---
_id: '30341'
author:
- first_name: Britta
full_name: Hoyer, Britta
id: '42447'
last_name: Hoyer
- first_name: Dirk
full_name: van Straaten, Dirk
id: '10311'
last_name: van Straaten
citation:
ama: Hoyer B, van Straaten D. Anonymity and Self-Expression in Online Rating Systems
- An Experimental Analysis. Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics.
2022;98:101869. doi:10.1016/j.socec.2022.101869
apa: Hoyer, B., & van Straaten, D. (2022). Anonymity and Self-Expression in
Online Rating Systems - An Experimental Analysis. Journal of Behavioral and
Experimental Economics, 98, 101869. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2022.101869
bibtex: '@article{Hoyer_van Straaten_2022, title={Anonymity and Self-Expression
in Online Rating Systems - An Experimental Analysis}, volume={98}, DOI={10.1016/j.socec.2022.101869},
journal={Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics}, publisher={Elsevier
BV}, author={Hoyer, Britta and van Straaten, Dirk}, year={2022}, pages={101869}
}'
chicago: 'Hoyer, Britta, and Dirk van Straaten. “Anonymity and Self-Expression in
Online Rating Systems - An Experimental Analysis.” Journal of Behavioral and
Experimental Economics 98 (2022): 101869. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2022.101869.'
ieee: 'B. Hoyer and D. van Straaten, “Anonymity and Self-Expression in Online Rating
Systems - An Experimental Analysis,” Journal of Behavioral and Experimental
Economics, vol. 98, p. 101869, 2022, doi: 10.1016/j.socec.2022.101869.'
mla: Hoyer, Britta, and Dirk van Straaten. “Anonymity and Self-Expression in Online
Rating Systems - An Experimental Analysis.” Journal of Behavioral and Experimental
Economics, vol. 98, Elsevier BV, 2022, p. 101869, doi:10.1016/j.socec.2022.101869.
short: B. Hoyer, D. van Straaten, Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics
98 (2022) 101869.
date_created: 2022-03-16T06:24:37Z
date_updated: 2022-03-21T06:07:39Z
department:
- _id: '280'
- _id: '475'
- _id: '179'
doi: 10.1016/j.socec.2022.101869
intvolume: ' 98'
keyword:
- General Social Sciences
- Economics and Econometrics
- Applied Psychology
language:
- iso: eng
main_file_link:
- url: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S2214804322000441
page: '101869'
project:
- _id: '1'
name: 'SFB 901: SFB 901'
- _id: '2'
name: 'SFB 901 - A: SFB 901 - Project Area A'
- _id: '7'
name: 'SFB 901 - A3: SFB 901 - Subproject A3'
- _id: '8'
name: 'SFB 901 - A4: SFB 901 - Subproject A4'
publication: Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics
publication_identifier:
issn:
- 2214-8043
publication_status: published
publisher: Elsevier BV
status: public
title: Anonymity and Self-Expression in Online Rating Systems - An Experimental Analysis
type: journal_article
user_id: '42447'
volume: 98
year: '2022'
...
---
_id: '31881'
author:
- first_name: Britta
full_name: Hoyer, Britta
id: '42447'
last_name: Hoyer
- first_name: Kris
full_name: De Jaegher, Kris
last_name: De Jaegher
citation:
ama: Hoyer B, De Jaegher K. Network Disruption and the Common-Enemy Effect. International
Journal of Game Theory. Published online 2022. doi:10.1007/s00182-022-00812-5
apa: Hoyer, B., & De Jaegher, K. (2022). Network Disruption and the Common-Enemy
Effect. International Journal of Game Theory. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-022-00812-5
bibtex: '@article{Hoyer_De Jaegher_2022, title={Network Disruption and the Common-Enemy
Effect}, DOI={10.1007/s00182-022-00812-5},
journal={International Journal of Game Theory}, publisher={Springer}, author={Hoyer,
Britta and De Jaegher, Kris}, year={2022} }'
chicago: Hoyer, Britta, and Kris De Jaegher. “Network Disruption and the Common-Enemy
Effect.” International Journal of Game Theory, 2022. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-022-00812-5.
