---
_id: '8080'
abstract:
- lang: eng
  text: This thesis investigates approximate pure Nash equilibria in different game-theoretic
    models. In such an outcome, no player can improve her objective by more than a
    given factor through a deviation to another strategy. In the first part, we investigate
    two variants of Congestion Games in which the existence of pure Nash equilibria
    is guaranteed through a potential function argument. However, the computation
    of such equilibria might be hard. We construct and analyze approximation algorithms
    that enable the computation of states with low approximation factors in polynomial
    time. To show their guarantees we use sub games among players, bound the potential
    function values of arbitrary states and exploit a connection between Shapley and
    proportional cost shares. Furthermore, we apply and analyze sampling techniques
    for the computation of approximate Shapley values in different settings. In the
    second part, we concentrate on the existence of approximate pure Nash equilibria
    in games in which no pure Nash equilibria exist in general. In the model of Coevolving
    Opinion Formation Games, we bound the approximation guarantees for natural states
    nearly independent of the specific definition of the players' neighborhoods by
    applying a concept of virtual costs. For the special case of only one influential
    neighbor, we even show lower approximation factors for a natural strategy. Then,
    we investigate a two-sided Facility Location Game among facilities and clients
    on a line with an objective function consisting of distance and load. We show
    tight bounds on the approximation factor for settings with three facilities and
    infinitely many clients. For the general scenario with an arbitrary number of
    facilities, we bound the approximation factor for two promising candidates, namely
    facilities that are uniformly distributed and which are paired.
author:
- first_name: Matthias
  full_name: Feldotto, Matthias
  id: '14052'
  last_name: Feldotto
  orcid: 0000-0003-1348-6516
citation:
  ama: Feldotto M. <i>Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Congestion, Opinion Formation
    and Facility Location Games</i>. Universität Paderborn; 2019. doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.17619/UNIPB/1-588">10.17619/UNIPB/1-588</a>
  apa: Feldotto, M. (2019). <i>Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Congestion, Opinion
    Formation and Facility Location Games</i>. Universität Paderborn. <a href="https://doi.org/10.17619/UNIPB/1-588">https://doi.org/10.17619/UNIPB/1-588</a>
  bibtex: '@book{Feldotto_2019, place={Universität Paderborn}, title={Approximate
    Pure Nash Equilibria in Congestion, Opinion Formation and Facility Location Games},
    DOI={<a href="https://doi.org/10.17619/UNIPB/1-588">10.17619/UNIPB/1-588</a>},
    author={Feldotto, Matthias}, year={2019} }'
  chicago: Feldotto, Matthias. <i>Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Congestion,
    Opinion Formation and Facility Location Games</i>. Universität Paderborn, 2019.
    <a href="https://doi.org/10.17619/UNIPB/1-588">https://doi.org/10.17619/UNIPB/1-588</a>.
  ieee: M. Feldotto, <i>Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Congestion, Opinion Formation
    and Facility Location Games</i>. Universität Paderborn, 2019.
  mla: Feldotto, Matthias. <i>Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Congestion, Opinion
    Formation and Facility Location Games</i>. 2019, doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.17619/UNIPB/1-588">10.17619/UNIPB/1-588</a>.
  short: M. Feldotto, Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Congestion, Opinion Formation
    and Facility Location Games, Universität Paderborn, 2019.
date_created: 2019-02-25T13:03:02Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:03:50Z
ddc:
- '000'
department:
- _id: '541'
- _id: '63'
doi: 10.17619/UNIPB/1-588
file:
- access_level: closed
  content_type: application/pdf
  creator: ups
  date_created: 2019-03-28T13:40:51Z
  date_updated: 2019-03-28T13:40:51Z
  file_id: '8715'
  file_name: Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Congestion, Opinion Formation and
    Facility Location Games.pdf
  file_size: 3116177
  relation: main_file
  success: 1
file_date_updated: 2019-03-28T13:40:51Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
language:
- iso: eng
main_file_link:
- url: http://digital.ub.uni-paderborn.de/hs/download/pdf/3005508?originalFilename=true
place: Universität Paderborn
project:
- _id: '1'
  name: SFB 901
- _id: '2'
  name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
- _id: '7'
  name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
status: public
supervisor:
- first_name: Alexander
  full_name: Skopalik, Alexander
  id: '40384'
  last_name: Skopalik
title: Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Congestion, Opinion Formation and Facility
  Location Games
type: dissertation
user_id: '15415'
year: '2019'
...
---
_id: '10281'
abstract:
- lang: eng
  text: 'Competing firms tend to select similar locations for their stores. This phenomenon,
    called the principle of minimum differentiation, was captured by Hotelling with
    a landmark model of spatial competition but is still the object of an ongoing
    scientific debate. Although consistently observed in practice, many more realistic
    variants of Hotelling''s model fail to support minimum differentiation or do not
    have pure equilibria at all. In particular, it was recently proven for a generalized
    model which incorporates negative network externalities and which contains Hotelling''s
    model and classical selfish load balancing as special cases, that the unique equilibria
    do not adhere to minimum differentiation. Furthermore, it was shown that for a
    significant parameter range pure equilibria do not exist. We derive a sharp contrast
    to these previous results by investigating Hotelling''s model with negative network
    externalities from an entirely new angle: approximate pure subgame perfect equilibria.
    This approach allows us to prove analytically and via agent-based simulations
    that approximate equilibria having good approximation guarantees and that adhere
    to minimum differentiation exist for the full parameter range of the model. Moreover,
    we show that the obtained approximate equilibria have high social welfare.'
author:
- first_name: Matthias
  full_name: Feldotto, Matthias
  id: '14052'
  last_name: Feldotto
  orcid: 0000-0003-1348-6516
- first_name: 'Pascal '
  full_name: 'Lenzner, Pascal '
  last_name: Lenzner
- first_name: Louise
  full_name: Molitor, Louise
  last_name: Molitor
- first_name: Alexander
  full_name: Skopalik, Alexander
  id: '40384'
  last_name: Skopalik
citation:
  ama: 'Feldotto M, Lenzner P, Molitor L, Skopalik A.  From Hotelling to Load Balancing:
    Approximation and the Principle of Minimum Differentiation. In: <i>Proceedings
    of the 18th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems</i>.
    International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems; 2019:1949--1951.'
  apa: 'Feldotto, M., Lenzner, P., Molitor, L., &#38; Skopalik, A. (2019).  From Hotelling
    to Load Balancing: Approximation and the Principle of Minimum Differentiation.
    In <i>Proceedings of the 18th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and
    MultiAgent Systems</i> (pp. 1949--1951). Montreal QC, Canada: International Foundation
    for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems.'
  bibtex: '@inproceedings{Feldotto_Lenzner_Molitor_Skopalik_2019, title={ From Hotelling
    to Load Balancing: Approximation and the Principle of Minimum Differentiation},
    booktitle={Proceedings of the 18th International Conference on Autonomous Agents
    and MultiAgent Systems}, publisher={International Foundation for Autonomous Agents
    and Multiagent Systems}, author={Feldotto, Matthias and Lenzner, Pascal  and Molitor,
    Louise and Skopalik, Alexander}, year={2019}, pages={1949--1951} }'
  chicago: 'Feldotto, Matthias, Pascal  Lenzner, Louise Molitor, and Alexander Skopalik.
    “ From Hotelling to Load Balancing: Approximation and the Principle of Minimum
    Differentiation.” In <i>Proceedings of the 18th International Conference on Autonomous
    Agents and MultiAgent Systems</i>, 1949--1951. International Foundation for Autonomous
    Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2019.'
  ieee: 'M. Feldotto, P. Lenzner, L. Molitor, and A. Skopalik, “ From Hotelling to
    Load Balancing: Approximation and the Principle of Minimum Differentiation,” in
    <i>Proceedings of the 18th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent
    Systems</i>, Montreal QC, Canada, 2019, pp. 1949--1951.'
  mla: 'Feldotto, Matthias, et al. “ From Hotelling to Load Balancing: Approximation
    and the Principle of Minimum Differentiation.” <i>Proceedings of the 18th International
    Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems</i>, International Foundation
    for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2019, pp. 1949--1951.'
  short: 'M. Feldotto, P. Lenzner, L. Molitor, A. Skopalik, in: Proceedings of the
    18th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems, International
    Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2019, pp. 1949--1951.'
conference:
  location: Montreal QC, Canada
  name: 18th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems
date_created: 2019-06-20T14:46:08Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:50:33Z
ddc:
- '004'
department:
- _id: '541'
- _id: '63'
file:
- access_level: closed
  content_type: application/pdf
  creator: ups
  date_created: 2019-08-26T11:10:02Z
  date_updated: 2019-08-26T11:10:02Z
  file_id: '12962'
  file_name: 1903.04265.pdf
  file_size: 698599
  relation: main_file
  success: 1
file_date_updated: 2019-08-26T11:10:02Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
language:
- iso: eng
main_file_link:
- url: https://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=3331973
page: 1949--1951
project:
- _id: '1'
  name: SFB 901
- _id: '2'
  name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
- _id: '7'
  name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
publication: Proceedings of the 18th International Conference on Autonomous Agents
  and MultiAgent Systems
publication_status: published
publisher: International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems
status: public
title: ' From Hotelling to Load Balancing: Approximation and the Principle of Minimum
  Differentiation'
type: conference
user_id: '477'
year: '2019'
...
---
_id: '2484'
abstract:
- lang: eng
  text: We study the classic bin packing problem in a fully-dynamic setting, where
    new items can arrive and old items may depart. We want algorithms with low asymptotic
    competitive ratio while repacking items sparingly between updates. Formally, each
    item i has a movement cost c_i >= 0, and we want to use alpha * OPT bins and incur
    a movement cost gamma * c_i, either in the worst case, or in an amortized sense,
    for alpha, gamma as small as possible. We call gamma the recourse of the algorithm.
    This is motivated by cloud storage applications, where fully-dynamic bin packing
    models the problem of data backup to minimize the number of disks used, as well
    as communication incurred in moving file backups between disks. Since the set
    of files changes over time, we could recompute a solution periodically from scratch,
    but this would give a high number of disk rewrites, incurring a high energy cost
    and possible wear and tear of the disks. In this work, we present optimal tradeoffs
    between number of bins used and number of items repacked, as well as natural extensions
    of the latter measure.
author:
- first_name: Björn
  full_name: Feldkord, Björn
  id: '22704'
  last_name: Feldkord
- first_name: Matthias
  full_name: Feldotto, Matthias
  id: '14052'
  last_name: Feldotto
  orcid: 0000-0003-1348-6516
- first_name: Anupam
  full_name: Gupta, Anupam
  last_name: Gupta
- first_name: Guru
  full_name: Guruganesh, Guru
  last_name: Guruganesh
- first_name: 'Amit '
  full_name: 'Kumar, Amit '
  last_name: Kumar
- first_name: Sören
  full_name: Riechers, Sören
  last_name: Riechers
- first_name: David
  full_name: Wajc, David
  last_name: Wajc
citation:
  ama: 'Feldkord B, Feldotto M, Gupta A, et al. Fully-Dynamic Bin Packing with Little
    Repacking. In: Chatzigiannakis I, Kaklamanis C, Marx D, Sannella D, eds. <i>45th
    International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2018)</i>.
