[{"doi":"10.1016/j.socec.2022.101869","date_updated":"2022-03-21T06:07:39Z","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"title":"Anonymity and Self-Expression in Online Rating Systems - An Experimental Analysis","project":[{"_id":"1","name":"SFB 901: SFB 901"},{"_id":"2","name":"SFB 901 - A: SFB 901 - Project Area A"},{"name":"SFB 901 - A3: SFB 901 - Subproject A3","_id":"7"},{"_id":"8","name":"SFB 901 - A4: SFB 901 - Subproject A4"}],"publication_identifier":{"issn":["2214-8043"]},"publication_status":"published","department":[{"_id":"280"},{"_id":"475"},{"_id":"179"}],"intvolume":" 98","_id":"30341","page":"101869","type":"journal_article","citation":{"short":"B. Hoyer, D. van Straaten, Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics 98 (2022) 101869.","ieee":"B. Hoyer and D. van Straaten, “Anonymity and Self-Expression in Online Rating Systems - An Experimental Analysis,” Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics, vol. 98, p. 101869, 2022, doi: 10.1016/j.socec.2022.101869.","chicago":"Hoyer, Britta, and Dirk van Straaten. “Anonymity and Self-Expression in Online Rating Systems - An Experimental Analysis.” Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics 98 (2022): 101869. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2022.101869.","ama":"Hoyer B, van Straaten D. Anonymity and Self-Expression in Online Rating Systems - An Experimental Analysis. Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics. 2022;98:101869. doi:10.1016/j.socec.2022.101869","apa":"Hoyer, B., & van Straaten, D. (2022). Anonymity and Self-Expression in Online Rating Systems - An Experimental Analysis. Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics, 98, 101869. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2022.101869","bibtex":"@article{Hoyer_van Straaten_2022, title={Anonymity and Self-Expression in Online Rating Systems - An Experimental Analysis}, volume={98}, DOI={10.1016/j.socec.2022.101869}, journal={Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics}, publisher={Elsevier BV}, author={Hoyer, Britta and van Straaten, Dirk}, year={2022}, pages={101869} }","mla":"Hoyer, Britta, and Dirk van Straaten. “Anonymity and Self-Expression in Online Rating Systems - An Experimental Analysis.” Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics, vol. 98, Elsevier BV, 2022, p. 101869, doi:10.1016/j.socec.2022.101869."},"year":"2022","main_file_link":[{"url":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S2214804322000441"}],"user_id":"42447","date_created":"2022-03-16T06:24:37Z","status":"public","volume":98,"keyword":["General Social Sciences","Economics and Econometrics","Applied Psychology"],"publication":"Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics","author":[{"full_name":"Hoyer, Britta","first_name":"Britta","id":"42447","last_name":"Hoyer"},{"full_name":"van Straaten, Dirk","first_name":"Dirk","id":"10311","last_name":"van Straaten"}],"publisher":"Elsevier BV"},{"date_updated":"2022-12-04T14:40:38Z","_id":"31881","doi":"10.1007/s00182-022-00812-5","citation":{"chicago":"Hoyer, Britta, and Kris De Jaegher. “Network Disruption and the Common-Enemy Effect.” International Journal of Game Theory, 2022. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-022-00812-5.","ama":"Hoyer B, De Jaegher K. Network Disruption and the Common-Enemy Effect. International Journal of Game Theory. Published online 2022. doi:10.1007/s00182-022-00812-5","apa":"Hoyer, B., & De Jaegher, K. (2022). Network Disruption and the Common-Enemy Effect. International Journal of Game Theory. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-022-00812-5","bibtex":"@article{Hoyer_De Jaegher_2022, title={Network Disruption and the Common-Enemy Effect}, DOI={10.1007/s00182-022-00812-5}, journal={International Journal of Game Theory}, publisher={Springer}, author={Hoyer, Britta and De Jaegher, Kris}, year={2022} }","mla":"Hoyer, Britta, and Kris De Jaegher. “Network Disruption and the Common-Enemy Effect.” International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, 2022, doi:10.1007/s00182-022-00812-5.","short":"B. Hoyer, K. De Jaegher, International Journal of Game Theory (2022).","ieee":"B. Hoyer and K. De Jaegher, “Network Disruption and the Common-Enemy Effect,” International Journal of Game Theory, 2022, doi: 10.1007/s00182-022-00812-5."},"type":"journal_article","year":"2022","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"extern":"1","title":"Network Disruption and the Common-Enemy Effect","user_id":"42447","author":[{"last_name":"Hoyer","id":"42447","first_name":"Britta","full_name":"Hoyer, Britta"},{"full_name":"De Jaegher, Kris","first_name":"Kris","last_name":"De Jaegher"}],"publisher":"Springer","publication":"International Journal of Game Theory","department":[{"_id":"280"},{"_id":"475"}],"publication_status":"epub_ahead","status":"public","date_created":"2022-06-14T15:33:35Z","project":[{"name":"SFB 901: SFB 901","_id":"1"},{"_id":"2","name":"SFB 901 - A: SFB 901 - Project Area A"},{"_id":"7","name":"SFB 901 - A3: SFB 901 - Subproject A3"}]},{"citation":{"ama":"Hoyer B, van Huizen T, Keijzer L, Rezaei S, Rosenkranz S, Westbrock B. Gender, competitiveness, and task difficulty: Evidence from the field. Labour Economics. 2020. doi:10.1016/j.labeco.2020.101815","apa":"Hoyer, B., van Huizen, T., Keijzer, L., Rezaei, S., Rosenkranz, S., & Westbrock, B. (2020). Gender, competitiveness, and task difficulty: Evidence from the field. Labour Economics. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.labeco.2020.101815","chicago":"Hoyer, Britta, Thomas van Huizen, Linda Keijzer, Sarah Rezaei, Stephanie Rosenkranz, and Bastian Westbrock. “Gender, Competitiveness, and Task Difficulty: Evidence from the Field.” Labour Economics, 2020. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.labeco.2020.101815.","mla":"Hoyer, Britta, et al. “Gender, Competitiveness, and Task Difficulty: Evidence from the Field.” Labour Economics, 2020, doi:10.1016/j.labeco.2020.101815.","bibtex":"@article{Hoyer_van Huizen_Keijzer_Rezaei_Rosenkranz_Westbrock_2020, title={Gender, competitiveness, and task difficulty: Evidence from the field}, DOI={10.1016/j.labeco.2020.101815}, journal={Labour Economics}, author={Hoyer, Britta and van Huizen, Thomas and Keijzer, Linda and Rezaei, Sarah and Rosenkranz, Stephanie and Westbrock, Bastian }, year={2020} }","short":"B. Hoyer, T. van Huizen, L. Keijzer, S. Rezaei, S. Rosenkranz, B. Westbrock, Labour Economics (2020).","ieee":"B. Hoyer, T. van Huizen, L. Keijzer, S. Rezaei, S. Rosenkranz, and B. Westbrock, “Gender, competitiveness, and task difficulty: Evidence from the field,” Labour Economics, 2020."