@phdthesis{65309, author = {{Hemmrich, Simon}}, keywords = {{Reputation Systems, Rating systems, monetary ratings, incentive mechanism, systems theory, Market coordination, advanced review system}}, pages = {{347}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{A Design Theory for Blockchain-Based Reputation Systems : Trust and Coordination in B2B Markets}}}, doi = {{https://doi.org/10.17619/UNIPB/1-2414}}, year = {{2025}}, } @article{34802, abstract = {{Purpose Academic research has intensively analyzed the relationship between market concentration or market power and banking stability but provides ambiguous results, which are summarized under the concentration-stability/fragility view. We provide empirical evidence that the mixed results are due to the difficulty of identifying reliable variables to measure concentration and market power. Design/methodology/approach Using data from 3,943 banks operating in the European Union (EU)-15 between 2013 and 2020, we employ linear regression models on panel data. Banking market concentration is measured by the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI), and market power is estimated by the product-specific Lerner Indices for the loan and deposit market, respectively. Findings Our analysis reveals a significantly stability-decreasing impact of market concentration (HHI) and a significantly stability-increasing effect of market power (Lerner Indices). In addition, we provide evidence for a weak (or even absent) empirical relationship between the (non)structural measures, challenging the validity of the structure-conduct-performance (SCP) paradigm. Our baseline findings remain robust, especially when controlling for a likely reverse causality. Originality/value Our results suggest that the HHI may reflect other factors beyond market power that influence banking stability. Thus, banking supervisors and competition authorities should investigate market concentration and market power simultaneously while considering their joint impact on banking stability.}}, author = {{Herwald, Sarah and Voigt, Simone and Uhde, André}}, journal = {{Journal of Risk Finance}}, keywords = {{market concentration, market power, banking stability, European banking}}, number = {{3}}, pages = {{510 -- 536}}, title = {{{The conditional impact of market consolidation and market power on banking stability – Evidence from Europe}}}, doi = {{https://doi.org/10.1108/JRF-03-2023-0075}}, volume = {{25}}, year = {{2024}}, } @inproceedings{45812, author = {{Özcan, Leon and Fichtler, Timm and Kasten, Benjamin and Koldewey, Christian and Dumitrescu, Roman}}, keywords = {{Digital Platform, Platform Strategy, Strategic Management, Platform Life Cycle, Interview Study, Business Model, Business-to-Business, Two-sided Market, Multi-sided Market}}, location = {{Ljubljana}}, title = {{{Interview Study on Strategy Options for Platform Operation in B2B Markets}}}, year = {{2023}}, } @inproceedings{33991, abstract = {{In the course of digitalization, digital platforms are unleashing their full disruptive potential and are already dominating the first industries (e.g., hotel industry). As a result of this success, more and more companies want to build their own platforms and participate in the success. However, building and operating a digital platform involves multiple challenges and most of such ambitions fail. Since most digital platforms fail, strategic leadership of digital platforms must consider both success factors and reasons for platform failure. For this purpose, we conducted a systematic literature analysis and identified 24 success as well as failure factors in 9 dimensions. From a scientific perspective, the article provides a structured analysis of success and failure factors of digital platforms, which previously did not exist in literature. Practitioners can use the resulting knowledge base to successfully manage platform activities and avoid pitfalls.}}, author = {{Özcan, Leon and Koldewey, Christian and Duparc, Estelle and van der Valk, Hendrik and Otto, Boris and Dumitrescu, Roman}}, keywords = {{Digital Platform, Multi-sided Market, Two-sided Market, Success Factor, Failure Factor}}, location = {{Minneapolis}}, title = {{{Why do Digital Platforms succeed or fail? - A Literature Review on Success and Failure Factors}}}, year = {{2022}}, } @techreport{37131, abstract = {{This paper introduces a novel database on the European corporate bond market to analyze the role of transparency regulation and recent developments in bond markets. We use data from the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) to build a comprehensive database covering daily corporate bond listing information in Europe starting in 2018. We then analyze the different market segments of the European bond market along four key areas: (i) time and cross-sectional trends in bond listings; (ii) composition of firms on the market; (iii) firms’ financial reporting transparency; (iv) bond contract terms. Furthermore, we discuss the impact of recent economic events on these key areas.