ieee: 'B. Hoyer and K. De Jaegher, “Network Disruption and the Common-Enemy Effect,”
International Journal of Game Theory, 2022, doi: 10.1007/s00182-022-00812-5.'
mla: Hoyer, Britta, and Kris De Jaegher. “Network Disruption and the Common-Enemy
Effect.” International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, 2022, doi:10.1007/s00182-022-00812-5.
short: B. Hoyer, K. De Jaegher, International Journal of Game Theory (2022).
date_created: 2022-06-14T15:33:35Z
date_updated: 2022-12-04T14:40:38Z
department:
- _id: '280'
- _id: '475'
doi: 10.1007/s00182-022-00812-5
extern: '1'
language:
- iso: eng
project:
- _id: '1'
name: 'SFB 901: SFB 901'
- _id: '2'
name: 'SFB 901 - A: SFB 901 - Project Area A'
- _id: '7'
name: 'SFB 901 - A3: SFB 901 - Subproject A3'
publication: International Journal of Game Theory
publication_status: epub_ahead
publisher: Springer
status: public
title: Network Disruption and the Common-Enemy Effect
type: journal_article
user_id: '42447'
year: '2022'
...
---
_id: '16273'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: "This study examines the gender gap in competitiveness in an educational setting\r\nand
tests whether this gap depends on the difficulty of the task at hand. For this
purpose,\r\nwe administered a series of experiments during the final exam of a
university\r\ncourse. We confronted three cohorts of undergraduate students with
a set of bonus\r\nquestions and the choice between an absolute and a tournament
grading scheme\r\nfor these questions. To test the moderating impact of task difficulty,
we (randomly)\r\nvaried the difficulty of the questions between treatment groups.
We find that, on\r\naverage, women are significantly less likely to select the
tournament scheme. However,\r\nthe results show that the gender gap in tournament
entry is sizable when the\r\nquestions are relative easy, but much smaller and
statistical insignificant when the\r\nquestions are difficult."
author:
- first_name: Britta
full_name: Hoyer, Britta
id: '42447'
last_name: Hoyer
- first_name: Thomas
full_name: van Huizen, Thomas
last_name: van Huizen
- first_name: 'Linda '
full_name: 'Keijzer, Linda '
last_name: Keijzer
- first_name: 'Sarah '
full_name: 'Rezaei, Sarah '
last_name: Rezaei
- first_name: Stephanie
full_name: Rosenkranz, Stephanie
last_name: Rosenkranz
- first_name: 'Bastian '
full_name: 'Westbrock, Bastian '
last_name: Westbrock
citation:
ama: 'Hoyer B, van Huizen T, Keijzer L, Rezaei S, Rosenkranz S, Westbrock B. Gender,
competitiveness, and task difficulty: Evidence from the field. Labour Economics.
2020. doi:10.1016/j.labeco.2020.101815'
apa: 'Hoyer, B., van Huizen, T., Keijzer, L., Rezaei, S., Rosenkranz, S., &
Westbrock, B. (2020). Gender, competitiveness, and task difficulty: Evidence from
the field. Labour Economics. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.labeco.2020.101815'
bibtex: '@article{Hoyer_van Huizen_Keijzer_Rezaei_Rosenkranz_Westbrock_2020, title={Gender,
competitiveness, and task difficulty: Evidence from the field}, DOI={10.1016/j.labeco.2020.101815},
journal={Labour Economics}, author={Hoyer, Britta and van Huizen, Thomas and Keijzer,
Linda and Rezaei, Sarah and Rosenkranz, Stephanie and Westbrock, Bastian },
year={2020} }'
chicago: 'Hoyer, Britta, Thomas van Huizen, Linda Keijzer, Sarah Rezaei, Stephanie
Rosenkranz, and Bastian Westbrock. “Gender, Competitiveness, and Task Difficulty:
Evidence from the Field.” Labour Economics, 2020. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.labeco.2020.101815.'
