---
_id: '63731'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: The Banzhaf power index can be used to quantify the explanatory power of single
conditions in a configurational analysis that aims at identifying whether combinations
of conditions are sufficient for an outcome. The latter method is an integral
part of the Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) approach. It is widely used
in the literature, e.g., in the field of International Management. Haake and Schneider
(2023) give a rigorous description of the connection between the empirical and
game theoretic modeling. To justify that the Banzhaf index is an appropriate tool
to measure the influence of a condition, this paper discusses a novel axiomatization
of the Banzhaf index that uses axioms that are directly linked to the QCA methodology.
As a side result, we demonstrate that in our model the Banzhaf index can be reinterpreted
as an average of Shapley-Shubik indices.
author:
- first_name: Claus-Jochen
full_name: Haake, Claus-Jochen
id: '20801'
last_name: Haake
- first_name: Martin
full_name: Schneider, Martin
id: '471'
last_name: Schneider
orcid: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6961-3716
citation:
ama: Haake C-J, Schneider M. An Axiomatization of the Banzhaf Index to Measure Influence
in Qualitative Comparative Analysis. International Journal of Game Theory.
2026;55. doi:10.1007/s00182-026-00978-2
apa: Haake, C.-J., & Schneider, M. (2026). An Axiomatization of the Banzhaf
Index to Measure Influence in Qualitative Comparative Analysis. International
Journal of Game Theory, 55. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-026-00978-2
bibtex: '@article{Haake_Schneider_2026, title={An Axiomatization of the Banzhaf
Index to Measure Influence in Qualitative Comparative Analysis}, volume={55},
DOI={10.1007/s00182-026-00978-2},
journal={International Journal of Game Theory}, publisher={Springer}, author={Haake,
Claus-Jochen and Schneider, Martin}, year={2026} }'
chicago: Haake, Claus-Jochen, and Martin Schneider. “An Axiomatization of the Banzhaf
Index to Measure Influence in Qualitative Comparative Analysis.” International
Journal of Game Theory 55 (2026). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-026-00978-2.
ieee: 'C.-J. Haake and M. Schneider, “An Axiomatization of the Banzhaf Index to
Measure Influence in Qualitative Comparative Analysis,” International Journal
of Game Theory, vol. 55, 2026, doi: 10.1007/s00182-026-00978-2.'
mla: Haake, Claus-Jochen, and Martin Schneider. “An Axiomatization of the Banzhaf
Index to Measure Influence in Qualitative Comparative Analysis.” International
Journal of Game Theory, vol. 55, Springer, 2026, doi:10.1007/s00182-026-00978-2.
short: C.-J. Haake, M. Schneider, International Journal of Game Theory 55 (2026).
date_created: 2026-01-26T12:30:50Z
date_updated: 2026-01-26T12:42:04Z
department:
- _id: '205'
- _id: '475'
- _id: '185'
doi: 10.1007/s00182-026-00978-2
intvolume: ' 55'
keyword:
- Banzhaf index
- axiomatization
- QCA
- explanatory power
language:
- iso: eng
main_file_link:
- open_access: '1'
url: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s00182-026-00978-2#citeas
oa: '1'
publication: International Journal of Game Theory
publisher: Springer
quality_controlled: '1'
status: public
title: An Axiomatization of the Banzhaf Index to Measure Influence in Qualitative
Comparative Analysis
type: journal_article
user_id: '20801'
volume: 55
year: '2026'
...
---
_id: '65066'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: "Abstract\r\n We investigate
whether the recently approved reforms of the apportionment of parliamentary seats
to parties in the German Bundestag affects the parties’ political influence measured
by power indices. We find that under neither reform the underlying simple game,
which describes the possibilities to form governments, remains unchanged and as
a result the Shapley-Shubik and the Banzhaf index are unaltered. As a consequence,
the major change resulting from the reforms is the reduction of the Bundestag’s
size to 630 seats."
article_type: original
author:
- first_name: Papatya
full_name: Duman, Papatya
last_name: Duman
- first_name: Claus-Jochen
full_name: Haake, Claus-Jochen
id: '20801'
last_name: Haake
citation:
ama: 'Duman P, Haake C-J. A Note on the Size Reduction Reform in the German Parliament:
A Game Theoretic Analysis of Power Indices. Review of Economics. 2026;76(3):241-270.
doi:10.1515/roe-2024-0048'
apa: 'Duman, P., & Haake, C.-J. (2026). A Note on the Size Reduction Reform
in the German Parliament: A Game Theoretic Analysis of Power Indices. Review
of Economics, 76(3), 241–270. https://doi.org/10.1515/roe-2024-0048'
bibtex: '@article{Duman_Haake_2026, title={A Note on the Size Reduction Reform in
the German Parliament: A Game Theoretic Analysis of Power Indices}, volume={76},
DOI={10.1515/roe-2024-0048},
number={3}, journal={Review of Economics}, publisher={Walter de Gruyter GmbH},
author={Duman, Papatya and Haake, Claus-Jochen}, year={2026}, pages={241–270}
}'
chicago: 'Duman, Papatya, and Claus-Jochen Haake. “A Note on the Size Reduction
Reform in the German Parliament: A Game Theoretic Analysis of Power Indices.”
Review of Economics 76, no. 3 (2026): 241–70. https://doi.org/10.1515/roe-2024-0048.'
ieee: 'P. Duman and C.-J. Haake, “A Note on the Size Reduction Reform in the German
Parliament: A Game Theoretic Analysis of Power Indices,” Review of Economics,
vol. 76, no. 3, pp. 241–270, 2026, doi: 10.1515/roe-2024-0048.'
mla: 'Duman, Papatya, and Claus-Jochen Haake. “A Note on the Size Reduction Reform
in the German Parliament: A Game Theoretic Analysis of Power Indices.” Review
of Economics, vol. 76, no. 3, Walter de Gruyter GmbH, 2026, pp. 241–70, doi:10.1515/roe-2024-0048.'
short: P. Duman, C.-J. Haake, Review of Economics 76 (2026) 241–270.
date_created: 2026-03-19T13:51:12Z
date_updated: 2026-03-19T13:56:59Z
department:
- _id: '205'
- _id: '475'
- _id: '200'
doi: 10.1515/roe-2024-0048
intvolume: ' 76'
issue: '3'
jel:
- D72
- C71
keyword:
- Bundestag reform
- Banzhaf power index
- Shapley-Shubik power index
language:
- iso: eng
main_file_link:
- open_access: '1'
url: https://www.degruyterbrill.com/document/doi/10.1515/roe-2024-0048/html
oa: '1'
page: 241-270
publication: Review of Economics
publication_identifier:
issn:
- 0948-5139
- 2366-035X
publication_status: published
publisher: Walter de Gruyter GmbH
quality_controlled: '1'
status: public
title: 'A Note on the Size Reduction Reform in the German Parliament: A Game Theoretic
Analysis of Power Indices'
type: journal_article
user_id: '20801'
volume: 76
year: '2026'
...
---
_id: '34114'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: "Qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) enables researchers in international
management to better understand how the impact of a single explanatory factor
depends on the context of other factors. But the analytical toolbox of QCA does
not include a parameter for the explanatory power of a single explanatory factor
or “condition”. In this paper, we therefore reinterpret the Banzhaf power index,
originally developed in cooperative game theory, to establish a goodness-of-fit
parameter in QCA. The relative Banzhaf index we suggest measures the explanatory
power of one condition averaged across all sufficient combinations of conditions.
The paper argues that the index is especially informative in three situations
that are all salient in international management and call for a context-sensitive
analysis of single conditions, namely substantial limited diversity in the data,
the emergence of strong INUS conditions in the analysis, and theorizing with contingency
factors. The paper derives the properties of the relative Banzhaf index in QCA,
demonstrates how the index can be computed easily from a rudimentary truth table,
and explores its insights by revisiting selected papers in international management
that apply fuzzy-set QCA. It finally suggests a three-step procedure for utilizing
the relative Banzhaf index when the causal structure involves both contingency
effects and configurational causation.\r\n"
article_type: original
author:
- first_name: Claus-Jochen
full_name: Haake, Claus-Jochen
id: '20801'
last_name: Haake
- first_name: Martin
full_name: Schneider, Martin
id: '471'
last_name: Schneider
orcid: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6961-3716
citation:
ama: 'Haake C-J, Schneider M. Playing games with QCA: Measuring the explanatory
power of single conditions with the Banzhaf index. Journal of International
Management. 2024;30(2).'
apa: 'Haake, C.-J., & Schneider, M. (2024). Playing games with QCA: Measuring
the explanatory power of single conditions with the Banzhaf index. Journal
of International Management, 30(2).'
bibtex: '@article{Haake_Schneider_2024, title={Playing games with QCA: Measuring
the explanatory power of single conditions with the Banzhaf index}, volume={30},
number={2}, journal={Journal of International Management}, publisher={Elsevier},
author={Haake, Claus-Jochen and Schneider, Martin}, year={2024} }'
chicago: 'Haake, Claus-Jochen, and Martin Schneider. “Playing Games with QCA: Measuring
the Explanatory Power of Single Conditions with the Banzhaf Index.” Journal
of International Management 30, no. 2 (2024).'
ieee: 'C.-J. Haake and M. Schneider, “Playing games with QCA: Measuring the explanatory
power of single conditions with the Banzhaf index,” Journal of International
Management, vol. 30, no. 2, 2024.'
mla: 'Haake, Claus-Jochen, and Martin Schneider. “Playing Games with QCA: Measuring
the Explanatory Power of Single Conditions with the Banzhaf Index.” Journal
of International Management, vol. 30, no. 2, Elsevier, 2024.'
short: C.-J. Haake, M. Schneider, Journal of International Management 30 (2024).
date_created: 2022-11-19T15:33:27Z
date_updated: 2024-04-24T12:58:51Z
department:
- _id: '205'
- _id: '475'
- _id: '178'
- _id: '185'
funded_apc: '1'
intvolume: ' 30'
issue: '2'
keyword:
- Qualitative comparative analysis
- Banzhaf power index
- causality
- explanatory power
language:
- iso: eng
project:
- _id: '1'
grant_number: '160364472'
name: 'SFB 901: SFB 901'
- _id: '2'
name: 'SFB 901 - A: SFB 901 - Project Area A'
- _id: '7'
grant_number: '160364472'
name: 'SFB 901 - A3: SFB 901 - Subproject A3'
publication: Journal of International Management
publication_status: published
publisher: Elsevier
quality_controlled: '1'
status: public
title: 'Playing games with QCA: Measuring the explanatory power of single conditions
with the Banzhaf index'
type: journal_article
user_id: '20801'
volume: 30
year: '2024'
...