}}, author = {{Franke, Benedikt and Kosi, Urska and Stoczek, Pia}}, keywords = {{Transparency regulation, Corporate bond, European market}}, title = {{{Current developments in the European corporate bond market}}}, year = {{2022}}, } @techreport{44091, abstract = {{We study the effects of product differentiation on the bundling incentives of a two-product retailer. Two monopolistic manufacturers each produce a differentiated good. One sells it to both retailers, while the other only supplies a single retailer. Retailers compete in prices. Retail bundling is profitable when the goods are close substitutes. Only then is competition so intense that the retailer uses bundling to relax competition both within and across product markets, despite an aggravation of the double marginalization problem. Our asymmetric market structure arises endogenously for the case of close substitutes. In this case, bundling reduces social welfare.}}, author = {{Endres-Fröhlich, Angelika Elfriede and Hehenkamp, Burkhard and Heinzel, Joachim}}, keywords = {{Retail bundling, upstream market power, double marginalization, product differentiation}}, pages = {{43}}, title = {{{The Impact of Product Differentiation on Retail Bundling in a Vertical Market}}}, year = {{2022}}, } @article{30940, abstract = {{We analyse the two-dimensional Nash bargaining solution (NBS) by deploying the standard labour market negotiations model of McDonald and Solow (1981). We show that the two-dimensional bargaining problem can be decomposed into two one-dimensional problems, such that the two solutions together replicate the solution of the two-dimensional problem if the NBS is applied. The axiom of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives is shown to be crucial for this type of decomposability. This result has significant implications for actual negotiations because it allows for the decomposition of a multi-dimensional bargaining problem into one-dimensional problems---and thus helps to facilitate real-world negotiations.}}, author = {{Haake, Claus-Jochen and Upmann, Thorsten and Duman, Papatya}}, issn = {{0347-0520}}, journal = {{Scandinavian Journal of Economics}}, keywords = {{Labour market negotiations, efficient bargains, Nash bargaining solution, sequential bargaining, restricted bargaining games}}, number = {{2}}, pages = {{403--440}}, publisher = {{Wiley}}, title = {{{Wage Bargaining and Employment Revisited: Separability and Efficiency in Collective Bargaining}}}, doi = {{https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12518}}, volume = {{125}}, year = {{2022}}, } @inproceedings{33997, abstract = {{Digital platforms have already led to disruptions in multiple B2C markets and are becoming increasingly dominant in B2B markets. As a result, more and more companies are trying to participate in the platform economy. However, the successful development and operation of a digital platform is associated with significant challenges, which leads to 85% of all platforms failing. A core challenge is the dynamic nature of the platform economy, with varying strategic objectives at different stages in the platform lifecycle. Platform operators must continuously monitor platform progress and adjust their strategy. Utilizing action research in the real-world platform project AI Marketplace, we developed a lifecycle-oriented performance management approach for digital platforms in B2B markets. It enables platform operators to reflect on their position in the platform lifecycle, derive relevant strategic objectives, and monitor them with suitable key performance indicators. Hence, allowing them to secure the long-term success of their platform business.}}, author = {{Özcan, Leon and Kirchberg, Lisa Irene and Koldewey, Christian and Dumitrescu, Roman}}, booktitle = {{The Role of Innovation: Past, Present, Future}}, editor = {{Bitran, Iain and Bitetti, Leandro and Conn, Steffen and Fishburn, Jessica and Huizingh, Eelko and Torkkeli, Marko and Yang, Jialei}}, keywords = {{Digital Platform, Two-Sided Market, Multi-Sided Market, Platform Lifecycle, Platform Monitoring, Performance Management}}, location = {{Athens}}, title = {{{Performance Management Approach for Digital Platforms in B2B Markets}}}, year = {{2022}}, } @techreport{15202, abstract = {{In this paper, we analyze the two-dimensional Nash bargaining solution (NBS) deploying a standard labor market negotiations model (see McDonald and Solow, 1981; Creedy and McDonald, 1991). We show that the two-dimensional bargaining problem can be decomposed into two one-dimensional problems such that the (Cartesian) product of the solutions of these problems replicates the solution of the two-dimensional problem, if the NBS is applied. However, this decomposition fails for any solution concept that does not satisfy the axiom of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA axiom). Our decomposition result has significant implications for actual negotiations, as it allows for the decomposition of a multi-issue bargaining problem into a set of simpler problems, in particular a set of single-issue bargaining problems. In this way, the decomposition may help facilitate negotiations in labor markets and also in other environments.