ieee: 'B. Hoyer, T. van Huizen, L. Keijzer, S. Rezaei, S. Rosenkranz, and B. Westbrock,
“Gender, competitiveness, and task difficulty: Evidence from the field,” Labour
Economics, 2020.'
mla: 'Hoyer, Britta, et al. “Gender, Competitiveness, and Task Difficulty: Evidence
from the Field.” Labour Economics, 2020, doi:10.1016/j.labeco.2020.101815.'
short: B. Hoyer, T. van Huizen, L. Keijzer, S. Rezaei, S. Rosenkranz, B. Westbrock,
Labour Economics (2020).
date_created: 2020-03-09T12:35:49Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:52:47Z
department:
- _id: '280'
- _id: '475'
doi: 10.1016/j.labeco.2020.101815
language:
- iso: eng
publication: Labour Economics
publication_status: epub_ahead
status: public
title: 'Gender, competitiveness, and task difficulty: Evidence from the field'
type: journal_article
user_id: '42447'
year: '2020'
...
---
_id: '16334'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: We analyze the actual behavior of agents in a matching mechanism, using data
from a clearinghouse at the Faculty of Business Administration and Economics at
a German university, where a variant of the Boston mechanism is used. We supplement
this data with data generated in a survey among the students who participated
in the clearinghouse. We find that under the current mechanism over 74% of students
act strategically by misrepresenting at least one of their preferences. Nevertheless,
not all students are able to improve their outcome by doing so. We show that this
is mainly due to the incomplete information of students and naiveté. Sophisticated
students actually reach significantly better outcomes than naive students. Thus,
we find evidence that naive students are exploited by sophisticated students in
an incomplete information setting.
article_type: original
author:
- first_name: Britta
full_name: Hoyer, Britta
id: '42447'
last_name: Hoyer
- first_name: Nadja
full_name: Stroh-Maraun, Nadja
id: '13264'
last_name: Stroh-Maraun
citation:
ama: Hoyer B, Stroh-Maraun N. Matching Strategies of Heterogeneous Agents under
Incomplete Information in a University Clearinghouse. Games and Economic Behavior.
2020;121:453-481. doi:10.1016/j.geb.2020.03.006
apa: Hoyer, B., & Stroh-Maraun, N. (2020). Matching Strategies of Heterogeneous
Agents under Incomplete Information in a University Clearinghouse. Games and
Economic Behavior, 121, 453–481. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2020.03.006
bibtex: '@article{Hoyer_Stroh-Maraun_2020, title={Matching Strategies of Heterogeneous
Agents under Incomplete Information in a University Clearinghouse}, volume={121},
DOI={10.1016/j.geb.2020.03.006},
journal={Games and Economic Behavior}, author={Hoyer, Britta and Stroh-Maraun,
Nadja}, year={2020}, pages={453–481} }'
chicago: 'Hoyer, Britta, and Nadja Stroh-Maraun. “Matching Strategies of Heterogeneous
Agents under Incomplete Information in a University Clearinghouse.” Games and
Economic Behavior 121 (2020): 453–81. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2020.03.006.'
ieee: B. Hoyer and N. Stroh-Maraun, “Matching Strategies of Heterogeneous Agents
under Incomplete Information in a University Clearinghouse,” Games and Economic
Behavior, vol. 121, pp. 453–481, 2020.
mla: Hoyer, Britta, and Nadja Stroh-Maraun. “Matching Strategies of Heterogeneous
Agents under Incomplete Information in a University Clearinghouse.” Games and
Economic Behavior, vol. 121, 2020, pp. 453–81, doi:10.1016/j.geb.2020.03.006.
short: B. Hoyer, N. Stroh-Maraun, Games and Economic Behavior 121 (2020) 453–481.
date_created: 2020-03-24T08:05:53Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:52:49Z
department:
- _id: '280'
- _id: '475'
- _id: '205'
- _id: '368'
doi: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.03.006
intvolume: ' 121'
language:
- iso: eng
page: 453 - 481
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
publication: Games and Economic Behavior
publication_status: published
status: public
title: Matching Strategies of Heterogeneous Agents under Incomplete Information in
a University Clearinghouse
type: journal_article
user_id: '42447'
volume: 121
year: '2020'
...
