---
_id: '60299'
abstract:
- lang: eng
  text: Non-rotationally symmetrical joints can have different properties that can
    be controlled by the joint orientation. This hypothesis is tested using a Reuleaux
    triangle joint geometry. A tool design is carried out, followed by a numerical
    sensitivity analysis of the tool geometry. Initial tools were manufactured for
    experimental investigations and then adapted based on the findings of the sensitivity
    analysis. The joints are characterized by micrographs, 3D scans, shear tensile
    tests, head tensile tests and three-point bending tests and compared with a round
    geometry. The analysis confirms the hypothesis. Thus, joints with adaptable properties
    can be produced with one tool set.
author:
- first_name: Christian
  full_name: Steinfelder, Christian
  last_name: Steinfelder
- first_name: Clemens
  full_name: Acksteiner, Clemens
  last_name: Acksteiner
- first_name: Alexander
  full_name: Brosius, Alexander
  last_name: Brosius
citation:
  ama: Steinfelder C, Acksteiner C, Brosius A. A new joint with versatile properties
    based on a Reuleaux triangle geometry. <i>CIRP Annals</i>. Published online 2025.
    doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cirp.2025.03.002">10.1016/j.cirp.2025.03.002</a>
  apa: Steinfelder, C., Acksteiner, C., &#38; Brosius, A. (2025). A new joint with
    versatile properties based on a Reuleaux triangle geometry. <i>CIRP Annals</i>.
    <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cirp.2025.03.002">https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cirp.2025.03.002</a>
  bibtex: '@article{Steinfelder_Acksteiner_Brosius_2025, title={A new joint with versatile
    properties based on a Reuleaux triangle geometry}, DOI={<a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cirp.2025.03.002">10.1016/j.cirp.2025.03.002</a>},
    journal={CIRP Annals}, publisher={Elsevier BV}, author={Steinfelder, Christian
    and Acksteiner, Clemens and Brosius, Alexander}, year={2025} }'
  chicago: Steinfelder, Christian, Clemens Acksteiner, and Alexander Brosius. “A New
    Joint with Versatile Properties Based on a Reuleaux Triangle Geometry.” <i>CIRP
    Annals</i>, 2025. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cirp.2025.03.002">https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cirp.2025.03.002</a>.
  ieee: 'C. Steinfelder, C. Acksteiner, and A. Brosius, “A new joint with versatile
    properties based on a Reuleaux triangle geometry,” <i>CIRP Annals</i>, 2025, doi:
    <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cirp.2025.03.002">10.1016/j.cirp.2025.03.002</a>.'
  mla: Steinfelder, Christian, et al. “A New Joint with Versatile Properties Based
    on a Reuleaux Triangle Geometry.” <i>CIRP Annals</i>, Elsevier BV, 2025, doi:<a
    href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cirp.2025.03.002">10.1016/j.cirp.2025.03.002</a>.
  short: C. Steinfelder, C. Acksteiner, A. Brosius, CIRP Annals (2025).
date_created: 2025-06-23T07:47:56Z
date_updated: 2025-06-23T08:00:05Z
department:
- _id: '630'
doi: 10.1016/j.cirp.2025.03.002
keyword:
- Joining
- Forming
- Property adjustment
language:
- iso: eng
project:
- _id: '130'
  grant_number: '418701707'
  name: 'TRR 285: TRR 285:  Methodenentwicklung zur mechanischen Fügbarkeit in wandlungsfähigen
    Prozessketten'
- _id: '132'
  name: 'TRR 285 - B: TRR 285 - Project Area B'
- _id: '140'
  name: 'TRR 285 – B01: TRR 285 - Subproject B01'
publication: CIRP Annals
publication_identifier:
  issn:
  - 0007-8506
publication_status: published
publisher: Elsevier BV
status: public
title: A new joint with versatile properties based on a Reuleaux triangle geometry
type: journal_article
user_id: '104464'
year: '2025'
...
---
_id: '34040'
abstract:
- lang: eng
  text: "<jats:p>Consider the practical goal of making a desired action profile played,\r\n\r\nwhen
    the planner can only change the payoffs, bound by \r\n\r\nstringent constraints.\r\n\r\nApplications
    include motivating people\r\n\r\nto choose the closest school, the closest subway
    station, or to coordinate\r\n\r\non a communication protocol or an investment
    strategy.\r\n\r\nEmploying subsidies and tolls, we adjust the game so that choosing
    this predefined action profile\r\n\r\nbecomes strictly dominant. \r\n\r\nInspired
    mainly by the work of Monderer and Tennenholtz,\r\n\r\nwhere the promised subsidies
    do not materialise in the not played\r\n\r\nprofiles, we provide a fair and individually
    rational game\r\n\r\nadjustment, such that the total outside investments sum up\r\n\r\nto
    zero at any profile, thereby facilitating easy and frequent\r\n\r\nusage of our
    adjustment without bearing costs, even if some\r\n\r\nplayers behave unexpectedly.