    Vol 107. Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs). Dagstuhl,
    Germany: Schloss Dagstuhl--Leibniz-Zentrum fuer Informatik; 2018:51:1-51:24. doi:<a
    href="https://doi.org/10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2018.51">10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2018.51</a>'
  apa: 'Feldkord, B., Feldotto, M., Gupta, A., Guruganesh, G., Kumar, A., Riechers,
    S., &#38; Wajc, D. (2018). Fully-Dynamic Bin Packing with Little Repacking. In
    I. Chatzigiannakis, C. Kaklamanis, D. Marx, &#38; D. Sannella (Eds.), <i>45th
    International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2018)</i>
    (Vol. 107, pp. 51:1-51:24). Dagstuhl, Germany: Schloss Dagstuhl--Leibniz-Zentrum
    fuer Informatik. <a href="https://doi.org/10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2018.51">https://doi.org/10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2018.51</a>'
  bibtex: '@inproceedings{Feldkord_Feldotto_Gupta_Guruganesh_Kumar_Riechers_Wajc_2018,
    place={Dagstuhl, Germany}, series={Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics
    (LIPIcs)}, title={Fully-Dynamic Bin Packing with Little Repacking}, volume={107},
    DOI={<a href="https://doi.org/10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2018.51">10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2018.51</a>},
    booktitle={45th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming
    (ICALP 2018)}, publisher={Schloss Dagstuhl--Leibniz-Zentrum fuer Informatik},
    author={Feldkord, Björn and Feldotto, Matthias and Gupta, Anupam and Guruganesh,
    Guru and Kumar, Amit  and Riechers, Sören and Wajc, David}, editor={Chatzigiannakis,
    Ioannis and Kaklamanis, Christos and Marx, Dániel and Sannella, DonaldEditors},
    year={2018}, pages={51:1-51:24}, collection={Leibniz International Proceedings
    in Informatics (LIPIcs)} }'
  chicago: 'Feldkord, Björn, Matthias Feldotto, Anupam Gupta, Guru Guruganesh, Amit  Kumar,
    Sören Riechers, and David Wajc. “Fully-Dynamic Bin Packing with Little Repacking.”
    In <i>45th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP
    2018)</i>, edited by Ioannis Chatzigiannakis, Christos Kaklamanis, Dániel Marx,
    and Donald Sannella, 107:51:1-51:24. Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics
    (LIPIcs). Dagstuhl, Germany: Schloss Dagstuhl--Leibniz-Zentrum fuer Informatik,
    2018. <a href="https://doi.org/10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2018.51">https://doi.org/10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2018.51</a>.'
  ieee: B. Feldkord <i>et al.</i>, “Fully-Dynamic Bin Packing with Little Repacking,”
    in <i>45th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP
    2018)</i>, Prag, 2018, vol. 107, pp. 51:1-51:24.
  mla: Feldkord, Björn, et al. “Fully-Dynamic Bin Packing with Little Repacking.”
    <i>45th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP
    2018)</i>, edited by Ioannis Chatzigiannakis et al., vol. 107, Schloss Dagstuhl--Leibniz-Zentrum
    fuer Informatik, 2018, pp. 51:1-51:24, doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2018.51">10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2018.51</a>.
  short: 'B. Feldkord, M. Feldotto, A. Gupta, G. Guruganesh, A. Kumar, S. Riechers,
    D. Wajc, in: I. Chatzigiannakis, C. Kaklamanis, D. Marx, D. Sannella (Eds.), 45th
    International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2018),
    Schloss Dagstuhl--Leibniz-Zentrum fuer Informatik, Dagstuhl, Germany, 2018, pp.
    51:1-51:24.'
conference:
  end_date: 2018-07-13
  location: Prag
  name: 45th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP
    2018)
  start_date: 2018-07-10
date_created: 2018-04-24T15:21:56Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:56:39Z
ddc:
- '000'
department:
- _id: '541'
- _id: '63'
doi: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2018.51
editor:
- first_name: Ioannis
  full_name: Chatzigiannakis, Ioannis
  last_name: Chatzigiannakis
- first_name: Christos
  full_name: Kaklamanis, Christos
  last_name: Kaklamanis
- first_name: Dániel
  full_name: Marx, Dániel
  last_name: Marx
- first_name: Donald
  full_name: Sannella, Donald
  last_name: Sannella
external_id:
  arxiv:
  - '1711.01231'
file:
- access_level: closed
  content_type: application/pdf
  creator: feldi
  date_created: 2018-10-31T16:58:18Z
  date_updated: 2018-10-31T16:58:18Z
  file_id: '5227'
  file_name: LIPIcs-ICALP-2018-51.pdf
  file_size: 723824
  relation: main_file
  success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-10-31T16:58:18Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: '       107'
language:
- iso: eng
page: 51:1-51:24
place: Dagstuhl, Germany
project:
- _id: '1'
  name: SFB 901
- _id: '2'
  name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
- _id: '4'
  name: SFB 901 - Project Area C
- _id: '5'
  name: SFB 901 - Subproject A1
- _id: '7'
  name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
- _id: '16'
  name: SFB 901 - Subproject C4
publication: 45th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming
  (ICALP 2018)
publication_identifier:
  isbn:
  - 978-3-95977-076-7
  issn:
  - 1868-8969
publication_status: published
publisher: Schloss Dagstuhl--Leibniz-Zentrum fuer Informatik
series_title: Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)
status: public
title: Fully-Dynamic Bin Packing with Little Repacking
type: conference
user_id: '14052'
volume: 107
year: '2018'
...
---
_id: '2831'
abstract:
- lang: eng
  text: 'We consider a market where final products or services are compositions of
    a number of basic services. Users are asked to evaluate the quality of the composed
    product after purchase. The quality of the basic service influences the performance
    of the composed services but cannot be observed directly. The question we pose
    is whether it is possible to use user evaluations on composed services to assess
    the quality of basic services. We discuss how to combine aggregation of evaluations
    across users and disaggregation of information on composed services to derive
    valuations for the single components. As a solution we propose to use the (weighted)
    average as aggregation device in connection with the Shapley value as disaggregation
    method, since this combination fulfills natural requirements in our context. In
    addition, we address some occurring computational issues: We give an approximate
    solution concept using only a limited number of evaluations which guarantees nearly
    optimal results with reduced running time. Lastly, we show that a slightly modified
    Shapley value and the weighted average are still applicable if the evaluation
    profiles are incomplete.'
author:
- first_name: Matthias
  full_name: Feldotto, Matthias
  id: '14052'
  last_name: Feldotto
  orcid: 0000-0003-1348-6516
- first_name: Claus-Jochen
  full_name: Haake, Claus-Jochen
  id: '20801'
  last_name: Haake
- first_name: Alexander
  full_name: Skopalik, Alexander
  id: '40384'
  last_name: Skopalik
- first_name: Nadja
  full_name: Stroh-Maraun, Nadja
  id: '13264'
  last_name: Stroh-Maraun
citation:
  ama: 'Feldotto M, Haake C-J, Skopalik A, Stroh-Maraun N. Disaggregating User Evaluations
    Using the Shapley Value. In: <i>Proceedings of the 13th Workshop on Economics
    of Networks, Systems and Computation (NetEcon 2018)</i>. ; 2018:5:1-5:6. doi:<a
    href="https://doi.org/10.1145/3230654.3230659">10.1145/3230654.3230659</a>'
  apa: Feldotto, M., Haake, C.-J., Skopalik, A., &#38; Stroh-Maraun, N. (2018). Disaggregating
    User Evaluations Using the Shapley Value. In <i>Proceedings of the 13th Workshop
    on Economics of Networks, Systems and Computation (NetEcon 2018)</i> (pp. 5:1-5:6).
    Irvine, California, USA. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1145/3230654.3230659">https://doi.org/10.1145/3230654.3230659</a>
  bibtex: '@inproceedings{Feldotto_Haake_Skopalik_Stroh-Maraun_2018, title={Disaggregating
    User Evaluations Using the Shapley Value}, DOI={<a href="https://doi.org/10.1145/3230654.3230659">10.1145/3230654.3230659</a>},
    booktitle={Proceedings of the 13th Workshop on Economics of Networks, Systems
    and Computation (NetEcon 2018)}, author={Feldotto, Matthias and Haake, Claus-Jochen
    and Skopalik, Alexander and Stroh-Maraun, Nadja}, year={2018}, pages={5:1-5:6}
    }'
  chicago: Feldotto, Matthias, Claus-Jochen Haake, Alexander Skopalik, and Nadja Stroh-Maraun.
    “Disaggregating User Evaluations Using the Shapley Value.” In <i>Proceedings of
    the 13th Workshop on Economics of Networks, Systems and Computation (NetEcon 2018)</i>,
    5:1-5:6, 2018. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1145/3230654.3230659">https://doi.org/10.1145/3230654.3230659</a>.
  ieee: M. Feldotto, C.-J. Haake, A. Skopalik, and N. Stroh-Maraun, “Disaggregating
    User Evaluations Using the Shapley Value,” in <i>Proceedings of the 13th Workshop
    on Economics of Networks, Systems and Computation (NetEcon 2018)</i>, Irvine,
    California, USA, 2018, pp. 5:1-5:6.
  mla: Feldotto, Matthias, et al. “Disaggregating User Evaluations Using the Shapley
    Value.” <i>Proceedings of the 13th Workshop on Economics of Networks, Systems
    and Computation (NetEcon 2018)</i>, 2018, pp. 5:1-5:6, doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.1145/3230654.3230659">10.1145/3230654.3230659</a>.
  short: 'M. Feldotto, C.-J. Haake, A. Skopalik, N. Stroh-Maraun, in: Proceedings
    of the 13th Workshop on Economics of Networks, Systems and Computation (NetEcon
    2018), 2018, pp. 5:1-5:6.'
conference:
  end_date: 2018-06-18
  location: Irvine, California, USA
  name: The 13th Workshop on the Economics of Networks, Systems and Computation (NetEcon
    2018)
  start_date: 2018-06-18
date_created: 2018-05-22T10:28:51Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:58:01Z
ddc:
- '040'
department:
- _id: '541'
- _id: '63'
- _id: '205'
- _id: '475'
doi: 10.1145/3230654.3230659
file:
- access_level: closed
  content_type: application/pdf
  creator: nmaraun
  date_created: 2018-08-15T07:30:50Z
  date_updated: 2018-08-15T07:30:50Z
  file_id: '3910'
  file_name: Disaggregating User Evaluations Using the Shapley Value.pdf
  file_size: 1450171
  relation: main_file
  success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-08-15T07:30:50Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
language:
- iso: eng
page: 5:1-5:6
project:
- _id: '1'
  name: SFB 901
- _id: '2'
  name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
- _id: '7'
  name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
publication: Proceedings of the 13th Workshop on Economics of Networks, Systems and
  Computation (NetEcon 2018)
publication_identifier:
  isbn:
  - 978-1-4503-5916-0
publication_status: published
status: public
title: Disaggregating User Evaluations Using the Shapley Value
type: conference
user_id: '14052'
year: '2018'
...
---
_id: '669'
abstract:
- lang: eng
  text: We study a new class of games which generalizes congestion games andits bottleneck
    variant. We introduce congestion games with mixed objectives to modelnetwork scenarios
    in which players seek to optimize for latency and bandwidths alike.We characterize
    the (non-)existence of pure Nash equilibria (PNE), the convergenceof improvement
    dynamics, the quality of equilibria and show the complexity of thedecision problem.