---
_id: '45863'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: "In the proposal for our CRC in 2011, we formulated a vision of markets for\r\nIT
services that describes an approach to the provision of such services\r\nthat
was novel at that time and, to a large extent, remains so today:\r\n„Our vision
of on-the-fly computing is that of IT services individually and\r\nautomatically
configured and brought to execution from flexibly combinable\r\nservices traded
on markets. At the same time, we aim at organizing\r\nmarkets whose participants
maintain a lively market of services through\r\nappropriate entrepreneurial actions.“\r\nOver
the last 12 years, we have developed methods and techniques to\r\naddress problems
critical to the convenient, efficient, and secure use of\r\non-the-fly computing.
Among other things, we have made the description\r\nof services more convenient
by allowing natural language input,\r\nincreased the quality of configured services
through (natural language)\r\ninteraction and more efficient configuration processes
and analysis\r\nprocedures, made the quality of (the products of) providers in
the\r\nmarketplace transparent through reputation systems, and increased the\r\nresource
efficiency of execution through reconfigurable heterogeneous\r\ncomputing nodes
and an integrated treatment of service description and\r\nconfiguration. We have
also developed network infrastructures that have\r\na high degree of adaptivity,
scalability, efficiency, and reliability, and\r\nprovide cryptographic guarantees
of anonymity and security for market\r\nparticipants and their products and services.\r\nTo
demonstrate the pervasiveness of the OTF computing approach, we\r\nhave implemented
a proof-of-concept for OTF computing that can run\r\ntypical scenarios of an OTF
market. We illustrated the approach using\r\na cutting-edge application scenario
– automated machine learning (AutoML).\r\nFinally, we have been pushing our work
for the perpetuation of\r\nOn-The-Fly Computing beyond the SFB and sharing the
expertise gained\r\nin the SFB in events with industry partners as well as transfer
projects.\r\nThis work required a broad spectrum of expertise. Computer scientists\r\nand
economists with research interests such as computer networks and\r\ndistributed
algorithms, security and cryptography, software engineering\r\nand verification,
configuration and machine learning, computer engineering\r\nand HPC, microeconomics
and game theory, business informatics\r\nand management have successfully collaborated
here."
alternative_title:
- Collaborative Research Centre 901 (2011 – 2023)
author:
- first_name: Claus-Jochen
full_name: Haake, Claus-Jochen
id: '20801'
last_name: Haake
- first_name: Friedhelm
full_name: Meyer auf der Heide, Friedhelm
id: '15523'
last_name: Meyer auf der Heide
- first_name: Marco
full_name: Platzner, Marco
id: '398'
last_name: Platzner
- first_name: Henning
full_name: Wachsmuth, Henning
id: '3900'
last_name: Wachsmuth
- first_name: Heike
full_name: Wehrheim, Heike
id: '573'
last_name: Wehrheim
citation:
ama: Haake C-J, Meyer auf der Heide F, Platzner M, Wachsmuth H, Wehrheim H. On-The-Fly
Computing -- Individualized IT-Services in Dynamic Markets. Vol 412. Heinz
Nixdorf Institut, Universität Paderborn; 2023. doi:10.17619/UNIPB/1-1797
apa: Haake, C.-J., Meyer auf der Heide, F., Platzner, M., Wachsmuth, H., & Wehrheim,
H. (2023). On-The-Fly Computing -- Individualized IT-services in dynamic markets
(Vol. 412). Heinz Nixdorf Institut, Universität Paderborn. https://doi.org/10.17619/UNIPB/1-1797
bibtex: '@book{Haake_Meyer auf der Heide_Platzner_Wachsmuth_Wehrheim_2023, place={Paderborn},
series={Verlagsschriftenreihe des Heinz Nixdorf Instituts}, title={On-The-Fly
Computing -- Individualized IT-services in dynamic markets}, volume={412}, DOI={10.17619/UNIPB/1-1797}, publisher={Heinz
Nixdorf Institut, Universität Paderborn}, author={Haake, Claus-Jochen and Meyer
auf der Heide, Friedhelm and Platzner, Marco and Wachsmuth, Henning and Wehrheim,
Heike}, year={2023}, collection={Verlagsschriftenreihe des Heinz Nixdorf Instituts}
}'
chicago: 'Haake, Claus-Jochen, Friedhelm Meyer auf der Heide, Marco Platzner, Henning
Wachsmuth, and Heike Wehrheim. On-The-Fly Computing -- Individualized IT-Services
in Dynamic Markets. Vol. 412. Verlagsschriftenreihe Des Heinz Nixdorf Instituts.
Paderborn: Heinz Nixdorf Institut, Universität Paderborn, 2023. https://doi.org/10.17619/UNIPB/1-1797.'
ieee: 'C.-J. Haake, F. Meyer auf der Heide, M. Platzner, H. Wachsmuth, and H. Wehrheim,
On-The-Fly Computing -- Individualized IT-services in dynamic markets,
vol. 412. Paderborn: Heinz Nixdorf Institut, Universität Paderborn, 2023.'
mla: Haake, Claus-Jochen, et al. On-The-Fly Computing -- Individualized IT-Services
in Dynamic Markets. Heinz Nixdorf Institut, Universität Paderborn, 2023, doi:10.17619/UNIPB/1-1797.
short: C.-J. Haake, F. Meyer auf der Heide, M. Platzner, H. Wachsmuth, H. Wehrheim,
On-The-Fly Computing -- Individualized IT-Services in Dynamic Markets, Heinz Nixdorf
Institut, Universität Paderborn, Paderborn, 2023.
date_created: 2023-07-05T07:16:51Z
date_updated: 2024-07-12T12:07:59Z
ddc:
- '000'
department:
- _id: '7'
- _id: '78'
- _id: '26'
doi: 10.17619/UNIPB/1-1797
file:
- access_level: open_access
content_type: application/pdf
creator: ups
date_created: 2023-07-05T07:15:55Z
date_updated: 2023-07-05T07:19:14Z
file_id: '45864'
file_name: SFB-Buch-Final.pdf
file_size: 15480050
relation: main_file
file_date_updated: 2023-07-05T07:19:14Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: ' 412'
language:
- iso: eng
oa: '1'
page: '247'
place: Paderborn
project:
- _id: '1'
grant_number: '160364472'
name: 'SFB 901: SFB 901: On-The-Fly Computing - Individualisierte IT-Dienstleistungen
in dynamischen Märkten '
- _id: '2'
name: 'SFB 901 - A: SFB 901 - Project Area A'
- _id: '3'
name: 'SFB 901 - B: SFB 901 - Project Area B'
- _id: '4'
name: 'SFB 901 - C: SFB 901 - Project Area C'
- _id: '82'
name: 'SFB 901 - T: SFB 901 - Project Area T'
- _id: '5'
grant_number: '160364472'
name: 'SFB 901 - A1: SFB 901 - Möglichkeiten und Grenzen lokaler Strategien in dynamischen
Netzen (Subproject A1)'
- _id: '7'
grant_number: '160364472'
name: 'SFB 901 - A3: SFB 901 - Der Markt für Services: Anreize, Algorithmen, Implementation
(Subproject A3)'
- _id: '8'
grant_number: '160364472'
name: 'SFB 901 - A4: SFB 901 - Empirische Analysen in Märkten für OTF Dienstleistungen
(Subproject A4)'
- _id: '9'
grant_number: '160364472'
name: 'SFB 901 - B1: SFB 901 - Parametrisierte Servicespezifikation (Subproject
B1)'
- _id: '10'
grant_number: '160364472'
name: 'SFB 901 - B2: Konfiguration und Bewertung (B02)'
- _id: '11'
name: 'SFB 901 - B3: SFB 901 - Subproject B3'
- _id: '12'
name: 'SFB 901 - B4: SFB 901 - Subproject B4'
- _id: '13'
grant_number: '160364472'
name: 'SFB 901 - C1: SFB 901 - Subproject C1'
- _id: '14'
grant_number: '160364472'
name: 'SFB 901 - C2: SFB 901 - On-The-Fly Compute Centers I: Heterogene Ausführungsumgebungen
(Subproject C2)'
- _id: '16'
grant_number: '160364472'
name: 'SFB 901 - C4: SFB 901 - On-The-Fly Compute Centers II: Ausführung komponierter
Dienste in konfigurierbaren Rechenzentren (Subproject C4)'
- _id: '17'
name: 'SFB 901 - C5: SFB 901 - Subproject C5'
- _id: '83'
name: 'SFB 901 - T1: SFB 901 -Subproject T1'
- _id: '84'
grant_number: '160364472'
name: 'SFB 901 - T2: SFB 901 -Subproject T2'
publication_identifier:
unknown:
- 978-3-947647-31-6
publisher: Heinz Nixdorf Institut, Universität Paderborn
series_title: Verlagsschriftenreihe des Heinz Nixdorf Instituts
status: public
title: On-The-Fly Computing -- Individualized IT-services in dynamic markets
type: book
user_id: '1112'
volume: 412
year: '2023'
...
