---
_id: '8836'
abstract:
- lang: eng
  text: While Islamic State is the most present example, it is a fact that in many
    places around the globe, throughout history initially small groups have tried
    to challenge and destabilize or even overthrow governments by means of terrorist
    and guerrilla strategies. Therefore, we answer two questions. Why does a small
    group of insurgents believe it can overthrow the government by turning violent,
    even if the government is clearly superior? And how does a conflict develop into
    terrorism, a guerilla war, or a major conventional civil war, or is resolved peacefully?
    We develop a formal model for rebels and government and derive optimal choices.
    Further, we focus on three elements as important ingredients of a "destabilization
    war". All three of these - large random events, time preference (which we relate
    to ideology), and choice of duration of fight - are rarely considered in formal
    conflict theory. We can answer the above two questions using game theory analysis.
    First, insurgents rise up because they hope to destabilize through permanent challenging
    attacks. In this context, large randomness is an important ally of rebels. While
    each individual attack may have a low impact, at some point a large random event
    could lead to success. Hence, the duration of activities is a constitutive element
    of this kind of armed conflict. Patience (low time preference), which may reflect
    rebels' degree of ideological motivation, is crucial. Second, the mode of warfare
    or the conflict resolutions that develop are generally path-dependent and conditioned
    on the full set of options (including compromise). Various conditions (level of
    funding, ease of recruitment, access to weapons) influence different modes of
    warfare or a peaceful compromise in a complex way.
author:
- first_name: Thomas
  full_name: Gries, Thomas
  id: '186'
  last_name: Gries
- first_name: Claus-Jochen
  full_name: Haake, Claus-Jochen
  id: '20801'
  last_name: Haake
citation:
  ama: Gries T, Haake C-J. <i>An Economic Theory of “Destabilization War.”</i> Vol
    95.; 2016.
  apa: Gries, T., &#38; Haake, C.-J. (2016). <i>An Economic Theory of “Destabilization
    War”</i> (Vol. 95).
  bibtex: '@book{Gries_Haake_2016, series={Working Papers CIE}, title={An Economic
    Theory of “Destabilization War”}, volume={95}, author={Gries, Thomas and Haake,
    Claus-Jochen}, year={2016}, collection={Working Papers CIE} }'
  chicago: Gries, Thomas, and Claus-Jochen Haake. <i>An Economic Theory of “Destabilization
    War.”</i> Vol. 95. Working Papers CIE, 2016.
  ieee: T. Gries and C.-J. Haake, <i>An Economic Theory of “Destabilization War,”</i>
    vol. 95. 2016.
  mla: Gries, Thomas, and Claus-Jochen Haake. <i>An Economic Theory of “Destabilization
    War.”</i> Vol. 95, 2016.
  short: T. Gries, C.-J. Haake, An Economic Theory of “Destabilization War,” 2016.
date_created: 2019-04-08T06:45:02Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:04:03Z
ddc:
- '040'
department:
- _id: '205'
- _id: '475'
file:
- access_level: closed
  content_type: application/pdf
  creator: cjhaake
  date_created: 2019-04-08T06:49:16Z
  date_updated: 2019-04-08T06:49:16Z
  file_id: '8838'
  file_name: WP - An Economic Theory of ’Destabilization War'.pdf
  file_size: 516125
  relation: main_file
  success: 1
file_date_updated: 2019-04-08T06:49:16Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: '        95'
jel:
- H56
- O10
- D84
- C72
- D74
keyword:
- terrorism
- civil war
- conflict duration
- game theory
- stochastic process
- ideology
language:
- iso: eng
series_title: Working Papers CIE
status: public
title: An Economic Theory of 'Destabilization War'
type: working_paper
user_id: '20801'
volume: 95
year: '2016'
...