    For games that do not possess PNE we give bounds on the approx-imation ratio of
    approximate pure Nash equilibria.
author:
- first_name: Matthias
  full_name: Feldotto, Matthias
  id: '14052'
  last_name: Feldotto
  orcid: 0000-0003-1348-6516
- first_name: Lennart
  full_name: Leder, Lennart
  last_name: Leder
- first_name: Alexander
  full_name: Skopalik, Alexander
  id: '40384'
  last_name: Skopalik
citation:
  ama: Feldotto M, Leder L, Skopalik A. Congestion games with mixed objectives. <i>Journal
    of Combinatorial Optimization</i>. 2018;36(4):1145-1167. doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s10878-017-0189-y">10.1007/s10878-017-0189-y</a>
  apa: Feldotto, M., Leder, L., &#38; Skopalik, A. (2018). Congestion games with mixed
    objectives. <i>Journal of Combinatorial Optimization</i>, <i>36</i>(4), 1145–1167.
    <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s10878-017-0189-y">https://doi.org/10.1007/s10878-017-0189-y</a>
  bibtex: '@article{Feldotto_Leder_Skopalik_2018, title={Congestion games with mixed
    objectives}, volume={36}, DOI={<a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s10878-017-0189-y">10.1007/s10878-017-0189-y</a>},
    number={4}, journal={Journal of Combinatorial Optimization}, publisher={Springer
    Nature}, author={Feldotto, Matthias and Leder, Lennart and Skopalik, Alexander},
    year={2018}, pages={1145–1167} }'
  chicago: 'Feldotto, Matthias, Lennart Leder, and Alexander Skopalik. “Congestion
    Games with Mixed Objectives.” <i>Journal of Combinatorial Optimization</i> 36,
    no. 4 (2018): 1145–67. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s10878-017-0189-y">https://doi.org/10.1007/s10878-017-0189-y</a>.'
  ieee: M. Feldotto, L. Leder, and A. Skopalik, “Congestion games with mixed objectives,”
    <i>Journal of Combinatorial Optimization</i>, vol. 36, no. 4, pp. 1145–1167, 2018.
  mla: Feldotto, Matthias, et al. “Congestion Games with Mixed Objectives.” <i>Journal
    of Combinatorial Optimization</i>, vol. 36, no. 4, Springer Nature, 2018, pp.
    1145–67, doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s10878-017-0189-y">10.1007/s10878-017-0189-y</a>.
  short: M. Feldotto, L. Leder, A. Skopalik, Journal of Combinatorial Optimization
    36 (2018) 1145–1167.
date_created: 2017-10-26T14:11:04Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:03:15Z
ddc:
- '000'
department:
- _id: '63'
- _id: '541'
doi: 10.1007/s10878-017-0189-y
external_id:
  arxiv:
  - '1607.05143'
file:
- access_level: closed
  content_type: application/pdf
  creator: feldi
  date_created: 2018-10-31T16:57:32Z
  date_updated: 2018-10-31T16:57:32Z
  file_id: '5226'
  file_name: Feldotto2018_Article_CongestionGamesWithMixedObject.pdf
  file_size: 605207
  relation: main_file
  success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-10-31T16:57:32Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: '        36'
issue: '4'
language:
- iso: eng
page: 1145-1167
project:
- _id: '1'
  name: SFB 901
- _id: '7'
  name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3
- _id: '2'
  name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
publication: Journal of Combinatorial Optimization
publication_identifier:
  issn:
  - 1382-6905
  - 1573-2886
publication_status: published
publisher: Springer Nature
status: public
title: Congestion games with mixed objectives
type: journal_article
user_id: '14052'
volume: 36
year: '2018'
...
---
_id: '1369'
abstract:
- lang: eng
  text: In budget games, players compete over resources with finite budgets. For every
    resource, a player has a specific demand and as a strategy, he chooses a subset
    of resources. If the total demand on a resource does not exceed its budget, the
    utility of each player who chose that resource equals his demand. Otherwise, the
    budget is shared proportionally. In the general case, pure Nash equilibria (NE)
    do not exist for such games. In this paper, we consider the natural classes of
    singleton and matroid budget games with additional constraints and show that for
    each, pure NE can be guaranteed. In addition, we introduce a lexicographical potential
    function to prove that every matroid budget game has an approximate pure NE which
    depends on the largest ratio between the different demands of each individual
    player.
author:
- first_name: Maximilian
  full_name: Drees, Maximilian
  last_name: Drees
- first_name: Matthias
  full_name: Feldotto, Matthias
  id: '14052'
  last_name: Feldotto
  orcid: 0000-0003-1348-6516
- first_name: Sören
  full_name: Riechers, Sören
  last_name: Riechers
- first_name: Alexander
  full_name: Skopalik, Alexander
  id: '40384'
  last_name: Skopalik
citation:
  ama: Drees M, Feldotto M, Riechers S, Skopalik A. Pure Nash equilibria in restricted
    budget games. <i>Journal of Combinatorial Optimization</i>. 2018. doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s10878-018-0269-7">10.1007/s10878-018-0269-7</a>
  apa: Drees, M., Feldotto, M., Riechers, S., &#38; Skopalik, A. (2018). Pure Nash
    equilibria in restricted budget games. <i>Journal of Combinatorial Optimization</i>.
    <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s10878-018-0269-7">https://doi.org/10.1007/s10878-018-0269-7</a>
  bibtex: '@article{Drees_Feldotto_Riechers_Skopalik_2018, title={Pure Nash equilibria
    in restricted budget games}, DOI={<a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s10878-018-0269-7">10.1007/s10878-018-0269-7</a>},
    journal={Journal of Combinatorial Optimization}, publisher={Springer Nature},
    author={Drees, Maximilian and Feldotto, Matthias and Riechers, Sören and Skopalik,
    Alexander}, year={2018} }'
  chicago: Drees, Maximilian, Matthias Feldotto, Sören Riechers, and Alexander Skopalik.
    “Pure Nash Equilibria in Restricted Budget Games.” <i>Journal of Combinatorial
    Optimization</i>, 2018. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s10878-018-0269-7">https://doi.org/10.1007/s10878-018-0269-7</a>.
  ieee: M. Drees, M. Feldotto, S. Riechers, and A. Skopalik, “Pure Nash equilibria
    in restricted budget games,” <i>Journal of Combinatorial Optimization</i>, 2018.
  mla: Drees, Maximilian, et al. “Pure Nash Equilibria in Restricted Budget Games.”
    <i>Journal of Combinatorial Optimization</i>, Springer Nature, 2018, doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s10878-018-0269-7">10.1007/s10878-018-0269-7</a>.
  short: M. Drees, M. Feldotto, S. Riechers, A. Skopalik, Journal of Combinatorial
    Optimization (2018).
date_created: 2018-03-18T11:12:49Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:51:42Z
ddc:
- '000'
department:
- _id: '63'
- _id: '541'
doi: 10.1007/s10878-018-0269-7
file:
- access_level: closed
  content_type: application/pdf
  creator: feldi
  date_created: 2018-10-31T16:56:13Z
  date_updated: 2018-10-31T16:56:13Z
  file_id: '5225'
  file_name: Drees2018_Article_PureNashEquilibriaInRestricted.pdf
  file_size: 561187
  relation: main_file
file_date_updated: 2018-10-31T16:56:13Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
language:
- iso: eng
project:
- _id: '1'
  name: SFB 901
- _id: '2'
  name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
- _id: '7'
  name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
- _id: '4'
  name: SFB 901 - Project Area C
- _id: '16'
  name: SFB 901 - Subproject C4
publication: Journal of Combinatorial Optimization
publication_identifier:
  issn:
  - 1382-6905
  - 1573-2886
publication_status: epub_ahead
publisher: Springer Nature
status: public
title: Pure Nash equilibria in restricted budget games
type: journal_article
user_id: '14052'
year: '2018'
...
---
_id: '112'
abstract:
- lang: eng
  text: We study a model of selfish resource allocation that seeks to incorporate
    dependencies among resources as they exist in in modern networked environments.
    Our model is inspired by utility functions with constant elasticity of substitution
    (CES) which is a well-studied model in economics. We consider congestion games
    with different aggregation functions. In particular, we study $L_p$ norms and
    analyze the existence and complexity of (approximate) pure Nash equilibria. Additionally,
    we give an almost tight characterization based on monotonicity properties to describe
    the set of aggregation functions that guarantee the existence of pure Nash equilibria.
author:
- first_name: Matthias
  full_name: Feldotto, Matthias
  id: '14052'
  last_name: Feldotto
  orcid: 0000-0003-1348-6516
- first_name: Lennart
  full_name: Leder, Lennart
  last_name: Leder
- first_name: Alexander
  full_name: Skopalik, Alexander
  id: '40384'
  last_name: Skopalik
citation:
  ama: 'Feldotto M, Leder L, Skopalik A. Congestion Games with Complementarities.
    In: <i>Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Algorithms and Complexity
    (CIAC)</i>. LNCS. ; 2017:222--233. doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-57586-5_19">10.1007/978-3-319-57586-5_19</a>'
  apa: Feldotto, M., Leder, L., &#38; Skopalik, A. (2017). Congestion Games with Complementarities.
    In <i>Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Algorithms and Complexity
    (CIAC)</i> (pp. 222--233). <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-57586-5_19">https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-57586-5_19</a>
  bibtex: '@inproceedings{Feldotto_Leder_Skopalik_2017, series={LNCS}, title={Congestion
    Games with Complementarities}, DOI={<a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-57586-5_19">10.1007/978-3-319-57586-5_19</a>},
    booktitle={Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Algorithms and
    Complexity (CIAC)}, author={Feldotto, Matthias and Leder, Lennart and Skopalik,
    Alexander}, year={2017}, pages={222--233}, collection={LNCS} }'
  chicago: Feldotto, Matthias, Lennart Leder, and Alexander Skopalik. “Congestion
    Games with Complementarities.” In <i>Proceedings of the 10th International Conference
    on Algorithms and Complexity (CIAC)</i>, 222--233. LNCS, 2017. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-57586-5_19">https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-57586-5_19</a>.
  ieee: M. Feldotto, L. Leder, and A. Skopalik, “Congestion Games with Complementarities,”
    in <i>Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Algorithms and Complexity
    (CIAC)</i>, 2017, pp. 222--233.
  mla: Feldotto, Matthias, et al. “Congestion Games with Complementarities.” <i>Proceedings
    of the 10th International Conference on Algorithms and Complexity (CIAC)</i>,
    2017, pp. 222--233, doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-57586-5_19">10.1007/978-3-319-57586-5_19</a>.
  short: 'M. Feldotto, L. Leder, A. Skopalik, in: Proceedings of the 10th International
    Conference on Algorithms and Complexity (CIAC), 2017, pp. 222--233.'
date_created: 2017-10-17T12:41:13Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:50:58Z
ddc:
- '040'
department:
- _id: '63'
- _id: '541'
doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-57586-5_19
external_id:
  arxiv:
  - '1701.07304'
file:
- access_level: closed
  content_type: application/pdf
  creator: florida
  date_created: 2018-03-21T13:05:37Z
  date_updated: 2018-03-21T13:05:37Z
  file_id: '1566'
  file_name: 112-FeldottoLederSkopalik2017.pdf
  file_size: 264089
  relation: main_file
  success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-03-21T13:05:37Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
page: 222--233
project:
- _id: '1'
  name: SFB 901
- _id: '7'
  name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3
- _id: '2'
  name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
publication: Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Algorithms and Complexity
  (CIAC)
series_title: LNCS
status: public
title: Congestion Games with Complementarities
type: conference
user_id: '14052'
year: '2017'
...