---
_id: '1139'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: We investigate the degree of price competition among telecommunication firms.
Underlying a Bertrand model of price competition, we empirically model pricing
behaviour in an oligopoly. We analyse panel data of individual pricing information
of mobile phone contracts offered between 2011 and 2017. We provide empirical
evidence that price differences as well as reputational effects serve as a signal
to buyers and significantly affect market demand. Additionally, we find that brands
lead to an increase in demand and thus are able to generate spillover effects
even after price increase.
author:
- first_name: Daniel
full_name: Kaimann, Daniel
id: '18949'
last_name: Kaimann
- first_name: Britta
full_name: Hoyer, Britta
id: '42447'
last_name: Hoyer
citation:
ama: 'Kaimann D, Hoyer B. Price competition and the Bertrand model: The paradox
of the German mobile discount market. Applied Economics Letters. 2019;26(1):54-57.
doi:10.1080/13504851.2018.1436141'
apa: 'Kaimann, D., & Hoyer, B. (2019). Price competition and the Bertrand model:
The paradox of the German mobile discount market. Applied Economics Letters,
26(1), 54–57. https://doi.org/10.1080/13504851.2018.1436141'
bibtex: '@article{Kaimann_Hoyer_2019, title={Price competition and the Bertrand
model: The paradox of the German mobile discount market}, volume={26}, DOI={10.1080/13504851.2018.1436141},
number={1}, journal={Applied Economics Letters}, publisher={Taylor and Francis
Online}, author={Kaimann, Daniel and Hoyer, Britta}, year={2019}, pages={54–57}
}'
chicago: 'Kaimann, Daniel, and Britta Hoyer. “Price Competition and the Bertrand
Model: The Paradox of the German Mobile Discount Market.” Applied Economics
Letters 26, no. 1 (2019): 54–57. https://doi.org/10.1080/13504851.2018.1436141.'
ieee: 'D. Kaimann and B. Hoyer, “Price competition and the Bertrand model: The paradox
of the German mobile discount market,” Applied Economics Letters, vol.
26, no. 1, pp. 54–57, 2019.'
mla: 'Kaimann, Daniel, and Britta Hoyer. “Price Competition and the Bertrand Model:
The Paradox of the German Mobile Discount Market.” Applied Economics Letters,
vol. 26, no. 1, Taylor and Francis Online, 2019, pp. 54–57, doi:10.1080/13504851.2018.1436141.'
short: D. Kaimann, B. Hoyer, Applied Economics Letters 26 (2019) 54–57.
date_created: 2018-01-31T08:34:35Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:51:00Z
ddc:
- '000'
department:
- _id: '280'
- _id: '183'
- _id: '475'
doi: 10.1080/13504851.2018.1436141
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: ups
date_created: 2018-11-02T15:35:29Z
date_updated: 2018-11-02T15:35:29Z
file_id: '5307'
file_name: KaimannHoyer.pdf
file_size: 625230
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-11-02T15:35:29Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: ' 26'
issue: '1'
language:
- iso: eng
main_file_link:
- url: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13504851.2018.1436141
page: 54-57
project:
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
- _id: '8'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject A4
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
publication: Applied Economics Letters
publication_status: epub_ahead
publisher: Taylor and Francis Online
status: public
title: 'Price competition and the Bertrand model: The paradox of the German mobile
discount market'
type: journal_article
user_id: '18949'
volume: 26
year: '2019'
...
