@inproceedings{34040,
  abstract     = {{<jats:p>Consider the practical goal of making a desired action profile played,

when the planner can only change the payoffs, bound by 

stringent constraints.

Applications include motivating people

to choose the closest school, the closest subway station, or to coordinate

on a communication protocol or an investment strategy.

Employing subsidies and tolls, we adjust the game so that choosing this predefined action profile

becomes strictly dominant. 

Inspired mainly by the work of Monderer and Tennenholtz,

where the promised subsidies do not materialise in the not played

profiles, we provide a fair and individually rational game

adjustment, such that the total outside investments sum up

to zero at any profile, thereby facilitating easy and frequent

usage of our adjustment without bearing costs, even if some

players behave unexpectedly. The resultant action profile itself needs no

adjustment. Importantly, we also prove that our adjustment minimises 

the general transfer among all such adjustments, counting the total subsidising and taxation.</jats:p>}},
  author       = {{Polevoy, Gleb and Dziubiński, Marcin}},
  booktitle    = {{Proceedings of the Thirty-First International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence}},
  editor       = {{De Raedt, Luc}},
  keywords     = {{adjustment, strictly dominant, fairness, individually rational, transfer, tax, subsidy}},
  location     = {{Vienna}},
  publisher    = {{International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization}},
  title        = {{{Fair, Individually Rational and Cheap Adjustment}}},
  doi          = {{10.24963/ijcai.2022/64}},
  year         = {{2022}},
}