---
_id: '113'
abstract:
- lang: eng
  text: We study the computation of approximate pure Nash equilibria in Shapley value
    (SV) weighted congestion games, introduced in [19]. This class of games considers
    weighted congestion games in which Shapley values are used as an alternative (to
    proportional shares) for distributing the total cost of each resource among its
    users. We focus on the interesting subclass of such games with polynomial resource
    cost functions and present an algorithm that computes approximate pure Nash equilibria
    with a polynomial number of strategy updates. Since computing a single strategy
    update is hard, we apply sampling techniques which allow us to achieve polynomial
    running time. The algorithm builds on the algorithmic ideas of [7], however, to
    the best of our knowledge, this is the first algorithmic result on computation
    of approximate equilibria using other than proportional shares as player costs
    in this setting. We present a novel relation that approximates the Shapley value
    of a player by her proportional share and vice versa. As side results, we upper
    bound the approximate price of anarchy of such games and significantly improve
    the best known factor for computing approximate pure Nash equilibria in weighted
    congestion games of [7].
author:
- first_name: Matthias
  full_name: Feldotto, Matthias
  id: '14052'
  last_name: Feldotto
  orcid: 0000-0003-1348-6516
- first_name: Martin
  full_name: Gairing, Martin
  last_name: Gairing
- first_name: Grammateia
  full_name: Kotsialou, Grammateia
  last_name: Kotsialou
- first_name: Alexander
  full_name: Skopalik, Alexander
  id: '40384'
  last_name: Skopalik
citation:
  ama: 'Feldotto M, Gairing M, Kotsialou G, Skopalik A. Computing Approximate Pure
    Nash Equilibria in Shapley Value Weighted Congestion Games. In: <i>Proceedings
    of the 13th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE)</i>.
    ; 2017. doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-71924-5_14">10.1007/978-3-319-71924-5_14</a>'
  apa: Feldotto, M., Gairing, M., Kotsialou, G., &#38; Skopalik, A. (2017). Computing
    Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Shapley Value Weighted Congestion Games. In
    <i>Proceedings of the 13th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics
    (WINE)</i>. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-71924-5_14">https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-71924-5_14</a>
  bibtex: '@inproceedings{Feldotto_Gairing_Kotsialou_Skopalik_2017, title={Computing
    Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Shapley Value Weighted Congestion Games},
    DOI={<a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-71924-5_14">10.1007/978-3-319-71924-5_14</a>},
    booktitle={Proceedings of the 13th International Conference on Web and Internet
    Economics (WINE)}, author={Feldotto, Matthias and Gairing, Martin and Kotsialou,
    Grammateia and Skopalik, Alexander}, year={2017} }'
  chicago: Feldotto, Matthias, Martin Gairing, Grammateia Kotsialou, and Alexander
    Skopalik. “Computing Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Shapley Value Weighted
    Congestion Games.” In <i>Proceedings of the 13th International Conference on Web
    and Internet Economics (WINE)</i>, 2017. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-71924-5_14">https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-71924-5_14</a>.
  ieee: M. Feldotto, M. Gairing, G. Kotsialou, and A. Skopalik, “Computing Approximate
    Pure Nash Equilibria in Shapley Value Weighted Congestion Games,” in <i>Proceedings
    of the 13th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE)</i>,
    2017.
  mla: Feldotto, Matthias, et al. “Computing Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Shapley
    Value Weighted Congestion Games.” <i>Proceedings of the 13th International Conference
    on Web and Internet Economics (WINE)</i>, 2017, doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-71924-5_14">10.1007/978-3-319-71924-5_14</a>.
  short: 'M. Feldotto, M. Gairing, G. Kotsialou, A. Skopalik, in: Proceedings of the
    13th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE), 2017.'
date_created: 2017-10-17T12:41:13Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:50:59Z
ddc:
- '000'
department:
- _id: '63'
- _id: '541'
doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-71924-5_14
external_id:
  arxiv:
  - '1710.01634'
file:
- access_level: closed
  content_type: application/pdf
  creator: feldi
  date_created: 2018-10-31T17:01:32Z
  date_updated: 2018-10-31T17:01:32Z
  file_id: '5231'
  file_name: Feldotto2017_Chapter_ComputingApproximatePureNashEq.pdf
  file_size: 279055
  relation: main_file
  success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-10-31T17:01:32Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
language:
- iso: eng
project:
- _id: '1'
  name: SFB 901
- _id: '7'
  name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3
- _id: '2'
  name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
publication: Proceedings of the 13th International Conference on Web and Internet
  Economics (WINE)
status: public
title: Computing Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Shapley Value Weighted Congestion
  Games
type: conference
user_id: '14052'
year: '2017'
...
---
_id: '66'
abstract:
- lang: eng
  text: In budget games, players compete over resources with finite budgets. For every
    resource, a player has a specific demand and as a strategy, he chooses a subset
    of resources. If the total demand on a resource does not exceed its budget, the
    utility of each player who chose that resource equals his demand. Otherwise, the
    budget is shared proportionally. In the general case, pure Nash equilibria (NE)
    do not exist for such games. In this paper, we consider the natural classes of
    singleton and matroid budget games with additional constraints and show that for
    each, pure NE can be guaranteed. In addition, we introduce a lexicographical potential
    function to prove that every matroid budget game has an approximate pure NE which
    depends on the largest ratio between the different demands of each individual
    player.
author:
- first_name: Maximilian
  full_name: Drees, Maximilian
  last_name: Drees
- first_name: Matthias
  full_name: Feldotto, Matthias
  id: '14052'
  last_name: Feldotto
  orcid: 0000-0003-1348-6516
- first_name: Sören
  full_name: Riechers, Sören
  last_name: Riechers
- first_name: Alexander
  full_name: Skopalik, Alexander
  id: '40384'
  last_name: Skopalik
citation:
  ama: 'Drees M, Feldotto M, Riechers S, Skopalik A. Pure Nash Equilibria in Restricted
    Budget Games. In: <i>Proceedings of the 23rd International Computing and Combinatorics
    Conference (COCOON)</i>. LNCS. ; 2017:175--187. doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-62389-4_15">10.1007/978-3-319-62389-4_15</a>'
  apa: Drees, M., Feldotto, M., Riechers, S., &#38; Skopalik, A. (2017). Pure Nash
    Equilibria in Restricted Budget Games. In <i>Proceedings of the 23rd International
    Computing and Combinatorics Conference (COCOON)</i> (pp. 175--187). <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-62389-4_15">https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-62389-4_15</a>
  bibtex: '@inproceedings{Drees_Feldotto_Riechers_Skopalik_2017, series={LNCS}, title={Pure
    Nash Equilibria in Restricted Budget Games}, DOI={<a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-62389-4_15">10.1007/978-3-319-62389-4_15</a>},
    booktitle={Proceedings of the 23rd International Computing and Combinatorics Conference
    (COCOON)}, author={Drees, Maximilian and Feldotto, Matthias and Riechers, Sören
    and Skopalik, Alexander}, year={2017}, pages={175--187}, collection={LNCS} }'
  chicago: Drees, Maximilian, Matthias Feldotto, Sören Riechers, and Alexander Skopalik.
    “Pure Nash Equilibria in Restricted Budget Games.” In <i>Proceedings of the 23rd
    International Computing and Combinatorics Conference (COCOON)</i>, 175--187. LNCS,
    2017. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-62389-4_15">https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-62389-4_15</a>.
  ieee: M. Drees, M. Feldotto, S. Riechers, and A. Skopalik, “Pure Nash Equilibria
    in Restricted Budget Games,” in <i>Proceedings of the 23rd International Computing
    and Combinatorics Conference (COCOON)</i>, 2017, pp. 175--187.
  mla: Drees, Maximilian, et al. “Pure Nash Equilibria in Restricted Budget Games.”
    <i>Proceedings of the 23rd International Computing and Combinatorics Conference
    (COCOON)</i>, 2017, pp. 175--187, doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-62389-4_15">10.1007/978-3-319-62389-4_15</a>.
  short: 'M. Drees, M. Feldotto, S. Riechers, A. Skopalik, in: Proceedings of the
    23rd International Computing and Combinatorics Conference (COCOON), 2017, pp.
    175--187.'
date_created: 2017-10-17T12:41:04Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:03:13Z
ddc:
- '000'
department:
- _id: '541'
- _id: '63'
doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-62389-4_15
file:
- access_level: closed
  content_type: application/pdf
  creator: feldi
  date_created: 2018-10-31T16:58:42Z
  date_updated: 2018-10-31T16:58:42Z
  file_id: '5228'
  file_name: Drees2017_Chapter_PureNashEquilibriaInRestricted.pdf
  file_size: 346390
  relation: main_file
  success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-10-31T16:58:42Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
language:
- iso: eng
page: 175--187
project:
- _id: '1'
  name: SFB 901
- _id: '7'
  name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3
- _id: '16'
  name: SFB 901 - Subproject C4
- _id: '2'
  name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
- _id: '4'
  name: SFB 901 - Project Area C
publication: Proceedings of the 23rd International Computing and Combinatorics Conference
  (COCOON)
series_title: LNCS
status: public
title: Pure Nash Equilibria in Restricted Budget Games
type: conference
user_id: '14052'
year: '2017'
...
---
_id: '1094'
abstract:
- lang: eng
  text: Many university students struggle with motivational problems, and gamification
    has the potential to address these problems. However, gamification is hardly used
    in education, because current approaches to gamification require instructors to
    engage in the time-consuming preparation of their course contents for use in quizzes,
    mini-games and the like. Drawing on research on limited attention and present
    bias, we propose a "lean" approach to gamification, which relies on gamifying
    learning activities (rather than learning contents) and increasing their salience.
    In this paper, we present the app StudyNow that implements such a lean gamification
    approach. With this app, we aim to enable more students and instructors to benefit
    from the advantages of gamification.
author:
- first_name: Matthias
  full_name: Feldotto, Matthias
  id: '14052'
  last_name: Feldotto
  orcid: 0000-0003-1348-6516
- first_name: Thomas
  full_name: John, Thomas
  id: '3952'
  last_name: John
- first_name: Dennis
  full_name: Kundisch, Dennis
  id: '21117'
  last_name: Kundisch
- first_name: Paul
  full_name: Hemsen, Paul
  id: '22546'
  last_name: Hemsen
- first_name: Katrin
  full_name: Klingsieck, Katrin
  last_name: Klingsieck
- first_name: Alexander
  full_name: Skopalik, Alexander
  id: '40384'
  last_name: Skopalik
citation:
  ama: 'Feldotto M, John T, Kundisch D, Hemsen P, Klingsieck K, Skopalik A. Making
    Gamification Easy for the Professor: Decoupling Game and Content with the StudyNow
    Mobile App. In: <i>Proceedings of the 12th International Conference on Design
    Science Research in Information Systems and Technology (DESRIST)</i>. LNCS. ;
    2017:462-467. doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-59144-5_32">10.1007/978-3-319-59144-5_32</a>'
  apa: 'Feldotto, M., John, T., Kundisch, D., Hemsen, P., Klingsieck, K., &#38; Skopalik,
    A. (2017). Making Gamification Easy for the Professor: Decoupling Game and Content
    with the StudyNow Mobile App. In <i>Proceedings of the 12th International Conference
    on Design Science Research in Information Systems and Technology (DESRIST)</i>
    (pp. 462–467). <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-59144-5_32">https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-59144-5_32</a>'
  bibtex: '@inproceedings{Feldotto_John_Kundisch_Hemsen_Klingsieck_Skopalik_2017,
    series={LNCS}, title={Making Gamification Easy for the Professor: Decoupling Game
    and Content with the StudyNow Mobile App}, DOI={<a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-59144-5_32">10.1007/978-3-319-59144-5_32</a>},
    booktitle={Proceedings of the 12th International Conference on Design Science
    Research in Information Systems and Technology (DESRIST)}, author={Feldotto, Matthias
    and John, Thomas and Kundisch, Dennis and Hemsen, Paul and Klingsieck, Katrin
    and Skopalik, Alexander}, year={2017}, pages={462–467}, collection={LNCS} }'
  chicago: 'Feldotto, Matthias, Thomas John, Dennis Kundisch, Paul Hemsen, Katrin
    Klingsieck, and Alexander Skopalik. “Making Gamification Easy for the Professor:
    Decoupling Game and Content with the StudyNow Mobile App.” In <i>Proceedings of
    the 12th International Conference on Design Science Research in Information Systems
    and Technology (DESRIST)</i>, 462–67. LNCS, 2017. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-59144-5_32">https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-59144-5_32</a>.'