},"type":"journal_article","year":"2020","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"date_updated":"2022-01-06T06:52:47Z","_id":"16273","doi":"10.1016/j.labeco.2020.101815","department":[{"_id":"280"},{"_id":"475"}],"publication":"Labour Economics","author":[{"last_name":"Hoyer","id":"42447","first_name":"Britta","full_name":"Hoyer, Britta"},{"last_name":"van Huizen","full_name":"van Huizen, Thomas","first_name":"Thomas"},{"last_name":"Keijzer","first_name":"Linda ","full_name":"Keijzer, Linda "},{"last_name":"Rezaei","full_name":"Rezaei, Sarah ","first_name":"Sarah "},{"last_name":"Rosenkranz","first_name":"Stephanie","full_name":"Rosenkranz, Stephanie"},{"full_name":"Westbrock, Bastian ","first_name":"Bastian ","last_name":"Westbrock"}],"publication_status":"epub_ahead","date_created":"2020-03-09T12:35:49Z","status":"public","abstract":[{"text":"This study examines the gender gap in competitiveness in an educational setting\r\nand tests whether this gap depends on the difficulty of the task at hand. For this purpose,\r\nwe administered a series of experiments during the final exam of a university\r\ncourse. We confronted three cohorts of undergraduate students with a set of bonus\r\nquestions and the choice between an absolute and a tournament grading scheme\r\nfor these questions. To test the moderating impact of task difficulty, we (randomly)\r\nvaried the difficulty of the questions between treatment groups. We find that, on\r\naverage, women are significantly less likely to select the tournament scheme. However,\r\nthe results show that the gender gap in tournament entry is sizable when the\r\nquestions are relative easy, but much smaller and statistical insignificant when the\r\nquestions are difficult.","lang":"eng"}],"title":"Gender, competitiveness, and task difficulty: Evidence from the field","user_id":"42447"},{"doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2020.03.006","date_updated":"2022-01-06T06:52:49Z","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"title":"Matching Strategies of Heterogeneous Agents under Incomplete Information in a University Clearinghouse","project":[{"name":"SFB 901","_id":"1"},{"_id":"2","name":"SFB 901 - Project Area A"},{"_id":"7","name":"SFB 901 - Subproject A3"}],"publication_status":"published","department":[{"_id":"280"},{"_id":"475"},{"_id":"205"},{"_id":"368"}],"intvolume":" 121","_id":"16334","page":"453 - 481","year":"2020","type":"journal_article","citation":{"short":"B. Hoyer, N. Stroh-Maraun, Games and Economic Behavior 121 (2020) 453–481.","ieee":"B. Hoyer and N. Stroh-Maraun, “Matching Strategies of Heterogeneous Agents under Incomplete Information in a University Clearinghouse,” Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 121, pp. 453–481, 2020.","ama":"Hoyer B, Stroh-Maraun N. Matching Strategies of Heterogeneous Agents under Incomplete Information in a University Clearinghouse. Games and Economic Behavior. 2020;121:453-481. doi:10.1016/j.geb.2020.03.006","apa":"Hoyer, B., & Stroh-Maraun, N. (2020). Matching Strategies of Heterogeneous Agents under Incomplete Information in a University Clearinghouse. Games and Economic Behavior, 121, 453–481. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2020.03.006","chicago":"Hoyer, Britta, and Nadja Stroh-Maraun. “Matching Strategies of Heterogeneous Agents under Incomplete Information in a University Clearinghouse.” Games and Economic Behavior 121 (2020): 453–81. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2020.03.006.","bibtex":"@article{Hoyer_Stroh-Maraun_2020, title={Matching Strategies of Heterogeneous Agents under Incomplete Information in a University Clearinghouse}, volume={121}, DOI={10.1016/j.geb.2020.03.006}, journal={Games and Economic Behavior}, author={Hoyer, Britta and Stroh-Maraun, Nadja}, year={2020}, pages={453–481} }","mla":"Hoyer, Britta, and Nadja Stroh-Maraun. “Matching Strategies of Heterogeneous Agents under Incomplete Information in a University Clearinghouse.” Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 121, 2020, pp. 453–81, doi:10.1016/j.geb.2020.03.006."},"user_id":"42447","abstract":[{"text":"We analyze the actual behavior of agents in a matching mechanism, using data from a clearinghouse at the Faculty of Business Administration and Economics at a German university, where a variant of the Boston mechanism is used. We supplement this data with data generated in a survey among the students who participated in the clearinghouse. We find that under the current mechanism over 74% of students act strategically by misrepresenting at least one of their preferences. Nevertheless, not all students are able to improve their outcome by doing so. We show that this is mainly due to the incomplete information of students and naiveté. Sophisticated students actually reach significantly better outcomes than naive students. Thus, we find evidence that naive students are exploited by sophisticated students in an incomplete information setting.","lang":"eng"}],"article_type":"original","date_created":"2020-03-24T08:05:53Z","status":"public","volume":121,"publication":"Games and Economic Behavior","author":[{"first_name":"Britta","full_name":"Hoyer, Britta","last_name":"Hoyer","id":"42447"},{"first_name":"Nadja","full_name":"Stroh-Maraun, Nadja","last_name":"Stroh-Maraun","id":"13264"}]},{"title":"Price competition and the Bertrand model: The paradox of the German mobile discount market","project":[{"name":"SFB 901 - Project Area A","_id":"2"},{"_id":"7","name":"SFB 901 - Subproject A3"},{"_id":"8","name":"SFB 901 - Subproject A4"},{"_id":"1","name":"SFB 901"}],"publication_status":"epub_ahead","department":[{"_id":"280"},{"_id":"183"},{"_id":"475"}],"doi":"10.1080/13504851.2018.1436141","date_updated":"2022-01-06T06:51:00Z","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"user_id":"18949","ddc":["000"],"abstract":[{"text":"We