[{"publication":"Health Economics","citation":{"ama":"Brosig-Koch J, Hehenkamp B, Kokot J. Who benefits from quality competition in health care? A theory and a laboratory experiment on the relevance of patient characteristics. <i>Health Economics</i>. Published online 2023. doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1002/hec.4689\">10.1002/hec.4689</a>","bibtex":"@article{Brosig-Koch_Hehenkamp_Kokot_2023, title={Who benefits from quality competition in health care? A theory and a laboratory experiment on the relevance of patient characteristics}, DOI={<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1002/hec.4689\">10.1002/hec.4689</a>}, journal={Health Economics}, author={Brosig-Koch, Jeannette and Hehenkamp, Burkhard and Kokot, Johanna}, year={2023} }","mla":"Brosig-Koch, Jeannette, et al. “Who Benefits from Quality Competition in Health Care? A Theory and a Laboratory Experiment on the Relevance of Patient Characteristics.” <i>Health Economics</i>, 2023, doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1002/hec.4689\">10.1002/hec.4689</a>.","chicago":"Brosig-Koch, Jeannette, Burkhard Hehenkamp, and Johanna Kokot. “Who Benefits from Quality Competition in Health Care? A Theory and a Laboratory Experiment on the Relevance of Patient Characteristics.” <i>Health Economics</i>, 2023. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1002/hec.4689\">https://doi.org/10.1002/hec.4689</a>.","short":"J. Brosig-Koch, B. Hehenkamp, J. Kokot, Health Economics (2023).","apa":"Brosig-Koch, J., Hehenkamp, B., &#38; Kokot, J. (2023). Who benefits from quality competition in health care? A theory and a laboratory experiment on the relevance of patient characteristics. <i>Health Economics</i>. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1002/hec.4689\">https://doi.org/10.1002/hec.4689</a>","ieee":"J. Brosig-Koch, B. Hehenkamp, and J. Kokot, “Who benefits from quality competition in health care? A theory and a laboratory experiment on the relevance of patient characteristics,” <i>Health Economics</i>, 2023, doi: <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1002/hec.4689\">10.1002/hec.4689</a>."},"quality_controlled":"1","abstract":[{"text":"We study how competition between physicians affects the provision of medical care. In\r\nour theoretical model, physicians are faced with a heterogeneous patient population, in which patients\r\nsystematically vary with regard to both their responsiveness to the provided quality of care and their\r\nstate of health. We test the behavioral predictions derived from this model in a controlled laboratory\r\nexperiment. In line with the model, we observe that competition significantly improves patient benefits\r\nas long as patients are able to respond to the quality provided. For those patients, who are not able\r\nto choose a physician, competition even decreases the patient benefit compared to a situation without\r\ncompetition. This decrease is in contrast to our theoretical prediction implying no change in benefits for\r\npassive patients. Deviations from patient-optimal treatment are highest for passive patients in need of\r\na low quantity of medical services. With repetition, both, the positive effects of competition for active\r\npatients as well as the negative effects of competition for passive patients become more pronounced. Our\r\nresults imply that competition can not only improve but also worsen patient outcome and that patients’\r\nresponsiveness to quality is decisive.","lang":"eng"}],"project":[{"_id":"1","name":"SFB 901: SFB 901"},{"name":"SFB 901 - A: SFB 901 - Project Area A","_id":"2"},{"_id":"7","name":"SFB 901 - A3: SFB 901 - Subproject A3"}],"date_created":"2023-04-20T17:02:41Z","type":"journal_article","keyword":["physician competition","patient characteristics","heterogeneity in quality responses","fee-for-service","laboratory experiment"],"department":[{"_id":"280"},{"_id":"475"}],"title":"Who benefits from quality competition in health care? A theory and a laboratory experiment on the relevance of patient