@techreport{29761,
  abstract     = {{We study the abilities of competitive markets to produce sufficient energy capacities to
meet a fixed energy demand. Renewable energy producers with stochastic outputs and no
variable costs compete against conventional energy producers with deterministic, pollutant
outputs and increasing marginal costs. We find that either market forces are strong enough
to serve the entire demand, or they are too weak such that the market fails and nothing is
produced. This crucially depends on the relative cost of renewable energy investments, such
that relatively cheap renewable energy causes the market to fail. Welfare analyses show that
with increasing levels of conventional energy pollution the ability of the market to produce
an ecient outcome further declines. As a policy implication, our findings refute the use of
a strategic reserve as a blackout backstop solution. Instead, a capacity mechanism consisting
of a tax-and-subsidy scheme can align the market outcome with the eficient solution for all
pollution levels and relative costs of renewable energy capacities.}},
  author       = {{Block, Lukas and Westbrock, Bastian}},
  keywords     = {{Renewable versus conventional energy, capacity mechanisms, strategic reserves, capacity payments}},
  title        = {{{Capacity investments in a competitive energy market}}},
  year         = {{2022}},
}

@article{30917,
  abstract     = {{We study lobby group formation in a two-stage model where the players rst form lobby
groups that then engage in a rent-seeking contest to inuence the legislator. However, the
outcome of the contest aects all players according to the ideological distance between the
implemented policy and the players' preferences. The players can either lobby by themselves,
form a coalition of lobbyists or free ride. We nd that free coalition formation is reasonable
if either players with moderate preferences face lobby groups with extreme preferences, or if
there are two opposing coalitions with an equal number of members. Otherwise, there are
always free riders among the players.}},
  author       = {{Block, Lukas}},
  journal      = {{Quick And Easy Journal Title}},
  keywords     = {{Group formation, Rent-seeking, Free riding}},
  title        = {{{Coalition formation versus free riding in rent-seeking contests}}},
  year         = {{2022}},
}

@techreport{23568,
  abstract     = {{We study the structure of power networks in consideration of local protests against certain
power lines (’not-in-my-backyard’). An application of a network formation game is used to
determine whether or not such protests arise. We examine the existence of stable networks and
their characteristics, when no player wants to make an alteration. Stability within this game is
only reached if each player is sufficiently connected to a power source but is not linked to more
players than necessary. In addition we introduce an algorithm that creates a stable network.}},
  author       = {{Block, Lukas}},
  keywords     = {{Network formation, NIMBY, Power networks, Nash stability}},
  title        = {{{Network formation with NIMBY constraints}}},
  year         = {{2020}},
}