---
_id: '32409'
abstract:
- lang: eng
  text: 'Context: Cryptographic APIs are often misused in real-world applications.
    Therefore, many cryptographic API misuse detection tools have been introduced.
    However, there exists no established reference benchmark for a fair and comprehensive
    comparison and evaluation of these tools. While there are benchmarks, they often
    only address a subset of the domain or were only used to evaluate a subset of
    existing misuse detection tools. Objective: To fairly compare cryptographic API
    misuse detection tools and to drive future development in this domain, we will
    devise such a benchmark. Openness and transparency in the generation process are
    key factors to fairly generate and establish the needed benchmark. Method: We
    propose an approach where we derive the benchmark generation methodology from
    the literature which consists of general best practices in benchmarking and domain-specific
    benchmark generation. A part of this methodology is transparency and openness
    of the generation process, which is achieved by pre-registering this work. Based
    on our methodology we design CamBench, a fair "Cryptographic API Misuse Detection
    Tool Benchmark Suite". We will implement the first version of CamBench limiting
    the domain to Java, the JCA, and static analyses. Finally, we will use CamBench
    to compare current misuse detection tools and compare CamBench to related benchmarks
    of its domain.'
author:
- first_name: Michael
  full_name: Schlichtig, Michael
  id: '32312'
  last_name: Schlichtig
  orcid: 0000-0001-6600-6171
- first_name: Anna-Katharina
  full_name: Wickert, Anna-Katharina
  last_name: Wickert
- first_name: Stefan
  full_name: Krüger, Stefan
  last_name: Krüger
- first_name: Eric
  full_name: Bodden, Eric
  id: '59256'
  last_name: Bodden
  orcid: 0000-0003-3470-3647
- first_name: Mira
  full_name: Mezini, Mira
  last_name: Mezini
citation:
  ama: Schlichtig M, Wickert A-K, Krüger S, Bodden E, Mezini M. <i>CamBench -- Cryptographic
    API Misuse Detection Tool Benchmark Suite</i>.; 2022. doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.48550/ARXIV.2204.06447">10.48550/ARXIV.2204.06447</a>
  apa: Schlichtig, M., Wickert, A.-K., Krüger, S., Bodden, E., &#38; Mezini, M. (2022).
    <i>CamBench -- Cryptographic API Misuse Detection Tool Benchmark Suite</i>. <a
    href="https://doi.org/10.48550/ARXIV.2204.06447">https://doi.org/10.48550/ARXIV.2204.06447</a>
  bibtex: '@book{Schlichtig_Wickert_Krüger_Bodden_Mezini_2022, title={CamBench --
    Cryptographic API Misuse Detection Tool Benchmark Suite}, DOI={<a href="https://doi.org/10.48550/ARXIV.2204.06447">10.48550/ARXIV.2204.06447</a>},
    author={Schlichtig, Michael and Wickert, Anna-Katharina and Krüger, Stefan and
    Bodden, Eric and Mezini, Mira}, year={2022} }'
  chicago: Schlichtig, Michael, Anna-Katharina Wickert, Stefan Krüger, Eric Bodden,
    and Mira Mezini. <i>CamBench -- Cryptographic API Misuse Detection Tool Benchmark
    Suite</i>, 2022. <a href="https://doi.org/10.48550/ARXIV.2204.06447">https://doi.org/10.48550/ARXIV.2204.06447</a>.
  ieee: M. Schlichtig, A.-K. Wickert, S. Krüger, E. Bodden, and M. Mezini, <i>CamBench
    -- Cryptographic API Misuse Detection Tool Benchmark Suite</i>. 2022.
  mla: Schlichtig, Michael, et al. <i>CamBench -- Cryptographic API Misuse Detection
    Tool Benchmark Suite</i>. 2022, doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.48550/ARXIV.2204.06447">10.48550/ARXIV.2204.06447</a>.
  short: M. Schlichtig, A.-K. Wickert, S. Krüger, E. Bodden, M. Mezini, CamBench --
    Cryptographic API Misuse Detection Tool Benchmark Suite, 2022.
date_created: 2022-07-25T07:56:59Z
date_updated: 2022-07-25T10:23:44Z
department:
- _id: '76'
doi: 10.48550/ARXIV.2204.06447
keyword:
- cryptography
- benchmark
- API misuse
- static analysis
language:
- iso: eng
related_material:
  link:
  - relation: confirmation
    url: https://arxiv.org/abs/2204.06447
status: public
title: CamBench -- Cryptographic API Misuse Detection Tool Benchmark Suite
type: misc
user_id: '32312'
year: '2022'
...
