TY - GEN AB - In this paper, we analyze a model in which two divisions negotiate over an intrafirm transfer price for an intermediate product. Formally, we consider bargaining problems under incomplete information, since the upstream division’s (seller's) costs and downstream division's (buyer's) revenues are supposed to be private information. Assuming two possible types for buyer and seller each, we first establish that the bargaining problem is regular, regardless whether incentive and/or efficiency constraints are imposed. This allows us to apply the generalized Nash bargaining solution to determine transfer payments and transfer probabilities. Furthermore, we derive general properties of this solution for the transfer pricing problem and compare the model developed here with the existing literature for negotiated transfer pricing under incomplete information. In particular, we focus on the models presented in Wagenhofer (1994). AU - Brangewitz, Sonja AU - Haake, Claus-Jochen ID - 5146 KW - Transfer Pricing KW - Negotiation KW - Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution KW - Incomplete Information TI - Cooperative Transfer Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information VL - 64 ER -