@article{44092, abstract = {{We study how competition between physicians affects the provision of medical care. In our theoretical model, physicians are faced with a heterogeneous patient population, in which patients systematically vary with regard to both their responsiveness to the provided quality of care and their state of health. We test the behavioral predictions derived from this model in a controlled laboratory experiment. In line with the model, we observe that competition significantly improves patient benefits as long as patients are able to respond to the quality provided. For those patients, who are not able to choose a physician, competition even decreases the patient benefit compared to a situation without competition. This decrease is in contrast to our theoretical prediction implying no change in benefits for passive patients. Deviations from patient-optimal treatment are highest for passive patients in need of a low quantity of medical services. With repetition, both, the positive effects of competition for active patients as well as the negative effects of competition for passive patients become more pronounced. Our results imply that competition can not only improve but also worsen patient outcome and that patients’ responsiveness to quality is decisive.}}, author = {{Brosig-Koch, Jeannette and Hehenkamp, Burkhard and Kokot, Johanna}}, journal = {{Health Economics}}, keywords = {{physician competition, patient characteristics, heterogeneity in quality responses, fee-for-service, laboratory experiment}}, title = {{{Who benefits from quality competition in health care? A theory and a laboratory experiment on the relevance of patient characteristics}}}, doi = {{10.1002/hec.4689}}, year = {{2023}}, } @techreport{44093, abstract = {{We consider a model where for-profit providers compete in quality in a price-regulated market that has been opened to competition, and where the incumbent is located at the center of the market, facing high costs of relocation. The model is relevant in markets such as public health care, education and schooling, or postal services. We find that, when the regulated price is low or intermediate, the entrant strategically locates towards the corner of the market to keep the incumbent at the low monopoly quality level. For a high price, the entrant locates at the corner of the market and both providers implement higher quality compared to a monopoly. In any case, the entrant implements higher quality than the incumbent provider. Social welfare is always higher in a duopoly if the cost of quality is low. For higher cost levels welfare is non-monotonic in the price and it can be optimal to the regulator not to use its entire budget. Therefore, the welfare effect of entry depends on the price and the size of the entry cost, and the regulator should condition the decision to allow entry on an assessment of the entry cost.}}, author = {{Hehenkamp, Burkhard and Kaarbøe, Oddvar M.}}, keywords = {{Quality competition, Price regulation, Location choice, Product differentiation}}, title = {{{Price Regulation, Quality Competition and Location Choice with Costly Relocation}}}, year = {{2023}}, } @article{5101, abstract = {{Prior literature finds that International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) adopters enjoy lower financing costs subsequent to IFRS adoption. We predict and find that mandatory IFRS adopters exploit lower financing costs to increase market share vis-à-vis non-adopters. This effect is robust across several different model specifications in a sample capturing the universe of public and private firms in the EU, in a matched sample of public and private firms, and in a public firm sample comparing mandatory and voluntary IFRS adopters. We further find that IFRS is associated with an increase (decrease) in industry sales concentration (competition), consistent with large public firms increasing market share. In supplemental analyses, we find that mandatory adopters issue more equity and debt after IFRS adoption and that larger market share gains accrue to those mandatory IFRS adopters that issue more equity and debt after IFRS adoption. Overall, we provide evidence of unintended product market consequences of IFRS adoption.}}, author = {{Downes, Jimmy F and Flagmeier, Vanessa and Godsell, David}}, journal = {{Journal of Accounting and Public Policy}}, keywords = {{Financial reporting regulationProduct market competition}}, number = {{5}}, pages = {{376--401}}, publisher = {{Elsevier}}, title = {{{Product market effects of IFRS adoption}}}, doi = {{10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2018.09.004}}, volume = {{37}}, year = {{2018}}, } @inproceedings{17654, author = {{Polevoy, Gleb and de Weerdt, M.M.}}, booktitle = {{Proceedings of the 29th Benelux Conference on Artificial Intelligence}}, keywords = {{agents, projects, contribute, shared effort game, competition, quota, threshold, Nash equilibrium, social welfare, efficiency, price of anarchy, price of stability}}, publisher = {{Springer}}, title = {{{Competition between Cooperative Projects}}}, year = {{2017}}, } @techreport{2570, abstract = {{On an intermediate goods market we consider vertical and horizontal product differentiation and analyze the impact of simultaneous competition for resources and the demand of customers on the market outcome. Asymmetries between intermediaries may arise due to distinct product qualities as well as by reasons of different production technologies. The intermediaries compete on the output market by choosing production quantities sequentially and for the supplies of a monopolistic input supplier on the input market. It turns out that there exist differences in product quality and productivities such that an intermediary being the Stackelberg leader has no incentive to procure inputs, whereas in the role of the Stackelberg follower will participate in the market. Moreover, we find that given an intermediary is more competitive, his equilibrium output quantity is higher when being the leader than when being the follower. Interestingly, if the intermediary is less competitive and goods are complements, there may exist asymmetries such that an intermediary being in the position of the Stackelberg follower offers higher output quantities in equilibrium than when being in the position of the Stackelberg leader.}}, author = {{Manegold, Jochen}}, keywords = {{Input Market, Product Quality, Quantity Competition, Stackelberg Competition, Product Innovation}}, publisher = {{CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University}}, title = {{{Stackelberg Competition among Intermediaries in a Differentiated Duopoly with Product Innovation}}}, volume = {{98}}, year = {{2016}}, } @inproceedings{17659, author = {{Polevoy, Gleb and Trajanovski, Stojan and de Weerdt, Mathijs M.}}, booktitle = {{Proceedings of the 2014 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-agent Systems}}, isbn = {{978-1-4503-2738-1}}, keywords = {{competition, equilibrium, market, models, shared effort games, simulation}}, pages = {{861--868}}, publisher = {{International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems}}, title = {{{Nash Equilibria in Shared Effort Games}}}, year = {{2014}}, } @article{17662, author = {{Polevoy, Gleb and Smorodinsky, Rann and Tennenholtz, Moshe}}, issn = {{2167-8375}}, journal = {{ACM Trans. Econ. Comput.}}, keywords = {{Competition, efficiency, equilibrium, market, social welfare}}, number = {{1}}, pages = {{1:1--1:16}}, publisher = {{ACM}}, title = {{{Signaling Competition and Social Welfare}}}, doi = {{10.1145/2560766}}, volume = {{2}}, year = {{2014}}, }