---
_id: '29763'
abstract:
- lang: eng
  text: "Modern-day communication has become more and more digital. While this comes
    with many advantages such as a more efficient economy, it has also created more
    and more opportunities for various adversaries to manipulate communication or
    eavesdrop on it. The Snowden revelations in 2013 further highlighted the seriousness
    of these threats. To protect the communication of people, companies, and states
    from such threats, we require cryptography with strong security guarantees.\r\nDifferent
    applications may require different security properties from cryptographic schemes.
    For most applications, however, so-called adaptive security is considered a reasonable
    minimal requirement of security. Cryptographic schemes with adaptive security
    remain secure in the presence of an adversary that can corrupt communication partners
    to respond to messages of the adversaries choice, while the adversary may choose
    the messages based on previously observed interactions.\r\nWhile cryptography
    is associated the most with encryption, this is only one of many primitives that
    are essential for the security of digital interactions. This thesis presents novel
    identity-based encryption (IBE) schemes and verifiable random functions (VRFs)
    that achieve adaptive security as outlined above. Moreover, the cryptographic
    schemes presented in this thesis are proven secure in the standard model. That
    is without making use of idealized models like the random oracle model."
author:
- first_name: David
  full_name: Niehues, David
  id: '36113'
  last_name: Niehues
citation:
  ama: Niehues D. <i>More Efficient Techniques for Adaptively-Secure Cryptography</i>.;
    2022. doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.25926/rdtq-jw45">10.25926/rdtq-jw45</a>
  apa: Niehues, D. (2022). <i>More Efficient Techniques for Adaptively-Secure Cryptography</i>.
    <a href="https://doi.org/10.25926/rdtq-jw45">https://doi.org/10.25926/rdtq-jw45</a>
  bibtex: '@book{Niehues_2022, title={More Efficient Techniques for Adaptively-Secure
    Cryptography}, DOI={<a href="https://doi.org/10.25926/rdtq-jw45">10.25926/rdtq-jw45</a>},
    author={Niehues, David}, year={2022} }'
  chicago: Niehues, David. <i>More Efficient Techniques for Adaptively-Secure Cryptography</i>,
    2022. <a href="https://doi.org/10.25926/rdtq-jw45">https://doi.org/10.25926/rdtq-jw45</a>.
  ieee: D. Niehues, <i>More Efficient Techniques for Adaptively-Secure Cryptography</i>.
    2022.
  mla: Niehues, David. <i>More Efficient Techniques for Adaptively-Secure Cryptography</i>.
    2022, doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.25926/rdtq-jw45">10.25926/rdtq-jw45</a>.
  short: D. Niehues, More Efficient Techniques for Adaptively-Secure Cryptography,
    2022.
date_created: 2022-02-07T13:29:07Z
date_updated: 2022-02-07T13:32:28Z
ddc:
- '000'
department:
- _id: '558'
doi: 10.25926/rdtq-jw45
file:
- access_level: closed
  content_type: application/pdf
  creator: davnie
  date_created: 2022-02-07T13:26:05Z
  date_updated: 2022-02-07T13:26:05Z
  file_id: '29764'
  file_name: de2107.pdf
  file_size: 1542089
  relation: main_file
  success: 1
file_date_updated: 2022-02-07T13:26:05Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
keyword:
- public-key cryptography
- lattices
- pairings
- verifiable random functions
- identity-based encryption
language:
- iso: eng
license: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/
main_file_link:
- open_access: '1'
  url: https://elpub.bib.uni-wuppertal.de/servlets/DerivateServlet/Derivate-14686/de2107.pdf
oa: '1'
project:
- _id: '1'
  name: 'SFB 901: SFB 901'
- _id: '4'
  name: 'SFB 901 - C: SFB 901 - Project Area C'
- _id: '13'
  name: 'SFB 901 - C1: SFB 901 - Subproject C1'
publication_status: published
status: public
supervisor:
- first_name: Tibor
  full_name: Jager, Tibor
  id: '64669'
  last_name: Jager
- first_name: Anja
  full_name: Lehmann, Anja
  last_name: Lehmann
title: More Efficient Techniques for Adaptively-Secure Cryptography
type: dissertation
user_id: '36113'
year: '2022'
...
