@inbook{45880, author = {{Elrich, Alina and Kaimann, Daniel and Fahr, René and Kundisch, Dennis and Mir Djawadi, Behnud and Müller, Michelle and Poniatowski, Martin and Schäfers, Sabrina and Frick, Bernd}}, booktitle = {{On-The-Fly Computing -- Individualized IT-services in dynamic markets}}, editor = {{Haake, Claus-Jochen and Meyer auf der Heide, Friedhelm and Platzner, Marco and Wachsmuth, Henning and Wehrheim, Heike}}, pages = {{45--64}}, publisher = {{Heinz Nixdorf Institut, Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Empirical Analysis in Markets for OTF Services}}}, doi = {{10.5281/zenodo.8068430}}, volume = {{412}}, year = {{2023}}, } @inbook{46088, author = {{Mir Djawadi, Behnud and Plaß, Sabrina and Schäfers, Sabrina}}, booktitle = {{Organizational Wrongdoing as the “Foundational” Grand Challenge: Consequences and Impact}}, editor = {{Gabbioneta, Claudia and Clemente, Marco and Greenwood, Royston}}, isbn = {{9781837532834}}, issn = {{0733-558X}}, pages = {{73--100}}, publisher = {{Emerald Publishing Limited}}, title = {{{Peers: Powerful or Negligible? A Systematic Review on Peer Factors and Internal Whistleblowing}}}, doi = {{10.1108/s0733-558x20230000085005}}, volume = {{85}}, year = {{2023}}, } @techreport{45616, abstract = {{Aggregation metrics in reputation systems are important for overcoming information overload. When using these metrics, technical aggregation functions such as the arithmetic mean are implemented to measure the valence of product ratings. However, it is unclear whether the implemented aggregation functions match the inherent aggregation patterns of customers. In our experiment, we elicit customers' aggregation heuristics and contrast these with reference functions. Our findings indicate that, overall, the arithmetic mean performs best in comparison with other aggregation functions. However, our analysis on an individual level reveals heterogeneous aggregation patterns. Major clusters exhibit a binary bias (i.e., an over-weighting of moderate ratings and under-weighting of extreme ratings) in combination with the arithmetic mean. Minor clusters focus on 1-star ratings or negative (i.e., 1-star and 2-star) ratings. Thereby, inherent aggregation patterns are neither affected by variation of provided information nor by individual characteristics such as experience, risk attitudes, or demographics.}}, author = {{van Straaten, Dirk and Melnikov, Vitalik and Hüllermeier, Eyke and Mir Djawadi, Behnud and Fahr, René}}, title = {{{Accounting for Heuristics in Reputation Systems: An Interdisciplinary Approach on Aggregation Processes}}}, volume = {{72}}, year = {{2021}}, } @article{80, abstract = {{Models on network formation have often been extended to include the potential of network disruption in recent years. Whereas the theoretical research on network formation under the threat of disruption has thus gained prominence, hardly any experimental research exists so far. In this paper, we therefore experimentally study the emergence of networks including the aspect of a known external threat by relating theoretical predictions by Dzuibiński and Goyal (2013) to actual observed behaviour. We deal with the question if subjects in the role of a strategic Designer are able to form safe networks for least costs while facing a strategic Adversary who is going to attack their networks. Varying the costs for protecting nodes, we designed and tested two treatments with different predictions for the equilibrium network and investigated whether one of the least cost equilibrium networks was more likely to be reached. Furthermore, the influence of the subjects’ farsightedness on their decision-making process was elicited and analysed. We find that while subjects are able to build safe networks in both treatments, equilibrium networks are only built in one of the two treatments. In the other treatment, predominantly safe networks are built but they are not for least costs. Additionally, we find that farsightedness –as measured in our experiment– has no influence on whether subjects are able to build safe or least cost equilibrium networks. Two robustness settings with a reduced external threat or more liberties to modify the initial networks qualitatively confirm our results. Overall, in this experiment observed behaviour is only partially in line with the theoretical predictions by Dzuibiński and Goyal (2013).}}, author = {{Endres, Angelika Elfriede and Recker, Sonja and Mir Djawadi, Behnud and Hoyer, Britta}}, journal = {{Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization }}, pages = {{708--734}}, title = {{{Network Formation and Disruption - An Experiment: Are equilibrium networks too complex?}}}, doi = {{10.1016/j.jebo.2018.11.004}}, volume = {{157}}, year = {{2019}}, } @article{5330, abstract = {{In Internet transactions, customers and service providers often interact once and anonymously. To prevent deceptive behavior a reputation system is particularly important to reduce information asymmetries about the quality of the offered product or service. In this study we examine the effectiveness of a reputation system to reduce information asymmetries when customers may make mistakes in judging the provided service quality. In our model, a service provider makes strategic quality choices and short-lived customers are asked to evaluate the observed quality by providing ratings to a reputation system. The customer is not able to always evaluate the service quality correctly and possibly submits an erroneous rating according to a predefined