--- _id: '45878' author: - first_name: Claus-Jochen full_name: Haake, Claus-Jochen id: '20801' last_name: Haake - first_name: Burkhard full_name: Hehenkamp, Burkhard id: '37339' last_name: Hehenkamp - first_name: Gleb full_name: Polevoy, Gleb id: '83983' last_name: Polevoy citation: ama: 'Haake C-J, Hehenkamp B, Polevoy G. The Market for Services: Incentives, Algorithms, Implementation. In: Haake C-J, Meyer auf der Heide F, Platzner M, Wachsmuth H, Wehrheim H, eds. On-The-Fly Computing -- Individualized IT-Services in Dynamic Markets. Vol 412. Verlagsschriftenreihe des Heinz Nixdorf Instituts. Heinz Nixdorf Institut, Universität Paderborn; 2023:21-44. doi:10.5281/zenodo.8068414' apa: 'Haake, C.-J., Hehenkamp, B., & Polevoy, G. (2023). The Market for Services: Incentives, Algorithms, Implementation. In C.-J. Haake, F. Meyer auf der Heide, M. Platzner, H. Wachsmuth, & H. Wehrheim (Eds.), On-The-Fly Computing -- Individualized IT-services in dynamic markets (Vol. 412, pp. 21–44). Heinz Nixdorf Institut, Universität Paderborn. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.8068414' bibtex: '@inbook{Haake_Hehenkamp_Polevoy_2023, place={Paderborn}, series={Verlagsschriftenreihe des Heinz Nixdorf Instituts}, title={The Market for Services: Incentives, Algorithms, Implementation}, volume={412}, DOI={10.5281/zenodo.8068414}, booktitle={On-The-Fly Computing -- Individualized IT-services in dynamic markets}, publisher={Heinz Nixdorf Institut, Universität Paderborn}, author={Haake, Claus-Jochen and Hehenkamp, Burkhard and Polevoy, Gleb}, editor={Haake, Claus-Jochen and Meyer auf der Heide, Friedhelm and Platzner, Marco and Wachsmuth, Henning and Wehrheim, Heike}, year={2023}, pages={21–44}, collection={Verlagsschriftenreihe des Heinz Nixdorf Instituts} }' chicago: 'Haake, Claus-Jochen, Burkhard Hehenkamp, and Gleb Polevoy. “The Market for Services: Incentives, Algorithms, Implementation.” In On-The-Fly Computing -- Individualized IT-Services in Dynamic Markets, edited by Claus-Jochen Haake, Friedhelm Meyer auf der Heide, Marco Platzner, Henning Wachsmuth, and Heike Wehrheim, 412:21–44. Verlagsschriftenreihe Des Heinz Nixdorf Instituts. Paderborn: Heinz Nixdorf Institut, Universität Paderborn, 2023. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.8068414.' ieee: 'C.-J. Haake, B. Hehenkamp, and G. Polevoy, “The Market for Services: Incentives, Algorithms, Implementation,” in On-The-Fly Computing -- Individualized IT-services in dynamic markets, vol. 412, C.-J. Haake, F. Meyer auf der Heide, M. Platzner, H. Wachsmuth, and H. Wehrheim, Eds. Paderborn: Heinz Nixdorf Institut, Universität Paderborn, 2023, pp. 21–44.' mla: 'Haake, Claus-Jochen, et al. “The Market for Services: Incentives, Algorithms, Implementation.” On-The-Fly Computing -- Individualized IT-Services in Dynamic Markets, edited by Claus-Jochen Haake et al., vol. 412, Heinz Nixdorf Institut, Universität Paderborn, 2023, pp. 21–44, doi:10.5281/zenodo.8068414.' short: 'C.-J. Haake, B. Hehenkamp, G. Polevoy, in: C.-J. Haake, F. Meyer auf der Heide, M. Platzner, H. Wachsmuth, H. Wehrheim (Eds.), On-The-Fly Computing -- Individualized IT-Services in Dynamic Markets, Heinz Nixdorf Institut, Universität Paderborn, Paderborn, 2023, pp. 21–44.' date_created: 2023-07-07T07:02:44Z date_updated: 2023-07-07T11:23:08Z ddc: - '004' department: - _id: '7' - _id: '19' doi: 10.5281/zenodo.8068414 editor: - first_name: Claus-Jochen full_name: Haake, Claus-Jochen last_name: Haake - first_name: Friedhelm full_name: Meyer auf der Heide, Friedhelm last_name: Meyer auf der Heide - first_name: Marco full_name: Platzner, Marco last_name: Platzner - first_name: Henning full_name: Wachsmuth, Henning last_name: Wachsmuth - first_name: Heike full_name: Wehrheim, Heike last_name: Wehrheim file: - access_level: open_access content_type: application/pdf creator: florida date_created: 2023-07-07T06:59:23Z date_updated: 2023-07-07T11:23:07Z file_id: '45879' file_name: A3-Chapter-SFB-Buch-Final.pdf file_size: 1116173 relation: main_file file_date_updated: 2023-07-07T11:23:07Z has_accepted_license: '1' intvolume: ' 412' language: - iso: eng oa: '1' page: 21-44 place: Paderborn project: - _id: '1' grant_number: '160364472' name: 'SFB 901: SFB 901: On-The-Fly Computing - Individualisierte IT-Dienstleistungen in dynamischen Märkten ' - _id: '2' name: 'SFB 901 - A: SFB 901 - Project Area A' - _id: '7' grant_number: '160364472' name: 'SFB 901 - A3: SFB 901 - Der Markt für Services: Anreize, Algorithmen, Implementation (Subproject A3)' publication: On-The-Fly Computing -- Individualized IT-services in dynamic markets publisher: Heinz Nixdorf Institut, Universität Paderborn series_title: Verlagsschriftenreihe des Heinz Nixdorf Instituts status: public title: 'The Market for Services: Incentives, Algorithms, Implementation' type: book_chapter user_id: '477' volume: 412 year: '2023' ... --- _id: '45863' abstract: - lang: eng text: "In the proposal for our CRC in 2011, we formulated a vision of markets for\r\nIT services that describes an approach to the provision of such services\r\nthat was novel at that time and, to a large extent, remains so today:\r\n„Our vision of on-the-fly computing is that of IT services individually and\r\nautomatically configured and brought to execution from flexibly combinable\r\nservices traded on markets. At the same time, we aim at organizing\r\nmarkets whose participants maintain a lively market of services through\r\nappropriate entrepreneurial actions.“\r\nOver the last 12 years, we have developed methods and techniques to\r\naddress problems critical to the convenient, efficient, and secure use of\r\non-the-fly computing. Among other things, we have made the description\r\nof services more convenient by allowing natural language input,\r\nincreased the quality of configured services through (natural language)\r\ninteraction and more efficient configuration processes and analysis\r\nprocedures, made the quality of (the products of) providers in the\r\nmarketplace transparent through reputation systems, and increased the\r\nresource efficiency of execution through reconfigurable heterogeneous\r\ncomputing nodes and an integrated treatment of service description and\r\nconfiguration. We have also developed network infrastructures that have\r\na high degree of adaptivity, scalability, efficiency, and reliability, and\r\nprovide cryptographic guarantees of anonymity and security for market\r\nparticipants and their products and services.\r\nTo demonstrate the pervasiveness of the OTF computing approach, we\r\nhave implemented a proof-of-concept for OTF computing that can run\r\ntypical scenarios of an OTF market. We illustrated the approach using\r\na cutting-edge application scenario – automated machine learning (AutoML).\r\nFinally, we have been pushing our work for the perpetuation of\r\nOn-The-Fly Computing beyond the SFB and sharing the expertise gained\r\nin the SFB in events with industry partners as well as transfer projects.\r\nThis work required a broad spectrum of expertise. Computer scientists\r\nand economists with research interests such as computer networks and\r\ndistributed algorithms, security and cryptography, software engineering\r\nand verification, configuration and machine learning, computer engineering\r\nand HPC, microeconomics and game theory, business informatics\r\nand management have successfully collaborated here." alternative_title: - Collaborative Research Centre 901 (2011 – 2023) author: - first_name: Claus-Jochen full_name: Haake, Claus-Jochen id: '20801' last_name: Haake - first_name: Friedhelm full_name: Meyer auf der Heide, Friedhelm id: '15523' last_name: Meyer auf der Heide - first_name: Marco full_name: Platzner, Marco id: '398' last_name: Platzner - first_name: Henning full_name: Wachsmuth, Henning id: '3900' last_name: Wachsmuth - first_name: Heike full_name: Wehrheim, Heike id: '573' last_name: Wehrheim citation: ama: Haake C-J, Meyer auf der Heide F, Platzner M, Wachsmuth H, Wehrheim H. On-The-Fly Computing -- Individualized IT-Services in Dynamic Markets. Vol 412. Heinz Nixdorf Institut, Universität Paderborn; 2023. doi:10.17619/UNIPB/1-1797 apa: Haake, C.-J., Meyer auf der Heide, F., Platzner, M., Wachsmuth, H., & Wehrheim, H. (2023). On-The-Fly Computing -- Individualized IT-services in dynamic markets (Vol. 412). Heinz Nixdorf Institut, Universität Paderborn. https://doi.org/10.17619/UNIPB/1-1797 bibtex: '@book{Haake_Meyer auf der Heide_Platzner_Wachsmuth_Wehrheim_2023, place={Paderborn}, series={Verlagsschriftenreihe des Heinz Nixdorf Instituts}, title={On-The-Fly Computing -- Individualized IT-services in dynamic markets}, volume={412}, DOI={10.17619/UNIPB/1-1797}, publisher={Heinz Nixdorf Institut, Universität Paderborn}, author={Haake, Claus-Jochen and Meyer auf der Heide, Friedhelm and Platzner, Marco and Wachsmuth, Henning and Wehrheim, Heike}, year={2023}, collection={Verlagsschriftenreihe des Heinz Nixdorf Instituts} }' chicago: 'Haake, Claus-Jochen, Friedhelm Meyer auf der Heide, Marco Platzner, Henning Wachsmuth, and Heike Wehrheim. On-The-Fly Computing -- Individualized IT-Services in Dynamic Markets. Vol. 412. Verlagsschriftenreihe Des Heinz Nixdorf Instituts. Paderborn: Heinz Nixdorf Institut, Universität Paderborn, 2023. https://doi.org/10.17619/UNIPB/1-1797.' ieee: 'C.-J. Haake, F. Meyer auf der Heide, M. Platzner, H. Wachsmuth, and H. Wehrheim, On-The-Fly Computing -- Individualized IT-services in dynamic markets, vol. 412. Paderborn: Heinz Nixdorf Institut, Universität Paderborn, 2023.' mla: Haake, Claus-Jochen, et al. On-The-Fly Computing -- Individualized IT-Services in Dynamic Markets. Heinz Nixdorf Institut, Universität Paderborn, 2023, doi:10.17619/UNIPB/1-1797. short: C.