---
_id: '61508'
abstract:
- lang: eng
  text: We investigate how tax authorities use joint tax audits as a coordinated enforcement
    tool in cross-border transactions of a multinational firm. Joint tax audits aim
    to resolve potential tax disputes early, before such disputes escalate into costly
    and time-consuming resolution procedures that may not fully eliminate double taxation.
    Employing a game-theoretic model, we identify settings in which we expect joint
    audits to occur and investigate their effect on the firm's expected tax payments
    and tax audit efficiency. We find that the occurrence of joint audits critically
    depends on the double taxation risk in the absence of joint audits. Unless tax
    rules are consistently applied, joint audits can occur more often when this risk
    is higher. The reason is that the firm changes its income-shifting strategy to
    reduce its expected tax payments, and thereby also enables tax authorities to
    better target tax disputes via joint audits that would otherwise escalate. However,
    we identify conditions under which joint audits are then detrimental to tax audit
    efficiency, particularly when the firm prefers them most. Our results imply that
    cost-sharing arrangements for joint audits should be tailored to the level of
    double taxation risk, with firm involvement having the potential to improve efficiency
    when this risk is high.
author:
- first_name: Daniel
  full_name: Dyck, Daniel
  id: '83379'
  last_name: Dyck
- first_name: Thomas
  full_name: Kourouxous, Thomas
  last_name: Kourouxous
- first_name: Johannes
  full_name: Lorenz, Johannes
  last_name: Lorenz
citation:
  ama: Dyck D, Kourouxous T, Lorenz J. <i>An Economic Analysis of Joint Tax Audits</i>.;
    2025. doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.5398645">10.2139/ssrn.5398645</a>
  apa: Dyck, D., Kourouxous, T., &#38; Lorenz, J. (2025). <i>An Economic Analysis
    of Joint Tax Audits</i>. <a href="https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.5398645">https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.5398645</a>
  bibtex: '@book{Dyck_Kourouxous_Lorenz_2025, series={TRR 266 Accounting for Transparency
    Working Paper Series No. 208}, title={An Economic Analysis of Joint Tax Audits},
    DOI={<a href="https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.5398645">10.2139/ssrn.5398645</a>},
    author={Dyck, Daniel and Kourouxous, Thomas and Lorenz, Johannes}, year={2025},
    collection={TRR 266 Accounting for Transparency Working Paper Series No. 208}
    }'
  chicago: Dyck, Daniel, Thomas Kourouxous, and Johannes Lorenz. <i>An Economic Analysis
    of Joint Tax Audits</i>. TRR 266 Accounting for Transparency Working Paper Series
    No. 208, 2025. <a href="https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.5398645">https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.5398645</a>.
  ieee: D. Dyck, T. Kourouxous, and J. Lorenz, <i>An Economic Analysis of Joint Tax
    Audits</i>. 2025.
  mla: Dyck, Daniel, et al. <i>An Economic Analysis of Joint Tax Audits</i>. 2025,
    doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.5398645">10.2139/ssrn.5398645</a>.
  short: D. Dyck, T. Kourouxous, J. Lorenz, An Economic Analysis of Joint Tax Audits,
    2025.
date_created: 2025-10-02T08:53:38Z
date_updated: 2025-10-02T08:56:48Z
department:
- _id: '187'
doi: 10.2139/ssrn.5398645
keyword:
- joint tax audits
- double taxation
- dispute prevention
- income shifting
language:
- iso: eng
main_file_link:
- open_access: '1'
  url: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5398645
oa: '1'
page: '57'
publication_status: published
series_title: TRR 266 Accounting for Transparency Working Paper Series No. 208
status: public
title: An Economic Analysis of Joint Tax Audits
type: working_paper
user_id: '97894'
year: '2025'
...