}}, author = {{Haake, Claus-Jochen and Upmann, Thorsten and Duman, Papatya}}, keywords = {{Labor market negotiations, Efficient bargains, Nash bargaining solution, Sequential bargaining, Restricted bargaining games}}, publisher = {{CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University}}, title = {{{The Decomposability of the Nash Bargaining Solution in Labor Markets}}}, volume = {{128}}, year = {{2019}}, } @article{5101, abstract = {{Prior literature finds that International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) adopters enjoy lower financing costs subsequent to IFRS adoption. We predict and find that mandatory IFRS adopters exploit lower financing costs to increase market share vis-à-vis non-adopters. This effect is robust across several different model specifications in a sample capturing the universe of public and private firms in the EU, in a matched sample of public and private firms, and in a public firm sample comparing mandatory and voluntary IFRS adopters. We further find that IFRS is associated with an increase (decrease) in industry sales concentration (competition), consistent with large public firms increasing market share. In supplemental analyses, we find that mandatory adopters issue more equity and debt after IFRS adoption and that larger market share gains accrue to those mandatory IFRS adopters that issue more equity and debt after IFRS adoption. Overall, we provide evidence of unintended product market consequences of IFRS adoption.}}, author = {{Downes, Jimmy F and Flagmeier, Vanessa and Godsell, David}}, journal = {{Journal of Accounting and Public Policy}}, keywords = {{Financial reporting regulationProduct market competition}}, number = {{5}}, pages = {{376--401}}, publisher = {{Elsevier}}, title = {{{Product market effects of IFRS adoption}}}, doi = {{10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2018.09.004}}, volume = {{37}}, year = {{2018}}, } @article{4687, author = {{Müller, Oliver and Simons, Alexander and Weinmann, Markus}}, issn = {{03772217}}, journal = {{European Journal of Operational Research}}, keywords = {{Crowdsourcing, Football, Market value, OR in Sports, Soccer}}, number = {{2}}, pages = {{611----624}}, title = {{{Beyond crowd judgments: Data-driven estimation of market value in association football}}}, doi = {{10.1016/j.ejor.2017.05.005}}, year = {{2017}}, } @techreport{2570, abstract = {{On an intermediate goods market we consider vertical and horizontal product differentiation and analyze the impact of simultaneous competition for resources and the demand of customers on the market outcome. Asymmetries between intermediaries may arise due to distinct product qualities as well as by reasons of different production technologies. The intermediaries compete on the output market by choosing production quantities sequentially and for the supplies of a monopolistic input supplier on the input market. It turns out that there exist differences in product quality and productivities such that an intermediary being the Stackelberg leader has no incentive to procure inputs, whereas in the role of the Stackelberg follower will participate in the market. Moreover, we find that given an intermediary is more competitive, his equilibrium output quantity is higher when being the leader than when being the follower. Interestingly, if the intermediary is less competitive and goods are complements, there may exist asymmetries such that an intermediary being in the position of the Stackelberg follower offers higher output quantities in equilibrium than when being in the position of the Stackelberg leader.}}, author = {{Manegold, Jochen}}, keywords = {{Input Market, Product Quality, Quantity Competition, Stackelberg Competition, Product Innovation}}, publisher = {{CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University}}, title = {{{Stackelberg Competition among Intermediaries in a Differentiated Duopoly with Product Innovation}}}, volume = {{98}}, year = {{2016}}, } @inproceedings{17659, author = {{Polevoy, Gleb and Trajanovski, Stojan and de Weerdt, Mathijs M.}}, booktitle = {{Proceedings of the 2014 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-agent Systems}}, isbn = {{978-1-4503-2738-1}}, keywords = {{competition, equilibrium, market, models, shared effort games, simulation}}, pages = {{861--868}}, publisher = {{International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems}}, title = {{{Nash Equilibria in Shared Effort Games}}}, year = {{2014}}, } @article{17662, author = {{Polevoy, Gleb and Smorodinsky, Rann and Tennenholtz, Moshe}}, issn = {{2167-8375}}, journal = {{ACM Trans. Econ. Comput.