-J. Haake, F. Meyer auf der Heide, M. Platzner, H. Wachsmuth, H. Wehrheim, On-The-Fly Computing -- Individualized IT-Services in Dynamic Markets, Heinz Nixdorf Institut, Universität Paderborn, Paderborn, 2023. date_created: 2023-07-05T07:16:51Z date_updated: 2023-08-29T06:44:36Z ddc: - '000' department: - _id: '7' doi: 10.17619/UNIPB/1-1797 file: - access_level: open_access content_type: application/pdf creator: ups date_created: 2023-07-05T07:15:55Z date_updated: 2023-07-05T07:19:14Z file_id: '45864' file_name: SFB-Buch-Final.pdf file_size: 15480050 relation: main_file file_date_updated: 2023-07-05T07:19:14Z has_accepted_license: '1' intvolume: ' 412' language: - iso: eng oa: '1' page: '247' place: Paderborn project: - _id: '1' grant_number: '160364472' name: 'SFB 901: SFB 901: On-The-Fly Computing - Individualisierte IT-Dienstleistungen in dynamischen Märkten ' - _id: '2' name: 'SFB 901 - A: SFB 901 - Project Area A' - _id: '3' name: 'SFB 901 - B: SFB 901 - Project Area B' - _id: '4' name: 'SFB 901 - C: SFB 901 - Project Area C' - _id: '82' name: 'SFB 901 - T: SFB 901 - Project Area T' - _id: '5' grant_number: '160364472' name: 'SFB 901 - A1: SFB 901 - Möglichkeiten und Grenzen lokaler Strategien in dynamischen Netzen (Subproject A1)' - _id: '7' grant_number: '160364472' name: 'SFB 901 - A3: SFB 901 - Der Markt für Services: Anreize, Algorithmen, Implementation (Subproject A3)' - _id: '8' grant_number: '160364472' name: 'SFB 901 - A4: SFB 901 - Empirische Analysen in Märkten für OTF Dienstleistungen (Subproject A4)' - _id: '9' grant_number: '160364472' name: 'SFB 901 - B1: SFB 901 - Parametrisierte Servicespezifikation (Subproject B1)' - _id: '10' grant_number: '160364472' name: 'SFB 901 - B2: Konfiguration und Bewertung (B02)' - _id: '11' name: 'SFB 901 - B3: SFB 901 - Subproject B3' - _id: '12' name: 'SFB 901 - B4: SFB 901 - Subproject B4' - _id: '13' name: 'SFB 901 - C1: SFB 901 - Subproject C1' - _id: '14' grant_number: '160364472' name: 'SFB 901 - C2: SFB 901 - On-The-Fly Compute Centers I: Heterogene Ausführungsumgebungen (Subproject C2)' - _id: '16' grant_number: '160364472' name: 'SFB 901 - C4: SFB 901 - On-The-Fly Compute Centers II: Ausführung komponierter Dienste in konfigurierbaren Rechenzentren (Subproject C4)' - _id: '17' name: 'SFB 901 - C5: SFB 901 - Subproject C5' - _id: '83' name: 'SFB 901 - T1: SFB 901 -Subproject T1' - _id: '84' name: 'SFB 901 - T2: SFB 901 -Subproject T2' publication_identifier: unknown: - 978-3-947647-31-6 publisher: Heinz Nixdorf Institut, Universität Paderborn series_title: Verlagsschriftenreihe des Heinz Nixdorf Instituts status: public title: On-The-Fly Computing -- Individualized IT-services in dynamic markets type: book user_id: '477' volume: 412 year: '2023' ... --- _id: '34114' abstract: - lang: eng text: "Qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) enables researchers in international management to better understand how the impact of a single explanatory factor depends on the context of other factors. But the analytical toolbox of QCA does not include a parameter for the explanatory power of a single explanatory factor or “condition”. In this paper, we therefore reinterpret the Banzhaf power index, originally developed in cooperative game theory, to establish a goodness-of-fit parameter in QCA. The relative Banzhaf index we suggest measures the explanatory power of one condition averaged across all sufficient combinations of conditions. The paper argues that the index is especially informative in three situations that are all salient in international management and call for a context-sensitive analysis of single conditions, namely substantial limited diversity in the data, the emergence of strong INUS conditions in the analysis, and theorizing with contingency factors. The paper derives the properties of the relative Banzhaf index in QCA, demonstrates how the index can be computed easily from a rudimentary truth table, and explores its insights by revisiting selected papers in international management that apply fuzzy-set QCA. It finally suggests a three-step procedure for utilizing the relative Banzhaf index when the causal structure involves both contingency effects and configurational causation.\r\n" article_type: original author: - first_name: Claus-Jochen full_name: Haake, Claus-Jochen id: '20801' last_name: Haake - first_name: Martin full_name: Schneider, Martin id: '471' last_name: Schneider orcid: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6961-3716 citation: ama: 'Haake C-J, Schneider M. Playing games with QCA: Measuring the explanatory power of single conditions with the Banzhaf index. Journal of International Management.' apa: 'Haake, C.-J., & Schneider, M. (n.d.). Playing games with QCA: Measuring the explanatory power of single conditions with the Banzhaf index. Journal of International Management.' bibtex: '@article{Haake_Schneider, title={Playing games with QCA: Measuring the explanatory power of single conditions with the Banzhaf index}, journal={Journal of International Management}, publisher={Elsevier}, author={Haake, Claus-Jochen and Schneider, Martin} }' chicago: 'Haake, Claus-Jochen, and Martin Schneider. “Playing Games with QCA: Measuring the Explanatory Power of Single Conditions with the Banzhaf Index.” Journal of International Management, n.d.' ieee: 'C.-J. Haake and M. Schneider, “Playing games with QCA: Measuring the explanatory power of single conditions with the Banzhaf index,” Journal of International Management.' mla: 'Haake, Claus-Jochen, and Martin Schneider. “Playing Games with QCA: Measuring the Explanatory Power of Single Conditions with the Banzhaf Index.” Journal of International Management, Elsevier.' short: C.-J. Haake, M. Schneider, Journal of International Management (n.d.). date_created: 2022-11-19T15:33:27Z date_updated: 2023-08-29T16:17:48Z department: - _id: '205' - _id: '475' - _id: '178' - _id: '185' keyword: - Qualitative comparative analysis - Banzhaf power index - causality - explanatory power language: - iso: eng project: - _id: '1' grant_number: '160364472' name: 'SFB 901: SFB 901' - _id: '2' name: 'SFB 901 - A: SFB 901 - Project Area A' - _id: '7' grant_number: '160364472' name: 'SFB 901 - A3: SFB 901 - Subproject A3' publication: Journal of International Management publication_status: accepted publisher: Elsevier status: public title: 'Playing games with QCA: Measuring the explanatory power of single conditions with the Banzhaf index' type: journal_article user_id: '20801' year: '2023' ... --- _id: '32106' abstract: - lang: eng text: We study the consequences of modeling asymmetric bargaining power in two-person bargaining problems. Comparing application of an asymmetric version of a bargaining solution to an upfront modification of the disagreement point, the resulting distortion crucially depends on the bargaining solution concept. While for the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution weaker players benefit from modifying the disagreement point, the situation is reversed for the Nash bargaining solution. There, weaker players are better off in the asymmetric bargaining solution. When comparing application of the asymmetric versions of the Nash and the Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions, we demonstrate that there is an upper bound for the weight of a player, so that she is better off with the Nash bargaining solution. This threshold is ultimately determined by the relative utilitarian bargaining solution. From a mechanism design perspective, our results provide valuable information for a social planner, when implementing a bargaining solution for unequally powerful players. author: - first_name: Claus-Jochen full_name: Haake, Claus-Jochen id: '20801' last_name: Haake - first_name: Thomas full_name: Streck, Thomas id: '33041' last_name: Streck citation: ama: Haake C-J, Streck T. Distortion through Modeling Asymmetric Bargaining Power. Vol 148.; 2022. apa: Haake, C.-J., & Streck, T. (2022). Distortion through modeling asymmetric bargaining power (Vol. 148). bibtex: '@book{Haake_Streck_2022, series={CIE Working Paper Series}, title={Distortion through modeling asymmetric bargaining power}, volume={148}, author={Haake, Claus-Jochen and Streck, Thomas}, year={2022}, collection={CIE Working Paper Series} }' chicago: Haake, Claus-Jochen, and Thomas Streck. Distortion through Modeling Asymmetric Bargaining Power. Vol. 148. CIE Working Paper Series, 2022. ieee: C.-J. Haake and T. Streck, Distortion through modeling asymmetric bargaining power, vol. 148. 2022. mla: Haake, Claus-Jochen, and Thomas Streck. Distortion through Modeling Asymmetric Bargaining Power. 2022. short: C.-J. Haake, T. Streck, Distortion through Modeling Asymmetric Bargaining Power, 2022. date_created: 2022-06-22T12:12:58Z date_updated: 2022-11-19T15:42:15Z department: - _id: '205' - _id: '475' - _id: '200' intvolume: ' 148' jel: - C78 - D63 keyword: - Asymmetric bargaining power - Nash bargaining solution - Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution language: - iso: eng page: '17' project: - _id: '2' name: 'SFB 901 - A: SFB 901 - Project Area A' - _id: '7' name: 'SFB 901 - A3: SFB 901 - Subproject A3' - _id: '1' name: 'SFB 901: SFB 901' series_title: CIE Working Paper Series status: public title: Distortion through modeling asymmetric bargaining power type: working_paper user_id: '20801' volume: 148 year: '2022' ... --- _id: '30940' abstract: - lang: eng text: "We analyse the two-dimensional Nash bargaining solution (NBS) by deploying\r\nthe standard labour market negotiations model of McDonald and Solow (1981).