characteristics","year":"2023","status":"public","author":[{"first_name":"Jeannette","last_name":"Brosig-Koch","full_name":"Brosig-Koch, Jeannette"},{"last_name":"Hehenkamp","first_name":"Burkhard","full_name":"Hehenkamp, Burkhard","id":"37339"},{"first_name":"Johanna","last_name":"Kokot","full_name":"Kokot, Johanna"}],"jel":["I11","D43","C91"],"date_updated":"2023-04-20T17:16:14Z","article_type":"original","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"_id":"44092","doi":"10.1002/hec.4689","user_id":"37339"},{"user_id":"37339","_id":"44093","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"publication_status":"submitted","date_updated":"2023-04-20T17:16:24Z","status":"public","title":"Price Regulation, Quality Competition and Location Choice with Costly Relocation","year":"2023","jel":["D43","L13","L51"],"author":[{"full_name":"Hehenkamp, Burkhard","first_name":"Burkhard","last_name":"Hehenkamp","id":"37339"},{"last_name":"Kaarbøe","first_name":"Oddvar M.","full_name":"Kaarbøe, Oddvar M."}],"type":"report","keyword":["Quality competition","Price regulation","Location choice","Product differentiation"],"department":[{"_id":"280"},{"_id":"475"}],"date_created":"2023-04-20T17:12:18Z","abstract":[{"text":"We consider a model where for-profit providers compete in quality in a price-regulated market that has been opened to competition, and where the incumbent is located at the center of the market, facing high costs of relocation. The model is relevant in markets such as public health care, education and schooling, or postal services. We find that, when the regulated price is low or intermediate, the entrant strategically locates towards the corner of the market to keep the incumbent at the low monopoly quality level. For a high price, the entrant locates at the corner of the market and both providers implement higher quality compared to a monopoly. In any case, the entrant implements higher quality than the incumbent provider. Social welfare is always higher in a duopoly if the cost of quality is low. For higher cost levels welfare is non-monotonic in the price and it can be optimal to the regulator not to use its entire budget. Therefore, the welfare effect of entry depends on the price and the size of the entry cost, and the regulator should condition the decision to allow entry on an assessment of the entry cost.","lang":"eng"}],"project":[{"name":"SFB 901: SFB 901","_id":"1"},{"_id":"2","name":"SFB 901 - A: SFB 901 - Project Area A"},{"_id":"7","name":"SFB 901 - A3: SFB 901 - Subproject A3"}],"citation":{"short":"B. Hehenkamp, O.M. Kaarbøe, Price Regulation, Quality Competition and Location Choice with Costly Relocation, n.d.","chicago":"Hehenkamp, Burkhard, and Oddvar M. Kaarbøe. <i>Price Regulation, Quality Competition and Location Choice with Costly Relocation</i>, n.d.","ieee":"B. Hehenkamp and O. M. Kaarbøe, <i>Price Regulation, Quality Competition and Location Choice with Costly Relocation</i>. .","apa":"Hehenkamp, B., &#38; Kaarbøe, O. M. (n.d.). <i>Price Regulation, Quality Competition and Location Choice with Costly Relocation</i>.","bibtex":"@book{Hehenkamp_Kaarbøe, title={Price Regulation, Quality Competition and Location Choice with Costly Relocation}, author={Hehenkamp, Burkhard and Kaarbøe, Oddvar M.} }","ama":"Hehenkamp B, Kaarbøe OM. <i>Price Regulation, Quality Competition and Location Choice with Costly Relocation</i>.","mla":"Hehenkamp, Burkhard, and Oddvar M. Kaarbøe. <i>Price Regulation, Quality Competition and Location Choice with Costly Relocation</i>."}},{"language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"doi":"10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2018.09.004","author":[{"last_name":"Downes","first_name":"Jimmy F","full_name":"Downes, Jimmy F"},{"full_name":"Flagmeier, Vanessa","last_name":"Flagmeier","first_name":"Vanessa","id":"8084"},{"full_name":"Godsell, David","last_name":"Godsell","first_name":"David"}],"title":"Product market effects of IFRS adoption","year":"2018","intvolume":"        37","publication_status":"published","date_updated":"2022-01-06T07:01:38Z","date_created":"2018-10-31T06:59:36Z","department":[{"_id":"551"},{"_id":"189"}],"type":"journal_article","keyword":["Financial reporting regulationProduct market competition"],"publication":"Journal of Accounting and Public Policy","issue":"5","abstract":[{"lang":"eng","text":"Prior literature finds that International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) adopters enjoy lower financing costs subsequent to IFRS adoption. We predict and find that mandatory IFRS adopters exploit lower financing costs to increase market share vis-à-vis non-adopters. This effect is robust across several