---
_id: '45878'
author:
- first_name: Claus-Jochen
full_name: Haake, Claus-Jochen
id: '20801'
last_name: Haake
- first_name: Burkhard
full_name: Hehenkamp, Burkhard
id: '37339'
last_name: Hehenkamp
- first_name: Gleb
full_name: Polevoy, Gleb
id: '83983'
last_name: Polevoy
citation:
ama: 'Haake C-J, Hehenkamp B, Polevoy G. The Market for Services: Incentives, Algorithms,
Implementation. In: Haake C-J, Meyer auf der Heide F, Platzner M, Wachsmuth H,
Wehrheim H, eds. On-The-Fly Computing -- Individualized IT-Services in Dynamic
Markets. Vol 412. Verlagsschriftenreihe des Heinz Nixdorf Instituts. Heinz
Nixdorf Institut, Universität Paderborn; 2023:21-44. doi:10.5281/zenodo.8068414'
apa: 'Haake, C.-J., Hehenkamp, B., & Polevoy, G. (2023). The Market for Services:
Incentives, Algorithms, Implementation. In C.-J. Haake, F. Meyer auf der Heide,
M. Platzner, H. Wachsmuth, & H. Wehrheim (Eds.), On-The-Fly Computing --
Individualized IT-services in dynamic markets (Vol. 412, pp. 21–44). Heinz
Nixdorf Institut, Universität Paderborn. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.8068414'
bibtex: '@inbook{Haake_Hehenkamp_Polevoy_2023, place={Paderborn}, series={Verlagsschriftenreihe
des Heinz Nixdorf Instituts}, title={The Market for Services: Incentives, Algorithms,
Implementation}, volume={412}, DOI={10.5281/zenodo.8068414},
booktitle={On-The-Fly Computing -- Individualized IT-services in dynamic markets},
publisher={Heinz Nixdorf Institut, Universität Paderborn}, author={Haake, Claus-Jochen
and Hehenkamp, Burkhard and Polevoy, Gleb}, editor={Haake, Claus-Jochen and Meyer
auf der Heide, Friedhelm and Platzner, Marco and Wachsmuth, Henning and Wehrheim,
Heike}, year={2023}, pages={21–44}, collection={Verlagsschriftenreihe des Heinz
Nixdorf Instituts} }'
chicago: 'Haake, Claus-Jochen, Burkhard Hehenkamp, and Gleb Polevoy. “The Market
for Services: Incentives, Algorithms, Implementation.” In On-The-Fly Computing
-- Individualized IT-Services in Dynamic Markets, edited by Claus-Jochen Haake,
Friedhelm Meyer auf der Heide, Marco Platzner, Henning Wachsmuth, and Heike Wehrheim,
412:21–44. Verlagsschriftenreihe Des Heinz Nixdorf Instituts. Paderborn: Heinz
Nixdorf Institut, Universität Paderborn, 2023. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.8068414.'
ieee: 'C.-J. Haake, B. Hehenkamp, and G. Polevoy, “The Market for Services: Incentives,
Algorithms, Implementation,” in On-The-Fly Computing -- Individualized IT-services
in dynamic markets, vol. 412, C.-J. Haake, F. Meyer auf der Heide, M. Platzner,
H. Wachsmuth, and H. Wehrheim, Eds. Paderborn: Heinz Nixdorf Institut, Universität
Paderborn, 2023, pp. 21–44.'
mla: 'Haake, Claus-Jochen, et al. “The Market for Services: Incentives, Algorithms,
Implementation.” On-The-Fly Computing -- Individualized IT-Services in Dynamic
Markets, edited by Claus-Jochen Haake et al., vol. 412, Heinz Nixdorf Institut,
Universität Paderborn, 2023, pp. 21–44, doi:10.5281/zenodo.8068414.'
short: 'C.-J. Haake, B. Hehenkamp, G. Polevoy, in: C.-J. Haake, F. Meyer auf der
Heide, M. Platzner, H. Wachsmuth, H. Wehrheim (Eds.), On-The-Fly Computing --
Individualized IT-Services in Dynamic Markets, Heinz Nixdorf Institut, Universität
Paderborn, Paderborn, 2023, pp. 21–44.'
date_created: 2023-07-07T07:02:44Z
date_updated: 2023-07-07T11:23:08Z
ddc:
- '004'
department:
- _id: '7'
- _id: '19'
doi: 10.5281/zenodo.8068414
editor:
- first_name: Claus-Jochen
full_name: Haake, Claus-Jochen
last_name: Haake
- first_name: Friedhelm
full_name: Meyer auf der Heide, Friedhelm
last_name: Meyer auf der Heide
- first_name: Marco
full_name: Platzner, Marco
last_name: Platzner
- first_name: Henning
full_name: Wachsmuth, Henning
last_name: Wachsmuth
- first_name: Heike
full_name: Wehrheim, Heike
last_name: Wehrheim
file:
- access_level: open_access
content_type: application/pdf
creator: florida
date_created: 2023-07-07T06:59:23Z
date_updated: 2023-07-07T11:23:07Z
file_id: '45879'
file_name: A3-Chapter-SFB-Buch-Final.pdf
file_size: 1116173
relation: main_file
file_date_updated: 2023-07-07T11:23:07Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: ' 412'
language:
- iso: eng
oa: '1'
page: 21-44
place: Paderborn
project:
- _id: '1'
grant_number: '160364472'
name: 'SFB 901: SFB 901: On-The-Fly Computing - Individualisierte IT-Dienstleistungen
in dynamischen Märkten '
- _id: '2'
name: 'SFB 901 - A: SFB 901 - Project Area A'
- _id: '7'
grant_number: '160364472'
name: 'SFB 901 - A3: SFB 901 - Der Markt für Services: Anreize, Algorithmen, Implementation
(Subproject A3)'
publication: On-The-Fly Computing -- Individualized IT-services in dynamic markets
publisher: Heinz Nixdorf Institut, Universität Paderborn
series_title: Verlagsschriftenreihe des Heinz Nixdorf Instituts
status: public
title: 'The Market for Services: Incentives, Algorithms, Implementation'
type: book_chapter
user_id: '477'
volume: 412
year: '2023'
...
---
_id: '32106'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: We study the consequences of modeling asymmetric bargaining power in two-person
bargaining problems. Comparing application of an asymmetric version of a bargaining
solution to an upfront modification of the disagreement point, the resulting distortion
crucially depends on the bargaining solution concept. While for the Kalai-Smorodinsky
solution weaker players benefit from modifying the disagreement point, the situation
is reversed for the Nash bargaining solution. There, weaker players are better
off in the asymmetric bargaining solution. When comparing application of the asymmetric
versions of the Nash and the Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions, we demonstrate that
there is an upper bound for the weight of a player, so that she is better off
with the Nash bargaining solution. This threshold is ultimately determined by
the relative utilitarian bargaining solution. From a mechanism design perspective,
our results provide valuable information for a social planner, when implementing
a bargaining solution for unequally powerful players.
author:
- first_name: Claus-Jochen
full_name: Haake, Claus-Jochen
id: '20801'
last_name: Haake
- first_name: Thomas
full_name: Streck, Thomas
id: '33041'
last_name: Streck
citation:
ama: Haake C-J, Streck T. Distortion through Modeling Asymmetric Bargaining Power.
Vol 148.; 2022.
apa: Haake, C.-J., & Streck, T. (2022). Distortion through modeling asymmetric
bargaining power (Vol. 148).
bibtex: '@book{Haake_Streck_2022, series={CIE Working Paper Series}, title={Distortion
through modeling asymmetric bargaining power}, volume={148}, author={Haake, Claus-Jochen
and Streck, Thomas}, year={2022}, collection={CIE Working Paper Series} }'
chicago: Haake, Claus-Jochen, and Thomas Streck. Distortion through Modeling
Asymmetric Bargaining Power. Vol. 148. CIE Working Paper Series, 2022.
ieee: C.-J. Haake and T. Streck, Distortion through modeling asymmetric bargaining
power, vol. 148. 2022.
mla: Haake, Claus-Jochen, and Thomas Streck. Distortion through Modeling Asymmetric
Bargaining Power. 2022.
short: C.-J. Haake, T. Streck, Distortion through Modeling Asymmetric Bargaining
Power, 2022.
date_created: 2022-06-22T12:12:58Z
date_updated: 2022-11-19T15:42:15Z
department:
- _id: '205'
- _id: '475'
- _id: '200'
intvolume: ' 148'
jel:
- C78
- D63
keyword:
- Asymmetric bargaining power
- Nash bargaining solution
- Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution
language:
- iso: eng
page: '17'
project:
- _id: '2'
name: 'SFB 901 - A: SFB 901 - Project Area A'
- _id: '7'
name: 'SFB 901 - A3: SFB 901 - Subproject A3'
- _id: '1'
name: 'SFB 901: SFB 901'
series_title: CIE Working Paper Series
status: public
title: Distortion through modeling asymmetric bargaining power
type: working_paper
user_id: '20801'
volume: 148
year: '2022'
...
---
_id: '30940'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: "We analyse the two-dimensional Nash bargaining solution (NBS) by deploying\r\nthe
standard labour market negotiations model of McDonald and Solow (1981).\r\nWe
show that the two-dimensional bargaining problem can be decomposed into two\r\none-dimensional
problems, such that the two solutions together replicate the solution\r\nof the
two-dimensional problem if the NBS is applied. The axiom of\r\nIndependence of
Irrelevant Alternatives is shown to be crucial for this type\r\nof decomposability.
\ This result has significant implications for actual\r\nnegotiations because
it allows for the decomposition of a multi-dimensional bargaining\r\nproblem into
one-dimensional problems---and thus helps to facilitate real-world\r\nnegotiations."
article_type: original
author:
- first_name: Claus-Jochen
full_name: Haake, Claus-Jochen
id: '20801'
last_name: Haake
- first_name: Thorsten
full_name: Upmann, Thorsten
last_name: Upmann
- first_name: Papatya
full_name: Duman, Papatya
id: '72752'
last_name: Duman
citation:
ama: 'Haake C-J, Upmann T, Duman P. Wage Bargaining and Employment Revisited: Separability
and Efficiency in Collective Bargaining. Scandinavian Journal of Economics.