\r\nWe show that the two-dimensional bargaining problem can be decomposed into two\r\none-dimensional problems, such that the two solutions together replicate the solution\r\nof the two-dimensional problem if the NBS is applied. The axiom of\r\nIndependence of Irrelevant Alternatives is shown to be crucial for this type\r\nof decomposability. \ This result has significant implications for actual\r\nnegotiations because it allows for the decomposition of a multi-dimensional bargaining\r\nproblem into one-dimensional problems---and thus helps to facilitate real-world\r\nnegotiations." article_type: original author: - first_name: Claus-Jochen full_name: Haake, Claus-Jochen id: '20801' last_name: Haake - first_name: Thorsten full_name: Upmann, Thorsten last_name: Upmann - first_name: Papatya full_name: Duman, Papatya id: '72752' last_name: Duman citation: ama: 'Haake C-J, Upmann T, Duman P. Wage Bargaining and Employment Revisited: Separability and Efficiency in Collective Bargaining. Scandinavian Journal of Economics. 2022;125(2):403-440. doi:https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12518' apa: 'Haake, C.-J., Upmann, T., & Duman, P. (2022). Wage Bargaining and Employment Revisited: Separability and Efficiency in Collective Bargaining. Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 125(2), 403–440. https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12518' bibtex: '@article{Haake_Upmann_Duman_2022, title={Wage Bargaining and Employment Revisited: Separability and Efficiency in Collective Bargaining}, volume={125}, DOI={https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12518}, number={2}, journal={Scandinavian Journal of Economics}, publisher={Wiley}, author={Haake, Claus-Jochen and Upmann, Thorsten and Duman, Papatya}, year={2022}, pages={403–440} }' chicago: 'Haake, Claus-Jochen, Thorsten Upmann, and Papatya Duman. “Wage Bargaining and Employment Revisited: Separability and Efficiency in Collective Bargaining.” Scandinavian Journal of Economics 125, no. 2 (2022): 403–40. https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12518.' ieee: 'C.-J. Haake, T. Upmann, and P. Duman, “Wage Bargaining and Employment Revisited: Separability and Efficiency in Collective Bargaining,” Scandinavian Journal of Economics, vol. 125, no. 2, pp. 403–440, 2022, doi: https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12518.' mla: 'Haake, Claus-Jochen, et al. “Wage Bargaining and Employment Revisited: Separability and Efficiency in Collective Bargaining.” Scandinavian Journal of Economics, vol. 125, no. 2, Wiley, 2022, pp. 403–40, doi:https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12518.' short: C.-J. Haake, T. Upmann, P. Duman, Scandinavian Journal of Economics 125 (2022) 403–440. date_created: 2022-04-22T14:10:44Z date_updated: 2023-06-08T16:42:31Z ddc: - '330' department: - _id: '205' - _id: '475' doi: https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12518 funded_apc: '1' has_accepted_license: '1' intvolume: ' 125' issue: '2' jel: - J52 - J41 - C78 keyword: - Labour market negotiations - efficient bargains - Nash bargaining solution - sequential bargaining - restricted bargaining games language: - iso: eng main_file_link: - url: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/sjoe.12518 page: 403-440 project: - _id: '7' grant_number: '160364472' name: 'SFB 901 - A3: SFB 901 - Subproject A3' - _id: '2' name: 'SFB 901 - A: SFB 901 - Project Area A' - _id: '1' grant_number: '160364472' name: 'SFB 901: SFB 901' publication: Scandinavian Journal of Economics publication_identifier: eissn: - 0347-0520 publication_status: published publisher: Wiley quality_controlled: '1' status: public title: 'Wage Bargaining and Employment Revisited: Separability and Efficiency in Collective Bargaining' type: journal_article user_id: '20801' volume: 125 year: '2022' ... --- _id: '29152' abstract: - lang: eng text: 'AbstractIn this article we combine Debreu’s (Proc Natl Acad Sci 38(10):886–893, 1952) social system with Hurwicz’s (Econ Design 1(1):1–14, 1994; Am Econ Rev 98(3):577–585, 2008) ideas of embedding a “desired” game form into a “natural” game form that includes all feasible behavior, even if it is “illegal” according to the desired form. For the resulting socio-legal system we extend Debreu’s concepts of a social system and its social equilibria to a socio-legal system with its Debreu–Hurwicz equilibria. We build on a more general version of social equilibrium due to Shafer and Sonnenschein (J Math Econ 2(3):345–348, 1975) that also generalizes the dc-mechanism of Koray and Yildiz (J Econ Theory 176:479–502, 2018) which relates implementation via mechanisms with implementation via rights structures as introduced by Sertel (Designing rights: invisible hand theorems, covering and membership. Tech. rep. Mimeo, Bogazici University, 2001). In the second part we apply and illustrate these new concepts via an application in the narrow welfarist framework of two person cooperative bargaining. There we provide in a socio-legal system based on Nash’s demand game an implementation of the Nash bargaining solution in Debreu–Hurwicz equilibrium.' author: - first_name: Claus-Jochen full_name: Haake, Claus-Jochen id: '20801' last_name: Haake - first_name: Walter full_name: Trockel, Walter last_name: Trockel citation: ama: Haake C-J, Trockel W. Socio-legal systems and implementation of the Nash solution in Debreu–Hurwicz equilibrium. Review of Economic Design. Published online 2021. doi:10.1007/s10058-021-00278-z apa: Haake, C.-J., & Trockel, W. (2021). Socio-legal systems and implementation of the Nash solution in Debreu–Hurwicz equilibrium. Review of Economic Design. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-021-00278-z bibtex: '@article{Haake_Trockel_2021, title={Socio-legal systems and implementation of the Nash solution in Debreu–Hurwicz equilibrium}, DOI={10.1007/s10058-021-00278-z}, journal={Review of Economic Design}, publisher={Springer}, author={Haake, Claus-Jochen and Trockel, Walter}, year={2021} }' chicago: Haake, Claus-Jochen, and Walter Trockel. “Socio-Legal Systems and Implementation of the Nash Solution in Debreu–Hurwicz Equilibrium.” Review of Economic Design, 2021. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-021-00278-z. ieee: 'C.-J. Haake and W. Trockel, “Socio-legal systems and implementation of the Nash solution in Debreu–Hurwicz equilibrium,” Review of Economic Design, 2021, doi: 10.1007/s10058-021-00278-z.' mla: Haake, Claus-Jochen, and Walter Trockel. “Socio-Legal Systems and Implementation of the Nash Solution in Debreu–Hurwicz Equilibrium.” Review of Economic Design, Springer, 2021, doi:10.1007/s10058-021-00278-z. short: C.-J. Haake, W. Trockel, Review of Economic Design (2021). date_created: 2022-01-04T19:54:03Z date_updated: 2022-11-17T14:24:26Z department: - _id: '205' - _id: '475' doi: 10.1007/s10058-021-00278-z funded_apc: '1' language: - iso: eng project: - _id: '7' name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3 - _id: '1' name: 'SFB 901: SFB 901' - _id: '2' name: 'SFB 901 - A: SFB 901 - Project Area A' publication: Review of Economic Design publication_identifier: issn: - 1434-4742 - 1434-4750 publication_status: epub_ahead publisher: Springer status: public title: Socio-legal systems and implementation of the Nash solution in Debreu–Hurwicz equilibrium type: journal_article user_id: '477' year: '2021' ... --- _id: '34115' author: - first_name: Claus-Jochen full_name: Haake, Claus-Jochen id: '20801' last_name: Haake - first_name: Walter full_name: Trockel, Walter last_name: Trockel citation: ama: Haake C-J, Trockel W. Introduction to the Special Issue “Bargaining.” Homo Oeconomicus. 2020;37(1-2):1-6. doi:10.1007/s41412-020-00104-x apa: Haake, C.-J., & Trockel, W. (2020). Introduction to the Special Issue “Bargaining.” Homo Oeconomicus, 37(1–2), 1–6. https://doi.org/10.1007/s41412-020-00104-x bibtex: '@article{Haake_Trockel_2020, title={Introduction to the Special Issue “Bargaining”}, volume={37}, DOI={10.1007/s41412-020-00104-x}, number={1–2}, journal={Homo Oeconomicus}, publisher={Springer Science and Business Media LLC}, author={Haake, Claus-Jochen and Trockel, Walter}, year={2020}, pages={1–6} }' chicago: 'Haake, Claus-Jochen, and Walter Trockel. “Introduction to the Special Issue ‘Bargaining.’” Homo Oeconomicus 37, no. 1–2 (2020): 1–6. https://doi.org/10.1007/s41412-020-00104-x.' ieee: 'C.-J. Haake and W. Trockel, “Introduction to the Special Issue ‘Bargaining,’” Homo Oeconomicus, vol. 37, no. 1–2, pp. 1–6, 2020, doi: 10.1007/s41412-020-00104-x.' mla: Haake, Claus-Jochen, and Walter Trockel. “Introduction to the Special Issue ‘Bargaining.’” Homo Oeconomicus, vol. 37, no. 1–2, Springer Science and Business Media LLC, 2020, pp. 1–6, doi:10.1007/s41412-020-00104-x. short: C.