investigate the degree of price competition among telecommunication firms. Underlying a Bertrand model of price competition, we empirically model pricing behaviour in an oligopoly. We analyse panel data of individual pricing information of mobile phone contracts offered between 2011 and 2017. We provide empirical evidence that price differences as well as reputational effects serve as a signal to buyers and significantly affect market demand. Additionally, we find that brands lead to an increase in demand and thus are able to generate spillover effects even after price increase.","lang":"eng"}],"status":"public","has_accepted_license":"1","date_created":"2018-01-31T08:34:35Z","volume":26,"file":[{"file_size":625230,"file_id":"5307","creator":"ups","content_type":"application/pdf","date_updated":"2018-11-02T15:35:29Z","relation":"main_file","success":1,"date_created":"2018-11-02T15:35:29Z","file_name":"KaimannHoyer.pdf","access_level":"closed"}],"author":[{"first_name":"Daniel","full_name":"Kaimann, Daniel","last_name":"Kaimann","id":"18949"},{"id":"42447","last_name":"Hoyer","full_name":"Hoyer, Britta","first_name":"Britta"}],"publisher":"Taylor and Francis Online","publication":"Applied Economics Letters","file_date_updated":"2018-11-02T15:35:29Z","issue":"1","_id":"1139","intvolume":" 26","year":"2019","citation":{"bibtex":"@article{Kaimann_Hoyer_2019, title={Price competition and the Bertrand model: The paradox of the German mobile discount market}, volume={26}, DOI={10.1080/13504851.2018.1436141}, number={1}, journal={Applied Economics Letters}, publisher={Taylor and Francis Online}, author={Kaimann, Daniel and Hoyer, Britta}, year={2019}, pages={54–57} }","mla":"Kaimann, Daniel, and Britta Hoyer. “Price Competition and the Bertrand Model: The Paradox of the German Mobile Discount Market.” Applied Economics Letters, vol. 26, no. 1, Taylor and Francis Online, 2019, pp. 54–57, doi:10.1080/13504851.2018.1436141.","chicago":"Kaimann, Daniel, and Britta Hoyer. “Price Competition and the Bertrand Model: The Paradox of the German Mobile Discount Market.” Applied Economics Letters 26, no. 1 (2019): 54–57. https://doi.org/10.1080/13504851.2018.1436141.","apa":"Kaimann, D., & Hoyer, B. (2019). Price competition and the Bertrand model: The paradox of the German mobile discount market. Applied Economics Letters, 26(1), 54–57. https://doi.org/10.1080/13504851.2018.1436141","ama":"Kaimann D, Hoyer B. Price competition and the Bertrand model: The paradox of the German mobile discount market. Applied Economics Letters. 2019;26(1):54-57. doi:10.1080/13504851.2018.1436141","ieee":"D. Kaimann and B. Hoyer, “Price competition and the Bertrand model: The paradox of the German mobile discount market,” Applied Economics Letters, vol. 26, no. 1, pp. 54–57, 2019.","short":"D. Kaimann, B. Hoyer, Applied Economics Letters 26 (2019) 54–57."},"type":"journal_article","page":"54-57","main_file_link":[{"url":"http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13504851.2018.1436141"}]},{"title":"The Common Enemy Effect under Strategic Network Formation and Disruption","department":[{"_id":"280"},{"_id":"475"}],"project":[{"name":"SFB 901","_id":"1"},{"_id":"2","name":"SFB 901 - Project Area A"},{"_id":"7","name":"SFB 901 - Subproject A3"}],"publication_status":"published","date_updated":"2022-01-06T06:55:36Z","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2019.03.011","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"abstract":[{"lang":"eng","text":"Social psychology studies the \"common enemy effect\", the phenomenon\r\nthat members of a group work together when they face an opponent, although they otherwise have little in common. An interesting scenario\r\nis the formation of an information network where group members individually sponsor costly links. Suppose that ceteris paribus, an outsider\r\nappears who aims to disrupt the information \r\nflow within the network\r\nby deleting some of the links. The question is how the group responds\r\nto this common enemy. We address this question for the homogeneous\r\nconnections model of strategic network formation, with two-way \r\nflow of\r\ninformation and without information decay. For sufficiently low linkage\r\ncosts, the external threat can lead to a more connected network, a positive\r\ncommon enemy effect. For very high but not prohibitively high linkage\r\ncosts, the equilibrium network can be minimally connected and efficient\r\nin the absence of the external threat whereas it is always empty and ineffi\fcient in the presence of the external threat, a negative common enemy\r\neffect. For intermediate linkage costs, both connected networks and the\r\nempty network are Nash for certain cost ranges."}],"user_id":"477","author":[{"last_name":"Hoyer","id":"42447","first_name":"Britta","full_name":"Hoyer, Britta"},{"full_name":"Haller, Hans","first_name":"Hans","last_name":"Haller"}],"publication":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","status":"public","date_created":"2018-04-06T07:59:01Z","volume":162,"_id":"2256","intvolume":" 162","main_file_link":[{"url":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167268119300824"}],"citation":{"short":"B. Hoyer, H. Haller, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 162 (2019) 146–163.","ieee":"B. Hoyer and H. Haller, “The Common Enemy Effect under Strategic Network Formation and Disruption,” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, vol. 162, pp. 146–163, 2019.","chicago":"Hoyer, Britta, and Hans Haller. “The Common Enemy Effect under Strategic Network Formation and Disruption.” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 162 (2019): 146–63. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2019.03.011.","apa":"Hoyer, B., & Haller, H. (2019). The Common Enemy Effect under Strategic Network Formation and Disruption. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 162, 146–163. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2019.03.011","ama":"Hoyer B, Haller H. The Common Enemy Effect under Strategic Network Formation and Disruption. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. 