}}, keywords = {{Competition, efficiency, equilibrium, market, social welfare}}, number = {{1}}, pages = {{1:1--1:16}}, publisher = {{ACM}}, title = {{{Signaling Competition and Social Welfare}}}, doi = {{10.1145/2560766}}, volume = {{2}}, year = {{2014}}, } @article{4397, abstract = {{Employing four event dates of the U.S. “Troubled Asset Relief Program” (TARP) this paper empirically investigates the impact of the first announcement of TARP (September 19, 2008), the announcement of revised TARP (October 14, 2008), respective capital infusions under TARP-CPP and capital repayments on changes in shareholder value and risk exposure of 125 supported U.S. banks as perceived by the capital market through share price reactions for an entire sample period from September 19, 2008 to June 16, 2010. Our analysis reveals a light and a dark side of TARP. While announcements as well as capital repayments may restore market confidence and financial stability, equity capital injections to banks are observed to be a severe impediment to an increase in bank shareholder value and financial soundness. }}, author = {{Farruggio, Christian and Michalak, Tobias C. and Uhde, André}}, journal = {{Journal of Banking and Finance}}, keywords = {{Financial crisis, TARP, Market efficiency, Event study}}, number = {{5}}, pages = {{2586--2604}}, title = {{{The light and dark side of TARP}}}, doi = {{10.1016/j.jbankfin.2013.02.020}}, volume = {{32}}, year = {{2013}}, } @article{5192, abstract = {{For the valuation of fast growing innovative firms Schwartz and Moon (Financ Anal J 56:62–75, 2000), (Financ Rev 36:7–26, 2001) develop a fundamental valuation model where key parameters follow stochastic processes. While prior research shows promising potential for this model, it has never been tested on a large scale dataset. Thus, guided by economic theory, this paper is the first to design a large-scale applicable implementation on around 30,000 technology firm quarter observations from 1992 to 2009 for the US to assess this model. Evaluating the feasibility and performance of the Schwartz-Moon model reveals that it is comparably accurate to the traditional sales multiple with key advantages in valuing small and non-listed firms. Most importantly, however, the model is able to indicate severe market over- or undervaluation from a fundamental perspective. We demonstrate that a trading strategy based on our implementation has significant investment value. Consequently, the model seems suitable for detecting misvaluations as the dot-com bubble.}}, author = {{Klobucnik, Jan and Sievers, Sönke}}, journal = {{Journal of Business Economics (VHB-JOURQUAL 4 Ranking B)}}, keywords = {{Schwartz-Moon model, Market mispricing, Empirical test, Company valuation, Trading strategy}}, number = {{9}}, pages = {{947--984}}, publisher = {{Springer}}, title = {{{Valuing high technology growth firms}}}, doi = {{https://doi.org/10.1007/s11573-013-0684-2}}, volume = {{83}}, year = {{2013}}, } @inproceedings{5685, abstract = {{In double-sided markets for computing resources an optimal allocation schedule among job offers and requests subject to relevant capacity constraints can be determined. With increasing storage demands and emerging storage services the question how to schedule storage jobs becomes more and more interesting. Since such scheduling problems are often in the class NP-complete an exact computation is not feasible in practice. On the other hand an approximation to the optimal solution can easily be found by means of using heuristics. The problem with this attempt is that the suggested solution may not be exactly optimal and is thus less satisfying. Considering the two above mentioned solution approaches one can clearly find a trade-off between the optimality of the solution and the efficiency to get to a solution at all. This work proposes to apply and combine heuristics in optimization to gain from both of their benefits while reducing the problematic aspects. Following this method it is assumed to get closer to the optimal solution in a shorter time compared to a full optimization.}}, author = {{Finkbeiner, Josef and Bodenstein, Christian and Schryen, Guido and Neumann, Dirk}}, booktitle = {{18th European Conference on Information Systems (ECIS 2010)}}, keywords = {{Decision Support System, Algorithms, Optimization, Market Engineering}}, title = {{{Applying heuristic methods for job scheduling in storage markets}}}, year = {{2010}}, } @article{4406, abstract = {{Using aggregate balance sheet data from banks across the EU-25 over the period from 1997 to 2005 we provide empirical evidence that national banking market concentration has a negative impact on European banks’ financial soundness as measured by the Z-score technique while controlling for macroeconomic, bank-specific, regulatory, and institutional factors. Furthermore, our analysis reveals that Eastern European banking markets exhibiting a lower level of competitive pressure, fewer diversification opportunities and a higher fraction of government-owned banks are more prone to financial fragility whereas capital regulations have supported financial stability across the entire European Union.}}, author = {{Uhde, André and Heimeshoff, Ulrich}}, journal = {{Journal of Banking & Finance}}, keywords = {{Market structure, Financial stability, Banking regulation}}, number = {{7}}, pages = {{1299--1311}}, title = {{{Consolidation in banking and financial stability in Europe: Empirical evidence}}}, doi = {{https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2009.01.006}}, volume = {{33}}, year = {{2009}}, }