-J. Haake, W. Trockel, Homo Oeconomicus 37 (2020) 1–6. date_created: 2022-11-19T15:44:21Z date_updated: 2022-11-30T13:29:13Z department: - _id: '205' - _id: '475' doi: 10.1007/s41412-020-00104-x intvolume: ' 37' issue: 1-2 keyword: - Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering - Environmental Engineering language: - iso: eng page: 1-6 project: - _id: '1' name: 'SFB 901: SFB 901' - _id: '7' name: 'SFB 901 - A3: SFB 901 - Subproject A3' - _id: '2' name: 'SFB 901 - A: SFB 901 - Project Area A' publication: Homo Oeconomicus publication_identifier: issn: - 0943-0180 - 2366-6161 publication_status: published publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC status: public title: Introduction to the Special Issue “Bargaining” type: journal_article user_id: '477' volume: 37 year: '2020' ... --- _id: '15202' abstract: - lang: eng text: In this paper, we analyze the two-dimensional Nash bargaining solution (NBS) deploying a standard labor market negotiations model (see McDonald and Solow, 1981; Creedy and McDonald, 1991). We show that the two-dimensional bargaining problem can be decomposed into two one-dimensional problems such that the (Cartesian) product of the solutions of these problems replicates the solution of the two-dimensional problem, if the NBS is applied. However, this decomposition fails for any solution concept that does not satisfy the axiom of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA axiom). Our decomposition result has significant implications for actual negotiations, as it allows for the decomposition of a multi-issue bargaining problem into a set of simpler problems, in particular a set of single-issue bargaining problems. In this way, the decomposition may help facilitate negotiations in labor markets and also in other environments. author: - first_name: Claus-Jochen full_name: Haake, Claus-Jochen id: '20801' last_name: Haake - first_name: Thorsten full_name: Upmann, Thorsten last_name: Upmann - first_name: Papatya full_name: Duman, Papatya id: '72752' last_name: Duman citation: ama: Haake C-J, Upmann T, Duman P. The Decomposability of the Nash Bargaining Solution in Labor Markets. Vol 128. CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University; 2019. apa: Haake, C.-J., Upmann, T., & Duman, P. (2019). The Decomposability of the Nash Bargaining Solution in Labor Markets (Vol. 128). CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University. bibtex: '@book{Haake_Upmann_Duman_2019, series={Working Papers CIE}, title={The Decomposability of the Nash Bargaining Solution in Labor Markets}, volume={128}, publisher={CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University}, author={Haake, Claus-Jochen and Upmann, Thorsten and Duman, Papatya}, year={2019}, collection={Working Papers CIE} }' chicago: Haake, Claus-Jochen, Thorsten Upmann, and Papatya Duman. The Decomposability of the Nash Bargaining Solution in Labor Markets. Vol. 128. Working Papers CIE. CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2019. ieee: C.-J. Haake, T. Upmann, and P. Duman, The Decomposability of the Nash Bargaining Solution in Labor Markets, vol. 128. CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2019. mla: Haake, Claus-Jochen, et al. The Decomposability of the Nash Bargaining Solution in Labor Markets. Vol. 128, CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2019. short: C.-J. Haake, T. Upmann, P. Duman, The Decomposability of the Nash Bargaining Solution in Labor Markets, CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2019. date_created: 2019-11-28T09:49:08Z date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:52:16Z ddc: - '040' department: - _id: '205' - _id: '475' file: - access_level: closed content_type: application/pdf creator: stela date_created: 2019-11-28T09:50:10Z date_updated: 2019-11-28T09:50:10Z file_id: '15203' file_name: WP - The Decomposability of the Nash Bargaining Solution in Labor Markets.pdf file_size: 1068284 relation: main_file success: 1 file_date_updated: 2019-11-28T09:50:10Z has_accepted_license: '1' intvolume: ' 128' keyword: - Labor market negotiations - Efficient bargains - Nash bargaining solution - Sequential bargaining - Restricted bargaining games language: - iso: eng project: - _id: '1' name: SFB 901 - _id: '7' name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3 - _id: '2' name: SFB 901 - Project Area A publisher: CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University series_title: Working Papers CIE status: public title: The Decomposability of the Nash Bargaining Solution in Labor Markets type: working_paper user_id: '477' volume: 128 year: '2019' ... --- _id: '2831' abstract: - lang: eng text: 'We consider a market where final products or services are compositions of a number of basic services. Users are asked to evaluate the quality of the composed product after purchase. The quality of the basic service influences the performance of the composed services but cannot be observed directly. The question we pose is whether it is possible to use user evaluations on composed services to assess the quality of basic services. We discuss how to combine aggregation of evaluations across users and disaggregation of information on composed services to derive valuations for the single components. As a solution we propose to use the (weighted) average as aggregation device in connection with the Shapley value as disaggregation method, since this combination fulfills natural requirements in our context. In addition, we address some occurring computational issues: We give an approximate solution concept using only a limited number of evaluations which guarantees nearly optimal results with reduced running time. Lastly, we show that a slightly modified Shapley value and the weighted average are still applicable if the evaluation profiles are incomplete.' author: - first_name: Matthias full_name: Feldotto, Matthias id: '14052' last_name: Feldotto orcid: 0000-0003-1348-6516 - first_name: Claus-Jochen full_name: Haake, Claus-Jochen id: '20801' last_name: Haake - first_name: Alexander full_name: Skopalik, Alexander id: '40384' last_name: Skopalik - first_name: Nadja full_name: Stroh-Maraun, Nadja id: '13264' last_name: Stroh-Maraun citation: ama: 'Feldotto M, Haake C-J, Skopalik A, Stroh-Maraun N. Disaggregating User Evaluations Using the Shapley Value. In: Proceedings of the 13th Workshop on Economics of Networks, Systems and Computation (NetEcon 2018). ; 2018:5:1-5:6. doi:10.1145/3230654.3230659' apa: Feldotto, M., Haake, C.-J., Skopalik, A., & Stroh-Maraun, N. (2018). Disaggregating User Evaluations Using the Shapley Value. In Proceedings of the 13th Workshop on Economics of Networks, Systems and Computation (NetEcon 2018) (pp. 5:1-5:6). Irvine, California, USA. https://doi.org/10.1145/3230654.3230659 bibtex: '@inproceedings{Feldotto_Haake_Skopalik_Stroh-Maraun_2018, title={Disaggregating User Evaluations Using the Shapley Value}, DOI={10.1145/3230654.3230659}, booktitle={Proceedings of the 13th Workshop on Economics of Networks, Systems and Computation (NetEcon 2018)}, author={Feldotto, Matthias and Haake, Claus-Jochen and Skopalik, Alexander and Stroh-Maraun, Nadja}, year={2018}, pages={5:1-5:6} }' chicago: Feldotto, Matthias, Claus-Jochen Haake, Alexander Skopalik, and Nadja Stroh-Maraun. “Disaggregating User Evaluations Using the Shapley Value.” In Proceedings of the 13th Workshop on Economics of Networks, Systems and Computation (NetEcon 2018), 5:1-5:6, 2018. https://doi.org/10.1145/3230654.3230659. ieee: M. Feldotto, C.-J. Haake, A. Skopalik, and N. Stroh-Maraun, “Disaggregating User Evaluations Using the Shapley Value,” in Proceedings of the 13th Workshop on Economics of Networks, Systems and Computation (NetEcon 2018), Irvine, California, USA, 2018, pp. 5:1-5:6. mla: Feldotto, Matthias, et al. “Disaggregating User Evaluations Using the Shapley Value.” Proceedings of the 13th Workshop on Economics of Networks, Systems and Computation (NetEcon 2018), 2018, pp. 5:1-5:6, doi:10.1145/3230654.3230659. short: 'M. Feldotto, C.-J. Haake, A. Skopalik, N. Stroh-Maraun, in: Proceedings of the 13th Workshop on Economics of Networks, Systems and Computation (NetEcon 2018), 2018, pp. 5:1-5:6.' conference: end_date: 2018-06-18 location: Irvine, California, USA name: The 13th Workshop on the Economics of Networks, Systems and Computation (NetEcon 2018) start_date: 2018-06-18 date_created: 2018-05-22T10:28:51Z date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:58:01Z ddc: - '040' department: - _id: '541' - _id: '63' - _id: '205' - _id: '475' doi: 10.1145/3230654.3230659 file: - access_level: closed content_type: application/pdf creator: nmaraun date_created: 2018-08-15T07:30:50Z date_updated: 2018-08-15T07:30:50Z file_id: '3910' file_name: Disaggregating User Evaluations Using the Shapley Value.pdf file_size: 1450171 relation: main_file success: 1 file_date_updated: 2018-08-15T07:30:50Z has_accepted_license: '1' language: - iso: eng page: 5:1-5:6 project: - _id: '1' name: SFB 901 - _id: '2' name: SFB 901 - Project Area A - _id: '7' name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3 publication: Proceedings of the 13th Workshop on Economics of Networks, Systems and Computation (NetEcon 2018) publication_identifier: isbn: - 978-1-4503-5916-0 publication_status: published status: public title: Disaggregating User Evaluations Using the Shapley Value type: conference user_id: '14052' year: '2018' ... --- _id: '2566' abstract: - lang: eng text: We show that the Boston school choice mechanism (BM), the student proposing deferred acceptance algorithm (DA) and the top trading cycles algorithm (TTC) generate the same outcome when the colleges’ priorities are modified according to students’ preferences in a “first preferences first” manner. This outcome coincides with the BM outcome under original priorities. As a result, the DA and TTC mechanism that are non-manipulable under original priorities become vulnerable to strategic behavior. author: - first_name: Claus-Jochen full_name: Haake, Claus-Jochen id: '20801' last_name: Haake - first_name: Nadja full_name: Stroh-Maraun, Nadja id: '13264' last_name: Stroh-Maraun citation: ama: Haake C-J, Stroh-Maraun N. Outcome Equivalence in School Choice with Reciprocal Preferences. Economics Letters. 2018;170:39-41. doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2018.05.033 apa: Haake, C.-J., & Stroh-Maraun, N. (2018). Outcome Equivalence in School Choice with Reciprocal Preferences. Economics Letters, 170, 39–41. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2018.05.033 bibtex: '@article{Haake_Stroh-Maraun_2018, title={Outcome Equivalence in School Choice with Reciprocal Preferences}, volume={170}, DOI={10.1016/j.econlet.2018.05.033}, journal={Economics Letters}, publisher={Elsevier}, author={Haake, Claus-Jochen and Stroh-Maraun, Nadja}, year={2018}, pages={39–41} }' chicago: 'Haake, Claus-Jochen, and Nadja Stroh-Maraun. “Outcome Equivalence in School Choice with Reciprocal Preferences.” Economics Letters 170 (2018): 39–41. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2018.05.033.' ieee: C.-J. Haake and N. Stroh-Maraun, “Outcome Equivalence in School Choice with Reciprocal Preferences,” Economics Letters, vol. 170, pp. 39–41, 2018. mla: Haake, Claus-Jochen, and Nadja Stroh-Maraun. “Outcome Equivalence in School Choice with Reciprocal Preferences.” Economics Letters, vol. 170, Elsevier, 2018, pp. 39–41, doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2018.05.033. short: C.-J. Haake, N. Stroh-Maraun, Economics Letters 170 (2018) 39–41. date_created: 2018-05-03T07:53:56Z date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:57:09Z ddc: - '040' department: - _id: '205' doi: 10.1016/j.econlet.2018.05.033 file: - access_level: closed content_type: application/pdf creator: cjhaake date_created: 2018-08-09T08:08:17Z date_updated: 2018-08-09T09:15:07Z file_id: '3854' file_name: 1-s2.0-S016517651830212X-main.pdf file_size: 261888 relation: main_file title: Outcome equivalence in school choice with reciprocal preferences file_date_updated: 2018-08-09T09:15:07Z has_accepted_license: '1' intvolume: ' 170' language: - iso: eng page: 39 - 41 project: - _id: '1' name: SFB 901 - _id: '2' name: SFB 901 - Project Area A - _id: '7' name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3 publication: Economics Letters publication_status: published publisher: Elsevier status: public title: Outcome Equivalence in School Choice with Reciprocal Preferences type: journal_article urn: '25669' user_id: '477' volume: 170 year: '2018' ... --- _id: '2933' abstract: - lang: eng text: We establish axioms under which a bargaining solution can be found by the maximization of the CES function and is unique up to specification of the distribution and elasticity parameters. This solution is referred to as the CES solution which includes the NASH and egalitarian solutions as special cases. Next, we consider a normalization of the CES function and establish axioms, under which a bargaining solution can be found by the maximization of the normalized CES and is unique up to the specifications of the distribution and its substitution parameters. We refer to this solution as the normalized CES solution, which includes the Nash and Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions as special cases. Our paper contributes to bargaining theory by establishing unified characterizations of existing as well as a great variety of new bargaining solutions. author: - first_name: Claus-Jochen full_name: Haake, Claus-Jochen id: '20801' last_name: Haake - first_name: Cheng-Zhong full_name: Qin, Cheng-Zhong last_name: Qin citation: ama: 'Haake C-J, Qin C-Z. On Unification of Solutions to the Bargaining Problem. Vol 113. Paderborn University: CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University; 2018.' apa: 'Haake, C.-J., & Qin, C.-Z. (2018). On unification of solutions to the bargaining problem (Vol. 113). Paderborn University: CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University.' bibtex: '@book{Haake_Qin_2018, place={Paderborn University}, series={Working Papers CIE}, title={On unification of solutions to the bargaining problem}, volume={113}, publisher={CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University}, author={Haake, Claus-Jochen and Qin, Cheng-Zhong}, year={2018}, collection={Working Papers CIE} }' chicago: 'Haake, Claus-Jochen, and Cheng-Zhong Qin. On Unification of Solutions to the Bargaining Problem. Vol. 113. Working Papers CIE. Paderborn University: CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2018.' ieee: 'C.-J. Haake and C.-Z. Qin, On unification of solutions to the bargaining problem, vol. 113. Paderborn University: CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2018.' mla: Haake, Claus-Jochen, and Cheng-Zhong Qin. On Unification of Solutions to the Bargaining Problem. Vol. 113, CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2018. short: C.-J. Haake, C.-Z. Qin, On Unification of Solutions to the Bargaining Problem, CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, Paderborn University, 2018. date_created: 2018-05-28T07:00:28Z date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:58:48Z ddc: - '040' department: - _id: '205' - _id: '475' file: - access_level: closed content_type: application/pdf creator: cjhaake date_created: 2018-08-09T08:15:31Z date_updated: 2018-08-09T09:14:52Z file_id: '3855' file_name: On unification of solutions to the bargaining problem.pdf file_size: 469001 relation: main_file title: On unification of solutions to the bargaining problem file_date_updated: 2018-08-09T09:14:52Z has_accepted_license: '1' intvolume: ' 113' keyword: - Bargaining problem - CES Function - Normalized CES Function - Nash solution - Kalai-Smorodinsky Solution - Egalitarian Solution. language: - iso: eng place: Paderborn University project: - _id: '1' name: SFB 901 - _id: '2' name: SFB 901 - Project Area A - _id: '7' name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3 publisher: CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University series_title: Working Papers CIE status: public title: On unification of solutions to the bargaining problem type: working_paper urn: '29332' user_id: '65453' volume: 113 year: '2018' ... --- _id: '3098' abstract: - lang: eng text: "One of the fundamental problems in applications of methods and results\r\nfrom mechanism design and implementation theory is the effective enforcement of\r\ntheoretically established equilibria by which social choice rules are implemented.\r\nHurwicz (2008) and Myerson (2009) introduce different concepts of formalizing\r\nenforcement of institutional rules via the introduction of legal and illegal games. In\r\nthis note the relation of their concepts with that of a social system defined inDebreu\r\n(1952) is analyzed and its potential of being instrumental for modelling institution\r\ndesign is discussed. The existence proof for such a system, also known as generalized\r\ngame or abstract economy had been the basis for the existence proof of a\r\ncompetitive equilibrium of an economy." author: - first_name: Walter full_name: Trockel, Walter last_name: Trockel - first_name: Claus-Jochen full_name: Haake, Claus-Jochen id: '20801' last_name: Haake citation: ama: 'Trockel W, Haake C-J. Thoughts on Social Design. In: Laslier J-F, Moulin H, Sanver R, Zwicker W, eds. Studies in Economic Design. Vol (n.d.). Studies in Economic Design. Heidelberg: Springer.' apa: 'Trockel, W., & Haake, C.-J. (n.d.). Thoughts on Social Design. In J.-F. Laslier, H. Moulin, R. Sanver, & W. Zwicker (Eds.), Studies in Economic Design (Vol. (n.d.)). Heidelberg: Springer.' bibtex: '@inbook{Trockel_Haake, place={Heidelberg}, series={Studies in Economic Design}, title={Thoughts on Social Design}, volume={(n.d.)}, booktitle={Studies in Economic Design}, publisher={Springer}, author={Trockel, Walter and Haake, Claus-Jochen}, editor={Laslier, Jean-Francois and Moulin, Herve and Sanver, Remzi and Zwicker, WilliamEditors}, collection={Studies in Economic Design} }' chicago: 'Trockel, Walter, and Claus-Jochen Haake. “Thoughts on Social Design.” In Studies in Economic Design, edited by Jean-Francois Laslier, Herve Moulin, Remzi Sanver, and William Zwicker, Vol. (n.d.). Studies in Economic Design. Heidelberg: Springer, n.d.' ieee: 'W. Trockel and C.-J. Haake, “Thoughts on Social Design,” in Studies in Economic Design, vol. (n.d.), J.-F. Laslier, H. Moulin, R. Sanver, and W. Zwicker, Eds. Heidelberg: Springer.' mla: Trockel, Walter, and Claus-Jochen Haake. “Thoughts on Social Design.” Studies in Economic Design, edited by Jean-Francois Laslier et al., vol. (n.d.), Springer. short: 'W. Trockel, C.-J. Haake, in: J.-F. Laslier, H. Moulin, R. Sanver, W. Zwicker (Eds.), Studies in Economic Design, Springer, Heidelberg, n.d.' date_created: 2018-06-06T17:07:28Z date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:58:55Z ddc: - '040' department: - _id: '205' - _id: '475' editor: - first_name: Jean-Francois full_name: Laslier, Jean-Francois last_name: Laslier - first_name: Herve full_name: Moulin, Herve last_name: Moulin - first_name: Remzi full_name: Sanver, Remzi last_name: Sanver - first_name: William full_name: Zwicker, William last_name: Zwicker file: - access_level: closed content_type: application/pdf creator: cjhaake date_created: 2018-08-09T08:36:24Z date_updated: 2018-08-09T09:14:11Z file_id: '3857' file_name: WP - Thoughts on Social Design.pdf file_size: 141983 relation: main_file title: Thoughts on Social Design file_date_updated: 2018-08-09T09:14:11Z has_accepted_license: '1' language: - iso: eng place: Heidelberg project: - _id: '1' name: SFB 901 - _id: '2' name: SFB 901 - Project Area A - _id: '7' name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3 publication: Studies in Economic Design publication_identifier: issn: - 2510-3970 publication_status: accepted publisher: Springer quality_controlled: '1' series_title: Studies in Economic Design status: public title: Thoughts on Social Design type: book_chapter urn: '30987' user_id: '477' volume: (n.d.) year: '2018' ... --- _id: '4564' abstract: - lang: eng text: " In our model two divisions negotiate over type-dependent contracts to\r\n \ determine an intrafirm transfer price for an intermediate product. Since the\r\n \ upstream division's (seller's) costs and downstream division's (buyer's)\r\n \ revenues are supposed to be private information, we formally consider\r\n cooperative bargaining problems under incomplete information. This means\r\n that the two divisions consider allocations of expected utility generated by\r\n mechanisms that satisfy (interim) individual rationality, incentive\r\n compatibility and/or ex post efficiency. Assuming two possible types for\r\n buyer and seller each, we first establish that the bargaining problem is\r\n regular, regardless whether or not incentive and/or efficiency constraints\r\n are imposed. This allows us to apply the generalized Nash bargaining\r\n solution to determine fair transfer payments and transfer\r\n quantities. In particular, the generalized Nash bargaining solution tries to\r\n balance divisional profits, while incentive constraints are still in\r\n place. In that sense a fair profit division is generated. Furthermore, by\r\n means of illustrative examples we derive general properties of this solution\r\n \ for the transfer pricing problem and compare the model developed here with\r\n \ the models existing in the literature. We demonstrate that there is a\r\n tradeoff between ex post efficiency and fairness.