2019;162:146-163. doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2019.03.011","mla":"Hoyer, Britta, and Hans Haller. “The Common Enemy Effect under Strategic Network Formation and Disruption.” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, vol. 162, 2019, pp. 146–63, doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2019.03.011.","bibtex":"@article{Hoyer_Haller_2019, title={The Common Enemy Effect under Strategic Network Formation and Disruption}, volume={162}, DOI={10.1016/j.jebo.2019.03.011}, journal={Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization}, author={Hoyer, Britta and Haller, Hans}, year={2019}, pages={146–163} }"},"year":"2019","type":"journal_article","page":"146-163"},{"project":[{"_id":"1","name":"SFB 901"},{"name":"SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3","_id":"7"},{"name":"SFB 901 - Subprojekt A4","_id":"8"},{"_id":"2","name":"SFB 901 - Project Area A"}],"publication_status":"epub_ahead","department":[{"_id":"280"},{"_id":"179"},{"_id":"204"},{"_id":"475"}],"title":"Network Formation and Disruption - An Experiment: Are equilibrium networks too complex?","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2018.11.004","date_updated":"2022-01-06T07:03:49Z","date_created":"2017-10-17T12:41:07Z","has_accepted_license":"1","status":"public","volume":157,"file":[{"file_name":"Publication Jebo.pdf","date_created":"2018-11-19T07:39:42Z","access_level":"closed","creator":"bhoyer","file_id":"5723","file_size":1569991,"relation":"main_file","content_type":"application/pdf","date_updated":"2018-11-19T07:39:42Z"}],"publication":"Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization ","file_date_updated":"2018-11-19T07:39:42Z","author":[{"last_name":"Endres","id":"48794","first_name":"Angelika Elfriede","full_name":"Endres, Angelika Elfriede"},{"last_name":"Recker","full_name":"Recker, Sonja","first_name":"Sonja"},{"last_name":"Mir Djawadi","id":"26032","first_name":"Behnud","full_name":"Mir Djawadi, Behnud","orcid":"0000-0002-6271-5912"},{"id":"42447","last_name":"Hoyer","full_name":"Hoyer, Britta","first_name":"Britta"}],"user_id":"42447","ddc":["330"],"abstract":[{"text":"Models on network formation have often been extended to include the potential of network disruption in recent years. Whereas the theoretical research on network formation under the threat of disruption has thus gained prominence, hardly any experimental research exists so far. In this paper, we therefore experimentally study the emergence of networks including the aspect of a known external threat by relating theoretical predictions by Dzuibiński and Goyal (2013) to actual observed behaviour. We deal with the question if subjects in the role of a strategic Designer are able to form safe networks for least costs while facing a strategic Adversary who is going to attack their networks. Varying the costs for protecting nodes, we designed and tested two treatments with different predictions for the equilibrium network and investigated whether one of the least cost equilibrium networks was more likely to be reached. Furthermore, the influence of the subjects’ farsightedness on their decision-making process was elicited and analysed.\r\n\r\nWe find that while subjects are able to build safe networks in both treatments, equilibrium networks are only built in one of the two treatments. In the other treatment, predominantly safe networks are built but they are not for least costs. Additionally, we find that farsightedness –as measured in our experiment– has no influence on whether subjects are able to build safe or least cost equilibrium networks. Two robustness settings with a reduced external threat or more liberties to modify the initial networks qualitatively confirm our results. Overall, in this experiment observed behaviour is only partially in line with the theoretical predictions by Dzuibiński and Goyal (2013).","lang":"eng"}],"article_type":"original","page":"708-734","citation":{"chicago":"Endres, Angelika Elfriede, Sonja Recker, Behnud Mir Djawadi, and Britta Hoyer. “Network Formation and Disruption - An Experiment: Are Equilibrium Networks Too Complex?” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 157 (2019): 708–34. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2018.11.004.","ama":"Endres AE, Recker S, Mir Djawadi B, Hoyer B. Network Formation and Disruption - An Experiment: Are equilibrium networks too complex? Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization . 2019;157:708-734. doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2018.11.004","apa":"Endres, A. E., Recker, S., Mir Djawadi, B., & Hoyer, B. (2019). Network Formation and Disruption - An Experiment: Are equilibrium networks too complex? Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization , 157, 708–734. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2018.11.004","bibtex":"@article{Endres_Recker_Mir Djawadi_Hoyer_2019, title={Network Formation and Disruption - An Experiment: Are equilibrium networks too complex?}, volume={157}, DOI={10.1016/j.jebo.2018.11.004}, journal={Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization }, author={Endres, Angelika Elfriede and Recker, Sonja and Mir Djawadi, Behnud and Hoyer, Britta}, year={2019}, pages={708–734} }","mla":"Endres, Angelika Elfriede, et al. “Network Formation and Disruption - An Experiment: Are Equilibrium Networks Too Complex?” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization , vol. 157, 2019, pp. 708–34, doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2018.11.004.","short":"A.E. Endres, S. Recker, B. Mir Djawadi, B. Hoyer, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 157 (2019) 708–734.","ieee":"A. E. Endres, S. Recker, B. Mir Djawadi, and B. Hoyer, “Network Formation and Disruption - An Experiment: Are equilibrium networks too complex?,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization , vol. 157, pp. 708–734, 2019."