2022;125(2):403-440. doi:https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12518'
apa: 'Haake, C.-J., Upmann, T., & Duman, P. (2022). Wage Bargaining and Employment
Revisited: Separability and Efficiency in Collective Bargaining. Scandinavian
Journal of Economics, 125(2), 403–440. https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12518'
bibtex: '@article{Haake_Upmann_Duman_2022, title={Wage Bargaining and Employment
Revisited: Separability and Efficiency in Collective Bargaining}, volume={125},
DOI={https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12518},
number={2}, journal={Scandinavian Journal of Economics}, publisher={Wiley}, author={Haake,
Claus-Jochen and Upmann, Thorsten and Duman, Papatya}, year={2022}, pages={403–440}
}'
chicago: 'Haake, Claus-Jochen, Thorsten Upmann, and Papatya Duman. “Wage Bargaining
and Employment Revisited: Separability and Efficiency in Collective Bargaining.”
Scandinavian Journal of Economics 125, no. 2 (2022): 403–40. https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12518.'
ieee: 'C.-J. Haake, T. Upmann, and P. Duman, “Wage Bargaining and Employment Revisited:
Separability and Efficiency in Collective Bargaining,” Scandinavian Journal
of Economics, vol. 125, no. 2, pp. 403–440, 2022, doi: https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12518.'
mla: 'Haake, Claus-Jochen, et al. “Wage Bargaining and Employment Revisited: Separability
and Efficiency in Collective Bargaining.” Scandinavian Journal of Economics,
vol. 125, no. 2, Wiley, 2022, pp. 403–40, doi:https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12518.'
short: C.-J. Haake, T. Upmann, P. Duman, Scandinavian Journal of Economics 125 (2022)
403–440.
date_created: 2022-04-22T14:10:44Z
date_updated: 2023-06-08T16:42:31Z
ddc:
- '330'
department:
- _id: '205'
- _id: '475'
doi: https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12518
funded_apc: '1'
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: ' 125'
issue: '2'
jel:
- J52
- J41
- C78
keyword:
- Labour market negotiations
- efficient bargains
- Nash bargaining solution
- sequential bargaining
- restricted bargaining games
language:
- iso: eng
main_file_link:
- url: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/sjoe.12518
page: 403-440
project:
- _id: '7'
grant_number: '160364472'
name: 'SFB 901 - A3: SFB 901 - Subproject A3'
- _id: '2'
name: 'SFB 901 - A: SFB 901 - Project Area A'
- _id: '1'
grant_number: '160364472'
name: 'SFB 901: SFB 901'
publication: Scandinavian Journal of Economics
publication_identifier:
eissn:
- 0347-0520
publication_status: published
publisher: Wiley
quality_controlled: '1'
status: public
title: 'Wage Bargaining and Employment Revisited: Separability and Efficiency in Collective
Bargaining'
type: journal_article
user_id: '20801'
volume: 125
year: '2022'
...
---
_id: '29152'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: 'AbstractIn this article we combine Debreu’s
(Proc Natl Acad Sci 38(10):886–893, 1952) social system with Hurwicz’s (Econ Design
1(1):1–14, 1994; Am Econ Rev 98(3):577–585, 2008) ideas of embedding a “desired”
game form into a “natural” game form that includes all feasible behavior, even
if it is “illegal” according to the desired form. For the resulting socio-legal
system we extend Debreu’s concepts of a social system and its social equilibria
to a socio-legal system with its Debreu–Hurwicz equilibria. We build on a more
general version of social equilibrium due to Shafer and Sonnenschein (J Math Econ
2(3):345–348, 1975) that also generalizes the dc-mechanism of Koray and Yildiz
(J Econ Theory 176:479–502, 2018) which relates implementation via mechanisms
with implementation via rights structures as introduced by Sertel (Designing rights:
invisible hand theorems, covering and membership. Tech. rep. Mimeo, Bogazici University,
2001). In the second part we apply and illustrate these new concepts via an application
in the narrow welfarist framework of two person cooperative bargaining. There
we provide in a socio-legal system based on Nash’s demand game an implementation
of the Nash bargaining solution in Debreu–Hurwicz equilibrium.'
author:
- first_name: Claus-Jochen
full_name: Haake, Claus-Jochen
id: '20801'
last_name: Haake
- first_name: Walter
full_name: Trockel, Walter
last_name: Trockel
citation:
ama: Haake C-J, Trockel W. Socio-legal systems and implementation of the Nash solution
in Debreu–Hurwicz equilibrium. Review of Economic Design. Published online
2021. doi:10.1007/s10058-021-00278-z
apa: Haake, C.-J., & Trockel, W. (2021). Socio-legal systems and implementation
of the Nash solution in Debreu–Hurwicz equilibrium. Review of Economic Design.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-021-00278-z
bibtex: '@article{Haake_Trockel_2021, title={Socio-legal systems and implementation
of the Nash solution in Debreu–Hurwicz equilibrium}, DOI={10.1007/s10058-021-00278-z},
journal={Review of Economic Design}, publisher={Springer}, author={Haake, Claus-Jochen
and Trockel, Walter}, year={2021} }'
chicago: Haake, Claus-Jochen, and Walter Trockel. “Socio-Legal Systems and Implementation
of the Nash Solution in Debreu–Hurwicz Equilibrium.” Review of Economic Design,
2021. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-021-00278-z.
ieee: 'C.-J. Haake and W. Trockel, “Socio-legal systems and implementation of the
Nash solution in Debreu–Hurwicz equilibrium,” Review of Economic Design,
2021, doi: 10.1007/s10058-021-00278-z.'
mla: Haake, Claus-Jochen, and Walter Trockel. “Socio-Legal Systems and Implementation
of the Nash Solution in Debreu–Hurwicz Equilibrium.” Review of Economic Design,
Springer, 2021, doi:10.1007/s10058-021-00278-z.
short: C.-J. Haake, W. Trockel, Review of Economic Design (2021).
date_created: 2022-01-04T19:54:03Z
date_updated: 2022-11-17T14:24:26Z
department:
- _id: '205'
- _id: '475'
doi: 10.1007/s10058-021-00278-z
funded_apc: '1'
language:
- iso: eng
project:
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
- _id: '1'
name: 'SFB 901: SFB 901'
- _id: '2'
name: 'SFB 901 - A: SFB 901 - Project Area A'
publication: Review of Economic Design
publication_identifier:
issn:
- 1434-4742
- 1434-4750
publication_status: epub_ahead
publisher: Springer
status: public
title: Socio-legal systems and implementation of the Nash solution in Debreu–Hurwicz
equilibrium
type: journal_article
user_id: '477'
year: '2021'
...
---
_id: '34115'
author:
- first_name: Claus-Jochen
full_name: Haake, Claus-Jochen
id: '20801'
last_name: Haake
- first_name: Walter
full_name: Trockel, Walter
last_name: Trockel
citation:
ama: Haake C-J, Trockel W. Introduction to the Special Issue “Bargaining.” Homo
Oeconomicus. 2020;37(1-2):1-6. doi:10.1007/s41412-020-00104-x
apa: Haake, C.-J., & Trockel, W. (2020). Introduction to the Special Issue “Bargaining.”
Homo Oeconomicus, 37(1–2), 1–6. https://doi.org/10.1007/s41412-020-00104-x
bibtex: '@article{Haake_Trockel_2020, title={Introduction to the Special Issue “Bargaining”},
volume={37}, DOI={10.1007/s41412-020-00104-x},
number={1–2}, journal={Homo Oeconomicus}, publisher={Springer Science and Business
Media LLC}, author={Haake, Claus-Jochen and Trockel, Walter}, year={2020}, pages={1–6}
}'
chicago: 'Haake, Claus-Jochen, and Walter Trockel. “Introduction to the Special
Issue ‘Bargaining.’” Homo Oeconomicus 37, no. 1–2 (2020): 1–6. https://doi.org/10.1007/s41412-020-00104-x.'
ieee: 'C.-J. Haake and W. Trockel, “Introduction to the Special Issue ‘Bargaining,’”
Homo Oeconomicus, vol. 37, no. 1–2, pp. 1–6, 2020, doi: 10.1007/s41412-020-00104-x.'
mla: Haake, Claus-Jochen, and Walter Trockel. “Introduction to the Special Issue
‘Bargaining.’” Homo Oeconomicus, vol. 37, no. 1–2, Springer Science and
Business Media LLC, 2020, pp. 1–6, doi:10.1007/s41412-020-00104-x.
short: C.-J. Haake, W. Trockel, Homo Oeconomicus 37 (2020) 1–6.
date_created: 2022-11-19T15:44:21Z
date_updated: 2022-11-30T13:29:13Z
department:
- _id: '205'
- _id: '475'
doi: 10.1007/s41412-020-00104-x
intvolume: ' 37'
issue: 1-2
keyword:
- Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering
- Environmental Engineering
language:
- iso: eng
page: 1-6
project:
- _id: '1'
name: 'SFB 901: SFB 901'
- _id: '7'
name: 'SFB 901 - A3: SFB 901 - Subproject A3'
- _id: '2'
name: 'SFB 901 - A: SFB 901 - Project Area A'
publication: Homo Oeconomicus
publication_identifier:
issn:
- 0943-0180
- 2366-6161
publication_status: published
publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
status: public
title: Introduction to the Special Issue “Bargaining”
type: journal_article
user_id: '477'
volume: 37
year: '2020'
...
