[{"publication_status":"submitted","jel":["D43","L13","L51"],"citation":{"apa":"Hehenkamp, B., &#38; Kaarbøe, O. M. (n.d.). <i>Price Regulation, Quality Competition and Location Choice with Costly Relocation</i>.","bibtex":"@book{Hehenkamp_Kaarbøe, title={Price Regulation, Quality Competition and Location Choice with Costly Relocation}, author={Hehenkamp, Burkhard and Kaarbøe, Oddvar M.} }","short":"B. Hehenkamp, O.M. Kaarbøe, Price Regulation, Quality Competition and Location Choice with Costly Relocation, n.d.","mla":"Hehenkamp, Burkhard, and Oddvar M. Kaarbøe. <i>Price Regulation, Quality Competition and Location Choice with Costly Relocation</i>.","ama":"Hehenkamp B, Kaarbøe OM. <i>Price Regulation, Quality Competition and Location Choice with Costly Relocation</i>.","ieee":"B. Hehenkamp and O. M. Kaarbøe, <i>Price Regulation, Quality Competition and Location Choice with Costly Relocation</i>. .","chicago":"Hehenkamp, Burkhard, and Oddvar M. Kaarbøe. <i>Price Regulation, Quality Competition and Location Choice with Costly Relocation</i>, n.d."},"year":"2023","author":[{"last_name":"Hehenkamp","full_name":"Hehenkamp, Burkhard","id":"37339","first_name":"Burkhard"},{"first_name":"Oddvar M.","full_name":"Kaarbøe, Oddvar M.","last_name":"Kaarbøe"}],"date_created":"2023-04-20T17:12:18Z","date_updated":"2023-04-20T17:16:24Z","title":"Price Regulation, Quality Competition and Location Choice with Costly Relocation","type":"report","status":"public","abstract":[{"lang":"eng","text":"We consider a model where for-profit providers compete in quality in a price-regulated market that has been opened to competition, and where the incumbent is located at the center of the market, facing high costs of relocation. The model is relevant in markets such as public health care, education and schooling, or postal services. We find that, when the regulated price is low or intermediate, the entrant strategically locates towards the corner of the market to keep the incumbent at the low monopoly quality level. For a high price, the entrant locates at the corner of the market and both providers implement higher quality compared to a monopoly. In any case, the entrant implements higher quality than the incumbent provider. Social welfare is always higher in a duopoly if the cost of quality is low. For higher cost levels welfare is non-monotonic in the price and it can be optimal to the regulator not to use its entire budget. Therefore, the welfare effect of entry depends on the price and the size of the entry cost, and the regulator should condition the decision to allow entry on an assessment of the entry cost."}],"department":[{"_id":"280"},{"_id":"475"}],"user_id":"37339","_id":"44093","project":[{"_id":"1","name":"SFB 901: SFB 901"},{"name":"SFB 901 - A: SFB 901 - Project Area A","_id":"2"},{"_id":"7","name":"SFB 901 - A3: SFB 901 - Subproject A3"}],"language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"keyword":["Quality competition","Price regulation","Location choice","Product differentiation"]},{"_id":"44091","project":[{"_id":"1","name":"SFB 901: SFB 901"},{"_id":"2","name":"SFB 901 - A: SFB 901 - Project Area A"},{"name":"SFB 901 - A3: SFB 901 - Subproject A3","_id":"7"}],"department":[{"_id":"280"},{"_id":"475"}],"user_id":"37339","keyword":["Retail bundling","upstream market power","double marginalization","product differentiation"],"language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"type":"report","abstract":[{"text":"We study the effects of product differentiation on the bundling incentives of a two-product retailer. Two monopolistic manufacturers each produce a differentiated good. One sells it to both retailers, while the other only supplies a single retailer. Retailers compete in prices. Retail bundling is profitable when the goods are close substitutes. Only then is competition so intense that the retailer uses bundling to relax competition both within and across product markets, despite an aggravation of the double marginalization problem. Our asymmetric market structure arises endogenously for the case of close substitutes. In this case, bundling reduces social welfare.","lang":"eng"}],"status":"public","date_updated":"2023-04-20T17:15:48Z","date_created":"2023-04-20T16:21:28Z","author":[{"first_name":"Angelika Elfriede","last_name":"Endres-Fröhlich","full_name":"Endres-Fröhlich, Angelika Elfriede","id":"48794"},{"first_name":"Burkhard","last_name":"Hehenkamp","full_name":"Hehenkamp, Burkhard","id":"37339"},{"full_name":"Heinzel, Joachim","last_name":"Heinzel","first_name":"Joachim"}],"title":"The Impact of Product Differentiation on Retail Bundling in a Vertical Market","publication_status":"draft","year":"2022","page":"43","citation":{"mla":"Endres-Fröhlich, Angelika Elfriede, et al. <i>The Impact of Product Differentiation on Retail Bundling in a Vertical Market</i>.","bibtex":"@book{Endres-Fröhlich_Hehenkamp_Heinzel, title={The Impact of Product Differentiation on Retail Bundling in a Vertical Market}, author={Endres-Fröhlich, Angelika Elfriede and Hehenkamp, Burkhard and Heinzel, Joachim} }","short":"A.E. Endres-Fröhlich, B. Hehenkamp, J. Heinzel, The Impact of Product Differentiation on Retail Bundling in a Vertical Market, n.d.","apa":"Endres-Fröhlich, A. E., Hehenkamp, B., &#38; Heinzel, J. (n.d.). <i>The Impact of Product Differentiation on Retail Bundling in a Vertical Market</i>.","chicago":"Endres-Fröhlich, Angelika Elfriede, Burkhard Hehenkamp, and Joachim Heinzel. <i>The Impact of Product Differentiation on Retail Bundling in a Vertical Market</i>, n.d.","ieee":"A. E. Endres-Fröhlich, B. Hehenkamp, and J. Heinzel, <i>The Impact of Product Differentiation on Retail Bundling in a Vertical Market</i>. .","ama":"Endres-Fröhlich AE, Hehenkamp B, Heinzel J. <i>The Impact of Product Differentiation on Retail Bundling in a Vertical Market</i>."},"jel":["D43","L13","L42"]}]