},"year":"2019","type":"journal_article","intvolume":" 157","_id":"80"},{"title":" Determinants of Equilibrium Selection in Network Formation - An Experiment","department":[{"_id":"280"},{"_id":"475"}],"project":[{"_id":"1","name":"SFB 901"},{"name":"SFB 901 - Project Area A","_id":"2"},{"name":"SFB 901 - Subproject A3","_id":"7"}],"date_updated":"2022-01-06T07:01:33Z","oa":"1","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"ddc":["000"],"user_id":"42447","author":[{"last_name":"Hoyer","id":"42447","first_name":"Britta","full_name":"Hoyer, Britta"},{"first_name":"Stephanie","full_name":"Rosenkranz, Stephanie","last_name":"Rosenkranz"}],"publisher":"MDPI","file_date_updated":"2018-11-02T15:15:21Z","publication":"Games","file":[{"access_level":"closed","file_name":"games-09-00089.pdf","date_created":"2018-11-02T15:15:21Z","success":1,"relation":"main_file","date_updated":"2018-11-02T15:15:21Z","content_type":"application/pdf","creator":"ups","file_id":"5296","file_size":492018}],"volume":9,"status":"public","has_accepted_license":"1","date_created":"2018-10-29T10:27:40Z","_id":"4982","intvolume":" 9","article_number":"89","issue":"4","main_file_link":[{"url":"http://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/9/4/89/","open_access":"1"}],"year":"2018","citation":{"short":"B. Hoyer, S. Rosenkranz, Games 9 (2018).","ieee":"B. Hoyer and S. Rosenkranz, “ Determinants of Equilibrium Selection in Network Formation - An Experiment,” Games, vol. 9, no. 4, 2018.","chicago":"Hoyer, Britta, and Stephanie Rosenkranz. “ Determinants of Equilibrium Selection in Network Formation - An Experiment.” Games 9, no. 4 (2018).","apa":"Hoyer, B., & Rosenkranz, S. (2018). Determinants of Equilibrium Selection in Network Formation - An Experiment. Games, 9(4).","ama":"Hoyer B, Rosenkranz S. Determinants of Equilibrium Selection in Network Formation - An Experiment. Games. 2018;9(4).","mla":"Hoyer, Britta, and Stephanie Rosenkranz. “ Determinants of Equilibrium Selection in Network Formation - An Experiment.” Games, vol. 9, no. 4, 89, MDPI, 2018.","bibtex":"@article{Hoyer_Rosenkranz_2018, title={ Determinants of Equilibrium Selection in Network Formation - An Experiment}, volume={9}, number={489}, journal={Games}, publisher={MDPI}, author={Hoyer, Britta and Rosenkranz, Stephanie}, year={2018} }"},"type":"journal_article"},{"title":"Preemptive Repression: Deterrence, Backfiring, Iron Fists and Velvet Gloves","department":[{"_id":"280"},{"_id":"475"}],"project":[{"_id":"1","name":"SFB 901"},{"_id":"2","name":"SFB 901 - Project Area A"},{"_id":"7","name":"SFB 901 - Subproject A3"}],"date_updated":"2022-01-06T06:50:35Z","doi":"10.1177/0022002717750450","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"abstract":[{"text":"We present a game-theoretic model of the repression–dissent nexus, focusing on preemptive repression. A small group of instigating dissidents triggers a protest if each dissident participates. The dissidents face random checks by security forces, and when an individual dissident is caught while preparing to participate, he or she is prevented from doing so. Each dissident can invest in countermeasures, which make checks ineffective. For large benefits of protest, higher preemptive repression in the form of a higher number of checks has a deterrence effect and makes dissidents less prone to invest in countermeasures, decreasing the probability of protest. For small benefits of protest, higher preemptive repression instead has a backfiring effect. Both myopic and farsighted governments avoid the backfiring effect by setting low levels of preemptive repression (velvet-glove strategy). However, only a farsighted government is able to exploit the deterrence effect by maintaining a high level of preemptive repression (iron-fist strategy).","lang":"eng"}],"user_id":"477","ddc":["000"],"file":[{"file_size":335051,"file_id":"5323","creator":"ups","date_updated":"2018-11-02T16:07:11Z","content_type":"application/pdf","success":1,"relation":"main_file","date_created":"2018-11-02T16:07:11Z","file_name":"0022002717750450.pdf","access_level":"closed"}],"publication":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","file_date_updated":"2018-11-02T16:07:11Z","author":[{"last_name":"De Jaegher","full_name":"De Jaegher, Kris","first_name":"Kris"},{"first_name":"Britta","full_name":"Hoyer, Britta","last_name":"Hoyer","id":"42447"}],"publisher":"SAGE Publications","date_created":"2017-12-06T10:52:44Z","status":"public","has_accepted_license":"1","volume":63,"_id":"1029","intvolume":" 63","issue":"2","page":"502--527","year":"2018","citation":{"short":"K. De Jaegher, B. Hoyer, Journal of Conflict Resolution 63 (2018) 502--527.","ieee":"K. De Jaegher and B. Hoyer, “Preemptive Repression: Deterrence, Backfiring, Iron Fists and Velvet Gloves,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 63, no. 2, pp. 502--527, 2018.","ama":"De Jaegher K, Hoyer B. Preemptive Repression: Deterrence, Backfiring, Iron Fists and Velvet Gloves. Journal of Conflict Resolution. 2018;63(2):502--527. doi:10.1177/0022002717750450","apa":"De Jaegher, K., & Hoyer, B. (2018). Preemptive Repression: Deterrence, Backfiring, Iron Fists and Velvet Gloves. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 63(2), 502--527. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002717750450","chicago":"De Jaegher, Kris, and Britta Hoyer. “Preemptive Repression: Deterrence, Backfiring, Iron Fists and Velvet Gloves.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 63, no. 2 (2018): 502--527. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002717750450.","bibtex":"@article{De Jaegher_Hoyer_2018, title={Preemptive Repression: Deterrence, Backfiring, Iron Fists and Velvet Gloves}, volume={63}, DOI={10.1177/0022002717750450}, number={2}, journal={Journal of Conflict Resolution}, publisher={SAGE Publications}, author={De Jaegher, Kris and Hoyer, Britta}, year={2018}, pages={502--527} }","mla":"De Jaegher, Kris, and Britta Hoyer. “Preemptive Repression: Deterrence, Backfiring, Iron Fists and Velvet Gloves.” Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 63, no. 2, SAGE Publications, 2018, pp. 502--527, doi:10.1177/0022002717750450."