probability. Considering reputation profiles of the last three sales, within the theoretical model we derive that the service provider’s dichotomous quality decisions are independent of the reputation profile and depend only on the probabilities of receiving positive and negative ratings when providing low or high quality. Thus, a service provider optimally either maintains a good reputation or completely refrains from any reputation building process. However, when mapping our theoretical model to an experimental design we find that a significant share of subjects in the role of the service provider deviates from optimal behavior and chooses actions which are conditional on the current reputation profile. With respect to these individual quality choices we see that subjects use milking strategies which means that they exploit a good reputation. In particular, if the sales price is high, low quality is delivered until the price drops below a certain threshold, and then high quality is chosen until the price increases again.}}, author = {{Mir Djawadi, Behnud and Fahr, Rene and Haake, Claus-Jochen and Recker, Sonja}}, issn = {{1932-6203}}, journal = {{PLoS ONE}}, number = {{11}}, publisher = {{Public Library of Science}}, title = {{{Maintaining vs. Milking Good Reputation when Customer Feedback is Inaccurate}}}, doi = {{10.1371/journal.pone.0207172}}, volume = {{13}}, year = {{2018}}, } @techreport{1057, author = {{Sürücü, Oktay and Mir Djawadi, Behnud and Brangewitz, Sonja}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Asymmetric Dominance Effect with Multiple Decoys for Low- and High-Variance Lotteries}}}, year = {{2017}}, } @article{228, abstract = {{We investigate the pervasiveness of lying in professional contexts such as insurance fraud, tax evasion and untrue job applications. We argue that lying in professional contexts share three characterizing features: (1) the gain from the dishonest behavior is uncertain, (2) the harm that lying may cause to the other party is only indirect and (3) lies are more indirect lies by action or written statements. Conducted as a field experiment with a heterogenous group of participants during a University ‘‘Open House Day’’, our ‘‘gumball-machineexperiment’’ provides field evidence on how preferences for lying are shaped in situations typically found in professional contexts which we consider to be particularly prone to lying behavior compared to other contexts. As a key innovation, our experimental design allows measuring exact levels of cheating behavior under anonymous conditions. We find clean evidence that cheating is prevalent across all sub groups and that more than 32% of the population cheats for their own gain. However, an analysis of the cheating rates with respect to highest educational degree and professional status reveals that students cheat more than non-students. This finding warrants a careful interpretation of generalizing laboratory findings with student subjects about the prevalence of cheating in the population.}}, author = {{Fahr, Rene and Mir Djawadi, Behnud}}, journal = {{Journal of Economic Psychology}}, pages = {{48--59}}, publisher = {{Elsevier}}, title = {{{“…and they are really lying”: Clean Evidence on the Pervasiveness of Cheating in Professional Contexts from a Field Experiment.}}}, doi = {{10.1016/j.joep.2015.03.002}}, year = {{2015}}, } @article{444, abstract = {{BackgroundMedical nonpersistence is a worldwide problem of striking magnitude. Although many fields of studies including epidemiology, sociology, and psychology try to identify determinants for medical nonpersistence, comprehensive research to explain medical nonpersistence from an economics perspective is rather scarce.ObjectivesThe aim of the study was to develop a conceptual framework that augments standard economic choice theory with psychological concepts of behavioral economics to understand how patients’ preferences for discontinuing with therapy arise over the course of the medical treatment. The availability of such a framework allows the targeted design of mechanisms for intervention strategies.MethodsOur conceptual framework models the patient as an active economic agent who evaluates the benefits and costs for continuing with therapy. We argue that a combination of loss aversion and mental accounting operations explains why patients discontinue with therapy at a specific point in time. We designed a randomized laboratory economic experiment with a student subject pool to investigate the behavioral predictions.ResultsSubjects continue with therapy as long as experienced utility losses have to be compensated. As soon as previous losses are evened out, subjects perceive the marginal benefit of persistence lower than in the beginning of the treatment. Consequently, subjects start to discontinue with therapy.ConclusionsOur results highlight that concepts of behavioral economics capture the dynamic structure of medical nonpersistence better than does standard economic choice theory. We recommend that behavioral economics should be a mandatory part of the development of possible intervention strategies aimed at improving patients’ compliance and persistence behavior.}}, author = {{Mir Djawadi, Behnud and Fahr, Rene and Turk, Florian}}, journal = {{Value in Health}}, number = {{8}}, pages = {{814--822}}, publisher = {{Elsevier}}, title = {{{Conceptual Model and Economic Experiments to Explain Nonpersistence and Enable Mechanism Designs Fosterin Behavioral Change}}}, doi = {{10.1016/j.jval.2014.08.2669}}, year = {{2014}}, }