  ieee: 'M. Feldotto, T. John, D. Kundisch, P. Hemsen, K. Klingsieck, and A. Skopalik,
    “Making Gamification Easy for the Professor: Decoupling Game and Content with
    the StudyNow Mobile App,” in <i>Proceedings of the 12th International Conference
    on Design Science Research in Information Systems and Technology (DESRIST)</i>,
    2017, pp. 462–467.'
  mla: 'Feldotto, Matthias, et al. “Making Gamification Easy for the Professor: Decoupling
    Game and Content with the StudyNow Mobile App.” <i>Proceedings of the 12th International
    Conference on Design Science Research in Information Systems and Technology (DESRIST)</i>,
    2017, pp. 462–67, doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-59144-5_32">10.1007/978-3-319-59144-5_32</a>.'
  short: 'M. Feldotto, T. John, D. Kundisch, P. Hemsen, K. Klingsieck, A. Skopalik,
    in: Proceedings of the 12th International Conference on Design Science Research
    in Information Systems and Technology (DESRIST), 2017, pp. 462–467.'
date_created: 2018-01-05T08:37:52Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:50:53Z
ddc:
- '000'
department:
- _id: '63'
- _id: '541'
- _id: '276'
doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-59144-5_32
file:
- access_level: closed
  content_type: application/pdf
  creator: feldi
  date_created: 2018-10-31T17:01:09Z
  date_updated: 2018-10-31T17:01:09Z
  file_id: '5230'
  file_name: Feldotto2017_Chapter_MakingGamificationEasyForThePr.pdf
  file_size: 1576363
  relation: main_file
  success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-10-31T17:01:09Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
language:
- iso: eng
page: 462-467
publication: Proceedings of the 12th International Conference on Design Science Research
  in Information Systems and Technology (DESRIST)
series_title: LNCS
status: public
title: 'Making Gamification Easy for the Professor: Decoupling Game and Content with
  the StudyNow Mobile App'
type: conference
user_id: '14052'
year: '2017'
...
---
_id: '1095'
abstract:
- lang: eng
  text: 'Many university students struggle with motivational problems, and gamification
    has the potential to address these problems. However, using gamification currently
    is rather tedious and time-consuming for instructors because current approaches
    to gamification require instructors to engage in the time-consuming preparation
    of course contents (e.g., for quizzes or mini-games). In reply to this issue,
    we propose a “lean” approach to gamification, which relies on gamifying learning
    activities rather than learning contents. The learning activities that are gamified
    in the lean approach can typically be drawn from existing course syllabi (e.g.,
    attend certain lectures, hand in assignments, read book chapters and articles).
    Hence, compared to existing approaches, lean gamification substantially lowers
    the time requirements posed on instructors for gamifying a given course. Drawing
    on research on limited attention and the present bias, we provide the theoretical
    foundation for the lean gamification approach. In addition, we present a mobile
    application that implements lean gamification and outline a mixed-methods study
    that is currently under way for evaluating whether lean gamification does indeed
    have the potential to increase students’ motivation. We thereby hope to allow
    more students and instructors to benefit from the advantages of gamification. '
author:
- first_name: Thomas
  full_name: John, Thomas
  id: '3952'
  last_name: John
- first_name: Matthias
  full_name: Feldotto, Matthias
  id: '14052'
  last_name: Feldotto
  orcid: 0000-0003-1348-6516
- first_name: Paul
  full_name: Hemsen, Paul
  id: '22546'
  last_name: Hemsen
- first_name: Katrin
  full_name: Klingsieck, Katrin
  last_name: Klingsieck
- first_name: Dennis
  full_name: Kundisch, Dennis
  id: '21117'
  last_name: Kundisch
- first_name: Mike
  full_name: Langendorf, Mike
  last_name: Langendorf
citation:
  ama: 'John T, Feldotto M, Hemsen P, Klingsieck K, Kundisch D, Langendorf M. Towards
    a Lean Approach for Gamifying Education. In: <i>Proceedings of the 25th European
    Conference on Information Systems (ECIS)</i>. ; 2017:2970-2979.'
  apa: John, T., Feldotto, M., Hemsen, P., Klingsieck, K., Kundisch, D., &#38; Langendorf,
    M. (2017). Towards a Lean Approach for Gamifying Education. In <i>Proceedings
    of the 25th European Conference on Information Systems (ECIS)</i> (pp. 2970–2979).
  bibtex: '@inproceedings{John_Feldotto_Hemsen_Klingsieck_Kundisch_Langendorf_2017,
    title={Towards a Lean Approach for Gamifying Education}, booktitle={Proceedings
    of the 25th European Conference on Information Systems (ECIS)}, author={John,
    Thomas and Feldotto, Matthias and Hemsen, Paul and Klingsieck, Katrin and Kundisch,
    Dennis and Langendorf, Mike}, year={2017}, pages={2970–2979} }'
  chicago: John, Thomas, Matthias Feldotto, Paul Hemsen, Katrin Klingsieck, Dennis
    Kundisch, and Mike Langendorf. “Towards a Lean Approach for Gamifying Education.”
    In <i>Proceedings of the 25th European Conference on Information Systems (ECIS)</i>,
    2970–79, 2017.
  ieee: T. John, M. Feldotto, P. Hemsen, K. Klingsieck, D. Kundisch, and M. Langendorf,
    “Towards a Lean Approach for Gamifying Education,” in <i>Proceedings of the 25th
    European Conference on Information Systems (ECIS)</i>, 2017, pp. 2970–2979.
  mla: John, Thomas, et al. “Towards a Lean Approach for Gamifying Education.” <i>Proceedings
    of the 25th European Conference on Information Systems (ECIS)</i>, 2017, pp. 2970–79.
  short: 'T. John, M. Feldotto, P. Hemsen, K. Klingsieck, D. Kundisch, M. Langendorf,
    in: Proceedings of the 25th European Conference on Information Systems (ECIS),
    2017, pp. 2970–2979.'
date_created: 2018-01-05T08:39:41Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:50:53Z
ddc:
- '000'
department:
- _id: '63'
- _id: '541'
- _id: '178'
- _id: '185'
file:
- access_level: closed
  content_type: application/pdf
  creator: feldi
  date_created: 2018-10-31T17:02:07Z
  date_updated: 2018-10-31T17:02:07Z
  file_id: '5232'
  file_name: TOWARDS A LEAN APPROACH TO GAMIFYING EDUCATION.pdf
  file_size: 485333
  relation: main_file
  success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-10-31T17:02:07Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
language:
- iso: eng
main_file_link:
- open_access: '1'
  url: https://aisel.aisnet.org/ecis2017_rip/46
oa: '1'
page: 2970-2979
publication: Proceedings of the 25th European Conference on Information Systems (ECIS)
status: public
title: Towards a Lean Approach for Gamifying Education
type: conference
user_id: '14052'
year: '2017'
...
---
_id: '209'
abstract:
- lang: eng
  text: We study a new class of games which generalizes congestion games and its bottleneck
    variant. We introduce congestion games with mixed objectives to model network
    scenarios in which players seek to optimize for latency and bandwidths alike.
    We characterize the existence of pure Nash equilibria (PNE) and the convergence
    of improvement dynamics. For games that do not possess PNE we give bounds on the
    approximation ratio of approximate pure Nash equilibria.
author:
- first_name: Matthias
  full_name: Feldotto, Matthias
  id: '14052'
  last_name: Feldotto
  orcid: 0000-0003-1348-6516
- first_name: Lennart
  full_name: Leder, Lennart
  last_name: Leder
- first_name: Alexander
  full_name: Skopalik, Alexander
  id: '40384'
  last_name: Skopalik
citation:
  ama: 'Feldotto M, Leder L, Skopalik A. Congestion Games with Mixed Objectives. In:
    <i>Proceedings of the 10th Annual International Conference on Combinatorial Optimization
    and Applications (COCOA)</i>. LNCS. ; 2016:655--669. doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-48749-6_47">10.1007/978-3-319-48749-6_47</a>'
  apa: Feldotto, M., Leder, L., &#38; Skopalik, A. (2016). Congestion Games with Mixed
    Objectives. In <i>Proceedings of the 10th Annual International Conference on Combinatorial
    Optimization and Applications (COCOA)</i> (pp. 655--669). <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-48749-6_47">https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-48749-6_47</a>
  bibtex: '@inproceedings{Feldotto_Leder_Skopalik_2016, series={LNCS}, title={Congestion
    Games with Mixed Objectives}, DOI={<a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-48749-6_47">10.1007/978-3-319-48749-6_47</a>},
    booktitle={Proceedings of the 10th Annual International Conference on Combinatorial
    Optimization and Applications (COCOA)}, author={Feldotto, Matthias and Leder,
    Lennart and Skopalik, Alexander}, year={2016}, pages={655--669}, collection={LNCS}
    }'
  chicago: Feldotto, Matthias, Lennart Leder, and Alexander Skopalik. “Congestion
    Games with Mixed Objectives.” In <i>Proceedings of the 10th Annual International
    Conference on Combinatorial Optimization and Applications (COCOA)</i>, 655--669.
    LNCS, 2016. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-48749-6_47">https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-48749-6_47</a>.
  ieee: M. Feldotto, L. Leder, and A. Skopalik, “Congestion Games with Mixed Objectives,”
    in <i>Proceedings of the 10th Annual International Conference on Combinatorial
    Optimization and Applications (COCOA)</i>, 2016, pp. 655--669.
  mla: Feldotto, Matthias, et al. “Congestion Games with Mixed Objectives.” <i>Proceedings
    of the 10th Annual International Conference on Combinatorial Optimization and
    Applications (COCOA)</i>, 2016, pp. 655--669, doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-48749-6_47">10.1007/978-3-319-48749-6_47</a>.
  short: 'M. Feldotto, L. Leder, A. Skopalik, in: Proceedings of the 10th Annual International
    Conference on Combinatorial Optimization and Applications (COCOA), 2016, pp. 655--669.'
date_created: 2017-10-17T12:41:32Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:54:41Z
ddc:
- '000'
department:
- _id: '63'
- _id: '541'
doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-48749-6_47
external_id:
  arxiv:
  - '1607.05143'
file:
- access_level: closed
  content_type: application/pdf
  creator: feldi
  date_created: 2018-10-31T17:03:44Z
  date_updated: 2018-10-31T17:03:44Z
  file_id: '5233'
  file_name: Feldotto2016_Chapter_CongestionGamesWithMixedObject.pdf
  file_size: 235739
  relation: main_file
  success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-10-31T17:03:44Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
language:
- iso: eng
page: 655--669
project:
- _id: '1'
  name: SFB 901
- _id: '7'
  name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3
- _id: '2'
  name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
publication: Proceedings of the 10th Annual International Conference on Combinatorial
  Optimization and Applications (COCOA)
series_title: LNCS
status: public
title: Congestion Games with Mixed Objectives
type: conference
user_id: '14052'
year: '2016'
...