---
_id: '15202'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: In this paper, we analyze the two-dimensional Nash bargaining solution (NBS)
deploying a standard labor market negotiations model (see McDonald and Solow,
1981; Creedy and McDonald, 1991). We show that the two-dimensional bargaining
problem can be decomposed into two one-dimensional problems such that the (Cartesian)
product of the solutions of these problems replicates the solution of the two-dimensional
problem, if the NBS is applied. However, this decomposition fails for any solution
concept that does not satisfy the axiom of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives
(IIA axiom). Our decomposition result has significant implications for actual
negotiations, as it allows for the decomposition of a multi-issue bargaining problem
into a set of simpler problems, in particular a set of single-issue bargaining
problems. In this way, the decomposition may help facilitate negotiations in labor
markets and also in other environments.
author:
- first_name: Claus-Jochen
full_name: Haake, Claus-Jochen
id: '20801'
last_name: Haake
- first_name: Thorsten
full_name: Upmann, Thorsten
last_name: Upmann
- first_name: Papatya
full_name: Duman, Papatya
id: '72752'
last_name: Duman
citation:
ama: Haake C-J, Upmann T, Duman P. The Decomposability of the Nash Bargaining
Solution in Labor Markets. Vol 128. CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University;
2019.
apa: Haake, C.-J., Upmann, T., & Duman, P. (2019). The Decomposability of
the Nash Bargaining Solution in Labor Markets (Vol. 128). CIE Working Paper
Series, Paderborn University.
bibtex: '@book{Haake_Upmann_Duman_2019, series={Working Papers CIE}, title={The
Decomposability of the Nash Bargaining Solution in Labor Markets}, volume={128},
publisher={CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University}, author={Haake, Claus-Jochen
and Upmann, Thorsten and Duman, Papatya}, year={2019}, collection={Working Papers
CIE} }'
chicago: Haake, Claus-Jochen, Thorsten Upmann, and Papatya Duman. The Decomposability
of the Nash Bargaining Solution in Labor Markets. Vol. 128. Working Papers
CIE. CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2019.
ieee: C.-J. Haake, T. Upmann, and P. Duman, The Decomposability of the Nash Bargaining
Solution in Labor Markets, vol. 128. CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University,
2019.
mla: Haake, Claus-Jochen, et al. The Decomposability of the Nash Bargaining Solution
in Labor Markets. Vol. 128, CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University,
2019.
short: C.-J. Haake, T. Upmann, P. Duman, The Decomposability of the Nash Bargaining
Solution in Labor Markets, CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2019.
date_created: 2019-11-28T09:49:08Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:52:16Z
ddc:
- '040'
department:
- _id: '205'
- _id: '475'
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: stela
date_created: 2019-11-28T09:50:10Z
date_updated: 2019-11-28T09:50:10Z
file_id: '15203'
file_name: WP - The Decomposability of the Nash Bargaining Solution in Labor Markets.pdf
file_size: 1068284
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2019-11-28T09:50:10Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: ' 128'
keyword:
- Labor market negotiations
- Efficient bargains
- Nash bargaining solution
- Sequential bargaining
- Restricted bargaining games
language:
- iso: eng
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
publisher: CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University
series_title: Working Papers CIE
status: public
title: The Decomposability of the Nash Bargaining Solution in Labor Markets
type: working_paper
user_id: '477'
volume: 128
year: '2019'
...
---
_id: '2831'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: 'We consider a market where final products or services are compositions of
a number of basic services. Users are asked to evaluate the quality of the composed
product after purchase. The quality of the basic service influences the performance
of the composed services but cannot be observed directly. The question we pose
is whether it is possible to use user evaluations on composed services to assess
the quality of basic services. We discuss how to combine aggregation of evaluations
across users and disaggregation of information on composed services to derive
valuations for the single components. As a solution we propose to use the (weighted)
average as aggregation device in connection with the Shapley value as disaggregation
method, since this combination fulfills natural requirements in our context. In
addition, we address some occurring computational issues: We give an approximate
solution concept using only a limited number of evaluations which guarantees nearly
optimal results with reduced running time. Lastly, we show that a slightly modified
Shapley value and the weighted average are still applicable if the evaluation
profiles are incomplete.'
author:
- first_name: Matthias
full_name: Feldotto, Matthias
id: '14052'
last_name: Feldotto
orcid: 0000-0003-1348-6516
- first_name: Claus-Jochen
full_name: Haake, Claus-Jochen
id: '20801'
last_name: Haake
- first_name: Alexander
full_name: Skopalik, Alexander
id: '40384'
last_name: Skopalik
- first_name: Nadja
full_name: Stroh-Maraun, Nadja
id: '13264'
last_name: Stroh-Maraun
citation:
ama: 'Feldotto M, Haake C-J, Skopalik A, Stroh-Maraun N. Disaggregating User Evaluations
Using the Shapley Value. In: Proceedings of the 13th Workshop on Economics
of Networks, Systems and Computation (NetEcon 2018). ; 2018:5:1-5:6. doi:10.1145/3230654.3230659'
apa: Feldotto, M., Haake, C.-J., Skopalik, A., & Stroh-Maraun, N. (2018). Disaggregating
User Evaluations Using the Shapley Value. In Proceedings of the 13th Workshop
on Economics of Networks, Systems and Computation (NetEcon 2018) (pp. 5:1-5:6).
Irvine, California, USA. https://doi.org/10.1145/3230654.3230659
bibtex: '@inproceedings{Feldotto_Haake_Skopalik_Stroh-Maraun_2018, title={Disaggregating
User Evaluations Using the Shapley Value}, DOI={10.1145/3230654.3230659},
booktitle={Proceedings of the 13th Workshop on Economics of Networks, Systems
and Computation (NetEcon 2018)}, author={Feldotto, Matthias and Haake, Claus-Jochen
and Skopalik, Alexander and Stroh-Maraun, Nadja}, year={2018}, pages={5:1-5:6}
}'
chicago: Feldotto, Matthias, Claus-Jochen Haake, Alexander Skopalik, and Nadja Stroh-Maraun.
“Disaggregating User Evaluations Using the Shapley Value.” In Proceedings of
the 13th Workshop on Economics of Networks, Systems and Computation (NetEcon 2018),
5:1-5:6, 2018. https://doi.org/10.1145/3230654.3230659.
ieee: M. Feldotto, C.-J. Haake, A. Skopalik, and N. Stroh-Maraun, “Disaggregating
User Evaluations Using the Shapley Value,” in Proceedings of the 13th Workshop
on Economics of Networks, Systems and Computation (NetEcon 2018), Irvine,
California, USA, 2018, pp. 5:1-5:6.
mla: Feldotto, Matthias, et al. “Disaggregating User Evaluations Using the Shapley
Value.” Proceedings of the 13th Workshop on Economics of Networks, Systems
and Computation (NetEcon 2018), 2018, pp. 5:1-5:6, doi:10.1145/3230654.3230659.
short: 'M. Feldotto, C.-J. Haake, A. Skopalik, N. Stroh-Maraun, in: Proceedings
of the 13th Workshop on Economics of Networks, Systems and Computation (NetEcon
2018), 2018, pp. 5:1-5:6.'
conference:
end_date: 2018-06-18
location: Irvine, California, USA
name: The 13th Workshop on the Economics of Networks, Systems and Computation (NetEcon
2018)
start_date: 2018-06-18
date_created: 2018-05-22T10:28:51Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:58:01Z
ddc:
- '040'
department:
- _id: '541'
- _id: '63'
- _id: '205'
- _id: '475'
doi: 10.1145/3230654.3230659
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: nmaraun
date_created: 2018-08-15T07:30:50Z
date_updated: 2018-08-15T07:30:50Z
file_id: '3910'
file_name: Disaggregating User Evaluations Using the Shapley Value.pdf
file_size: 1450171
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-08-15T07:30:50Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
language:
- iso: eng
page: 5:1-5:6
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
publication: Proceedings of the 13th Workshop on Economics of Networks, Systems and
Computation (NetEcon 2018)
publication_identifier:
isbn:
- 978-1-4503-5916-0
publication_status: published
status: public
title: Disaggregating User Evaluations Using the Shapley Value
type: conference
user_id: '14052'
year: '2018'
...
---
_id: '2566'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: We show that the Boston school choice mechanism (BM), the student proposing
deferred acceptance algorithm (DA) and the top trading cycles algorithm (TTC)
generate the same outcome when the colleges’ priorities are modified according
to students’ preferences in a “first preferences first” manner. This outcome coincides
with the BM outcome under original priorities. As a result, the DA and TTC mechanism
that are non-manipulable under original priorities become vulnerable to strategic
behavior.
author:
- first_name: Claus-Jochen
full_name: Haake, Claus-Jochen
id: '20801'
last_name: Haake
- first_name: Nadja
full_name: Stroh-Maraun, Nadja
id: '13264'
last_name: Stroh-Maraun
citation:
ama: Haake C-J, Stroh-Maraun N. Outcome Equivalence in School Choice with Reciprocal
Preferences. Economics Letters. 2018;170:39-41. doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2018.05.033
apa: Haake, C.-J., & Stroh-Maraun, N. (2018). Outcome Equivalence in School
Choice with Reciprocal Preferences. Economics Letters, 170, 39–41.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2018.05.033
bibtex: '@article{Haake_Stroh-Maraun_2018, title={Outcome Equivalence in School
Choice with Reciprocal Preferences}, volume={170}, DOI={10.1016/j.econlet.2018.05.033},
journal={Economics Letters}, publisher={Elsevier}, author={Haake, Claus-Jochen
and Stroh-Maraun, Nadja}, year={2018}, pages={39–41} }'
chicago: 'Haake, Claus-Jochen, and Nadja Stroh-Maraun. “Outcome Equivalence in School
Choice with Reciprocal Preferences.” Economics Letters 170 (2018): 39–41.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2018.05.033.'
ieee: C.-J. Haake and N. Stroh-Maraun, “Outcome Equivalence in School Choice with
Reciprocal Preferences,” Economics Letters, vol. 170, pp. 39–41, 2018.
mla: Haake, Claus-Jochen, and Nadja Stroh-Maraun. “Outcome Equivalence in School
Choice with Reciprocal Preferences.” Economics Letters, vol. 170, Elsevier,
2018, pp. 39–41, doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2018.05.033.
short: C.-J. Haake, N. Stroh-Maraun, Economics Letters 170 (2018) 39–41.
date_created: 2018-05-03T07:53:56Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:57:09Z
ddc:
- '040'
department:
- _id: '205'
doi: 10.1016/j.econlet.2018.05.033
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: cjhaake
date_created: 2018-08-09T08:08:17Z
date_updated: 2018-08-09T09:15:07Z
file_id: '3854'
file_name: 1-s2.0-S016517651830212X-main.pdf
file_size: 261888
relation: main_file
title: Outcome equivalence in school choice with reciprocal preferences
file_date_updated: 2018-08-09T09:15:07Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: ' 170'
language:
- iso: eng
page: 39 - 41
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
publication: Economics Letters
publication_status: published
publisher: Elsevier
status: public
title: Outcome Equivalence in School Choice with Reciprocal Preferences
type: journal_article
urn: '25669'
user_id: '477'
volume: 170
year: '2018'
...