---
_id: '2256'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: "Social psychology studies the \"common enemy effect\", the phenomenon\r\nthat
members of a group work together when they face an opponent, although they otherwise
have little in common. An interesting scenario\r\nis the formation of an information
network where group members individually sponsor costly links. Suppose that ceteris
paribus, an outsider\r\nappears who aims to disrupt the information \r\nflow within
the network\r\nby deleting some of the links. The question is how the group responds\r\nto
this common enemy. We address this question for the homogeneous\r\nconnections
model of strategic network formation, with two-way \r\nflow of\r\ninformation
and without information decay. For sufficiently low linkage\r\ncosts, the external
threat can lead to a more connected network, a positive\r\ncommon enemy effect.
For very high but not prohibitively high linkage\r\ncosts, the equilibrium network
can be minimally connected and efficient\r\nin the absence of the external threat
whereas it is always empty and ineffi\fcient in the presence of the external threat,
a negative common enemy\r\neffect. For intermediate linkage costs, both connected
networks and the\r\nempty network are Nash for certain cost ranges."
author:
- first_name: Britta
full_name: Hoyer, Britta
id: '42447'
last_name: Hoyer
- first_name: Hans
full_name: Haller, Hans
last_name: Haller
citation:
ama: Hoyer B, Haller H. The Common Enemy Effect under Strategic Network Formation
and Disruption. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. 2019;162:146-163.
doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2019.03.011
apa: Hoyer, B., & Haller, H. (2019). The Common Enemy Effect under Strategic
Network Formation and Disruption. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization,
162, 146–163. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2019.03.011
bibtex: '@article{Hoyer_Haller_2019, title={The Common Enemy Effect under Strategic
Network Formation and Disruption}, volume={162}, DOI={10.1016/j.jebo.2019.03.011},
journal={Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization}, author={Hoyer, Britta
and Haller, Hans}, year={2019}, pages={146–163} }'
chicago: 'Hoyer, Britta, and Hans Haller. “The Common Enemy Effect under Strategic
Network Formation and Disruption.” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
162 (2019): 146–63. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2019.03.011.'
ieee: B. Hoyer and H. Haller, “The Common Enemy Effect under Strategic Network Formation
and Disruption,” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, vol.
162, pp. 146–163, 2019.
mla: Hoyer, Britta, and Hans Haller. “The Common Enemy Effect under Strategic Network
Formation and Disruption.” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization,
vol. 162, 2019, pp. 146–63, doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2019.03.011.
short: B. Hoyer, H. Haller, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 162
(2019) 146–163.
date_created: 2018-04-06T07:59:01Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:55:36Z
department:
- _id: '280'
- _id: '475'
doi: 10.1016/j.jebo.2019.03.011
intvolume: ' 162'
language:
- iso: eng
main_file_link:
- url: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167268119300824
page: 146-163
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
publication: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
publication_status: published
status: public
title: The Common Enemy Effect under Strategic Network Formation and Disruption
type: journal_article
user_id: '477'
volume: 162
year: '2019'
...
---
_id: '80'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: "Models on network formation have often been extended to include the potential
of network disruption in recent years. Whereas the theoretical research on network
formation under the threat of disruption has thus gained prominence, hardly any
experimental research exists so far. In this paper, we therefore experimentally
study the emergence of networks including the aspect of a known external threat
by relating theoretical predictions by Dzuibiński and Goyal (2013) to actual observed
behaviour. We deal with the question if subjects in the role of a strategic Designer
are able to form safe networks for least costs while facing a strategic Adversary
who is going to attack their networks. Varying the costs for protecting nodes,
we designed and tested two treatments with different predictions for the equilibrium
network and investigated whether one of the least cost equilibrium networks was
more likely to be reached. Furthermore, the influence of the subjects’ farsightedness
on their decision-making process was elicited and analysed.\r\n\r\nWe find that
while subjects are able to build safe networks in both treatments, equilibrium
networks are only built in one of the two treatments. In the other treatment,
predominantly safe networks are built but they are not for least costs. Additionally,
we find that farsightedness –as measured in our experiment– has no influence on
whether subjects are able to build safe or least cost equilibrium networks. Two
robustness settings with a reduced external threat or more liberties to modify
the initial networks qualitatively confirm our results. Overall, in this experiment
observed behaviour is only partially in line with the theoretical predictions
by Dzuibiński and Goyal (2013)."