\r\n" article_type: original author: - first_name: Claus-Jochen full_name: Haake, Claus-Jochen id: '20801' last_name: Haake - first_name: Sonja full_name: Recker, Sonja last_name: Recker citation: ama: Haake C-J, Recker S. The Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution for Transfer Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information. Group Decision and Negotiation. 2018;27(6):905-932. doi:10.1007/s10726-018-9592-8 apa: Haake, C.-J., & Recker, S. (2018). The Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution for Transfer Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information. Group Decision and Negotiation, 27(6), 905–932. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10726-018-9592-8 bibtex: '@article{Haake_Recker_2018, title={The Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution for Transfer Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information}, volume={27}, DOI={10.1007/s10726-018-9592-8}, number={6}, journal={Group Decision and Negotiation}, publisher={Springer}, author={Haake, Claus-Jochen and Recker, Sonja}, year={2018}, pages={905–932} }' chicago: 'Haake, Claus-Jochen, and Sonja Recker. “The Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution for Transfer Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information.” Group Decision and Negotiation 27, no. 6 (2018): 905–32. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10726-018-9592-8.' ieee: C.-J. Haake and S. Recker, “The Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution for Transfer Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information,” Group Decision and Negotiation, vol. 27, no. 6, pp. 905–932, 2018. mla: Haake, Claus-Jochen, and Sonja Recker. “The Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution for Transfer Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information.” Group Decision and Negotiation, vol. 27, no. 6, Springer, 2018, pp. 905–32, doi:10.1007/s10726-018-9592-8. short: C.-J. Haake, S. Recker, Group Decision and Negotiation 27 (2018) 905–932. date_created: 2018-10-02T07:15:26Z date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:01:11Z ddc: - '040' department: - _id: '205' - _id: '475' doi: 10.1007/s10726-018-9592-8 file: - access_level: closed content_type: application/pdf creator: stela date_created: 2018-10-31T07:43:31Z date_updated: 2018-10-31T07:43:31Z file_id: '5107' file_name: The Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution for Transfer Price Negotiations Under Incomplete Information.pdf file_size: 636521 relation: main_file success: 1 file_date_updated: 2018-10-31T07:43:31Z has_accepted_license: '1' intvolume: ' 27' issue: '6' jel: - C78 language: - iso: eng page: 905-932 project: - _id: '1' name: SFB 901 - _id: '2' name: SFB 901 - Project Area A - _id: '7' name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3 publication: Group Decision and Negotiation publication_status: published publisher: Springer quality_controlled: '1' status: public title: The Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution for Transfer Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information type: journal_article user_id: '477' volume: 27 year: '2018' ... --- _id: '5330' abstract: - lang: eng text: "In Internet transactions, customers and service providers often interact once and anonymously.\r\nTo prevent deceptive behavior a reputation system is particularly important to\r\nreduce information asymmetries about the quality of the offered product or service. In this\r\nstudy we examine the effectiveness of a reputation system to reduce information asymmetries\r\nwhen customers may make mistakes in judging the provided service quality. In our model,\r\na service provider makes strategic quality choices and short-lived customers are asked to\r\nevaluate the observed quality by providing ratings to a reputation system. The customer is\r\nnot able to always evaluate the service quality correctly and possibly submits an erroneous\r\nrating according to a predefined probability. Considering reputation profiles of the last three\r\nsales, within the theoretical model we derive that the service provider’s dichotomous quality\r\ndecisions are independent of the reputation profile and depend only on the probabilities of\r\nreceiving positive and negative ratings when providing low or high quality. Thus, a service\r\nprovider optimally either maintains a good reputation or completely refrains from any reputation\r\nbuilding process. However, when mapping our theoretical model to an experimental\r\ndesign we find that a significant share of subjects in the role of the service provider deviates\r\nfrom optimal behavior and chooses actions which are conditional on the current reputation\r\nprofile. With respect to these individual quality choices we see that subjects use milking\r\nstrategies which means that they exploit a good reputation. In particular, if the sales price\r\nis high, low quality is delivered until the price drops below a certain threshold, and then\r\nhigh quality is chosen until the price increases again." article_number: e0207172 article_type: review author: - first_name: Behnud full_name: Mir Djawadi, Behnud id: '26032' last_name: Mir Djawadi orcid: 0000-0002-6271-5912 - first_name: Rene full_name: Fahr, Rene id: '111' last_name: Fahr - first_name: Claus-Jochen full_name: Haake, Claus-Jochen id: '20801' last_name: Haake - first_name: Sonja full_name: Recker, Sonja last_name: Recker citation: ama: Mir Djawadi B, Fahr R, Haake C-J, Recker S. Maintaining vs. Milking Good Reputation when Customer Feedback is Inaccurate. PLoS ONE. 2018;13(11). doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0207172 apa: Mir Djawadi, B., Fahr, R., Haake, C.-J., & Recker, S. (2018). Maintaining vs. Milking Good Reputation when Customer Feedback is Inaccurate. PLoS ONE, 13(11). https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0207172 bibtex: '@article{Mir Djawadi_Fahr_Haake_Recker_2018, title={Maintaining vs. Milking Good Reputation when Customer Feedback is Inaccurate}, volume={13}, DOI={10.1371/journal.pone.0207172}, number={11e0207172}, journal={PLoS ONE}, publisher={Public Library of Science}, author={Mir Djawadi, Behnud and Fahr, Rene and Haake, Claus-Jochen and Recker, Sonja}, year={2018} }' chicago: Mir Djawadi, Behnud, Rene Fahr, Claus-Jochen Haake, and Sonja Recker. “Maintaining vs. Milking Good Reputation When Customer Feedback Is Inaccurate.” PLoS ONE 13, no. 11 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0207172. ieee: B. Mir Djawadi, R. Fahr, C.-J. Haake, and S. Recker, “Maintaining vs. Milking Good Reputation when Customer Feedback is Inaccurate,” PLoS ONE, vol. 13, no. 11, 2018. mla: Mir Djawadi, Behnud, et al. “Maintaining vs. Milking Good Reputation When Customer Feedback Is Inaccurate.” PLoS ONE, vol. 13, no. 11, e0207172, Public Library of Science, 2018, doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0207172. short: B. Mir Djawadi, R. Fahr, C.-J. Haake, S. Recker, PLoS ONE 13 (2018). date_created: 2018-11-03T11:51:48Z date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:01:50Z ddc: - '330' department: - _id: '205' - _id: '475' doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0207172 file: - access_level: closed content_type: application/pdf creator: cjhaake date_created: 2018-11-13T20:51:34Z date_updated: 2018-11-13T20:51:34Z file_id: '5542' file_name: Maintaining_vs_Milking.pdf file_size: 1107189 relation: main_file success: 1 file_date_updated: 2018-11-13T20:51:34Z funded_apc: '1' has_accepted_license: '1' intvolume: ' 13' issue: '11' language: - iso: eng project: - _id: '7' name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3 - _id: '8' name: SFB 901 - Subproject A4 - _id: '1' name: SFB 901 - _id: '2' name: SFB 901 - Project Area A publication: PLoS ONE publication_identifier: eissn: - 1932-6203 publication_status: published publisher: Public Library of Science status: public title: Maintaining vs. Milking Good Reputation when Customer Feedback is Inaccurate type: journal_article user_id: '477' volume: 13 year: '2018' ... --- _id: '2527' author: - first_name: Thomas full_name: Gries, Thomas last_name: Gries - first_name: Claus-Jochen full_name: Haake, Claus-Jochen id: '20801' last_name: Haake citation: ama: Gries T, Haake C-J. Towards an Economic Theory of Destabilization War. Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy. 2016;22(4):377-384. doi:10.1515/peps-2016-0042 apa: Gries, T., & Haake, C.-J. (2016). Towards an Economic Theory of Destabilization War. Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy, 22(4), 377–384. https://doi.org/10.1515/peps-2016-0042 bibtex: '@article{Gries_Haake_2016, title={Towards an Economic Theory of Destabilization War}, volume={22}, DOI={10.1515/peps-2016-0042}, number={4}, journal={Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy}, publisher={Walter de Gruyter GmbH}, author={Gries, Thomas and Haake, Claus-Jochen}, year={2016}, pages={377–384} }' chicago: 'Gries, Thomas, and Claus-Jochen Haake. “Towards an Economic Theory of Destabilization War.” Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy 22, no. 4 (2016): 377–84. https://doi.org/10.1515/peps-2016-0042.' ieee: T. Gries and C.-J. Haake, “Towards an Economic Theory of Destabilization War,” Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy, vol. 22, no. 4, pp. 377–384, 2016. mla: Gries, Thomas, and Claus-Jochen Haake. “Towards an Economic Theory of Destabilization War.” Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy, vol. 22, no. 4, Walter de Gruyter GmbH, 2016, pp. 377–84, doi:10.1515/peps-2016-0042. short: T. Gries, C.-J. Haake, Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy 22 (2016) 377–384. date_created: 2018-04-26T10:59:20Z date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:56:58Z ddc: - '040' department: - _id: '205' - _id: '475' doi: 10.1515/peps-2016-0042 file: - access_level: closed content_type: application/pdf creator: cjhaake date_created: 2018-08-09T08:56:42Z date_updated: 2018-08-09T09:19:05Z file_id: '3864' file_name: Towards an Economic Theory of Destabilization War.pdf file_size: 250706 relation: main_file title: Towards an Economic Theory of Destabilization War file_date_updated: 2018-08-09T09:19:05Z has_accepted_license: '1' intvolume: ' 22' issue: '4' language: - iso: eng page: 377 - 384 publication: Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy publication_identifier: issn: - 1554-8597 - 1079-2457 publication_status: published publisher: Walter de Gruyter GmbH status: public title: Towards an Economic Theory of Destabilization War type: journal_article urn: '25277' user_id: '65453' volume: 22 year: '2016' ... --- _id: '8836' abstract: - lang: eng text: While Islamic State is the most present example, it is a fact that in many places around the globe, throughout history initially small groups have tried to challenge and destabilize or even overthrow governments by means of terrorist and guerrilla strategies. Therefore, we answer two questions. Why does a small group of insurgents believe it can overthrow the government by turning violent, even if the government is clearly superior? And how does a conflict develop into terrorism, a guerilla war, or a major conventional civil war, or is resolved peacefully? We develop a formal model for rebels and government and derive optimal choices. Further, we focus on three elements as important ingredients of a "destabilization war". All three of these - large random events, time preference (which we relate to ideology), and choice of duration of fight - are rarely considered in formal conflict theory. We can answer the above two questions using game theory analysis. First, insurgents rise up because they hope to destabilize through permanent challenging attacks. In this context, large randomness is an important ally of rebels. While each individual attack may have a low impact, at some point a large random event could lead to success. Hence, the duration of activities is a constitutive element of this kind of armed conflict. Patience (low time preference), which may reflect rebels' degree of ideological motivation, is crucial. Second, the mode of warfare or the conflict resolutions that develop are generally path-dependent and conditioned on the full set of options (including compromise). Various conditions (level of funding, ease of recruitment, access to weapons) influence different modes of warfare or a peaceful compromise in a complex way. author: - first_name: Thomas full_name: Gries, Thomas id: '186' last_name: Gries - first_name: Claus-Jochen full_name: Haake, Claus-Jochen id: '20801' last_name: Haake citation: ama: Gries T, Haake C-J. An Economic Theory of “Destabilization War.” Vol 95.; 2016. apa: Gries, T., & Haake, C.-J. (2016). An Economic Theory of “Destabilization War” (Vol. 95). bibtex: '@book{Gries_Haake_2016, series={Working Papers CIE}, title={An Economic Theory of “Destabilization War”}, volume={95}, author={Gries, Thomas and Haake, Claus-Jochen}, year={2016}, collection={Working Papers CIE} }' chicago: Gries, Thomas, and Claus-Jochen Haake. An Economic Theory of “Destabilization War.” Vol. 95. Working Papers CIE, 2016. ieee: T. Gries and C.-J. Haake, An Economic Theory of “Destabilization War,” vol. 95. 2016. mla: Gries, Thomas, and Claus-Jochen Haake. An Economic Theory of “Destabilization War.” Vol. 95, 2016. short: T. Gries, C.-J. Haake, An Economic Theory of “Destabilization War,” 2016. date_created: 2019-04-08T06:45:02Z date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:04:03Z ddc: - '040' department: - _id: '205' - _id: '475' file: - access_level: closed content_type: application/pdf creator: cjhaake date_created: 2019-04-08T06:49:16Z date_updated: 2019-04-08T06:49:16Z file_id: '8838' file_name: WP - An Economic Theory of ’Destabilization War'.pdf file_size: 516125 relation: main_file success: 1 file_date_updated: 2019-04-08T06:49:16Z has_accepted_license: '1' intvolume: ' 95' jel: - H56 - O10 - D84 - C72 - D74 keyword: - terrorism - civil war - conflict duration - game theory - stochastic process - ideology language: - iso: eng series_title: Working Papers CIE status: public title: An Economic Theory of 'Destabilization War' type: working_paper user_id: '20801' volume: 95 year: '2016' ... --- _id: '249' abstract: - lang: eng text: 'We analyze the stability of networks when two intermediaries strategically form costly links to customers. We interpret these links as customer relationships that enable trade to sell a product. Equilibrium prices and equilibrium quantities on the output as well as on the input market are determined endogenously for a given network of customer relationships. We investigate in how far the substitutability of the intermediaries'' products and the costs of link formation influence the intermediaries'' equilibrium profits and thus have an impact on the incentives to strategically form relationships to customers. For networks with three customers we characterize locally stable networks, in particular existence is guaranteed for any degree of substitutability. Moreover for the special cases of perfect complements, independent products and perfect substitutes, local stability coincides with the stronger concept of Nash stability. Additionally, for networks with n customers we analyze stability regions for selected networks and determine their limits when n goes to infinity. It turns out that the shape of the stability regions for those networks does not significantly change compared to a setting with a small number of customers. ' author: - first_name: Sonja full_name: Brangewitz, Sonja last_name: Brangewitz - first_name: Claus-Jochen full_name: Haake, Claus-Jochen id: '20801' last_name: Haake - first_name: Philipp full_name: Möhlmeier, Philipp last_name: Möhlmeier citation: ama: Brangewitz S, Haake C-J, Möhlmeier P. Strategic Formation of Customer Relationship Networks. Vol 91. Universität Paderborn; 2015. apa: Brangewitz, S., Haake, C.-J., & Möhlmeier, P. (2015). Strategic Formation of Customer Relationship Networks (Vol. 91). Universität Paderborn. bibtex: '@book{Brangewitz_Haake_Möhlmeier_2015, series={Working Papers CIE}, title={Strategic Formation of Customer Relationship Networks}, volume={91}, publisher={Universität Paderborn}, author={Brangewitz, Sonja and Haake, Claus-Jochen and Möhlmeier, Philipp}, year={2015}, collection={Working Papers CIE} }' chicago: Brangewitz, Sonja, Claus-Jochen Haake, and Philipp Möhlmeier. Strategic Formation of Customer Relationship Networks. Vol. 91. Working Papers CIE. Universität Paderborn, 2015. ieee: S. Brangewitz, C.-J. Haake, and P. Möhlmeier, Strategic Formation of Customer Relationship Networks, vol. 91. Universität Paderborn, 2015. mla: Brangewitz, Sonja, et al. Strategic Formation of Customer Relationship Networks. Vol. 91, Universität Paderborn, 2015. short: S. Brangewitz, C.-J. Haake, P. Möhlmeier, Strategic Formation of Customer Relationship Networks, Universität Paderborn, 2015. date_created: 2017-10-17T12:41:40Z date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:56:40Z ddc: - '040' department: - _id: '205' - _id: '475' file: - access_level: closed content_type: application/pdf creator: cjhaake date_created: 2018-08-09T09:10:34Z date_updated: 2018-08-09T09:13:36Z file_id: '3865' file_name: WP - Strategic Formation of Customer Relationship Networks.pdf file_size: 908865 relation: main_file title: Strategic Formation of Customer Relationship Networks file_date_updated: 2018-08-09T09:13:36Z has_accepted_license: '1' intvolume: ' 91' language: - iso: eng project: - _id: '1' name: SFB 901 - _id: '7' name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3 - _id: '2' name: SFB 901 - Project Area A publisher: Universität Paderborn series_title: Working Papers CIE status: public title: Strategic Formation of Customer Relationship Networks type: working_paper urn: '2499' user_id: '65453' volume: 91 year: '2015' ... --- _id: '382' abstract: - lang: eng text: This paper explores how cloud provider competition influences instance pricing in an IaaS (Infrastructure-as-a-Service) market. When reserved instance pricing includes an on-demand price component in addition to a reservation fee (two-part tariffs), different providers might offer different price combinations, where the client’s choice depends on its load profile. We investigate a duopoly of providers and analyze stable market prices in two-part tariffs. Further, we study offers that allow a specified amount of included usage (three-part tariffs). Neither two-part nor three-part tariffs produce an equilibrium market outcome other than a service pricing that equals production cost, i.e., complex price structures do not significantly affect the results from ordinary Bertrand competition. author: - first_name: Jörn full_name: Künsemöller, Jörn last_name: Künsemöller - first_name: Sonja full_name: Brangewitz, Sonja last_name: Brangewitz - first_name: Holger full_name: Karl, Holger id: '126' last_name: Karl - first_name: Claus-Jochen full_name: Haake, Claus-Jochen id: '20801' last_name: Haake citation: ama: 'Künsemöller J, Brangewitz S, Karl H, Haake C-J. Provider Competition in Infrastructure-as-a-Service. In: Proceedings of the 2014 IEEE International Conference on Services Computing (SCC). ; 2014:203-210. doi:10.1109/SCC.2014.35' apa: Künsemöller, J., Brangewitz, S., Karl, H., & Haake, C.