---
_id: '145'
abstract:
- lang: eng
  text: 'Comparative evaluations of peer-to-peer protocols through simulations are
    a viable approach to judge the performance and costs of the individual protocols
    in large-scale networks. In order to support this work, we present the peer-to-peer
    system simulator PeerfactSim.KOM, which we extended over the last years. PeerfactSim.KOM
    comes with an extensive layer model to support various facets and protocols of
    peer-to-peer networking. In this article, we describe PeerfactSim.KOM and show
    how it can be used for detailed measurements of large-scale peer-to-peer networks.
    We enhanced PeerfactSim.KOM with a fine-grained analyzer concept, with exhaustive
    automated measurements and gnuplot generators as well as a coordination control
    to evaluate sets of experiment setups in parallel. Thus, by configuring all experiments
    and protocols only once and starting the simulator, all desired measurements are
    performed, analyzed, evaluated, and combined, resulting in a holistic environment
    for the comparative evaluation of peer-to-peer systems. An immediate comparison
    of different configurations and overlays under different aspects is possible directly
    after the execution without any manual post-processing. '
author:
- first_name: Matthias
  full_name: Feldotto, Matthias
  id: '14052'
  last_name: Feldotto
  orcid: 0000-0003-1348-6516
- first_name: Kalman
  full_name: Graffi, Kalman
  last_name: Graffi
citation:
  ama: 'Feldotto M, Graffi K. Systematic evaluation of peer-to-peer systems using
    PeerfactSim.KOM. <i>Concurrency and Computation: Practice and Experience</i>.
    2016;28(5):1655-1677. doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.1002/cpe.3716">10.1002/cpe.3716</a>'
  apa: 'Feldotto, M., &#38; Graffi, K. (2016). Systematic evaluation of peer-to-peer
    systems using PeerfactSim.KOM. <i>Concurrency and Computation: Practice and Experience</i>,
    <i>28</i>(5), 1655–1677. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1002/cpe.3716">https://doi.org/10.1002/cpe.3716</a>'
  bibtex: '@article{Feldotto_Graffi_2016, title={Systematic evaluation of peer-to-peer
    systems using PeerfactSim.KOM}, volume={28}, DOI={<a href="https://doi.org/10.1002/cpe.3716">10.1002/cpe.3716</a>},
    number={5}, journal={Concurrency and Computation: Practice and Experience}, publisher={Wiley
    Online Library}, author={Feldotto, Matthias and Graffi, Kalman}, year={2016},
    pages={1655–1677} }'
  chicago: 'Feldotto, Matthias, and Kalman Graffi. “Systematic Evaluation of Peer-to-Peer
    Systems Using PeerfactSim.KOM.” <i>Concurrency and Computation: Practice and Experience</i>
    28, no. 5 (2016): 1655–77. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1002/cpe.3716">https://doi.org/10.1002/cpe.3716</a>.'
  ieee: 'M. Feldotto and K. Graffi, “Systematic evaluation of peer-to-peer systems
    using PeerfactSim.KOM,” <i>Concurrency and Computation: Practice and Experience</i>,
    vol. 28, no. 5, pp. 1655–1677, 2016.'
  mla: 'Feldotto, Matthias, and Kalman Graffi. “Systematic Evaluation of Peer-to-Peer
    Systems Using PeerfactSim.KOM.” <i>Concurrency and Computation: Practice and Experience</i>,
    vol. 28, no. 5, Wiley Online Library, 2016, pp. 1655–77, doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.1002/cpe.3716">10.1002/cpe.3716</a>.'
  short: 'M. Feldotto, K. Graffi, Concurrency and Computation: Practice and Experience
    28 (2016) 1655–1677.'
date_created: 2017-10-17T12:41:20Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:52:00Z
ddc:
- '040'
department:
- _id: '79'
- _id: '63'
- _id: '541'
doi: 10.1002/cpe.3716
file:
- access_level: closed
  content_type: application/pdf
  creator: florida
  date_created: 2018-03-21T12:57:57Z
  date_updated: 2018-03-21T12:57:57Z
  file_id: '1556'
  file_name: 145-Feldotto_et_al-2016-Concurrency_and_Computation-_Practice_and_Experience.pdf
  file_size: 3121363
  relation: main_file
  success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-03-21T12:57:57Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: '        28'
issue: '5'
page: 1655-1677
project:
- _id: '1'
  name: SFB 901
- _id: '5'
  name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A1
- _id: '2'
  name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
publication: 'Concurrency and Computation: Practice and Experience'
publication_status: published
publisher: Wiley Online Library
status: public
title: Systematic evaluation of peer-to-peer systems using PeerfactSim.KOM
type: journal_article
user_id: '14052'
volume: 28
year: '2016'
...
---
_id: '271'
abstract:
- lang: eng
  text: In \emph{bandwidth allocation games} (BAGs), the strategy of a player consists
    of various demands on different resources. The player's utility is at most the
    sum of these demands, provided they are fully satisfied. Every resource has a
    limited capacity and if it is exceeded by the total demand, it has to be split
    between the players. Since these games generally do not have pure Nash equilibria,
    we consider approximate pure Nash equilibria, in which no player can improve her
    utility by more than some fixed factor $\alpha$ through unilateral strategy changes.
    There is a threshold $\alpha_\delta$ (where $\delta$ is a parameter that limits
    the demand of each player on a specific resource) such that $\alpha$-approximate
    pure Nash equilibria always exist for $\alpha \geq \alpha_\delta$, but not for
    $\alpha < \alpha_\delta$. We give both upper and lower bounds on this threshold
    $\alpha_\delta$ and show that the corresponding decision problem is ${\sf NP}$-hard.
    We also show that the $\alpha$-approximate price of anarchy for BAGs is $\alpha+1$.
    For a restricted version of the game, where demands of players only differ slightly
    from each other (e.g. symmetric games), we show that approximate Nash equilibria
    can be reached (and thus also be computed) in polynomial time using the best-response
    dynamic. Finally, we show that a broader class of utility-maximization games (which
    includes BAGs) converges quickly towards states whose social welfare is close
    to the optimum.
author:
- first_name: Maximilian
  full_name: Drees, Maximilian
  last_name: Drees
- first_name: Matthias
  full_name: Feldotto, Matthias
  id: '14052'
  last_name: Feldotto
  orcid: 0000-0003-1348-6516
- first_name: Sören
  full_name: Riechers, Sören
  last_name: Riechers
- first_name: Alexander
  full_name: Skopalik, Alexander
  id: '40384'
  last_name: Skopalik
citation:
  ama: 'Drees M, Feldotto M, Riechers S, Skopalik A. On Existence and Properties of
    Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Bandwidth Allocation Games. In: <i>Proceedings
    of the 8th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT)</i>. Lecture
    Notes in Computer Science. ; 2015:178-189. doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-48433-3_14">10.1007/978-3-662-48433-3_14</a>'
  apa: Drees, M., Feldotto, M., Riechers, S., &#38; Skopalik, A. (2015). On Existence
    and Properties of Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Bandwidth Allocation Games.
    In <i>Proceedings of the 8th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory
    (SAGT)</i> (pp. 178–189). <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-48433-3_14">https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-48433-3_14</a>
  bibtex: '@inproceedings{Drees_Feldotto_Riechers_Skopalik_2015, series={Lecture Notes
    in Computer Science}, title={On Existence and Properties of Approximate Pure Nash
    Equilibria in Bandwidth Allocation Games}, DOI={<a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-48433-3_14">10.1007/978-3-662-48433-3_14</a>},
    booktitle={Proceedings of the 8th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game
    Theory (SAGT)}, author={Drees, Maximilian and Feldotto, Matthias and Riechers,
    Sören and Skopalik, Alexander}, year={2015}, pages={178–189}, collection={Lecture
    Notes in Computer Science} }'
  chicago: Drees, Maximilian, Matthias Feldotto, Sören Riechers, and Alexander Skopalik.
    “On Existence and Properties of Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Bandwidth
    Allocation Games.” In <i>Proceedings of the 8th International Symposium on Algorithmic
    Game Theory (SAGT)</i>, 178–89. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 2015. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-48433-3_14">https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-48433-3_14</a>.
  ieee: M. Drees, M. Feldotto, S. Riechers, and A. Skopalik, “On Existence and Properties
    of Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Bandwidth Allocation Games,” in <i>Proceedings
    of the 8th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT)</i>, 2015,
    pp. 178–189.
  mla: Drees, Maximilian, et al. “On Existence and Properties of Approximate Pure
    Nash Equilibria in Bandwidth Allocation Games.” <i>Proceedings of the 8th International
    Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT)</i>, 2015, pp. 178–89, doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-48433-3_14">10.1007/978-3-662-48433-3_14</a>.
  short: 'M. Drees, M. Feldotto, S. Riechers, A. Skopalik, in: Proceedings of the
    8th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT), 2015, pp. 178–189.'
date_created: 2017-10-17T12:41:45Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:57:34Z
ddc:
- '040'
department:
- _id: '63'
- _id: '541'
doi: 10.1007/978-3-662-48433-3_14
external_id:
  arxiv:
  - '1507.02908'
file:
- access_level: closed
  content_type: application/pdf
  creator: florida
  date_created: 2018-03-21T09:29:34Z
  date_updated: 2018-03-21T09:29:34Z
  file_id: '1475'
  file_name: 271-chp_3A10.1007_2F978-3-662-48433-3_14.pdf
  file_size: 256718
  relation: main_file
  success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-03-21T09:29:34Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
page: 178-189
project:
- _id: '1'
  name: SFB 901
- _id: '7'
  name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3
- _id: '16'
  name: SFB 901 - Subproject C4
- _id: '2'
  name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
- _id: '4'
  name: SFB 901 - Project Area C
publication: Proceedings of the 8th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory
  (SAGT)
series_title: Lecture Notes in Computer Science
status: public
title: On Existence and Properties of Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Bandwidth
  Allocation Games
type: conference
user_id: '14052'
year: '2015'
...
---
_id: '453'
abstract:
- lang: eng
  text: In this paper we study the potential function in congestion games. We consider
    both games with non-decreasing cost functions as well as games with non-increasing
    utility functions. We show that the value of the potential function $\Phi(\sf
    s)$ of any outcome $\sf s$ of a congestion game approximates the optimum potential
    value $\Phi(\sf s^*)$ by a factor $\Psi_{\mathcal{F}}$ which only depends on the
    set of cost/utility functions $\mathcal{F}$, and an additive term which is bounded
    by the sum of the total possible improvements of the players in the outcome $\sf
    s$. The significance of this result is twofold. On the one hand it provides \emph{Price-of-Anarchy}-like
    results with respect to the potential function. On the other hand, we show that
    these approximations can be used to compute $(1+\varepsilon)\cdot\Psi_{\mathcal{F}}$-approximate
    pure Nash equilibria for congestion games with non-decreasing cost functions.