different model specifications in a sample capturing the universe of public and private firms in the EU, in a matched sample of public and private firms, and in a public firm sample comparing mandatory and voluntary IFRS adopters. We further find that IFRS is associated with an increase (decrease) in industry sales concentration (competition), consistent with large public firms increasing market share. In supplemental analyses, we find that mandatory adopters issue more equity and debt after IFRS adoption and that larger market share gains accrue to those mandatory IFRS adopters that issue more equity and debt after IFRS adoption. Overall, we provide evidence of unintended product market consequences of IFRS adoption."}],"_id":"5101","publisher":"Elsevier","page":"376-401","volume":37,"user_id":"64756","jel":["D43","G32","G38"],"status":"public","citation":{"mla":"Downes, Jimmy F., et al. “Product Market Effects of IFRS Adoption.” <i>Journal of Accounting and Public Policy</i>, vol. 37, no. 5, Elsevier, 2018, pp. 376–401, doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2018.09.004\">10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2018.09.004</a>.","ama":"Downes JF, Flagmeier V, Godsell D. Product market effects of IFRS adoption. <i>Journal of Accounting and Public Policy</i>. 2018;37(5):376-401. doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2018.09.004\">10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2018.09.004</a>","bibtex":"@article{Downes_Flagmeier_Godsell_2018, title={Product market effects of IFRS adoption}, volume={37}, DOI={<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2018.09.004\">10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2018.09.004</a>}, number={5}, journal={Journal of Accounting and Public Policy}, publisher={Elsevier}, author={Downes, Jimmy F and Flagmeier, Vanessa and Godsell, David}, year={2018}, pages={376–401} }","apa":"Downes, J. F., Flagmeier, V., &#38; Godsell, D. (2018). Product market effects of IFRS adoption. <i>Journal of Accounting and Public Policy</i>, <i>37</i>(5), 376–401. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2018.09.004\">https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2018.09.004</a>","ieee":"J. F. Downes, V. Flagmeier, and D. Godsell, “Product market effects of IFRS adoption,” <i>Journal of Accounting and Public Policy</i>, vol. 37, no. 5, pp. 376–401, 2018.","short":"J.F. Downes, V. Flagmeier, D. Godsell, Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 37 (2018) 376–401.","chicago":"Downes, Jimmy F, Vanessa Flagmeier, and David Godsell. “Product Market Effects of IFRS Adoption.” <i>Journal of Accounting and Public Policy</i> 37, no. 5 (2018): 376–401. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2018.09.004\">https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2018.09.004</a>."}},{"keyword":["agents","projects","contribute","shared effort game","competition","quota","threshold","Nash equilibrium","social welfare","efficiency","price of anarchy","price of stability"],"type":"conference","department":[{"_id":"63"},{"_id":"541"}],"date_created":"2020-08-06T15:20:19Z","extern":"1","publication":"Proceedings of the 29th Benelux Conference on Artificial Intelligence","citation":{"short":"G. Polevoy, M.M. de Weerdt, in: Proceedings of the 29th Benelux Conference on Artificial Intelligence, Springer, 2017.","chicago":"Polevoy, Gleb, and M.M. de Weerdt. “Competition between Cooperative Projects.” In <i>Proceedings of the 29th Benelux Conference on Artificial Intelligence</i>. CCIS. Springer, 2017.","apa":"Polevoy, G., &#38; de Weerdt, M. M. (2017). Competition between Cooperative Projects. In <i>Proceedings of the 29th Benelux Conference on Artificial Intelligence</i>. Springer.","ieee":"G. Polevoy and M. M. de Weerdt, “Competition between Cooperative Projects,” in <i>Proceedings of the 29th Benelux Conference on Artificial Intelligence</i>, 2017.","ama":"Polevoy G, de Weerdt MM. Competition between Cooperative Projects. In: <i>Proceedings of the 29th Benelux Conference on Artificial Intelligence</i>. CCIS. Springer; 2017.","bibtex":"@inproceedings{Polevoy_de Weerdt_2017, series={CCIS}, title={Competition between Cooperative Projects}, booktitle={Proceedings of the 29th Benelux Conference on Artificial Intelligence}, publisher={Springer}, author={Polevoy, Gleb and de Weerdt, M.M.