---
_id: '2933'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: We establish axioms under which a bargaining solution can be found by the
maximization of the CES function and is unique up to specification of the distribution
and elasticity parameters. This solution is referred to as the CES solution which
includes the NASH and egalitarian solutions as special cases. Next, we consider
a normalization of the CES function and establish axioms, under which a bargaining
solution can be found by the maximization of the normalized CES and is unique
up to the specifications of the distribution and its substitution parameters.
We refer to this solution as the normalized CES solution, which includes the Nash
and Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions as special cases. Our paper contributes to bargaining
theory by establishing unified characterizations of existing as well as a great
variety of new bargaining solutions.
author:
- first_name: Claus-Jochen
full_name: Haake, Claus-Jochen
id: '20801'
last_name: Haake
- first_name: Cheng-Zhong
full_name: Qin, Cheng-Zhong
last_name: Qin
citation:
ama: 'Haake C-J, Qin C-Z. On Unification of Solutions to the Bargaining Problem.
Vol 113. Paderborn University: CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University;
2018.'
apa: 'Haake, C.-J., & Qin, C.-Z. (2018). On unification of solutions to the
bargaining problem (Vol. 113). Paderborn University: CIE Working Paper Series,
Paderborn University.'
bibtex: '@book{Haake_Qin_2018, place={Paderborn University}, series={Working Papers
CIE}, title={On unification of solutions to the bargaining problem}, volume={113},
publisher={CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University}, author={Haake, Claus-Jochen
and Qin, Cheng-Zhong}, year={2018}, collection={Working Papers CIE} }'
chicago: 'Haake, Claus-Jochen, and Cheng-Zhong Qin. On Unification of Solutions
to the Bargaining Problem. Vol. 113. Working Papers CIE. Paderborn University:
CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2018.'
ieee: 'C.-J. Haake and C.-Z. Qin, On unification of solutions to the bargaining
problem, vol. 113. Paderborn University: CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn
University, 2018.'
mla: Haake, Claus-Jochen, and Cheng-Zhong Qin. On Unification of Solutions to
the Bargaining Problem. Vol. 113, CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University,
2018.
short: C.-J. Haake, C.-Z. Qin, On Unification of Solutions to the Bargaining Problem,
CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, Paderborn University, 2018.
date_created: 2018-05-28T07:00:28Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:58:48Z
ddc:
- '040'
department:
- _id: '205'
- _id: '475'
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: cjhaake
date_created: 2018-08-09T08:15:31Z
date_updated: 2018-08-09T09:14:52Z
file_id: '3855'
file_name: On unification of solutions to the bargaining problem.pdf
file_size: 469001
relation: main_file
title: On unification of solutions to the bargaining problem
file_date_updated: 2018-08-09T09:14:52Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: ' 113'
keyword:
- Bargaining problem
- CES Function
- Normalized CES Function
- Nash solution
- Kalai-Smorodinsky Solution
- Egalitarian Solution.
language:
- iso: eng
place: Paderborn University
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
publisher: CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University
series_title: Working Papers CIE
status: public
title: On unification of solutions to the bargaining problem
type: working_paper
urn: '29332'
user_id: '65453'
volume: 113
year: '2018'
...
---
_id: '3098'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: "One of the fundamental problems in applications of methods and results\r\nfrom
mechanism design and implementation theory is the effective enforcement of\r\ntheoretically
established equilibria by which social choice rules are implemented.\r\nHurwicz
(2008) and Myerson (2009) introduce different concepts of formalizing\r\nenforcement
of institutional rules via the introduction of legal and illegal games. In\r\nthis
note the relation of their concepts with that of a social system defined inDebreu\r\n(1952)
is analyzed and its potential of being instrumental for modelling institution\r\ndesign
is discussed. The existence proof for such a system, also known as generalized\r\ngame
or abstract economy had been the basis for the existence proof of a\r\ncompetitive
equilibrium of an economy."
author:
- first_name: Walter
full_name: Trockel, Walter
last_name: Trockel
- first_name: Claus-Jochen
full_name: Haake, Claus-Jochen
id: '20801'
last_name: Haake
citation:
ama: 'Trockel W, Haake C-J. Thoughts on Social Design. In: Laslier J-F, Moulin H,
Sanver R, Zwicker W, eds. Studies in Economic Design. Vol (n.d.). Studies
in Economic Design. Heidelberg: Springer.'
apa: 'Trockel, W., & Haake, C.-J. (n.d.). Thoughts on Social Design. In J.-F.
Laslier, H. Moulin, R. Sanver, & W. Zwicker (Eds.), Studies in Economic
Design (Vol. (n.d.)). Heidelberg: Springer.'
bibtex: '@inbook{Trockel_Haake, place={Heidelberg}, series={Studies in Economic
Design}, title={Thoughts on Social Design}, volume={(n.d.)}, booktitle={Studies
in Economic Design}, publisher={Springer}, author={Trockel, Walter and Haake,
Claus-Jochen}, editor={Laslier, Jean-Francois and Moulin, Herve and Sanver, Remzi
and Zwicker, WilliamEditors}, collection={Studies in Economic Design} }'
chicago: 'Trockel, Walter, and Claus-Jochen Haake. “Thoughts on Social Design.”
In Studies in Economic Design, edited by Jean-Francois Laslier, Herve Moulin,
Remzi Sanver, and William Zwicker, Vol. (n.d.). Studies in Economic Design. Heidelberg:
Springer, n.d.'
ieee: 'W. Trockel and C.-J. Haake, “Thoughts on Social Design,” in Studies in
Economic Design, vol. (n.d.), J.-F. Laslier, H. Moulin, R. Sanver, and W.
Zwicker, Eds. Heidelberg: Springer.'
mla: Trockel, Walter, and Claus-Jochen Haake. “Thoughts on Social Design.” Studies
in Economic Design, edited by Jean-Francois Laslier et al., vol. (n.d.), Springer.
short: 'W. Trockel, C.-J. Haake, in: J.-F. Laslier, H. Moulin, R. Sanver, W. Zwicker
(Eds.), Studies in Economic Design, Springer, Heidelberg, n.d.'
date_created: 2018-06-06T17:07:28Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:58:55Z
ddc:
- '040'
department:
- _id: '205'
- _id: '475'
editor:
- first_name: Jean-Francois
full_name: Laslier, Jean-Francois
last_name: Laslier
- first_name: Herve
full_name: Moulin, Herve
last_name: Moulin
- first_name: Remzi
full_name: Sanver, Remzi
last_name: Sanver
- first_name: William
full_name: Zwicker, William
last_name: Zwicker
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: cjhaake
date_created: 2018-08-09T08:36:24Z
date_updated: 2018-08-09T09:14:11Z
file_id: '3857'
file_name: WP - Thoughts on Social Design.pdf
file_size: 141983
relation: main_file
title: Thoughts on Social Design
file_date_updated: 2018-08-09T09:14:11Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
language:
- iso: eng
place: Heidelberg
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
publication: Studies in Economic Design
publication_identifier:
issn:
- 2510-3970
publication_status: accepted
publisher: Springer
quality_controlled: '1'
series_title: Studies in Economic Design
status: public
title: Thoughts on Social Design
type: book_chapter
urn: '30987'
user_id: '477'
volume: (n.d.)
year: '2018'
...
---
_id: '4564'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: " In our model two divisions negotiate over type-dependent contracts to\r\n
\ determine an intrafirm transfer price for an intermediate product. Since the\r\n
\ upstream division's (seller's) costs and downstream division's (buyer's)\r\n
\ revenues are supposed to be private information, we formally consider\r\n cooperative
bargaining problems under incomplete information. This means\r\n that the two
divisions consider allocations of expected utility generated by\r\n mechanisms
that satisfy (interim) individual rationality, incentive\r\n compatibility and/or
ex post efficiency. Assuming two possible types for\r\n buyer and seller each,
we first establish that the bargaining problem is\r\n regular, regardless whether
or not incentive and/or efficiency constraints\r\n are imposed. This allows us
to apply the generalized Nash bargaining\r\n solution to determine fair transfer
payments and transfer\r\n quantities. In particular, the generalized Nash bargaining
solution tries to\r\n balance divisional profits, while incentive constraints
are still in\r\n place. In that sense a fair profit division is generated. Furthermore,
by\r\n means of illustrative examples we derive general properties of this solution\r\n
\ for the transfer pricing problem and compare the model developed here with\r\n
\ the models existing in the literature. We demonstrate that there is a\r\n tradeoff
between ex post efficiency and fairness.\r\n"
article_type: original
author:
- first_name: Claus-Jochen
full_name: Haake, Claus-Jochen
id: '20801'
last_name: Haake
- first_name: Sonja
full_name: Recker, Sonja
last_name: Recker
citation:
ama: Haake C-J, Recker S. The Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution for Transfer
Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information. Group Decision and Negotiation.
