TY - THES AU - Stroh-Maraun, Nadja ID - 16910 TI - Mechanisms, Preferences, and Heterogeneity in Matching Markets ER - TY - JOUR AB - We analyze the actual behavior of agents in a matching mechanism, using data from a clearinghouse at the Faculty of Business Administration and Economics at a German university, where a variant of the Boston mechanism is used. We supplement this data with data generated in a survey among the students who participated in the clearinghouse. We find that under the current mechanism over 74% of students act strategically by misrepresenting at least one of their preferences. Nevertheless, not all students are able to improve their outcome by doing so. We show that this is mainly due to the incomplete information of students and naiveté. Sophisticated students actually reach significantly better outcomes than naive students. Thus, we find evidence that naive students are exploited by sophisticated students in an incomplete information setting. AU - Hoyer, Britta AU - Stroh-Maraun, Nadja ID - 16334 JF - Games and Economic Behavior TI - Matching Strategies of Heterogeneous Agents under Incomplete Information in a University Clearinghouse VL - 121 ER - TY - CONF AB - We consider a market where final products or services are compositions of a number of basic services. Users are asked to evaluate the quality of the composed product after purchase. The quality of the basic service influences the performance of the composed services but cannot be observed directly. The question we pose is whether it is possible to use user evaluations on composed services to assess the quality of basic services. We discuss how to combine aggregation of evaluations across users and disaggregation of information on composed services to derive valuations for the single components. As a solution we propose to use the (weighted) average as aggregation device in connection with the Shapley value as disaggregation method, since this combination fulfills natural requirements in our context. In addition, we address some occurring computational issues: We give an approximate solution concept using only a limited number of evaluations which guarantees nearly optimal results with reduced running time. Lastly, we show that a slightly modified Shapley value and the weighted average are still applicable if the evaluation profiles are incomplete. AU - Feldotto, Matthias AU - Haake, Claus-Jochen AU - Skopalik, Alexander AU - Stroh-Maraun, Nadja ID - 2831 SN - 978-1-4503-5916-0 T2 - Proceedings of the 13th Workshop on Economics of Networks, Systems and Computation (NetEcon 2018) TI - Disaggregating User Evaluations Using the Shapley Value ER - TY - JOUR AB - We show that the Boston school choice mechanism (BM), the student proposing deferred acceptance algorithm (DA) and the top trading cycles algorithm (TTC) generate the same outcome when the colleges’ priorities are modified according to students’ preferences in a “first preferences first” manner. This outcome coincides with the BM outcome under original priorities. As a result, the DA and TTC mechanism that are non-manipulable under original priorities become vulnerable to strategic behavior. AU - Haake, Claus-Jochen AU - Stroh-Maraun, Nadja ID - 2566 JF - Economics Letters TI - Outcome Equivalence in School Choice with Reciprocal Preferences VL - 170 ER - TY - JOUR AU - Stroh-Maraun, Nadja AU - Kaimann, Daniel AU - Cox, Joe ID - 1063 JF - Entertainment Computing TI - More than skills: A novel matching proposal for multiplayer video games VL - 25 ER - TY - JOUR AU - Kaimann, Daniel AU - Stroh-Maraun, Nadja AU - Cox, Joe ID - 1173 IS - 3 JF - Journal of Consumer Behaviour TI - A Duration Model Analysis of Consumer Preferences and Determinants of Video Game Consumption VL - 17 ER - TY - JOUR AU - Kaimann, Daniel AU - Stroh-Maraun, Nadja AU - Cox, Joe ID - 1031 IS - 3 JF - Managerial and Decision Economics SN - 0143-6570 TI - Variety in the video game industry: An empirical study of the Wundt curve VL - 39 ER - TY - GEN AB - In actual school choice applications the theoretical underpinnings of the Boston School Choice Mechanism (BM) (complete information and rationality of the agents) are often not given. We analyze the actual behavior of agents in such a matching mechanism, using data from the matching mechanism currently used in a clearinghouse at a faculty of Business Administration and Economics at a German university, where a variant of the BM is used, and supplement this data with data generated in a survey among students who participated in the clearinghouse. We find that under the current mechanism over 70% of students act strategically. Controlling for students' limited information, we find that they do act rationally in their decision to act strategically. While students thus seem to react to the incentives to act strategically under the BM, they do not seem to be able to use this to their own advantage. However, those students acting in line with their beliefs manage a significantly better personal outcome than those who do not. We also run simulations by using a variant of the deferred acceptance algorithm, adapted to our situation, to show that the use of a different algorithm may be to the students' advantage. AU - Hoyer, Britta AU - Stroh-Maraun, Nadja ID - 1083 TI - Matching Strategies of Heterogeneous Agents under Incomplete Information in a University Clearinghouse VL - 110 ER - TY - GEN AU - Stroh-Maraun, Nadja ID - 536 TI - Dynamic One-to-One Matching: Theory and a Job Market Application ER - TY - GEN AU - Stroh-Maraun, Nadja ID - 651 TI - Prozedurale Ansätze zur Lösung mehrdimensionaler Verhandlungsprobleme ER -