Feedback Pareto weights in cooperative NTU differential games}, volume={112}, publisher={CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University}, author={Hoof, Simon}, year={2018}, collection={Working Papers CIE} }","apa":"Hoof, S. (2018). <i>Feedback Pareto weights in cooperative NTU differential games</i> (Vol. 112). CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University.","ieee":"S. Hoof, <i>Feedback Pareto weights in cooperative NTU differential games</i>, vol. 112. CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2018.","short":"S. Hoof, Feedback Pareto Weights in Cooperative NTU Differential Games, CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2018.","chicago":"Hoof, Simon. <i>Feedback Pareto Weights in Cooperative NTU Differential Games</i>. Vol. 112. Working Papers CIE. CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2018."}},{"extern":"1","publication":"Proceedings of the 2014 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-agent Systems","citation":{"apa":"Polevoy, G., Trajanovski, S., &#38; de Weerdt, M. M. (2014). Nash Equilibria in Shared Effort Games. In <i>Proceedings of the 2014 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-agent Systems</i> (pp. 861–868). Richland, SC: International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems.","ieee":"G. Polevoy, S. Trajanovski, and M. M. de Weerdt, “Nash Equilibria in Shared Effort Games,” in <i>Proceedings of the 2014 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-agent Systems</i>, 2014, pp. 861–868.","chicago":"Polevoy, Gleb, Stojan Trajanovski, and Mathijs M. de Weerdt. “Nash Equilibria in Shared Effort Games.” In <i>Proceedings of the 2014 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems</i>, 861–68. AAMAS ’14. Richland, SC: International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2014.","short":"G. Polevoy, S. Trajanovski, M.M. de Weerdt, in: Proceedings of the 2014 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems, International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, Richland, SC, 2014, pp. 861–868.","mla":"Polevoy, Gleb, et al. “Nash Equilibria in Shared Effort Games.” <i>Proceedings of the 2014 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems</i>, International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2014, pp. 861–68.","ama":"Polevoy G, Trajanovski S, de Weerdt MM. Nash Equilibria in Shared Effort Games. In: <i>Proceedings of the 2014 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems</i>. AAMAS ’14. Richland, SC: International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems; 2014:861-868.","bibtex":"@inproceedings{Polevoy_Trajanovski_de Weerdt_2014, place={Richland, SC}, series={AAMAS ’14}, title={Nash Equilibria in Shared Effort Games}, booktitle={Proceedings of the 2014 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-agent Systems}, publisher={International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems}, author={Polevoy, Gleb and Trajanovski, Stojan and de Weerdt, Mathijs M.}, year={2014}, pages={861–868}, collection={AAMAS ’14} }"},"type":"conference","keyword":["competition","equilibrium","market","models","shared effort games","simulation"],"department":[{"_id":"63"},{"_id":"541"}],"place":"Richland, SC","date_created":"2020-08-06T15:21:26Z","date_updated":"2022-01-06T06:53:16Z","year":"2014","title":"Nash Equilibria in Shared Effort Games","status":"public","publication_identifier":{"isbn":["978-1-4503-2738-1"]},"author":[{"id":"83983","first_name":"Gleb","last_name":"Polevoy","full_name":"Polevoy, Gleb"},{"full_name":"Trajanovski, Stojan","last_name":"Trajanovski","first_name":"Stojan"},{"first_name":"Mathijs M.","last_name":"de Weerdt","full_name":"de Weerdt, Mathijs M."}],"user_id":"83983","page":"861-868","_id":"17659","publisher":"International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"series_title":"AAMAS '14"}]