}, year={2017}, collection={CCIS} }","mla":"Polevoy, Gleb, and M. M. de Weerdt. “Competition between Cooperative Projects.” <i>Proceedings of the 29th Benelux Conference on Artificial Intelligence</i>, Springer, 2017."},"user_id":"83983","_id":"17654","series_title":"CCIS","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"publisher":"Springer","date_updated":"2022-01-06T06:53:16Z","status":"public","title":"Competition between Cooperative Projects","year":"2017","author":[{"id":"83983","last_name":"Polevoy","first_name":"Gleb","full_name":"Polevoy, Gleb"},{"full_name":"de Weerdt, M.M.","first_name":"M.M.","last_name":"de Weerdt"}]},{"abstract":[{"text":"On an intermediate goods market we consider vertical and horizontal product differentiation and analyze the impact of simultaneous competition for resources and the demand of customers on the market outcome. Asymmetries between intermediaries may arise due to distinct product qualities as well as by reasons of different production technologies. The intermediaries compete on the output market by choosing production quantities sequentially and for the supplies of a monopolistic input supplier on the input market. It turns out that there exist differences in product quality and productivities such that an intermediary being the Stackelberg leader has no incentive to procure inputs, whereas in the role of the Stackelberg follower will participate in the market. Moreover, we find that given an intermediary is more competitive, his equilibrium output quantity is higher when being the leader than when being the follower. Interestingly, if the intermediary is less competitive and goods are complements, there may exist asymmetries such that an intermediary being in the position of the Stackelberg follower offers higher output quantities in equilibrium than when being in the position of the Stackelberg leader.","lang":"eng"}],"file":[{"file_name":"WP - Stackelberg Competition among Intermediaries in a Differentiated Duopoly with Product Innovation.pdf","access_level":"closed","file_size":776029,"relation":"main_file","date_updated":"2018-10-31T09:16:36Z","file_id":"5145","success":1,"content_type":"application/pdf","creator":"stela","date_created":"2018-10-31T09:16:36Z"}],"date_created":"2018-05-03T08:06:05Z","keyword":["Input Market","Product Quality","Quantity Competition","Stackelberg Competition","Product Innovation"],"type":"working_paper","department":[{"_id":"205"},{"_id":"475"}],"year":"2016","title":"Stackelberg Competition among Intermediaries in a Differentiated Duopoly with Product Innovation","author":[{"last_name":"Manegold","first_name":"Jochen","full_name":"Manegold, Jochen"}],"date_updated":"2022-01-06T06:57:11Z","intvolume":"        98","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"series_title":"Working Papers CIE","file_date_updated":"2018-10-31T09:16:36Z","citation":{"ama":"Manegold J. <i>Stackelberg Competition among Intermediaries in a Differentiated Duopoly with Product Innovation</i>. Vol 98. CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University; 2016.","bibtex":"@book{Manegold_2016, series={Working Papers CIE}, title={Stackelberg Competition among Intermediaries in a Differentiated Duopoly with Product Innovation}, volume={98}, publisher={CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University}, author={Manegold, Jochen}, year={2016}, collection={Working Papers CIE} }","mla":"Manegold, Jochen. <i>Stackelberg Competition among Intermediaries in a Differentiated Duopoly with Product Innovation</i>. Vol. 98, CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2016.","chicago":"Manegold, Jochen. <i>Stackelberg Competition among Intermediaries in a Differentiated Duopoly with Product Innovation</i>. Vol. 98. Working Papers CIE. CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2016.","short":"J. Manegold, Stackelberg Competition among Intermediaries in a Differentiated Duopoly with Product Innovation, CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2016.","apa":"Manegold, J. (2016). <i>Stackelberg Competition among Intermediaries in a Differentiated Duopoly with Product Innovation</i> (Vol. 98). CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University.","ieee":"J. Manegold, <i>Stackelberg Competition among Intermediaries in a Differentiated Duopoly with Product Innovation</i>, vol. 98. CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2016."