[{"has_accepted_license":"1","year":"2022","citation":{"mla":"Block, Lukas, and Bastian Westbrock. <i>Capacity Investments in a Competitive Energy Market</i>. 2022.","bibtex":"@book{Block_Westbrock_2022, title={Capacity investments in a competitive energy market}, author={Block, Lukas and Westbrock, Bastian}, year={2022} }","short":"L. Block, B. Westbrock, Capacity Investments in a Competitive Energy Market, 2022.","apa":"Block, L., &#38; Westbrock, B. (2022). <i>Capacity investments in a competitive energy market</i>.","ieee":"L. Block and B. Westbrock, <i>Capacity investments in a competitive energy market</i>. 2022.","chicago":"Block, Lukas, and Bastian Westbrock. <i>Capacity Investments in a Competitive Energy Market</i>, 2022.","ama":"Block L, Westbrock B. <i>Capacity Investments in a Competitive Energy Market</i>.; 2022."},"date_updated":"2022-02-08T20:09:13Z","oa":"1","author":[{"first_name":"Lukas","full_name":"Block, Lukas","id":"22527","last_name":"Block"},{"full_name":"Westbrock, Bastian","last_name":"Westbrock","first_name":"Bastian"}],"date_created":"2022-02-07T12:22:07Z","title":"Capacity investments in a competitive energy market","main_file_link":[{"open_access":"1"}],"type":"working_paper","abstract":[{"lang":"eng","text":"We study the abilities of competitive markets to produce sufficient energy capacities to\r\nmeet a fixed energy demand. Renewable energy producers with stochastic outputs and no\r\nvariable costs compete against conventional energy producers with deterministic, pollutant\r\noutputs and increasing marginal costs. We find that either market forces are strong enough\r\nto serve the entire demand, or they are too weak such that the market fails and nothing is\r\nproduced. This crucially depends on the relative cost of renewable energy investments, such\r\nthat relatively cheap renewable energy causes the market to fail. Welfare analyses show that\r\nwith increasing levels of conventional energy pollution the ability of the market to produce\r\nan e\u001ecient outcome further declines. As a policy implication, our findings refute the use of\r\na strategic reserve as a blackout backstop solution. Instead, a capacity mechanism consisting\r\nof a tax-and-subsidy scheme can align the market outcome with the eficient solution for all\r\npollution levels and relative costs of renewable energy capacities."}],"file":[{"date_updated":"2022-02-07T12:21:13Z","date_created":"2022-02-07T12:21:13Z","creator":"lblock","file_size":1303356,"file_id":"29762","file_name":"Capacity investments in a competitive energy market.pdf","access_level":"closed","content_type":"application/pdf","success":1,"relation":"main_file"}],"status":"public","_id":"29761","user_id":"22527","ddc":["330"],"keyword":["Renewable versus conventional energy","capacity mechanisms","strategic reserves","capacity payments"],"file_date_updated":"2022-02-07T12:21:13Z","language":[{"iso":"eng"}]},{"title":"Coalition formation versus free riding in rent-seeking contests","date_updated":"2022-04-19T15:09:44Z","oa":"1","date_created":"2022-04-19T15:06:55Z","author":[{"full_name":"Block, Lukas","id":"22527","last_name":"Block","first_name":"Lukas"}],"year":"2022","citation":{"ama":"Block L. Coalition formation versus free riding in rent-seeking contests. <i>Quick And Easy Journal Title</i>. Published online 2022.","ieee":"L. Block, “Coalition formation versus free riding in rent-seeking contests,” <i>Quick And Easy Journal Title</i>, 2022.","chicago":"Block, Lukas. “Coalition Formation versus Free Riding in Rent-Seeking Contests.” <i>Quick And Easy Journal Title</i>, 2022.","apa":"Block, L. (2022). Coalition formation versus free riding in rent-seeking contests. <i>Quick And Easy Journal Title</i>.","bibtex":"@article{Block_2022, title={Coalition formation versus free riding in rent-seeking contests}, journal={Quick And Easy Journal Title}, author={Block, Lukas}, year={2022} }","mla":"Block, Lukas. “Coalition Formation versus Free Riding in Rent-Seeking Contests.” <i>Quick And Easy Journal Title</i>, 2022.","short":"L. Block, Quick And Easy Journal Title (2022)."