2018;27(6):905-932. doi:10.1007/s10726-018-9592-8
apa: Haake, C.-J., & Recker, S. (2018). The Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution
for Transfer Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information. Group Decision
and Negotiation, 27(6), 905–932. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10726-018-9592-8
bibtex: '@article{Haake_Recker_2018, title={The Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution
for Transfer Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information}, volume={27}, DOI={10.1007/s10726-018-9592-8},
number={6}, journal={Group Decision and Negotiation}, publisher={Springer}, author={Haake,
Claus-Jochen and Recker, Sonja}, year={2018}, pages={905–932} }'
chicago: 'Haake, Claus-Jochen, and Sonja Recker. “The Generalized Nash Bargaining
Solution for Transfer Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information.” Group
Decision and Negotiation 27, no. 6 (2018): 905–32. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10726-018-9592-8.'
ieee: C.-J. Haake and S. Recker, “The Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution for Transfer
Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information,” Group Decision and Negotiation,
vol. 27, no. 6, pp. 905–932, 2018.
mla: Haake, Claus-Jochen, and Sonja Recker. “The Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution
for Transfer Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information.” Group Decision
and Negotiation, vol. 27, no. 6, Springer, 2018, pp. 905–32, doi:10.1007/s10726-018-9592-8.
short: C.-J. Haake, S. Recker, Group Decision and Negotiation 27 (2018) 905–932.
date_created: 2018-10-02T07:15:26Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:01:11Z
ddc:
- '040'
department:
- _id: '205'
- _id: '475'
doi: 10.1007/s10726-018-9592-8
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: stela
date_created: 2018-10-31T07:43:31Z
date_updated: 2018-10-31T07:43:31Z
file_id: '5107'
file_name: The Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution for Transfer Price Negotiations
Under Incomplete Information.pdf
file_size: 636521
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-10-31T07:43:31Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: ' 27'
issue: '6'
jel:
- C78
language:
- iso: eng
page: 905-932
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
publication: Group Decision and Negotiation
publication_status: published
publisher: Springer
quality_controlled: '1'
status: public
title: The Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution for Transfer Price Negotiations under
Incomplete Information
type: journal_article
user_id: '477'
volume: 27
year: '2018'
...
---
_id: '5330'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: "In Internet transactions, customers and service providers often interact
once and anonymously.\r\nTo prevent deceptive behavior a reputation system is
particularly important to\r\nreduce information asymmetries about the quality
of the offered product or service. In this\r\nstudy we examine the effectiveness
of a reputation system to reduce information asymmetries\r\nwhen customers may
make mistakes in judging the provided service quality. In our model,\r\na service
provider makes strategic quality choices and short-lived customers are asked to\r\nevaluate
the observed quality by providing ratings to a reputation system. The customer
is\r\nnot able to always evaluate the service quality correctly and possibly submits
an erroneous\r\nrating according to a predefined probability. Considering reputation
profiles of the last three\r\nsales, within the theoretical model we derive that
the service provider’s dichotomous quality\r\ndecisions are independent of the
reputation profile and depend only on the probabilities of\r\nreceiving positive
and negative ratings when providing low or high quality. Thus, a service\r\nprovider
optimally either maintains a good reputation or completely refrains from any reputation\r\nbuilding
process. However, when mapping our theoretical model to an experimental\r\ndesign
we find that a significant share of subjects in the role of the service provider
deviates\r\nfrom optimal behavior and chooses actions which are conditional on
the current reputation\r\nprofile. With respect to these individual quality choices
we see that subjects use milking\r\nstrategies which means that they exploit a
good reputation. In particular, if the sales price\r\nis high, low quality is
delivered until the price drops below a certain threshold, and then\r\nhigh quality
is chosen until the price increases again."
article_number: e0207172
article_type: review
author:
- first_name: Behnud
full_name: Mir Djawadi, Behnud
id: '26032'
last_name: Mir Djawadi
orcid: 0000-0002-6271-5912
- first_name: Rene
full_name: Fahr, Rene
id: '111'
last_name: Fahr
- first_name: Claus-Jochen
full_name: Haake, Claus-Jochen
id: '20801'
last_name: Haake
- first_name: Sonja
full_name: Recker, Sonja
last_name: Recker
citation:
ama: Mir Djawadi B, Fahr R, Haake C-J, Recker S. Maintaining vs. Milking Good Reputation
when Customer Feedback is Inaccurate. PLoS ONE. 2018;13(11). doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0207172
apa: Mir Djawadi, B., Fahr, R., Haake, C.-J., & Recker, S. (2018). Maintaining
vs. Milking Good Reputation when Customer Feedback is Inaccurate. PLoS ONE,
13(11). https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0207172
bibtex: '@article{Mir Djawadi_Fahr_Haake_Recker_2018, title={Maintaining vs. Milking
Good Reputation when Customer Feedback is Inaccurate}, volume={13}, DOI={10.1371/journal.pone.0207172},
number={11e0207172}, journal={PLoS ONE}, publisher={Public Library of Science},
author={Mir Djawadi, Behnud and Fahr, Rene and Haake, Claus-Jochen and Recker,
Sonja}, year={2018} }'
chicago: Mir Djawadi, Behnud, Rene Fahr, Claus-Jochen Haake, and Sonja Recker. “Maintaining
vs. Milking Good Reputation When Customer Feedback Is Inaccurate.” PLoS ONE
13, no. 11 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0207172.
ieee: B. Mir Djawadi, R. Fahr, C.-J. Haake, and S. Recker, “Maintaining vs. Milking
Good Reputation when Customer Feedback is Inaccurate,” PLoS ONE, vol. 13,
no. 11, 2018.
mla: Mir Djawadi, Behnud, et al. “Maintaining vs. Milking Good Reputation When Customer
Feedback Is Inaccurate.” PLoS ONE, vol. 13, no. 11, e0207172, Public Library
of Science, 2018, doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0207172.
short: B. Mir Djawadi, R. Fahr, C.-J. Haake, S. Recker, PLoS ONE 13 (2018).
date_created: 2018-11-03T11:51:48Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:01:50Z
ddc:
- '330'
department:
- _id: '205'
- _id: '475'
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0207172
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: cjhaake
date_created: 2018-11-13T20:51:34Z
date_updated: 2018-11-13T20:51:34Z
file_id: '5542'
file_name: Maintaining_vs_Milking.pdf
file_size: 1107189
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-11-13T20:51:34Z
funded_apc: '1'
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: ' 13'
issue: '11'
language:
- iso: eng
project:
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
- _id: '8'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject A4
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
publication: PLoS ONE
publication_identifier:
eissn:
- 1932-6203
publication_status: published
publisher: Public Library of Science
status: public
title: Maintaining vs. Milking Good Reputation when Customer Feedback is Inaccurate
type: journal_article
user_id: '477'
volume: 13
year: '2018'
...
---
_id: '2527'
author:
- first_name: Thomas
full_name: Gries, Thomas
last_name: Gries
- first_name: Claus-Jochen
full_name: Haake, Claus-Jochen
id: '20801'
last_name: Haake
citation:
ama: Gries T, Haake C-J. Towards an Economic Theory of Destabilization War. Peace
Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy. 2016;22(4):377-384. doi:10.1515/peps-2016-0042
apa: Gries, T., & Haake, C.-J. (2016). Towards an Economic Theory of Destabilization
War. Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy, 22(4), 377–384.
https://doi.org/10.1515/peps-2016-0042
bibtex: '@article{Gries_Haake_2016, title={Towards an Economic Theory of Destabilization
War}, volume={22}, DOI={10.1515/peps-2016-0042},
number={4}, journal={Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy}, publisher={Walter
de Gruyter GmbH}, author={Gries, Thomas and Haake, Claus-Jochen}, year={2016},
pages={377–384} }'
chicago: 'Gries, Thomas, and Claus-Jochen Haake. “Towards an Economic Theory of
Destabilization War.” Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy
22, no. 4 (2016): 377–84. https://doi.org/10.1515/peps-2016-0042.'
ieee: T. Gries and C.-J. Haake, “Towards an Economic Theory of Destabilization War,”
Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy, vol. 22, no. 4, pp. 377–384,
2016.
mla: Gries, Thomas, and Claus-Jochen Haake. “Towards an Economic Theory of Destabilization
War.” Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy, vol. 22, no. 4,
Walter de Gruyter GmbH, 2016, pp. 377–84, doi:10.1515/peps-2016-0042.
short: T. Gries, C.-J. Haake, Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy 22
(2016) 377–384.
date_created: 2018-04-26T10:59:20Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:56:58Z
ddc:
- '040'
department:
- _id: '205'
- _id: '475'
doi: 10.1515/peps-2016-0042
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: cjhaake
date_created: 2018-08-09T08:56:42Z
date_updated: 2018-08-09T09:19:05Z
file_id: '3864'
file_name: Towards an Economic Theory of Destabilization War.pdf
file_size: 250706
relation: main_file
title: Towards an Economic Theory of Destabilization War
file_date_updated: 2018-08-09T09:19:05Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: ' 22'
issue: '4'
language:
- iso: eng
page: 377 - 384
publication: Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy
publication_identifier:
issn:
- 1554-8597
- 1079-2457
publication_status: published
publisher: Walter de Gruyter GmbH
status: public
title: Towards an Economic Theory of Destabilization War
type: journal_article
urn: '25277'
user_id: '65453'
volume: 22
year: '2016'
...
---
_id: '8836'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: While Islamic State is the most present example, it is a fact that in many
places around the globe, throughout history initially small groups have tried
to challenge and destabilize or even overthrow governments by means of terrorist
and guerrilla strategies. Therefore, we answer two questions. Why does a small
group of insurgents believe it can overthrow the government by turning violent,
even if the government is clearly superior? And how does a conflict develop into
terrorism, a guerilla war, or a major conventional civil war, or is resolved peacefully?
We develop a formal model for rebels and government and derive optimal choices.
Further, we focus on three elements as important ingredients of a "destabilization
war". All three of these - large random events, time preference (which we relate
to ideology), and choice of duration of fight - are rarely considered in formal
conflict theory. We can answer the above two questions using game theory analysis.