},"project":[{"name":"SFB 901","_id":"1"},{"name":"SFB 901 - Project Area A","_id":"2"},{"_id":"7","name":"SFB 901 - Subproject A3"}],"status":"public","has_accepted_license":"1","publisher":"CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University","_id":"2570","user_id":"65453","ddc":["040"],"volume":98},{"date_updated":"2022-01-06T06:53:16Z","year":"2014","title":"Nash Equilibria in Shared Effort Games","status":"public","publication_identifier":{"isbn":["978-1-4503-2738-1"]},"author":[{"id":"83983","first_name":"Gleb","last_name":"Polevoy","full_name":"Polevoy, Gleb"},{"full_name":"Trajanovski, Stojan","last_name":"Trajanovski","first_name":"Stojan"},{"first_name":"Mathijs M.","last_name":"de Weerdt","full_name":"de Weerdt, Mathijs M."}],"user_id":"83983","page":"861-868","_id":"17659","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"publisher":"International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems","series_title":"AAMAS '14","extern":"1","publication":"Proceedings of the 2014 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-agent Systems","citation":{"ieee":"G. Polevoy, S. Trajanovski, and M. M. de Weerdt, “Nash Equilibria in Shared Effort Games,” in <i>Proceedings of the 2014 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-agent Systems</i>, 2014, pp. 861–868.","apa":"Polevoy, G., Trajanovski, S., &#38; de Weerdt, M. M. (2014). Nash Equilibria in Shared Effort Games. In <i>Proceedings of the 2014 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-agent Systems</i> (pp. 861–868). Richland, SC: International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems.","short":"G. Polevoy, S. Trajanovski, M.M. de Weerdt, in: Proceedings of the 2014 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems, International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, Richland, SC, 2014, pp. 861–868.","chicago":"Polevoy, Gleb, Stojan Trajanovski, and Mathijs M. de Weerdt. “Nash Equilibria in Shared Effort Games.” In <i>Proceedings of the 2014 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems</i>, 861–68. AAMAS ’14. Richland, SC: International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2014.","mla":"Polevoy, Gleb, et al. “Nash Equilibria in Shared Effort Games.” <i>Proceedings of the 2014 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems</i>, International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2014, pp. 861–68.","bibtex":"@inproceedings{Polevoy_Trajanovski_de Weerdt_2014, place={Richland, SC}, series={AAMAS ’14}, title={Nash Equilibria in Shared Effort Games}, booktitle={Proceedings of the 2014 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-agent Systems}, publisher={International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems}, author={Polevoy, Gleb and Trajanovski, Stojan and de Weerdt, Mathijs M.}, year={2014}, pages={861–868}, collection={AAMAS ’14} }","ama":"Polevoy G, Trajanovski S, de Weerdt MM. Nash Equilibria in Shared Effort Games. In: <i>Proceedings of the 2014 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems</i>. AAMAS ’14. Richland, SC: International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems; 2014:861-868."},"type":"conference","keyword":["competition","equilibrium","market","models","shared effort games","simulation"],"department":[{"_id":"63"},{"_id":"541"}],"date_created":"2020-08-06T15:21:26Z","place":"Richland, SC"},{"date_updated":"2022-01-06T06:53:16Z","intvolume":"         2","year":"2014","title":"Signaling Competition and Social Welfare","author":[{"id":"83983","full_name":"Polevoy, Gleb","first_name":"Gleb","last_name":"Polevoy"},{"full_name":"Smorodinsky, Rann","first_name":"Rann","last_name":"Smorodinsky"},{"full_name":"Tennenholtz, Moshe","first_name":"Moshe","last_name":"Tennenholtz"}],"publication_identifier":{"issn":["2167-8375"]},"doi":"10.1145/2560766","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"extern":"1","publication":"ACM Trans. Econ. Comput.","issue":"1","type":"journal_article","keyword":["Competition","efficiency","equilibrium","market","social welfare"],"department":[{"_id":"63"},{"_id":"541"}],"date_created":"2020-08-06T15:21:55Z","status":"public","user_id":"83983","volume":2,"page":"1:1-1:16","publisher":"ACM","_id":"17662","citation":{"bibtex":"@article{Polevoy_Smorodinsky_Tennenholtz_2014, title={Signaling Competition and Social Welfare}, volume={2}, DOI={<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1145/2560766\">10.1145/2560766</a>}, number={1}, journal={ACM Trans. Econ. Comput.