},"type":"journal_article"},{"main_file_link":[{"url":"http://groups.uni-paderborn.de/wp-wiwi/RePEc/pdf/ciepap/WP110.pdf","open_access":"1"}],"type":"working_paper","citation":{"short":"B. Hoyer, N. Stroh-Maraun, Matching Strategies of Heterogeneous Agents under Incomplete Information in a University Clearinghouse, CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2017.","ieee":"B. Hoyer and N. Stroh-Maraun, Matching Strategies of Heterogeneous Agents under Incomplete Information in a University Clearinghouse, vol. 110. CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2017.","ama":"Hoyer B, Stroh-Maraun N. Matching Strategies of Heterogeneous Agents under Incomplete Information in a University Clearinghouse. Vol 110. CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University; 2017.","apa":"Hoyer, B., & Stroh-Maraun, N. (2017). Matching Strategies of Heterogeneous Agents under Incomplete Information in a University Clearinghouse (Vol. 110). CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University.","chicago":"Hoyer, Britta, and Nadja Stroh-Maraun. Matching Strategies of Heterogeneous Agents under Incomplete Information in a University Clearinghouse. Vol. 110. Working Papers CIE. CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2017.","bibtex":"@book{Hoyer_Stroh-Maraun_2017, series={Working Papers CIE}, title={Matching Strategies of Heterogeneous Agents under Incomplete Information in a University Clearinghouse}, volume={110}, publisher={CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University}, author={Hoyer, Britta and Stroh-Maraun, Nadja}, year={2017}, collection={Working Papers CIE} }","mla":"Hoyer, Britta, and Nadja Stroh-Maraun. Matching Strategies of Heterogeneous Agents under Incomplete Information in a University Clearinghouse. Vol. 110, CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2017."},"year":"2017","intvolume":" 110","_id":"1083","file":[{"creator":"nmaraun","file_id":"3911","file_size":346752,"success":1,"relation":"main_file","content_type":"application/pdf","date_updated":"2018-08-15T07:33:12Z","file_name":"Matching Strategies of Heterogeneous Agents under Incomplete Information in a University Clearinghouse.pdf","date_created":"2018-08-15T07:33:12Z","access_level":"closed"}],"file_date_updated":"2018-08-15T07:33:12Z","publisher":"CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University","author":[{"last_name":"Hoyer","id":"42447","first_name":"Britta","full_name":"Hoyer, Britta"},{"first_name":"Nadja","full_name":"Stroh-Maraun, Nadja","last_name":"Stroh-Maraun","id":"13264"}],"date_created":"2017-12-20T16:21:51Z","status":"public","has_accepted_license":"1","volume":110,"abstract":[{"lang":"eng","text":"In actual school choice applications the theoretical underpinnings of the Boston School Choice Mechanism (BM) (complete information and rationality of the agents) are often not given. We analyze the actual behavior of agents in such a matching mechanism, using data from the matching mechanism currently used in a clearinghouse at a faculty of Business Administration and Economics at a German university, where a variant of the BM is used, and supplement this data with data generated in a survey among students who participated in the clearinghouse. We find that under the current mechanism over 70% of students act strategically. Controlling for students' limited information, we find that they do act rationally in their decision to act strategically. While students thus seem to react to the incentives to act strategically under the BM, they do not seem to be able to use this to their own advantage. However, those students acting in line with their beliefs manage a significantly better personal outcome than those who do not. We also run simulations by using a variant of the deferred acceptance algorithm, adapted to our situation, to show that the use of a different algorithm may be to the students' advantage."}],"user_id":"42447","ddc":["040"],"series_title":"Working Papers CIE","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"date_updated":"2022-01-06T06:50:51Z","oa":"1","department":[{"_id":"280"},{"_id":"205"},{"_id":"475"}],"project":[{"_id":"1","name":"SFB 901"},{"_id":"2","name":"SFB 901 - Project Area A"},{"name":"SFB 901 - Subproject A3","_id":"7"}],"title":"Matching Strategies of Heterogeneous Agents under Incomplete Information in a University Clearinghouse"},{"date_updated":"2022-01-06T06:53:59Z","doi":"10.1111/jpet.12168","title":"Strategic Network Disruption and Defense","department":[{"_id":"280"},{"_id":"475"}],"publication_identifier":{"issn":["1097-3923"]},"publication_status":"published","_id":"1919","intvolume":" 18","issue":"5","page":"802-830","year":"2016","citation":{"chicago":"Hoyer, Britta, and Kris De Jaegher. “Strategic Network Disruption and Defense.” Journal of Public Economic Theory 18, no. 5 (2016): 802–30. https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12168.","ama":"Hoyer B, De Jaegher K. Strategic Network Disruption and Defense. Journal of Public Economic Theory. 2016;18(5):802-830. doi:10.1111/jpet.12168","apa":"Hoyer, B., & De Jaegher, K. (2016). Strategic Network Disruption and Defense. Journal of Public Economic Theory, 18(5), 802–830. https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12168","mla":"Hoyer, Britta, and Kris De Jaegher. “Strategic Network Disruption and Defense.” Journal of Public Economic Theory, vol. 18, no. 5, Wiley-Blackwell, 2016, pp. 802–30, doi:10.1111/jpet.12168.","bibtex":"@article{Hoyer_De Jaegher_2016, title={Strategic Network Disruption and Defense}, volume={18}, DOI={10.1111/jpet.12168}, number={5}, journal={Journal of Public Economic Theory}, publisher={Wiley-Blackwell}, author={Hoyer, Britta and De Jaegher, Kris}, year={2016}, pages={802–830} }","short":"B. Hoyer, K. De Jaegher, Journal of Public Economic Theory 18 (2016) 802–830.","ieee":"B. Hoyer and K. De Jaegher, “Strategic Network Disruption and Defense,” Journal of Public Economic Theory, vol. 18, no. 5, pp. 802–830, 2016."},"type":"journal_article","abstract":[{"lang":"eng","text":"We study a game between a network designer, who uses costly links to connect nodes in a network, and a network disruptor who tries to disrupt the resulting network as much as possible by deleting either nodes or links. For low linking costs networks with all nodes in symmetric positions are a best response of the designer under both link deletion and node deletion. For high linking costs the designer builds a star network under link deletion, but for node deletion excludes some nodes from the network to build a smaller but stronger network. For intermediate linking costs the designer again builds a symmetric network under node deletion but a star‐like network with weak spots under link deletion."