First, insurgents rise up because they hope to destabilize through permanent challenging
attacks. In this context, large randomness is an important ally of rebels. While
each individual attack may have a low impact, at some point a large random event
could lead to success. Hence, the duration of activities is a constitutive element
of this kind of armed conflict. Patience (low time preference), which may reflect
rebels' degree of ideological motivation, is crucial. Second, the mode of warfare
or the conflict resolutions that develop are generally path-dependent and conditioned
on the full set of options (including compromise). Various conditions (level of
funding, ease of recruitment, access to weapons) influence different modes of
warfare or a peaceful compromise in a complex way.
author:
- first_name: Thomas
full_name: Gries, Thomas
id: '186'
last_name: Gries
- first_name: Claus-Jochen
full_name: Haake, Claus-Jochen
id: '20801'
last_name: Haake
citation:
ama: Gries T, Haake C-J. An Economic Theory of “Destabilization War.” Vol
95.; 2016.
apa: Gries, T., & Haake, C.-J. (2016). An Economic Theory of “Destabilization
War” (Vol. 95).
bibtex: '@book{Gries_Haake_2016, series={Working Papers CIE}, title={An Economic
Theory of “Destabilization War”}, volume={95}, author={Gries, Thomas and Haake,
Claus-Jochen}, year={2016}, collection={Working Papers CIE} }'
chicago: Gries, Thomas, and Claus-Jochen Haake. An Economic Theory of “Destabilization
War.” Vol. 95. Working Papers CIE, 2016.
ieee: T. Gries and C.-J. Haake, An Economic Theory of “Destabilization War,”
vol. 95. 2016.
mla: Gries, Thomas, and Claus-Jochen Haake. An Economic Theory of “Destabilization
War.” Vol. 95, 2016.
short: T. Gries, C.-J. Haake, An Economic Theory of “Destabilization War,” 2016.
date_created: 2019-04-08T06:45:02Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:04:03Z
ddc:
- '040'
department:
- _id: '205'
- _id: '475'
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: cjhaake
date_created: 2019-04-08T06:49:16Z
date_updated: 2019-04-08T06:49:16Z
file_id: '8838'
file_name: WP - An Economic Theory of ’Destabilization War'.pdf
file_size: 516125
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2019-04-08T06:49:16Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: ' 95'
jel:
- H56
- O10
- D84
- C72
- D74
keyword:
- terrorism
- civil war
- conflict duration
- game theory
- stochastic process
- ideology
language:
- iso: eng
series_title: Working Papers CIE
status: public
title: An Economic Theory of 'Destabilization War'
type: working_paper
user_id: '20801'
volume: 95
year: '2016'
...
---
_id: '249'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: 'We analyze the stability of networks when two intermediaries strategically
form costly links to customers. We interpret these links as customer relationships
that enable trade to sell a product. Equilibrium prices and equilibrium quantities
on the output as well as on the input market are determined endogenously for a
given network of customer relationships. We investigate in how far the substitutability
of the intermediaries'' products and the costs of link formation influence the
intermediaries'' equilibrium profits and thus have an impact on the incentives
to strategically form relationships to customers. For networks with three customers
we characterize locally stable networks, in particular existence is guaranteed
for any degree of substitutability. Moreover for the special cases of perfect
complements, independent products and perfect substitutes, local stability coincides
with the stronger concept of Nash stability. Additionally, for networks with n
customers we analyze stability regions for selected networks and determine their
limits when n goes to infinity. It turns out that the shape of the stability regions
for those networks does not significantly change compared to a setting with a
small number of customers. '
author:
- first_name: Sonja
full_name: Brangewitz, Sonja
last_name: Brangewitz
- first_name: Claus-Jochen
full_name: Haake, Claus-Jochen
id: '20801'
last_name: Haake
- first_name: Philipp
full_name: Möhlmeier, Philipp
last_name: Möhlmeier
citation:
ama: Brangewitz S, Haake C-J, Möhlmeier P. Strategic Formation of Customer Relationship
Networks. Vol 91. Universität Paderborn; 2015.
apa: Brangewitz, S., Haake, C.-J., & Möhlmeier, P. (2015). Strategic Formation
of Customer Relationship Networks (Vol. 91). Universität Paderborn.
bibtex: '@book{Brangewitz_Haake_Möhlmeier_2015, series={Working Papers CIE}, title={Strategic
Formation of Customer Relationship Networks}, volume={91}, publisher={Universität
Paderborn}, author={Brangewitz, Sonja and Haake, Claus-Jochen and Möhlmeier, Philipp},
year={2015}, collection={Working Papers CIE} }'
chicago: Brangewitz, Sonja, Claus-Jochen Haake, and Philipp Möhlmeier. Strategic
Formation of Customer Relationship Networks. Vol. 91. Working Papers CIE.
Universität Paderborn, 2015.
ieee: S. Brangewitz, C.-J. Haake, and P. Möhlmeier, Strategic Formation of Customer
Relationship Networks, vol. 91. Universität Paderborn, 2015.
mla: Brangewitz, Sonja, et al. Strategic Formation of Customer Relationship Networks.
Vol. 91, Universität Paderborn, 2015.
short: S. Brangewitz, C.-J. Haake, P. Möhlmeier, Strategic Formation of Customer
Relationship Networks, Universität Paderborn, 2015.
date_created: 2017-10-17T12:41:40Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:56:40Z
ddc:
- '040'
department:
- _id: '205'
- _id: '475'
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: cjhaake
date_created: 2018-08-09T09:10:34Z
date_updated: 2018-08-09T09:13:36Z
file_id: '3865'
file_name: WP - Strategic Formation of Customer Relationship Networks.pdf
file_size: 908865
relation: main_file
title: Strategic Formation of Customer Relationship Networks
file_date_updated: 2018-08-09T09:13:36Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: ' 91'
language:
- iso: eng
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
publisher: Universität Paderborn
series_title: Working Papers CIE
status: public
title: Strategic Formation of Customer Relationship Networks
type: working_paper
urn: '2499'
user_id: '65453'
volume: 91
year: '2015'
...
---
_id: '382'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: This paper explores how cloud provider competition influences instance pricing
in an IaaS (Infrastructure-as-a-Service) market. When reserved instance pricing
includes an on-demand price component in addition to a reservation fee (two-part
tariffs), different providers might offer different price combinations, where
the client’s choice depends on its load profile. We investigate a duopoly of providers
and analyze stable market prices in two-part tariffs. Further, we study offers
that allow a specified amount of included usage (three-part tariffs). Neither two-part
nor three-part tariffs produce an equilibrium market outcome other than a service
pricing that equals production cost, i.e., complex price structures do not significantly
affect the results from ordinary Bertrand competition.
author:
- first_name: Jörn
full_name: Künsemöller, Jörn
last_name: Künsemöller
- first_name: Sonja
full_name: Brangewitz, Sonja
last_name: Brangewitz
- first_name: Holger
full_name: Karl, Holger
id: '126'
last_name: Karl
- first_name: Claus-Jochen
full_name: Haake, Claus-Jochen
id: '20801'
last_name: Haake
citation:
ama: 'Künsemöller J, Brangewitz S, Karl H, Haake C-J. Provider Competition in Infrastructure-as-a-Service.
In: Proceedings of the 2014 IEEE International Conference on Services Computing
(SCC). ; 2014:203-210. doi:10.1109/SCC.2014.35'
apa: Künsemöller, J., Brangewitz, S., Karl, H., & Haake, C.-J. (2014). Provider
Competition in Infrastructure-as-a-Service. In Proceedings of the 2014 IEEE
International Conference on Services Computing (SCC) (pp. 203–210). https://doi.org/10.1109/SCC.2014.35
bibtex: '@inproceedings{Künsemöller_Brangewitz_Karl_Haake_2014, title={Provider
Competition in Infrastructure-as-a-Service}, DOI={10.1109/SCC.2014.35},
booktitle={Proceedings of the 2014 IEEE International Conference on Services Computing
(SCC)}, author={Künsemöller, Jörn and Brangewitz, Sonja and Karl, Holger and Haake,
Claus-Jochen}, year={2014}, pages={203–210} }'
chicago: Künsemöller, Jörn, Sonja Brangewitz, Holger Karl, and Claus-Jochen Haake.
“Provider Competition in Infrastructure-as-a-Service.” In Proceedings of the
2014 IEEE International Conference on Services Computing (SCC), 203–10, 2014.
https://doi.org/10.1109/SCC.2014.35.
ieee: J. Künsemöller, S. Brangewitz, H. Karl, and C.-J. Haake, “Provider Competition
in Infrastructure-as-a-Service,” in Proceedings of the 2014 IEEE International
Conference on Services Computing (SCC), 2014, pp. 203–210.
mla: Künsemöller, Jörn, et al. “Provider Competition in Infrastructure-as-a-Service.”
Proceedings of the 2014 IEEE International Conference on Services Computing
(SCC), 2014, pp. 203–10, doi:10.1109/SCC.2014.35.
short: 'J. Künsemöller, S. Brangewitz, H. Karl, C.-J. Haake, in: Proceedings of
the 2014 IEEE International Conference on Services Computing (SCC), 2014, pp.
203–210.'
date_created: 2017-10-17T12:42:06Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:59:37Z
ddc:
- '004'
department:
- _id: '75'
- _id: '205'
doi: 10.1109/SCC.2014.35
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: ups
date_created: 2018-11-02T13:34:46Z
date_updated: 2018-11-02T13:34:46Z
file_id: '5250'
file_name: 06930535.pdf
file_size: 228172
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-11-02T13:34:46Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
language:
- iso: eng
page: 203-210
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '6'
name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A2
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
publication: Proceedings of the 2014 IEEE International Conference on Services Computing
(SCC)
status: public
title: Provider Competition in Infrastructure-as-a-Service
type: conference
user_id: '477'
year: '2014'
...