}, publisher={ACM}, author={Polevoy, Gleb and Smorodinsky, Rann and Tennenholtz, Moshe}, year={2014}, pages={1:1-1:16} }","ama":"Polevoy G, Smorodinsky R, Tennenholtz M. Signaling Competition and Social Welfare. <i>ACM Trans Econ Comput</i>. 2014;2(1):1:1-1:16. doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1145/2560766\">10.1145/2560766</a>","mla":"Polevoy, Gleb, et al. “Signaling Competition and Social Welfare.” <i>ACM Trans. Econ. Comput.</i>, vol. 2, no. 1, ACM, 2014, pp. 1:1-1:16, doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1145/2560766\">10.1145/2560766</a>.","chicago":"Polevoy, Gleb, Rann Smorodinsky, and Moshe Tennenholtz. “Signaling Competition and Social Welfare.” <i>ACM Trans. Econ. Comput.</i> 2, no. 1 (2014): 1:1-1:16. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1145/2560766\">https://doi.org/10.1145/2560766</a>.","short":"G. Polevoy, R. Smorodinsky, M. Tennenholtz, ACM Trans. Econ. Comput. 2 (2014) 1:1-1:16.","ieee":"G. Polevoy, R. Smorodinsky, and M. Tennenholtz, “Signaling Competition and Social Welfare,” <i>ACM Trans. Econ. Comput.</i>, vol. 2, no. 1, pp. 1:1-1:16, 2014.","apa":"Polevoy, G., Smorodinsky, R., &#38; Tennenholtz, M. (2014). Signaling Competition and Social Welfare. <i>ACM Trans. Econ. Comput.</i>, <i>2</i>(1), 1:1-1:16. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1145/2560766\">https://doi.org/10.1145/2560766</a>"}},{"publisher":"Paderborn University","_id":"36021","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"user_id":"21810","year":"2011","status":"public","title":"The Nexus between Monetary Policy, Banking Market Structure and Bank Risk Taking","author":[{"last_name":"Michalak","first_name":"Tobias C.","full_name":"Michalak, Tobias C."},{"id":"36049","last_name":"Uhde","first_name":"André","full_name":"Uhde, André"}],"jel":["E43","E44","E52","G01","G28"],"date_updated":"2024-04-17T13:35:15Z","publication_status":"published","date_created":"2023-01-11T11:04:30Z","type":"working_paper","keyword":["risk-taking channel","competition","concentration","bank soundness","European banking"],"department":[{"_id":"186"},{"_id":"188"}],"citation":{"bibtex":"@book{Michalak_Uhde_2011, title={The Nexus between Monetary Policy, Banking Market Structure and Bank Risk Taking}, publisher={Paderborn University}, author={Michalak, Tobias C. and Uhde, André}, year={2011} }","ama":"Michalak TC, Uhde A. <i>The Nexus between Monetary Policy, Banking Market Structure and Bank Risk Taking</i>. Paderborn University; 2011.","mla":"Michalak, Tobias C., and André Uhde. <i>The Nexus between Monetary Policy, Banking Market Structure and Bank Risk Taking</i>. Paderborn University, 2011.","short":"T.C. Michalak, A. Uhde, The Nexus between Monetary Policy, Banking Market Structure and Bank Risk Taking, Paderborn University, 2011.","chicago":"Michalak, Tobias C., and André Uhde. <i>The Nexus between Monetary Policy, Banking Market Structure and Bank Risk Taking</i>. Paderborn University, 2011.","ieee":"T. C. Michalak and A. Uhde, <i>The Nexus between Monetary Policy, Banking Market Structure and Bank Risk Taking</i>. Paderborn University, 2011.","apa":"Michalak, T. C., &#38; Uhde, A. (2011). <i>The Nexus between Monetary Policy, Banking Market Structure and Bank Risk Taking</i>. Paderborn University."},"abstract":[{"lang":"eng","text":"Using a sample of stock-listed bank holding companies located in Western Europe over the period from 1997 to 2008 this paper provides empirical evidence that an increase in short-term interest rates as well as an extended period of expansionary monetary policy has a negative impact on European stock-listed banks’ soundness as measured by the Expected Default Frequency. Against this background and in order to evaluate interactions between the risk-taking channel of monetary policy and the competitiveness of a country’s banking market we find a negative impact of an increase in competition in the loan market – proxied by the Boone-indicator – on financial soundness. Referring to the structural-conduct performance (SCP) paradigm, this paper provides further evidence that an increase in concentration in the banking market spurs financial soundness. "}]}]