-J. (2014). Provider Competition in Infrastructure-as-a-Service. In Proceedings of the 2014 IEEE International Conference on Services Computing (SCC) (pp. 203–210). https://doi.org/10.1109/SCC.2014.35 bibtex: '@inproceedings{Künsemöller_Brangewitz_Karl_Haake_2014, title={Provider Competition in Infrastructure-as-a-Service}, DOI={10.1109/SCC.2014.35}, booktitle={Proceedings of the 2014 IEEE International Conference on Services Computing (SCC)}, author={Künsemöller, Jörn and Brangewitz, Sonja and Karl, Holger and Haake, Claus-Jochen}, year={2014}, pages={203–210} }' chicago: Künsemöller, Jörn, Sonja Brangewitz, Holger Karl, and Claus-Jochen Haake. “Provider Competition in Infrastructure-as-a-Service.” In Proceedings of the 2014 IEEE International Conference on Services Computing (SCC), 203–10, 2014. https://doi.org/10.1109/SCC.2014.35. ieee: J. Künsemöller, S. Brangewitz, H. Karl, and C.-J. Haake, “Provider Competition in Infrastructure-as-a-Service,” in Proceedings of the 2014 IEEE International Conference on Services Computing (SCC), 2014, pp. 203–210. mla: Künsemöller, Jörn, et al. “Provider Competition in Infrastructure-as-a-Service.” Proceedings of the 2014 IEEE International Conference on Services Computing (SCC), 2014, pp. 203–10, doi:10.1109/SCC.2014.35. short: 'J. Künsemöller, S. Brangewitz, H. Karl, C.-J. Haake, in: Proceedings of the 2014 IEEE International Conference on Services Computing (SCC), 2014, pp. 203–210.' date_created: 2017-10-17T12:42:06Z date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:59:37Z ddc: - '004' department: - _id: '75' - _id: '205' doi: 10.1109/SCC.2014.35 file: - access_level: closed content_type: application/pdf creator: ups date_created: 2018-11-02T13:34:46Z date_updated: 2018-11-02T13:34:46Z file_id: '5250' file_name: 06930535.pdf file_size: 228172 relation: main_file success: 1 file_date_updated: 2018-11-02T13:34:46Z has_accepted_license: '1' language: - iso: eng page: 203-210 project: - _id: '1' name: SFB 901 - _id: '6' name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A2 - _id: '7' name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3 - _id: '2' name: SFB 901 - Project Area A publication: Proceedings of the 2014 IEEE International Conference on Services Computing (SCC) status: public title: Provider Competition in Infrastructure-as-a-Service type: conference user_id: '477' year: '2014' ... --- _id: '5146' abstract: - lang: eng text: In this paper, we analyze a model in which two divisions negotiate over an intrafirm transfer price for an intermediate product. Formally, we consider bargaining problems under incomplete information, since the upstream division’s (seller's) costs and downstream division's (buyer's) revenues are supposed to be private information. Assuming two possible types for buyer and seller each, we first establish that the bargaining problem is regular, regardless whether incentive and/or efficiency constraints are imposed. This allows us to apply the generalized Nash bargaining solution to determine transfer payments and transfer probabilities. Furthermore, we derive general properties of this solution for the transfer pricing problem and compare the model developed here with the existing literature for negotiated transfer pricing under incomplete information. In particular, we focus on the models presented in Wagenhofer (1994). author: - first_name: Sonja full_name: Brangewitz, Sonja last_name: Brangewitz - first_name: Claus-Jochen full_name: Haake, Claus-Jochen id: '20801' last_name: Haake citation: ama: Brangewitz S, Haake C-J. Cooperative Transfer Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information. Vol 64. CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University; 2013. apa: Brangewitz, S., & Haake, C.-J. (2013). Cooperative Transfer Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information (Vol. 64). CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University. bibtex: '@book{Brangewitz_Haake_2013, series={Working Papers CIE}, title={Cooperative Transfer Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information}, volume={64}, publisher={CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University}, author={Brangewitz, Sonja and Haake, Claus-Jochen}, year={2013}, collection={Working Papers CIE} }' chicago: Brangewitz, Sonja, and Claus-Jochen Haake. Cooperative Transfer Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information. Vol. 64. Working Papers CIE. CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2013. ieee: S. Brangewitz and C.-J. Haake, Cooperative Transfer Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information, vol. 64. CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2013. mla: Brangewitz, Sonja, and Claus-Jochen Haake. Cooperative Transfer Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information. Vol. 64, CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2013. short: S. Brangewitz, C.-J. Haake, Cooperative Transfer Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information, CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2013. date_created: 2018-10-31T09:20:15Z date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:01:39Z ddc: - '040' department: - _id: '205' - _id: '475' file: - access_level: closed content_type: application/pdf creator: stela date_created: 2018-10-31T09:22:19Z date_updated: 2018-10-31T09:22:19Z file_id: '5148' file_name: WP - Cooperative Transfer Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information.pdf file_size: 430826 relation: main_file success: 1 file_date_updated: 2018-10-31T09:22:19Z has_accepted_license: '1' intvolume: ' 64' keyword: - Transfer Pricing - Negotiation - Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution - Incomplete Information language: - iso: eng project: - _id: '1' name: SFB 901 - _id: '2' name: SFB 901 - Project Area A - _id: '7' name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3 publisher: CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University series_title: Working Papers CIE status: public title: Cooperative Transfer Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information type: working_paper user_id: '477' volume: 64 year: '2013' ... --- _id: '2519' author: - first_name: Claus-Jochen full_name: Haake, Claus-Jochen id: '20801' last_name: Haake - first_name: Jan Thomas full_name: Martini, Jan Thomas last_name: Martini citation: ama: Haake C-J, Martini JT. Negotiating Transfer Prices. Group Decision and Negotiation. 2012;22(4):657-680. doi:10.1007/s10726-012-9286-6 apa: Haake, C.-J., & Martini, J. T. (2012). Negotiating Transfer Prices. Group Decision and Negotiation, 22(4), 657–680. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10726-012-9286-6 bibtex: '@article{Haake_Martini_2012, title={Negotiating Transfer Prices}, volume={22}, DOI={10.1007/s10726-012-9286-6}, number={4}, journal={Group Decision and Negotiation}, publisher={Springer Nature}, author={Haake, Claus-Jochen and Martini, Jan Thomas}, year={2012}, pages={657–680} }' chicago: 'Haake, Claus-Jochen, and Jan Thomas Martini. “Negotiating Transfer Prices.” Group Decision and Negotiation 22, no. 4 (2012): 657–80. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10726-012-9286-6.' ieee: C.-J. Haake and J. T. Martini, “Negotiating Transfer Prices,” Group Decision and Negotiation, vol. 22, no. 4, pp. 657–680, 2012. mla: Haake, Claus-Jochen, and Jan Thomas Martini. “Negotiating Transfer Prices.” Group Decision and Negotiation, vol. 22, no. 4, Springer Nature, 2012, pp. 657–80, doi:10.1007/s10726-012-9286-6. short: C.-J. Haake, J.T. Martini, Group Decision and Negotiation 22 (2012) 657–680. date_created: 2018-04-26T10:49:51Z date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:56:54Z ddc: - '040' department: - _id: '205' - _id: '475' doi: 10.1007/s10726-012-9286-6 file: - access_level: closed content_type: application/pdf creator: cjhaake date_created: 2018-08-09T09:59:39Z date_updated: 2018-08-09T09:59:39Z file_id: '3870' file_name: Negotiating Transfer Prices.pdf file_size: 407410 relation: main_file success: 1 file_date_updated: 2018-08-09T09:59:39Z has_accepted_license: '1' intvolume: ' 22' issue: '4' language: - iso: eng page: 657-680 project: - _id: '1' name: SFB 901 - _id: '2' name: SFB 901 - Project Area A - _id: '7' name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3 publication: Group Decision and Negotiation publication_identifier: issn: - 0926-2644 - 1572-9907 publication_status: published publisher: Springer Nature status: public title: Negotiating Transfer Prices type: journal_article user_id: '65453' volume: 22 year: '2012' ...