---
_id: '29761'
abstract:
- lang: eng
  text: "We study the abilities of competitive markets to produce sufficient energy
    capacities to\r\nmeet a fixed energy demand. Renewable energy producers with stochastic
    outputs and no\r\nvariable costs compete against conventional energy producers
    with deterministic, pollutant\r\noutputs and increasing marginal costs. We find
    that either market forces are strong enough\r\nto serve the entire demand, or
    they are too weak such that the market fails and nothing is\r\nproduced. This
    crucially depends on the relative cost of renewable energy investments, such\r\nthat
    relatively cheap renewable energy causes the market to fail. Welfare analyses
    show that\r\nwith increasing levels of conventional energy pollution the ability
    of the market to produce\r\nan e\x1Ecient outcome further declines. As a policy
    implication, our findings refute the use of\r\na strategic reserve as a blackout
    backstop solution. Instead, a capacity mechanism consisting\r\nof a tax-and-subsidy
    scheme can align the market outcome with the eficient solution for all\r\npollution
    levels and relative costs of renewable energy capacities."
author:
- first_name: Lukas
  full_name: Block, Lukas
  id: '22527'
  last_name: Block
- first_name: Bastian
  full_name: Westbrock, Bastian
  last_name: Westbrock
citation:
  ama: Block L, Westbrock B. <i>Capacity Investments in a Competitive Energy Market</i>.;
    2022.
  apa: Block, L., &#38; Westbrock, B. (2022). <i>Capacity investments in a competitive
    energy market</i>.
  bibtex: '@book{Block_Westbrock_2022, title={Capacity investments in a competitive
    energy market}, author={Block, Lukas and Westbrock, Bastian}, year={2022} }'
  chicago: Block, Lukas, and Bastian Westbrock. <i>Capacity Investments in a Competitive
    Energy Market</i>, 2022.
  ieee: L. Block and B. Westbrock, <i>Capacity investments in a competitive energy
    market</i>. 2022.
  mla: Block, Lukas, and Bastian Westbrock. <i>Capacity Investments in a Competitive
    Energy Market</i>. 2022.
  short: L. Block, B. Westbrock, Capacity Investments in a Competitive Energy Market,
    2022.
date_created: 2022-02-07T12:22:07Z
date_updated: 2022-02-08T20:09:13Z
ddc:
- '330'
file:
- access_level: closed
  content_type: application/pdf
  creator: lblock
  date_created: 2022-02-07T12:21:13Z
  date_updated: 2022-02-07T12:21:13Z
  file_id: '29762'
  file_name: Capacity investments in a competitive energy market.pdf
  file_size: 1303356
  relation: main_file
  success: 1
file_date_updated: 2022-02-07T12:21:13Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
keyword:
- Renewable versus conventional energy
- capacity mechanisms
- strategic reserves
- capacity payments
language:
- iso: eng
main_file_link:
- open_access: '1'
oa: '1'
status: public
title: Capacity investments in a competitive energy market
type: working_paper
user_id: '22527'
year: '2022'
...
---
_id: '30917'
abstract:
- lang: eng
  text: "We study lobby group formation in a two-stage model where the players \x1Crst
    form lobby\r\ngroups that then engage in a rent-seeking contest to in\x1Duence
    the legislator. However, the\r\noutcome of the contest a\eects all players according
    to the ideological distance between the\r\nimplemented policy and the players'
    preferences. The players can either lobby by themselves,\r\nform a coalition of
    lobbyists or free ride. We \x1Cnd that free coalition formation is reasonable\r\nif
    either players with moderate preferences face lobby groups with extreme preferences,
    or if\r\nthere are two opposing coalitions with an equal number of members. Otherwise,
    there are\r\nalways free riders among the players."
article_type: original
author:
- first_name: Lukas
  full_name: Block, Lukas
  id: '22527'
  last_name: Block
citation:
  ama: Block L. Coalition formation versus free riding in rent-seeking contests. <i>Quick
    And Easy Journal Title</i>. Published online 2022.
  apa: Block, L. (2022). Coalition formation versus free riding in rent-seeking contests.