}],"user_id":"42447","publication":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","author":[{"first_name":"Britta","full_name":"Hoyer, Britta","last_name":"Hoyer","id":"42447"},{"full_name":"De Jaegher, Kris","first_name":"Kris","last_name":"De Jaegher"}],"publisher":"Wiley-Blackwell","volume":18,"date_created":"2018-03-28T11:30:44Z","status":"public"},{"page":"82-97","citation":{"mla":"De Jaegher, Kris, and Britta Hoyer. “By-Product Mutualism and the Ambiguous Effects of Harsher Environments – A Game-Theoretic Model.” Journal of Theoretical Biology, vol. 393, Elsevier BV, 2016, pp. 82–97, doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2015.12.034.","bibtex":"@article{De Jaegher_Hoyer_2016, title={By-product mutualism and the ambiguous effects of harsher environments – A game-theoretic model}, volume={393}, DOI={10.1016/j.jtbi.2015.12.034}, journal={Journal of Theoretical Biology}, publisher={Elsevier BV}, author={De Jaegher, Kris and Hoyer, Britta}, year={2016}, pages={82–97} }","apa":"De Jaegher, K., & Hoyer, B. (2016). By-product mutualism and the ambiguous effects of harsher environments – A game-theoretic model. Journal of Theoretical Biology, 393, 82–97. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2015.12.034","ama":"De Jaegher K, Hoyer B. By-product mutualism and the ambiguous effects of harsher environments – A game-theoretic model. Journal of Theoretical Biology. 2016;393:82-97. doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2015.12.034","chicago":"De Jaegher, Kris, and Britta Hoyer. “By-Product Mutualism and the Ambiguous Effects of Harsher Environments – A Game-Theoretic Model.” Journal of Theoretical Biology 393 (2016): 82–97. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2015.12.034.","ieee":"K. De Jaegher and B. Hoyer, “By-product mutualism and the ambiguous effects of harsher environments – A game-theoretic model,” Journal of Theoretical Biology, vol. 393, pp. 82–97, 2016.","short":"K. De Jaegher, B. Hoyer, Journal of Theoretical Biology 393 (2016) 82–97."},"type":"journal_article","year":"2016","doi":"10.1016/j.jtbi.2015.12.034","date_updated":"2022-01-06T06:54:00Z","_id":"1922","intvolume":" 393","date_created":"2018-03-28T11:39:28Z","status":"public","publication_status":"published","volume":393,"publication_identifier":{"issn":["0022-5193"]},"publication":"Journal of Theoretical Biology","department":[{"_id":"280"},{"_id":"475"}],"author":[{"last_name":"De Jaegher","first_name":"Kris","full_name":"De Jaegher, Kris"},{"first_name":"Britta","full_name":"Hoyer, Britta","last_name":"Hoyer","id":"42447"}],"publisher":"Elsevier BV","user_id":"42447","title":"By-product mutualism and the ambiguous effects of harsher environments – A game-theoretic model","abstract":[{"lang":"eng","text":"We construct two-player two-strategy game-theoretic models of by-product mutualism, where our focus lies on the way in which the probability of cooperation among players is affected by the degree of adversity facing the players. In our first model, cooperation consists of the production of a public good, and adversity is linked to the degree of complementarity of the players׳ efforts in producing the public good. In our second model, cooperation consists of the defense of a public, and/or a private good with by-product benefits, and adversity is measured by the number of random attacks (e.g., by a predator) facing the players. In both of these models, our analysis confirms the existence of the so-called boomerang effect, which states that in a harsh environment, the individual player has few incentives to unilaterally defect in a situation of joint cooperation. Focusing on such an effect in isolation leads to the \"common-enemy\" hypothesis that a larger degree of adversity increases the probability of cooperation. Yet, we also find that a sucker effect may simultaneously exist, which says that in a harsh environment, the individual player has few incentives to unilaterally cooperate in a situation of joint defection. Looked at in isolation, the sucker effect leads to the competing hypothesis that a larger degree of adversity decreases the probability of cooperation. Our analysis predicts circumstances in which the \"common enemy\" hypothesis prevails, and circumstances in which the competing hypothesis prevails."}]},{"abstract":[{"text":"We study the willingness to compete in a cognitive task among an entire cohort\r\nof fresh man business and economics students. Combining data from a lab-in-thefield\r\nexperiment with university admissions data, we trace the gender gap in\r\ncompetitiveness at different levels of high school performance. Our results confirm\r\nthat, on average, men choose to compete more often. The gender gap disappears,\r\nhowever, among students with above average high school performance. Female high\r\nschool top performers are equally competitive as their male counterparts. In fact,\r\nthe overall gender gap is entirely driven by the group of female high school underperformers\r\nwho shied away from competition, even when they performed well in our\r\ntask. Overall, our findings suggest that high school grades are more than just a\r\nsignal of cognitive abilities, because they seem to influence the receivers selfperception\r\nof his or her performance in a competitive environment involved in later\r\non in life.","lang":"eng"}],"user_id":"42447","title":"Do talented women shy away from competition?","department":[{"_id":"280"},{"_id":"475"}],"author":[{"id":"42447","last_name":"Hoyer","full_name":"Hoyer, Britta","first_name":"Britta"},{"first_name":"Tomas","full_name":"van Huizen, Tomas","last_name":"van Huizen"},{"full_name":"Keijzer, Linda","first_name":"Linda","last_name":"Keijzer"},{"full_name":"Rezai Khavas, Tahere","first_name":"Tahere","last_name":"Rezai Khavas"},{"last_name":"Rosenkranz","first_name":"Stephanie","full_name":"Rosenkranz, Stephanie"}],"date_created":"2018-04-06T07:54:42Z","status":"public","volume":"16-06","date_updated":"2022-01-06T06:55:35Z","_id":"2252","oa":"1","main_file_link":[{"url":"https://www.uu.nl/en/files/rebousedp20161606pdf","open_access":"1"}],"series_title":"TKI Working Paper Series","citation":{"bibtex":"@book{Hoyer_van Huizen_Keijzer_Rezai Khavas_Rosenkranz_2016, series={TKI Working Paper Series}, title={Do talented women shy away from competition?