@article{20688,
  abstract     = {{We offer the first empirical analysis connecting the timing of general partner (GP) compensation to private equity fund performance. Using detailed information on limited partnership agreements between private equity limited and general partners, we find that “GP-friendly” contracts—agreements that pay general partners on a deal-by-deal basis instead of withholding carried interest until a benchmark return has been earned—are associated with higher returns, both gross and net of fees. This is robust to measures of performance persistence, time period effects, and other contract terms and is related to exit-timing incentives. Timing practices balance GP incentives against limited partner downside protection.}},
  author       = {{Hüther, Niklas and Robinson, David T. and Sievers, Sönke and Hartmann-Wendels, Thomas}},
  issn         = {{0025-1909}},
  journal      = {{Management Science (VHB-JOURQUAL 4 Ranking A+)}},
  keywords     = {{venture capital, compensation, private equity, VC partnership, pay-performance relation}},
  number       = {{4}},
  pages        = {{1756--1782}},
  title        = {{{Paying for Performance in Private Equity: Evidence from Venture Capital Partnerships}}},
  doi          = {{10.1287/mnsc.2018.3274}},
  volume       = {{66}},
  year         = {{2019}},
}

@article{5185,
  abstract     = {{We offer the first empirical analysis connecting the timing of general partner (GP) compensation to private equity fund performance. Using detailed information on limited partnership agreements between private equity limited and general partners, we find that "GP-friendly" contracts - agreements that pay general partners on a deal-by-deal basis instead of withholding carried interest until a benchmark return has been earned - are associated with higher returns, both gross and net of fees. This is robust to measures of performance persistence, time period effects, and other contract terms, and is related to exit-timing incentives. Timing practices balance GP incentives against limited partner downside protection. }},
  author       = {{Hüther, Niklas and Robinson, David and Sievers, Sönke and Hartmann-Wendels, Thomas}},
  journal      = {{SSRN Electronic Journal}},
  keywords     = {{venture capital, compensation, private equity, VC partnership, pay-performance relation}},
  title        = {{{Paying for Performance in Private Equity: Evidence from VC Partnerships}}},
  doi          = {{10.2139/ssrn.3087320}},
  year         = {{2017}},
}

@article{5191,
  abstract     = {{This study examines the relevance of financial and non-financial information for the valuation of venture capital (VC) investments. Based on a hand-collected data set on venture-backed start-ups in Germany, we investigate the internal due diligence documents of over 200 investment rounds. We document that balance sheet and income statement items capture as much economic content as verifiable non-financial information (e.g. team experience or the number of patents) while controlling for several deal characteristics (e.g. industry, investment round, or yearly VC fund inflows). In addition, we show that valuations based on accounting and non-accounting information yield a level of valuation accuracy that is comparable to that of publicly traded firms. Further analyses show that the industry-specific total asset multiples outperform the popular revenue multiples but lead to significantly less accurate results than those obtained from the more comprehensive valuation models. Overall, our findings might inform researchers and standard-setters of the usefulness of accounting information for investment companies and provide additional evidence to gauge the overall valuation accuracy in VC settings.}},
  author       = {{Sievers, Sönke and Mokwa, Christopher F and Keienburg, Georg}},
  journal      = {{European Accounting Review (VHB-JOURQUAL 4 Ranking A)}},
  keywords     = {{value relevance, equity valuation, venture capital, human capital, start-ups}},
  number       = {{3}},
  pages        = {{467--511}},
  publisher    = {{Taylor \& Francis}},
  title        = {{{The relevance of financial versus non-financial information for the valuation of venture capital-backed firms}}},
  doi          = {{10.1080/09638180.2012.741051}},
  volume       = {{22}},
  year         = {{2013}},
}

@article{5195,
  abstract     = {{This article analyses 336 German venture capital transactions from 1990 to 2005 and seeks to determine why selected financial securities differ across deals. We find that a broad array of financial instruments is used, covering straight equity, mezzanine and debt‐like securities. Based on the chosen financial securities’ upside potential and downside protection characteristics, we provide an explanation for the differing use of these securities. Our results show that investors’ deal experience, adverse selection risks and economic prospects in the public equity market influence the selection of financial securities. }},
  author       = {{Hartmann-Wendels, Thomas and Keienburg, Georg and Sievers, Sönke}},
  journal      = {{European Financial Management (VHB-JOURQUAL 4 Ranking B)}},
  keywords     = {{venture capital, capital structure, contract theory, deal experience}},
  number       = {{3}},
  pages        = {{464--499}},
  publisher    = {{Wiley Online Library}},
  title        = {{{Adverse selection, investor experience and security choice in venture capital finance: evidence from Germany}}},
  doi          = {{10.1111/j.1468-036X.2010.00568.x}},
  volume       = {{17}},
  year         = {{2011}},
}