@article{47093,
  abstract     = {{We experimentally test a theoretically promising amendment to the ratchet-up mechanism of the Paris Agreement. The ratchet-up mechanism prescribes that parties’ commitments to the global response to climate change cannot decrease over time, and our results show that its effect is detrimental. We design a public goods game to study whether cooperation is promoted by an amendment to the mechanism that stipulates that all agents must contribute at least a collectively chosen minimum based on the principle of the lowest common denominator. We find that binding collective minimum contributions improve the effectiveness of the ratchet-up mechanism. Non-binding minimum contributions, by contrast, do not encourage cooperation. Our data indicate that the difference is attributable to conditional cooperative dynamics. If other participants contribute less than the collective minimum contribution, even initially cooperative participants start to negatively reciprocate this form of non-compliance by contributing less.}},
  author       = {{Alt, Marius and Kesternich, Martin and Gallier, Carlo and Sturm, Bodo}},
  issn         = {{1556-5068}},
  journal      = {{Journal of Environmental Economics and Management}},
  keywords     = {{global public goods, climate change, institutions, ratchet-up mechanism, minimum contributions, laboratory experiment}},
  title        = {{{Collective Minimum Contributions to Counteract the Ratchet Effect in the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods}}},
  doi          = {{10.2139/ssrn.4288327}},
  year         = {{2023}},
}

@article{44092,
  abstract     = {{We study how competition between physicians affects the provision of medical care. In
our theoretical model, physicians are faced with a heterogeneous patient population, in which patients
systematically vary with regard to both their responsiveness to the provided quality of care and their
state of health. We test the behavioral predictions derived from this model in a controlled laboratory
experiment. In line with the model, we observe that competition significantly improves patient benefits
as long as patients are able to respond to the quality provided. For those patients, who are not able
to choose a physician, competition even decreases the patient benefit compared to a situation without
competition. This decrease is in contrast to our theoretical prediction implying no change in benefits for
passive patients. Deviations from patient-optimal treatment are highest for passive patients in need of
a low quantity of medical services. With repetition, both, the positive effects of competition for active
patients as well as the negative effects of competition for passive patients become more pronounced. Our
results imply that competition can not only improve but also worsen patient outcome and that patients’
responsiveness to quality is decisive.}},
  author       = {{Brosig-Koch, Jeannette and Hehenkamp, Burkhard and Kokot, Johanna}},
  journal      = {{Health Economics}},
  keywords     = {{physician competition, patient characteristics, heterogeneity in quality responses, fee-for-service, laboratory experiment}},
  title        = {{{Who benefits from quality competition in health care? A theory and a laboratory experiment on the relevance of patient characteristics}}},
  doi          = {{10.1002/hec.4689}},
  year         = {{2023}},
}