}, volume={16–06}, author={Hoyer, Britta and van Huizen, Tomas and Keijzer, Linda and Rezai Khavas, Tahere and Rosenkranz, Stephanie}, year={2016}, collection={TKI Working Paper Series} }","mla":"Hoyer, Britta, et al. Do Talented Women Shy Away from Competition? Vol. 16–06, 2016.","ama":"Hoyer B, van Huizen T, Keijzer L, Rezai Khavas T, Rosenkranz S. Do Talented Women Shy Away from Competition? Vol 16-06.; 2016.","apa":"Hoyer, B., van Huizen, T., Keijzer, L., Rezai Khavas, T., & Rosenkranz, S. (2016). Do talented women shy away from competition? (Vol. 16–06).","chicago":"Hoyer, Britta, Tomas van Huizen, Linda Keijzer, Tahere Rezai Khavas, and Stephanie Rosenkranz. Do Talented Women Shy Away from Competition? Vol. 16–06. TKI Working Paper Series, 2016.","ieee":"B. Hoyer, T. van Huizen, L. Keijzer, T. Rezai Khavas, and S. Rosenkranz, Do talented women shy away from competition?, vol. 16–06. 2016.","short":"B. Hoyer, T. van Huizen, L. Keijzer, T. Rezai Khavas, S. Rosenkranz, Do Talented Women Shy Away from Competition?, 2016."},"year":"2016","type":"working_paper"},{"volume":27,"date_created":"2018-03-28T11:43:04Z","status":"public","publication":"Defence and Peace Economics","author":[{"first_name":"Kris","full_name":"De Jaegher, Kris","last_name":"De Jaegher"},{"full_name":"Hoyer, Britta","first_name":"Britta","id":"42447","last_name":"Hoyer"}],"publisher":"Informa UK Limited","user_id":"42447","abstract":[{"text":"How is collective defence by players affected when they face a threat from an intelligent attacker rather than a natural threat? This paper analyses this question using a game-theoretic model. Facing an intelligent attacker has an effect if players move first and visibly set their defence strategies, thereby exposing any players who do not defend, and if the attacker is, moreover, not able to commit to a random attack. Depending on the parameters of the game, the presence of an intelligent attacker either increases the probability that players jointly defend (where such joint defence either does or does not constitute a utilitarian optimum), or decreases the probability that players jointly defend (even though joint defence is a utilitarian optimum).","lang":"eng"}],"page":"644-664","year":"2014","citation":{"mla":"De Jaegher, Kris, and Britta Hoyer. “Collective Action and the Common Enemy Effect.” Defence and Peace Economics, vol. 27, no. 5, Informa UK Limited, 2014, pp. 644–64, doi:10.1080/10242694.2014.925676.","bibtex":"@article{De Jaegher_Hoyer_2014, title={Collective action and the common enemy effect}, volume={27}, DOI={10.1080/10242694.2014.925676}, number={5}, journal={Defence and Peace Economics}, publisher={Informa UK Limited}, author={De Jaegher, Kris and Hoyer, Britta}, year={2014}, pages={644–664} }","ama":"De Jaegher K, Hoyer B. Collective action and the common enemy effect. Defence and Peace Economics. 2014;27(5):644-664. doi:10.1080/10242694.2014.925676","apa":"De Jaegher, K., & Hoyer, B. (2014). Collective action and the common enemy effect. Defence and Peace Economics, 27(5), 644–664. https://doi.org/10.1080/10242694.2014.925676","chicago":"De Jaegher, Kris, and Britta Hoyer. “Collective Action and the Common Enemy Effect.” Defence and Peace Economics 27, no. 5 (2014): 644–64. https://doi.org/10.1080/10242694.2014.925676.","ieee":"K. De Jaegher and B. Hoyer, “Collective action and the common enemy effect,” Defence and Peace Economics, vol. 27, no. 5, pp. 644–664, 2014.","short":"K. De Jaegher, B. Hoyer, Defence and Peace Economics 27 (2014) 644–664."},"type":"journal_article","issue":"5","_id":"1923","intvolume":" 27","publication_status":"published","publication_identifier":{"issn":["1024-2694","1476-8267"]},"department":[{"_id":"280"},{"_id":"475"}],"title":"Collective action and the common enemy effect","doi":"10.1080/10242694.2014.925676","date_updated":"2022-01-06T06:54:00Z"},{"author":[{"first_name":"Britta","full_name":"Hoyer, Britta","last_name":"Hoyer","id":"42447"},{"first_name":"Kris","full_name":"De Jaegher, Kris","last_name":"De Jaegher"}],"department":[{"_id":"280"},{"_id":"475"}],"status":"public","date_created":"2018-04-06T07:44:14Z","volume":"12-06","abstract":[{"lang":"eng","text":"The phenomenon that groups or people work together when they face an opponent,\r\nalthough they have little in common otherwise, has been termed the \"common enemy\r\neffect\". We study a model of network formation, where players can use links to build\r\na network, knowing that they are facing a common enemy who can disrupt the links\r\nwithin the network, and whose goal it is to minimize the sum of the benefits of the\r\nnetwork. We find that introducing a common enemy can lead to the formation of\r\nstable and efficient networks as well as fragmented networks and the empty network."}],"user_id":"42447","title":"Network Disruption and the Common Enemy Effect","series_title":"TKI Working Paper Series","main_file_link":[{"url":"https://www.uu.nl/en/files/rebousedp201212062pdf","open_access":"1"}],"citation":{"short":"B. Hoyer, K. De Jaegher, Network Disruption and the Common Enemy Effect, 2012.","ieee":"B. Hoyer and K. De Jaegher, Network Disruption and the Common Enemy Effect, vol. 12–06. 2012.","chicago":"Hoyer, Britta, and Kris De Jaegher. Network Disruption and the Common Enemy Effect. Vol. 12–06. TKI Working Paper Series, 2012.","apa":"Hoyer, B., & De Jaegher, K. (2012). Network Disruption and the Common Enemy Effect (Vol. 12–06).","ama":"Hoyer B, De Jaegher K. Network Disruption and the Common Enemy Effect. Vol 12-06.; 2012.","bibtex":"@book{Hoyer_De Jaegher_2012, series={TKI Working Paper Series}, title={Network Disruption and the Common Enemy Effect}, volume={12–06}, author={Hoyer, Britta and De Jaegher, Kris}, year={2012}, collection={TKI Working Paper Series} }","mla":"Hoyer, Britta, and Kris De Jaegher. Network Disruption and the Common Enemy Effect. Vol. 12–06, 2012."},"year":"2012","type":"working_paper","date_updated":"2022-01-06T06:55:34Z","_id":"2249","oa":"1"}]