    The resultant action profile itself needs no\r\n\r\nadjustment. Importantly, we
    also prove that our adjustment minimises \r\n\r\nthe general transfer among all
    such adjustments, counting the total subsidising and taxation.</jats:p>"
author:
- first_name: Gleb
  full_name: Polevoy, Gleb
  id: '83983'
  last_name: Polevoy
- first_name: Marcin
  full_name: Dziubiński, Marcin
  last_name: Dziubiński
citation:
  ama: 'Polevoy G, Dziubiński M. Fair, Individually Rational and Cheap Adjustment.
    In: De Raedt L, ed. <i>Proceedings of the Thirty-First International Joint Conference
    on Artificial Intelligence</i>. International Joint Conferences on Artificial
    Intelligence Organization; 2022. doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2022/64">10.24963/ijcai.2022/64</a>'
  apa: Polevoy, G., &#38; Dziubiński, M. (2022). Fair, Individually Rational and Cheap
    Adjustment. In L. De Raedt (Ed.), <i>Proceedings of the Thirty-First International
    Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence</i>. International Joint Conferences
    on Artificial Intelligence Organization. <a href="https://doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2022/64">https://doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2022/64</a>
  bibtex: '@inproceedings{Polevoy_Dziubiński_2022, title={Fair, Individually Rational
    and Cheap Adjustment}, DOI={<a href="https://doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2022/64">10.24963/ijcai.2022/64</a>},
    booktitle={Proceedings of the Thirty-First International Joint Conference on Artificial
    Intelligence}, publisher={International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence
    Organization}, author={Polevoy, Gleb and Dziubiński, Marcin}, editor={De Raedt,
    Luc}, year={2022} }'
  chicago: Polevoy, Gleb, and Marcin Dziubiński. “Fair, Individually Rational and
    Cheap Adjustment.” In <i>Proceedings of the Thirty-First International Joint Conference
    on Artificial Intelligence</i>, edited by Luc De Raedt. International Joint Conferences
    on Artificial Intelligence Organization, 2022. <a href="https://doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2022/64">https://doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2022/64</a>.
  ieee: 'G. Polevoy and M. Dziubiński, “Fair, Individually Rational and Cheap Adjustment,”
    in <i>Proceedings of the Thirty-First International Joint Conference on Artificial
    Intelligence</i>, Vienna, 2022, doi: <a href="https://doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2022/64">10.24963/ijcai.2022/64</a>.'
  mla: Polevoy, Gleb, and Marcin Dziubiński. “Fair, Individually Rational and Cheap
    Adjustment.” <i>Proceedings of the Thirty-First International Joint Conference
    on Artificial Intelligence</i>, edited by Luc De Raedt, International Joint Conferences
    on Artificial Intelligence Organization, 2022, doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2022/64">10.24963/ijcai.2022/64</a>.
  short: 'G. Polevoy, M. Dziubiński, in: L. De Raedt (Ed.), Proceedings of the Thirty-First
    International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, International Joint
    Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization, 2022.'
conference:
  end_date: 2022-07-29
  location: Vienna
  name: THE 31ST INTERNATIONAL JOINT CONFERENCE ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
  start_date: 2022-07-23
date_created: 2022-11-08T16:53:31Z
date_updated: 2022-11-08T17:34:36Z
department:
- _id: '63'
- _id: '541'
doi: 10.24963/ijcai.2022/64
editor:
- first_name: Luc
  full_name: De Raedt, Luc
  last_name: De Raedt
keyword:
- adjustment
- strictly dominant
- fairness
- individually rational
- transfer
- tax
- subsidy
language:
- iso: eng
main_file_link:
- url: https://www.ijcai.org/proceedings/2022/64
publication: Proceedings of the Thirty-First International Joint Conference on Artificial
  Intelligence
publication_status: published
publisher: International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization
status: public
title: Fair, Individually Rational and Cheap Adjustment
type: conference
user_id: '83983'
year: '2022'
...