    <i>Quick And Easy Journal Title</i>.
  bibtex: '@article{Block_2022, title={Coalition formation versus free riding in rent-seeking
    contests}, journal={Quick And Easy Journal Title}, author={Block, Lukas}, year={2022}
    }'
  chicago: Block, Lukas. “Coalition Formation versus Free Riding in Rent-Seeking Contests.”
    <i>Quick And Easy Journal Title</i>, 2022.
  ieee: L. Block, “Coalition formation versus free riding in rent-seeking contests,”
    <i>Quick And Easy Journal Title</i>, 2022.
  mla: Block, Lukas. “Coalition Formation versus Free Riding in Rent-Seeking Contests.”
    <i>Quick And Easy Journal Title</i>, 2022.
  short: L. Block, Quick And Easy Journal Title (2022).
date_created: 2022-04-19T15:06:55Z
date_updated: 2022-04-19T15:09:44Z
ddc:
- '330'
file:
- access_level: open_access
  content_type: application/pdf
  creator: lblock
  date_created: 2022-04-19T15:06:49Z
  date_updated: 2022-04-19T15:06:49Z
  file_id: '30918'
  file_name: Coalition formation versus free riding in rent-seeking contests.pdf
  file_size: 270316
  relation: main_file
file_date_updated: 2022-04-19T15:06:49Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
jel:
- C71
- D72
- D74
keyword:
- Group formation
- Rent-seeking
- Free riding
language:
- iso: eng
oa: '1'
publication: Quick And Easy Journal Title
status: public
title: Coalition formation versus free riding in rent-seeking contests
type: journal_article
user_id: '22527'
year: '2022'
...
---
_id: '23568'
abstract:
- lang: eng
  text: "We study the structure of power networks in consideration of local protests
    against certain\r\npower lines (’not-in-my-backyard’). An application of a network
    formation game is used to\r\ndetermine whether or not such protests arise. We
    examine the existence of stable networks and\r\ntheir characteristics, when no
    player wants to make an alteration. Stability within this game is\r\nonly reached
    if each player is sufficiently connected to a power source but is not linked to
    more\r\nplayers than necessary. In addition we introduce an algorithm that creates
    a stable network."
author:
- first_name: Lukas
  full_name: Block, Lukas
  id: '22527'
  last_name: Block
citation:
  ama: Block L. <i>Network Formation with NIMBY Constraints</i>.; 2020.
  apa: Block, L. (2020). <i>Network formation with NIMBY constraints</i>.
  bibtex: '@book{Block_2020, title={Network formation with NIMBY constraints}, author={Block,
    Lukas}, year={2020} }'
  chicago: Block, Lukas. <i>Network Formation with NIMBY Constraints</i>, 2020.
  ieee: L. Block, <i>Network formation with NIMBY constraints</i>. 2020.
  mla: Block, Lukas. <i>Network Formation with NIMBY Constraints</i>. 2020.
  short: L. Block, Network Formation with NIMBY Constraints, 2020.
date_created: 2021-08-30T10:05:18Z
date_updated: 2022-02-07T20:08:54Z
ddc:
- '330'
file:
- access_level: closed
  content_type: application/pdf
  creator: lblock
  date_created: 2021-08-30T10:01:53Z
  date_updated: 2021-08-30T10:01:53Z
  file_id: '23569'
  file_name: Network formation with NIMBY constraints.pdf
  file_size: 169285
  relation: main_file
  success: 1
file_date_updated: 2021-08-30T10:01:53Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
jel:
- D85
- H54
- L52
keyword:
- Network formation
- NIMBY
- Power networks
- Nash stability
language:
- iso: eng
main_file_link:
- open_access: '1'
oa: '1'
status: public
title: Network formation with NIMBY constraints
type: working_paper
user_id: '22527'
year: '2020'
...