[{"date_updated":"2022-01-06T07:03:42Z","volume":118,"author":[{"first_name":"Joachim Maria Josef","last_name":"Heinzel","id":"53445","full_name":"Heinzel, Joachim Maria Josef"}],"place":"Paderborn University","intvolume":"       118","citation":{"apa":"Heinzel, J. M. J. (2019). <i>Credence Goods Markets with Heterogeneous Experts</i> (Vol. 118). Paderborn University: CIE Working Paper Series.","bibtex":"@book{Heinzel_2019, place={Paderborn University}, series={CIE Working Paper Series}, title={Credence Goods Markets with Heterogeneous Experts}, volume={118}, publisher={CIE Working Paper Series}, author={Heinzel, Joachim Maria Josef}, year={2019}, collection={CIE Working Paper Series} }","mla":"Heinzel, Joachim Maria Josef. <i>Credence Goods Markets with Heterogeneous Experts</i>. Vol. 118, CIE Working Paper Series, 2019.","short":"J.M.J. Heinzel, Credence Goods Markets with Heterogeneous Experts, CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2019.","ama":"Heinzel JMJ. <i>Credence Goods Markets with Heterogeneous Experts</i>. Vol 118. Paderborn University: CIE Working Paper Series; 2019.","ieee":"J. M. J. Heinzel, <i>Credence Goods Markets with Heterogeneous Experts</i>, vol. 118. Paderborn University: CIE Working Paper Series, 2019.","chicago":"Heinzel, Joachim Maria Josef. <i>Credence Goods Markets with Heterogeneous Experts</i>. Vol. 118. CIE Working Paper Series. Paderborn University: CIE Working Paper Series, 2019."},"jel":["D82","I11","L15"],"has_accepted_license":"1","file_date_updated":"2019-02-12T08:21:37Z","_id":"7630","project":[{"name":"SFB 901","_id":"1"},{"_id":"2","name":"SFB 901 - Project Area A"},{"_id":"7","name":"SFB 901 - Subproject A3"}],"department":[{"_id":"280"},{"_id":"475"}],"user_id":"477","series_title":"CIE Working Paper Series","status":"public","type":"report","title":"Credence Goods Markets with Heterogeneous Experts","publisher":"CIE Working Paper Series","date_created":"2019-02-12T08:18:02Z","year":"2019","keyword":["credence goods","treatment efficiency","heterogeneous experts","overcharging"],"ddc":["330"],"language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"abstract":[{"lang":"eng","text":"In this paper, we analyze a credence goods model adjusted to the health care market with regulated prices and heterogeneous experts. Experts are physicians and are assumed to differ in their cost of treating a small problem. We investigate the effects of this heterogeneity on the physicians’ level of fraud and on the patients’ search for second opinions. We find that introducing a fraction of more efficient low-cost physicians always increases social welfare, but in some cases only because of the raised physicians’ surplus. When the low-cost physicians’ cost advantage is small, imposing a share of low-cost physicians does not change the equilibrium fraud level. When the cost advantage is large, however, different changes in the fraud level occur depending on the share of generated low-cost physicians, the search rate and the initial level of fraud."}],"file":[{"content_type":"application/pdf","success":1,"relation":"main_file","date_updated":"2019-02-12T08:21:37Z","creator":"jheinzel","date_created":"2019-02-12T08:21:37Z","file_size":286367,"file_id":"7631","file_name":"WP118.pdf","access_level":"closed"}],"report_number":"2019-01"}]