---
_id: '20533'
author:
- first_name: Stefan
  full_name: Krüger, Stefan
  last_name: Krüger
- first_name: Johannes
  full_name: Späth, Johannes
  last_name: Späth
- first_name: Karim
  full_name: Ali, Karim
  last_name: Ali
- first_name: Eric
  full_name: Bodden, Eric
  id: '59256'
  last_name: Bodden
  orcid: 0000-0003-3470-3647
- first_name: Mira
  full_name: Mezini, Mira
  last_name: Mezini
citation:
  ama: 'Krüger S, Späth J, Ali K, Bodden E, Mezini M. CrySL: An Extensible Approach
    to Validating the Correct Usage of Cryptographic APIs. <i>IEEE Transactions on
    Software Engineering</i>. Published online 2019:1-1. doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.1109/TSE.2019.2948910">10.1109/TSE.2019.2948910</a>'
  apa: 'Krüger, S., Späth, J., Ali, K., Bodden, E., &#38; Mezini, M. (2019). CrySL:
    An Extensible Approach to Validating the Correct Usage of Cryptographic APIs.
    <i>IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering</i>, 1–1. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1109/TSE.2019.2948910">https://doi.org/10.1109/TSE.2019.2948910</a>'
  bibtex: '@article{Krüger_Späth_Ali_Bodden_Mezini_2019, title={CrySL: An Extensible
    Approach to Validating the Correct Usage of Cryptographic APIs}, DOI={<a href="https://doi.org/10.1109/TSE.2019.2948910">10.1109/TSE.2019.2948910</a>},
    journal={IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering}, author={Krüger, Stefan and
    Späth, Johannes and Ali, Karim and Bodden, Eric and Mezini, Mira}, year={2019},
    pages={1–1} }'
  chicago: 'Krüger, Stefan, Johannes Späth, Karim Ali, Eric Bodden, and Mira Mezini.
    “CrySL: An Extensible Approach to Validating the Correct Usage of Cryptographic
    APIs.” <i>IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering</i>, 2019, 1–1. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1109/TSE.2019.2948910">https://doi.org/10.1109/TSE.2019.2948910</a>.'
  ieee: 'S. Krüger, J. Späth, K. Ali, E. Bodden, and M. Mezini, “CrySL: An Extensible
    Approach to Validating the Correct Usage of Cryptographic APIs,” <i>IEEE Transactions
    on Software Engineering</i>, pp. 1–1, 2019, doi: <a href="https://doi.org/10.1109/TSE.2019.2948910">10.1109/TSE.2019.2948910</a>.'
  mla: 'Krüger, Stefan, et al. “CrySL: An Extensible Approach to Validating the Correct
    Usage of Cryptographic APIs.” <i>IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering</i>,
    2019, pp. 1–1, doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.1109/TSE.2019.2948910">10.1109/TSE.2019.2948910</a>.'
  short: S. Krüger, J. Späth, K. Ali, E. Bodden, M. Mezini, IEEE Transactions on Software
    Engineering (2019) 1–1.
date_created: 2020-11-27T10:48:38Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:54:29Z
department:
- _id: '76'
doi: 10.1109/TSE.2019.2948910
keyword:
- Java
- Encryption
- Static analysis
- Tools
- Ciphers
- Semantics
- cryptography
- domain-specific language
- static analysis
language:
- iso: eng
main_file_link:
- url: http://www.bodden.de/pubs/tse19CrySL.pdf
page: 1-1
publication: IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering
publication_identifier:
  issn:
  - 2326-3881
status: public
title: 'CrySL: An Extensible Approach to Validating the Correct Usage of Cryptographic
  APIs'
type: journal_article
user_id: '5786'
year: '2019'
...