---
_id: '47093'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: We experimentally test a theoretically promising amendment to the ratchet-up
mechanism of the Paris Agreement. The ratchet-up mechanism prescribes that parties’
commitments to the global response to climate change cannot decrease over time,
and our results show that its effect is detrimental. We design a public goods
game to study whether cooperation is promoted by an amendment to the mechanism
that stipulates that all agents must contribute at least a collectively chosen
minimum based on the principle of the lowest common denominator. We find that
binding collective minimum contributions improve the effectiveness of the ratchet-up
mechanism. Non-binding minimum contributions, by contrast, do not encourage cooperation.
Our data indicate that the difference is attributable to conditional cooperative
dynamics. If other participants contribute less than the collective minimum contribution,
even initially cooperative participants start to negatively reciprocate this form
of non-compliance by contributing less.
author:
- first_name: Marius
full_name: Alt, Marius
last_name: Alt
- first_name: Martin
full_name: Kesternich, Martin
id: '98922'
last_name: Kesternich
- first_name: Carlo
full_name: Gallier, Carlo
last_name: Gallier
- first_name: Bodo
full_name: Sturm, Bodo
last_name: Sturm
citation:
ama: Alt M, Kesternich M, Gallier C, Sturm B. Collective Minimum Contributions to
Counteract the Ratchet Effect in the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods. Journal
of Environmental Economics and Management. Published online 2023. doi:10.2139/ssrn.4288327
apa: Alt, M., Kesternich, M., Gallier, C., & Sturm, B. (2023). Collective Minimum
Contributions to Counteract the Ratchet Effect in the Voluntary Provision of Public
Goods. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4288327
bibtex: '@article{Alt_Kesternich_Gallier_Sturm_2023, title={Collective Minimum Contributions
to Counteract the Ratchet Effect in the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods},
DOI={10.2139/ssrn.4288327},
journal={Journal of Environmental Economics and Management}, author={Alt, Marius
and Kesternich, Martin and Gallier, Carlo and Sturm, Bodo}, year={2023} }'
chicago: Alt, Marius, Martin Kesternich, Carlo Gallier, and Bodo Sturm. “Collective
Minimum Contributions to Counteract the Ratchet Effect in the Voluntary Provision
of Public Goods.” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 2023.
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4288327.
ieee: 'M. Alt, M. Kesternich, C. Gallier, and B. Sturm, “Collective Minimum Contributions
to Counteract the Ratchet Effect in the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods,”
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 2023, doi: 10.2139/ssrn.4288327.'
mla: Alt, Marius, et al. “Collective Minimum Contributions to Counteract the Ratchet
Effect in the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods.” Journal of Environmental
Economics and Management, 2023, doi:10.2139/ssrn.4288327.
short: M. Alt, M. Kesternich, C. Gallier, B. Sturm, Journal of Environmental Economics
and Management (2023).
date_created: 2023-09-16T11:52:21Z
date_updated: 2023-12-04T12:27:27Z
department:
- _id: '791'
- _id: '681'
doi: 10.2139/ssrn.4288327
keyword:
- global public goods
- climate change
- institutions
- ratchet-up mechanism
- minimum contributions
- laboratory experiment
language:
- iso: eng
publication: Journal of Environmental Economics and Management
publication_identifier:
issn:
- 1556-5068
publication_status: published
status: public
title: Collective Minimum Contributions to Counteract the Ratchet Effect in the Voluntary
Provision of Public Goods
type: journal_article
user_id: '46138'
year: '2023'
...
---
_id: '44092'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: "We study how competition between physicians affects the provision of medical
care. In\r\nour theoretical model, physicians are faced with a heterogeneous patient
population, in which patients\r\nsystematically vary with regard to both their
responsiveness to the provided quality of care and their\r\nstate of health. We
test the behavioral predictions derived from this model in a controlled laboratory\r\nexperiment.
In line with the model, we observe that competition significantly improves patient
benefits\r\nas long as patients are able to respond to the quality provided. For
those patients, who are not able\r\nto choose a physician, competition even decreases
the patient benefit compared to a situation without\r\ncompetition. This decrease
is in contrast to our theoretical prediction implying no change in benefits for\r\npassive
patients. Deviations from patient-optimal treatment are highest for passive patients
in need of\r\na low quantity of medical services. With repetition, both, the positive
effects of competition for active\r\npatients as well as the negative effects
of competition for passive patients become more pronounced. Our\r\nresults imply
that competition can not only improve but also worsen patient outcome and that
patients’\r\nresponsiveness to quality is decisive."
article_type: original
author:
- first_name: Jeannette
full_name: Brosig-Koch, Jeannette
last_name: Brosig-Koch
- first_name: Burkhard
full_name: Hehenkamp, Burkhard
id: '37339'
last_name: Hehenkamp
- first_name: Johanna
full_name: Kokot, Johanna
last_name: Kokot
citation:
ama: Brosig-Koch J, Hehenkamp B, Kokot J. Who benefits from quality competition
in health care? A theory and a laboratory experiment on the relevance of patient
characteristics. Health Economics. Published online 2023. doi:10.1002/hec.4689
apa: Brosig-Koch, J., Hehenkamp, B., & Kokot, J. (2023). Who benefits from quality
competition in health care? A theory and a laboratory experiment on the relevance
of patient characteristics. Health Economics. https://doi.org/10.1002/hec.4689
bibtex: '@article{Brosig-Koch_Hehenkamp_Kokot_2023, title={Who benefits from quality
competition in health care? A theory and a laboratory experiment on the relevance
of patient characteristics}, DOI={10.1002/hec.4689},
journal={Health Economics}, author={Brosig-Koch, Jeannette and Hehenkamp, Burkhard
and Kokot, Johanna}, year={2023} }'
chicago: Brosig-Koch, Jeannette, Burkhard Hehenkamp, and Johanna Kokot. “Who Benefits
from Quality Competition in Health Care? A Theory and a Laboratory Experiment
on the Relevance of Patient Characteristics.” Health Economics, 2023. https://doi.org/10.1002/hec.4689.
ieee: 'J. Brosig-Koch, B. Hehenkamp, and J. Kokot, “Who benefits from quality competition
in health care? A theory and a laboratory experiment on the relevance of patient
characteristics,” Health Economics, 2023, doi: 10.1002/hec.4689.'
mla: Brosig-Koch, Jeannette, et al. “Who Benefits from Quality Competition in Health
Care? A Theory and a Laboratory Experiment on the Relevance of Patient Characteristics.”
Health Economics, 2023, doi:10.1002/hec.4689.
short: J. Brosig-Koch, B. Hehenkamp, J. Kokot, Health Economics (2023).
date_created: 2023-04-20T17:02:41Z
date_updated: 2023-04-20T17:16:14Z
department:
- _id: '280'
- _id: '475'
doi: 10.1002/hec.4689
jel:
- I11
- D43
- C91
keyword:
- physician competition
- patient characteristics
- heterogeneity in quality responses
- fee-for-service
- laboratory experiment
language:
- iso: eng
project:
- _id: '1'
name: 'SFB 901: SFB 901'
- _id: '2'
name: 'SFB 901 - A: SFB 901 - Project Area A'
- _id: '7'
name: 'SFB 901 - A3: SFB 901 - Subproject A3'
publication: Health Economics
quality_controlled: '1'
status: public
title: Who benefits from quality competition in health care? A theory and a laboratory
experiment on the relevance of patient characteristics
type: journal_article
user_id: '37339'
year: '2023'
...