    For the special case of polynomial cost functions, this significantly improves
    the guarantees from Caragiannis et al. [FOCS 2011]. Moreover, our machinery provides
    the first guarantees for general latency functions.
author:
- first_name: Matthias
  full_name: Feldotto, Matthias
  id: '14052'
  last_name: Feldotto
  orcid: 0000-0003-1348-6516
- first_name: Martin
  full_name: Gairing, Martin
  last_name: Gairing
- first_name: Alexander
  full_name: Skopalik, Alexander
  id: '40384'
  last_name: Skopalik
citation:
  ama: 'Feldotto M, Gairing M, Skopalik A. Bounding the Potential Function in Congestion
    Games and Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria. In: <i>Proceedings of the 10th International
    Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE)</i>. LNCS. ; 2014:30-43. doi:<a
    href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_3">10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_3</a>'
  apa: Feldotto, M., Gairing, M., &#38; Skopalik, A. (2014). Bounding the Potential
    Function in Congestion Games and Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria. In <i>Proceedings
    of the 10th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE)</i>
    (pp. 30–43). <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_3">https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_3</a>
  bibtex: '@inproceedings{Feldotto_Gairing_Skopalik_2014, series={LNCS}, title={Bounding
    the Potential Function in Congestion Games and Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria},
    DOI={<a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_3">10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_3</a>},
    booktitle={Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Web and Internet
    Economics (WINE)}, author={Feldotto, Matthias and Gairing, Martin and Skopalik,
    Alexander}, year={2014}, pages={30–43}, collection={LNCS} }'
  chicago: Feldotto, Matthias, Martin Gairing, and Alexander Skopalik. “Bounding the
    Potential Function in Congestion Games and Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria.”
    In <i>Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics
    (WINE)</i>, 30–43. LNCS, 2014. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_3">https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_3</a>.
  ieee: M. Feldotto, M. Gairing, and A. Skopalik, “Bounding the Potential Function
    in Congestion Games and Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria,” in <i>Proceedings of
    the 10th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE)</i>, 2014,
    pp. 30–43.
  mla: Feldotto, Matthias, et al. “Bounding the Potential Function in Congestion Games
    and Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria.” <i>Proceedings of the 10th International
    Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE)</i>, 2014, pp. 30–43, doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_3">10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_3</a>.
  short: 'M. Feldotto, M. Gairing, A. Skopalik, in: Proceedings of the 10th International
    Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE), 2014, pp. 30–43.'
date_created: 2017-10-17T12:42:20Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:01:09Z
ddc:
- '040'
department:
- _id: '63'
- _id: '541'
doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_3
file:
- access_level: closed
  content_type: application/pdf
  creator: florida
  date_created: 2018-03-16T11:24:11Z
  date_updated: 2018-03-16T11:24:11Z
  file_id: '1342'
  file_name: 453-WINE14FGS.pdf
  file_size: 324307
  relation: main_file
  success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-03-16T11:24:11Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
page: 30-43
project:
- _id: '1'
  name: SFB 901
- _id: '2'
  name: SFB 901 - Teilprojekt A
- _id: '7'
  name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3
publication: Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Web and Internet
  Economics (WINE)
series_title: LNCS
status: public
title: Bounding the Potential Function in Congestion Games and Approximate Pure Nash
  Equilibria
type: conference
user_id: '14052'
year: '2014'
...
---
_id: '462'
abstract:
- lang: eng
  text: We discuss a technique to analyze complex infinitely repeated games using
    techniques from the fields of game theory and simulations. Our research is motivated
    by the analysis of electronic markets with thousands of participants and possibly
    complex strategic behavior. We consider an example of a global market of composed
    IT services to demonstrate the use of our simulation technique. We present our
    current work in this area and we want to discuss further approaches for the future.
author:
- first_name: Matthias
  full_name: Feldotto, Matthias
  id: '14052'
  last_name: Feldotto
  orcid: 0000-0003-1348-6516
- first_name: Alexander
  full_name: Skopalik, Alexander
  id: '40384'
  last_name: Skopalik
citation:
  ama: 'Feldotto M, Skopalik A. A Simulation Framework for Analyzing Complex Infinitely
    Repeated Games. In: <i>Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on Simulation
    and Modeling Methodologies, Technologies and Applications (SIMULTECH 2014)</i>.
    ; 2014:625-630. doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.5220/0005110406250630">10.5220/0005110406250630</a>'
  apa: Feldotto, M., &#38; Skopalik, A. (2014). A Simulation Framework for Analyzing
    Complex Infinitely Repeated Games. In <i>Proceedings of the 4th International
    Conference on Simulation and Modeling Methodologies, Technologies and Applications
    (SIMULTECH 2014)</i> (pp. 625–630). <a href="https://doi.org/10.5220/0005110406250630">https://doi.org/10.5220/0005110406250630</a>
  bibtex: '@inproceedings{Feldotto_Skopalik_2014, title={A Simulation Framework for
    Analyzing Complex Infinitely Repeated Games}, DOI={<a href="https://doi.org/10.5220/0005110406250630">10.5220/0005110406250630</a>},
    booktitle={Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on Simulation and Modeling
    Methodologies, Technologies and Applications (SIMULTECH 2014)}, author={Feldotto,
    Matthias and Skopalik, Alexander}, year={2014}, pages={625–630} }'
  chicago: Feldotto, Matthias, and Alexander Skopalik. “A Simulation Framework for
    Analyzing Complex Infinitely Repeated Games.” In <i>Proceedings of the 4th International
    Conference on Simulation and Modeling Methodologies, Technologies and Applications
    (SIMULTECH 2014)</i>, 625–30, 2014. <a href="https://doi.org/10.5220/0005110406250630">https://doi.org/10.5220/0005110406250630</a>.
  ieee: M. Feldotto and A. Skopalik, “A Simulation Framework for Analyzing Complex
    Infinitely Repeated Games,” in <i>Proceedings of the 4th International Conference
    on Simulation and Modeling Methodologies, Technologies and Applications (SIMULTECH
    2014)</i>, 2014, pp. 625–630.
  mla: Feldotto, Matthias, and Alexander Skopalik. “A Simulation Framework for Analyzing
    Complex Infinitely Repeated Games.” <i>Proceedings of the 4th International Conference
    on Simulation and Modeling Methodologies, Technologies and Applications (SIMULTECH
    2014)</i>, 2014, pp. 625–30, doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.5220/0005110406250630">10.5220/0005110406250630</a>.
  short: 'M. Feldotto, A. Skopalik, in: Proceedings of the 4th International Conference
    on Simulation and Modeling Methodologies, Technologies and Applications (SIMULTECH
    2014), 2014, pp. 625–630.'
date_created: 2017-10-17T12:42:22Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:01:15Z
ddc:
- '040'
department:
- _id: '63'
- _id: '541'
doi: 10.5220/0005110406250630
file:
- access_level: closed
  content_type: application/pdf
  creator: florida
  date_created: 2018-03-16T11:21:24Z
  date_updated: 2018-03-16T11:21:24Z
  file_id: '1337'
  file_name: 462-FS2014SIMULTECH.pdf
  file_size: 993721
  relation: main_file
  success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-03-16T11:21:24Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
page: 625-630
project:
- _id: '1'
  name: SFB 901
- _id: '2'
  name: SFB 901 - Teilprojekt A
- _id: '7'
  name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3
publication: Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on Simulation and Modeling
  Methodologies, Technologies and Applications (SIMULTECH 2014)
status: public
title: A Simulation Framework for Analyzing Complex Infinitely Repeated Games
type: conference
user_id: '14052'
year: '2014'
...
---
_id: '412'
abstract:
- lang: eng
  text: In this paper we present and analyze HSkip+, a self-stabilizing overlay network
    for nodes with arbitrary heterogeneous bandwidths. HSkip+ has the same topology
    as the Skip+ graph proposed by Jacob et al. [PODC 2009] but its self-stabilization
    mechanism significantly outperforms the self-stabilization mechanism proposed
    for Skip+. Also, the nodes are now ordered according to their bandwidths and not
    according to their identifiers. Various other solutions have already been proposed
    for overlay networks with heterogeneous bandwidths, but they are not self-stabilizing.
    In addition to HSkip+ being self-stabilizing, its performance is on par with the
    best previous bounds on the time and work for joining or leaving a network of
    peers of logarithmic diameter and degree and arbitrary bandwidths. Also, the dilation
    and congestion for routing messages is on par with the best previous bounds for
    such networks, so that HSkip+ combines the advantages of both worlds. Our theoretical
    investigations are backed by simulations demonstrating that HSkip+ is indeed performing
    much better than Skip+ and working correctly under high churn rates.
author:
- first_name: Matthias
  full_name: Feldotto, Matthias
  id: '14052'
  last_name: Feldotto
  orcid: 0000-0003-1348-6516
- first_name: Christian
  full_name: Scheideler, Christian
  id: '20792'
  last_name: Scheideler
- first_name: Kalman
  full_name: Graffi, Kalman
  last_name: Graffi
citation:
  ama: 'Feldotto M, Scheideler C, Graffi K. HSkip+: A Self-Stabilizing Overlay Network
    for Nodes with Heterogeneous Bandwidths. In: <i>Proceedings of the 14th IEEE International
    Conference on Peer-to-Peer Computing (P2P)</i>. ; 2014:1-10. doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.1109/P2P.2014.6934300">10.1109/P2P.2014.6934300</a>'
  apa: 'Feldotto, M., Scheideler, C., &#38; Graffi, K. (2014). HSkip+: A Self-Stabilizing
    Overlay Network for Nodes with Heterogeneous Bandwidths. In <i>Proceedings of
    the 14th IEEE International Conference on Peer-to-Peer Computing (P2P)</i> (pp.
    1–10). <a href="https://doi.org/10.1109/P2P.2014.6934300">https://doi.org/10.1109/P2P.2014.6934300</a>'
  bibtex: '@inproceedings{Feldotto_Scheideler_Graffi_2014, title={HSkip+: A Self-Stabilizing
    Overlay Network for Nodes with Heterogeneous Bandwidths}, DOI={<a href="https://doi.org/10.1109/P2P.2014.6934300">10.1109/P2P.2014.6934300</a>},
    booktitle={Proceedings of the 14th IEEE International Conference on Peer-to-Peer
    Computing (P2P)}, author={Feldotto, Matthias and Scheideler, Christian and Graffi,
    Kalman}, year={2014}, pages={1–10} }'
  chicago: 'Feldotto, Matthias, Christian Scheideler, and Kalman Graffi. “HSkip+:
    A Self-Stabilizing Overlay Network for Nodes with Heterogeneous Bandwidths.” In
    <i>Proceedings of the 14th IEEE International Conference on Peer-to-Peer Computing
    (P2P)</i>, 1–10, 2014. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1109/P2P.2014.6934300">https://doi.org/10.1109/P2P.2014.6934300</a>.'
  ieee: 'M. Feldotto, C. Scheideler, and K. Graffi, “HSkip+: A Self-Stabilizing Overlay
    Network for Nodes with Heterogeneous Bandwidths,” in <i>Proceedings of the 14th
    IEEE International Conference on Peer-to-Peer Computing (P2P)</i>, 2014, pp. 1–10.'
  mla: 'Feldotto, Matthias, et al. “HSkip+: A Self-Stabilizing Overlay Network for
    Nodes with Heterogeneous Bandwidths.” <i>Proceedings of the 14th IEEE International
    Conference on Peer-to-Peer Computing (P2P)</i>, 2014, pp. 1–10, doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.1109/P2P.2014.6934300">10.1109/P2P.2014.6934300</a>.'
  short: 'M. Feldotto, C. Scheideler, K. Graffi, in: Proceedings of the 14th IEEE
    International Conference on Peer-to-Peer Computing (P2P), 2014, pp. 1–10.'
date_created: 2017-10-17T12:42:12Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:00:20Z
ddc:
- '040'
department:
- _id: '79'
- _id: '63'
- _id: '541'
doi: 10.1109/P2P.2014.6934300
external_id:
  arxiv:
  - '1408.0395'
file:
- access_level: closed
  content_type: application/pdf
  creator: florida
  date_created: 2018-03-16T11:34:00Z
  date_updated: 2018-03-16T11:34:00Z
  file_id: '1361'
  file_name: 412-FSG2014P2P.pdf
  file_size: 472321
  relation: main_file
  success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-03-16T11:34:00Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
page: 1-10
project:
- _id: '1'
  name: SFB 901
- _id: '2'
  name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
- _id: '5'
  name: SFB 901 - Subproject A1
publication: Proceedings of the 14th IEEE International Conference on Peer-to-Peer
  Computing (P2P)
status: public
title: 'HSkip+: A Self-Stabilizing Overlay Network for Nodes with Heterogeneous Bandwidths'
type: conference
user_id: '14052'
year: '2014'
...