},"jel":["C71","D72","D74"],"has_accepted_license":"1","keyword":["Group formation","Rent-seeking","Free riding"],"ddc":["330"],"article_type":"original","file_date_updated":"2022-04-19T15:06:49Z","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"_id":"30917","user_id":"22527","abstract":[{"lang":"eng","text":"We study lobby group formation in a two-stage model where the players \u001crst form lobby\r\ngroups that then engage in a rent-seeking contest to in\u001duence the legislator. However, the\r\noutcome of the contest a\u001bects all players according to the ideological distance between the\r\nimplemented policy and the players' preferences. The players can either lobby by themselves,\r\nform a coalition of lobbyists or free ride. We \u001cnd that free coalition formation is reasonable\r\nif either players with moderate preferences face lobby groups with extreme preferences, or if\r\nthere are two opposing coalitions with an equal number of members. Otherwise, there are\r\nalways free riders among the players."}],"status":"public","file":[{"creator":"lblock","date_created":"2022-04-19T15:06:49Z","date_updated":"2022-04-19T15:06:49Z","file_id":"30918","file_name":"Coalition formation versus free riding in rent-seeking contests.pdf","access_level":"open_access","file_size":270316,"content_type":"application/pdf","relation":"main_file"}],"publication":"Quick And Easy Journal Title","type":"journal_article"},{"keyword":["Network formation","NIMBY","Power networks","Nash stability"],"ddc":["330"],"language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"file_date_updated":"2021-08-30T10:01:53Z","_id":"23568","user_id":"22527","abstract":[{"lang":"eng","text":"We study the structure of power networks in consideration of local protests against certain\r\npower lines (’not-in-my-backyard’). An application of a network formation game is used to\r\ndetermine whether or not such protests arise. We examine the existence of stable networks and\r\ntheir characteristics, when no player wants to make an alteration. Stability within this game is\r\nonly reached if each player is sufficiently connected to a power source but is not linked to more\r\nplayers than necessary. In addition we introduce an algorithm that creates a stable network."}],"status":"public","file":[{"relation":"main_file","success":1,"content_type":"application/pdf","access_level":"closed","file_id":"23569","file_name":"Network formation with NIMBY constraints.pdf","file_size":169285,"creator":"lblock","date_created":"2021-08-30T10:01:53Z","date_updated":"2021-08-30T10:01:53Z"}],"type":"working_paper","title":"Network formation with NIMBY constraints","main_file_link":[{"open_access":"1"}],"date_updated":"2022-02-07T20:08:54Z","oa":"1","date_created":"2021-08-30T10:05:18Z","author":[{"first_name":"Lukas","last_name":"Block","id":"22527","full_name":"Block, Lukas"}],"year":"2020","citation":{"apa":"Block, L. (2020). <i>Network formation with NIMBY constraints</i>.","bibtex":"@book{Block_2020, title={Network formation with NIMBY constraints}, author={Block, Lukas}, year={2020} }","mla":"Block, Lukas. <i>Network Formation with NIMBY Constraints</i>. 2020.","short":"L. Block, Network Formation with NIMBY Constraints, 2020.","chicago":"Block, Lukas. <i>Network Formation with NIMBY Constraints</i>, 2020.","ieee":"L. Block, <i>Network formation with NIMBY constraints</i>. 2020.","ama":"Block L. <i>Network Formation with NIMBY Constraints</i>.; 2020."},"jel":["D85","H54","L52"],"has_accepted_license":"1"}]