---
_id: '522'
author:
- first_name: Matthias
  full_name: Feldotto, Matthias
  id: '14052'
  last_name: Feldotto
  orcid: 0000-0003-1348-6516
citation:
  ama: 'Feldotto M. <i>HSkip+: A Self-Stabilizing Overlay Network for Nodes with Heterogeneous
    Bandwidths</i>. Universität Paderborn; 2013.'
  apa: 'Feldotto, M. (2013). <i>HSkip+: A Self-Stabilizing Overlay Network for Nodes
    with Heterogeneous Bandwidths</i>. Universität Paderborn.'
  bibtex: '@book{Feldotto_2013, title={HSkip+: A Self-Stabilizing Overlay Network
    for Nodes with Heterogeneous Bandwidths}, publisher={Universität Paderborn}, author={Feldotto,
    Matthias}, year={2013} }'
  chicago: 'Feldotto, Matthias. <i>HSkip+: A Self-Stabilizing Overlay Network for
    Nodes with Heterogeneous Bandwidths</i>. Universität Paderborn, 2013.'
  ieee: 'M. Feldotto, <i>HSkip+: A Self-Stabilizing Overlay Network for Nodes with
    Heterogeneous Bandwidths</i>. Universität Paderborn, 2013.'
  mla: 'Feldotto, Matthias. <i>HSkip+: A Self-Stabilizing Overlay Network for Nodes
    with Heterogeneous Bandwidths</i>. Universität Paderborn, 2013.'
  short: 'M. Feldotto, HSkip+: A Self-Stabilizing Overlay Network for Nodes with Heterogeneous
    Bandwidths, Universität Paderborn, 2013.'
date_created: 2017-10-17T12:42:34Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:01:47Z
department:
- _id: '79'
project:
- _id: '1'
  name: SFB 901
- _id: '2'
  name: SFB 901 - Teilprojekt A
- _id: '5'
  name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A1
publisher: Universität Paderborn
status: public
supervisor:
- first_name: Christian
  full_name: Scheideler, Christian
  id: '20792'
  last_name: Scheideler
title: 'HSkip+: A Self-Stabilizing Overlay Network for Nodes with Heterogeneous Bandwidths'
type: mastersthesis
user_id: '14052'
year: '2013'
...
---
_id: '544'
abstract:
- lang: eng
  text: Comparative evaluations of peer-to-peer protocols through simulations are
    a viable approach to judge the performance and costs of the individual protocols
    in large-scale networks. In order to support this work, we enhanced the peer-to-peer
    systems simulator PeerfactSim.KOM with a fine-grained analyzer concept, with exhaustive
    automated measurements and gnuplot generators as well as a coordination control
    to evaluate a set of experiment setups in parallel. Thus, by configuring all experiments
    and protocols only once and starting the simulator, all desired measurements are
    performed, analyzed, evaluated and combined, resulting in a holistic environment
    for the comparative evaluation of peer-to-peer systems.
author:
- first_name: Matthias
  full_name: Feldotto, Matthias
  id: '14052'
  last_name: Feldotto
  orcid: 0000-0003-1348-6516
- first_name: Kalman
  full_name: Graffi, Kalman
  last_name: Graffi
citation:
  ama: 'Feldotto M, Graffi K. Comparative Evaluation of Peer-to-Peer Systems Using
    PeerfactSim.KOM. In: <i>Proceedings of the International Conference on High Performance
    Computing and Simulation (HPCS’13)</i>. ; 2013:99-106. doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.1109/HPCSim.2013.6641399">10.1109/HPCSim.2013.6641399</a>'
  apa: Feldotto, M., &#38; Graffi, K. (2013). Comparative Evaluation of Peer-to-Peer
    Systems Using PeerfactSim.KOM. In <i>Proceedings of the International Conference
    on High Performance Computing and Simulation (HPCS’13)</i> (pp. 99–106). <a href="https://doi.org/10.1109/HPCSim.2013.6641399">https://doi.org/10.1109/HPCSim.2013.6641399</a>
  bibtex: '@inproceedings{Feldotto_Graffi_2013, title={Comparative Evaluation of Peer-to-Peer
    Systems Using PeerfactSim.KOM}, DOI={<a href="https://doi.org/10.1109/HPCSim.2013.6641399">10.1109/HPCSim.2013.6641399</a>},
    booktitle={Proceedings of the International Conference on High Performance Computing
    and Simulation (HPCS’13)}, author={Feldotto, Matthias and Graffi, Kalman}, year={2013},
    pages={99–106} }'
  chicago: Feldotto, Matthias, and Kalman Graffi. “Comparative Evaluation of Peer-to-Peer
    Systems Using PeerfactSim.KOM.” In <i>Proceedings of the International Conference
    on High Performance Computing and Simulation (HPCS’13)</i>, 99–106, 2013. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1109/HPCSim.2013.6641399">https://doi.org/10.1109/HPCSim.2013.6641399</a>.
  ieee: M. Feldotto and K. Graffi, “Comparative Evaluation of Peer-to-Peer Systems
    Using PeerfactSim.KOM,” in <i>Proceedings of the International Conference on High
    Performance Computing and Simulation (HPCS’13)</i>, 2013, pp. 99–106.
  mla: Feldotto, Matthias, and Kalman Graffi. “Comparative Evaluation of Peer-to-Peer
    Systems Using PeerfactSim.KOM.” <i>Proceedings of the International Conference
    on High Performance Computing and Simulation (HPCS’13)</i>, 2013, pp. 99–106,
    doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.1109/HPCSim.2013.6641399">10.1109/HPCSim.2013.6641399</a>.
  short: 'M. Feldotto, K. Graffi, in: Proceedings of the International Conference
    on High Performance Computing and Simulation (HPCS’13), 2013, pp. 99–106.'
date_created: 2017-10-17T12:42:38Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:01:53Z
ddc:
- '040'
department:
- _id: '79'
doi: 10.1109/HPCSim.2013.6641399
file:
- access_level: closed
  content_type: application/pdf
  creator: florida
  date_created: 2018-03-15T10:32:17Z
  date_updated: 2018-03-15T10:32:17Z
  file_id: '1288'
  file_name: 544-FeldGraffi13.pdf
  file_size: 899441
  relation: main_file
  success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-03-15T10:32:17Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
language:
- iso: eng
page: 99-106
project:
- _id: '1'
  name: SFB 901
- _id: '5'
  name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A1
- _id: '2'
  name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
publication: Proceedings of the International Conference on High Performance Computing
  and Simulation (HPCS'13)
status: public
title: Comparative Evaluation of Peer-to-Peer Systems Using PeerfactSim.KOM
type: conference
user_id: '14052'
year: '2013'
...
---
_id: '1093'
abstract:
- lang: eng
  text: Whenever huge amounts of XML data have to be transferred from a web server
    to multiple clients, the transferred data volumes can be reduced significantly
    by sending compressed XML instead of plain XML. Whenever applications require
    querying a compressed XML format and XML compression or decompression time is
    a bottleneck, parallel XML compression and parallel decompression may be of significant
    advantage. We choose the XML compressor XSDS as starting point for our new approach
    to parallel compression and parallel decompression of XML documents for the following
    reasons. First, XSDS generally reaches stronger compression ratios than other
    compressors like gzip, bzip2, and XMill. Second, in contrast to these compressors,
    XSDS not only supports XPath queries on compressed XML data, but also XPath queries
    can be evaluated on XSDS compressed data even faster than on uncompressed XML.
    We propose a String-search-based parsing approach to parallelize XML compression
    with XSDS, and we show that we can speed-up the compression of XML documents by
    a factor of 1.4 and that we can speed-up the decompression time even by a factor
    of up to 7 on a quad-core processor.
author:
- first_name: Stefan
  full_name: Böttcher, Stefan
  id: '624'
  last_name: Böttcher
- first_name: Matthias
  full_name: Feldotto, Matthias
  id: '14052'
  last_name: Feldotto
  orcid: 0000-0003-1348-6516
- first_name: Rita
  full_name: Hartel, Rita
  id: '14961'
  last_name: Hartel
citation:
  ama: 'Böttcher S, Feldotto M, Hartel R. Schema-based Parallel Compression and Decompression
    of XML Data. In: <i>WEBIST 2013 - Proceedings of the 9th International Conference
    on Web Information Systems and Technologies, Aachen, Germany, 8-10 May, 2013</i>.
    ; 2013:77-86. doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.5220/0004366300770086">10.5220/0004366300770086</a>'
  apa: Böttcher, S., Feldotto, M., &#38; Hartel, R. (2013). Schema-based Parallel
    Compression and Decompression of XML Data. In <i>WEBIST 2013 - Proceedings of
    the 9th International Conference on Web Information Systems and Technologies,
    Aachen, Germany, 8-10 May, 2013</i> (pp. 77–86). <a href="https://doi.org/10.5220/0004366300770086">https://doi.org/10.5220/0004366300770086</a>
  bibtex: '@inproceedings{Böttcher_Feldotto_Hartel_2013, title={Schema-based Parallel
    Compression and Decompression of XML Data}, DOI={<a href="https://doi.org/10.5220/0004366300770086">10.5220/0004366300770086</a>},
    booktitle={WEBIST 2013 - Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Web
    Information Systems and Technologies, Aachen, Germany, 8-10 May, 2013}, author={Böttcher,
    Stefan and Feldotto, Matthias and Hartel, Rita}, year={2013}, pages={77–86} }'
  chicago: Böttcher, Stefan, Matthias Feldotto, and Rita Hartel. “Schema-Based Parallel
    Compression and Decompression of XML Data.” In <i>WEBIST 2013 - Proceedings of
    the 9th International Conference on Web Information Systems and Technologies,
    Aachen, Germany, 8-10 May, 2013</i>, 77–86, 2013. <a href="https://doi.org/10.5220/0004366300770086">https://doi.org/10.5220/0004366300770086</a>.
  ieee: S. Böttcher, M. Feldotto, and R. Hartel, “Schema-based Parallel Compression
    and Decompression of XML Data,” in <i>WEBIST 2013 - Proceedings of the 9th International
    Conference on Web Information Systems and Technologies, Aachen, Germany, 8-10
    May, 2013</i>, 2013, pp. 77–86.
  mla: Böttcher, Stefan, et al. “Schema-Based Parallel Compression and Decompression
    of XML Data.” <i>WEBIST 2013 - Proceedings of the 9th International Conference
    on Web Information Systems and Technologies, Aachen, Germany, 8-10 May, 2013</i>,
    2013, pp. 77–86, doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.5220/0004366300770086">10.5220/0004366300770086</a>.
  short: 'S. Böttcher, M. Feldotto, R. Hartel, in: WEBIST 2013 - Proceedings of the
    9th International Conference on Web Information Systems and Technologies, Aachen,
    Germany, 8-10 May, 2013, 2013, pp. 77–86.'
date_created: 2018-01-05T08:35:39Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:50:53Z
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page: 77-86
publication: WEBIST 2013 - Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Web
  Information Systems and Technologies, Aachen, Germany, 8-10 May, 2013
status: public
title: Schema-based Parallel Compression and Decompression of XML Data
type: conference
user_id: '14052'
year: '2013'
...