article_type: original
author:
- first_name: Angelika Elfriede
full_name: Endres, Angelika Elfriede
id: '48794'
last_name: Endres
- first_name: Sonja
full_name: Recker, Sonja
last_name: Recker
- first_name: Behnud
full_name: Mir Djawadi, Behnud
id: '26032'
last_name: Mir Djawadi
orcid: 0000-0002-6271-5912
- first_name: Britta
full_name: Hoyer, Britta
id: '42447'
last_name: Hoyer
citation:
ama: 'Endres AE, Recker S, Mir Djawadi B, Hoyer B. Network Formation and Disruption
- An Experiment: Are equilibrium networks too complex? Journal of Economic
Behavior and Organization . 2019;157:708-734. doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2018.11.004'
apa: 'Endres, A. E., Recker, S., Mir Djawadi, B., & Hoyer, B. (2019). Network
Formation and Disruption - An Experiment: Are equilibrium networks too complex?
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization , 157, 708–734. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2018.11.004'
bibtex: '@article{Endres_Recker_Mir Djawadi_Hoyer_2019, title={Network Formation
and Disruption - An Experiment: Are equilibrium networks too complex?}, volume={157},
DOI={10.1016/j.jebo.2018.11.004},
journal={Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization }, author={Endres, Angelika
Elfriede and Recker, Sonja and Mir Djawadi, Behnud and Hoyer, Britta}, year={2019},
pages={708–734} }'
chicago: 'Endres, Angelika Elfriede, Sonja Recker, Behnud Mir Djawadi, and Britta
Hoyer. “Network Formation and Disruption - An Experiment: Are Equilibrium Networks
Too Complex?” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 157 (2019):
708–34. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2018.11.004.'
ieee: 'A. E. Endres, S. Recker, B. Mir Djawadi, and B. Hoyer, “Network Formation
and Disruption - An Experiment: Are equilibrium networks too complex?,” Journal
of Economic Behavior and Organization , vol. 157, pp. 708–734, 2019.'
mla: 'Endres, Angelika Elfriede, et al. “Network Formation and Disruption - An Experiment:
Are Equilibrium Networks Too Complex?” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
, vol. 157, 2019, pp. 708–34, doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2018.11.004.'
short: A.E. Endres, S. Recker, B. Mir Djawadi, B. Hoyer, Journal of Economic Behavior
and Organization 157 (2019) 708–734.
date_created: 2017-10-17T12:41:07Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:03:49Z
ddc:
- '330'
department:
- _id: '280'
- _id: '179'
- _id: '204'
- _id: '475'
doi: 10.1016/j.jebo.2018.11.004
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: bhoyer
date_created: 2018-11-19T07:39:42Z
date_updated: 2018-11-19T07:39:42Z
file_id: '5723'
file_name: Publication Jebo.pdf
file_size: 1569991
relation: main_file
file_date_updated: 2018-11-19T07:39:42Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: ' 157'
language:
- iso: eng
page: 708-734
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3
- _id: '8'
name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A4
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
publication: 'Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization '
publication_status: epub_ahead
status: public
title: 'Network Formation and Disruption - An Experiment: Are equilibrium networks
too complex?'
type: journal_article
user_id: '42447'
volume: 157
year: '2019'
...
---
_id: '4982'
article_number: '89'
author:
- first_name: Britta
full_name: Hoyer, Britta
id: '42447'
last_name: Hoyer
- first_name: Stephanie
full_name: Rosenkranz, Stephanie
last_name: Rosenkranz
citation:
ama: Hoyer B, Rosenkranz S. Determinants of Equilibrium Selection in Network Formation
- An Experiment. Games. 2018;9(4).
apa: Hoyer, B., & Rosenkranz, S. (2018). Determinants of Equilibrium Selection
in Network Formation - An Experiment. Games, 9(4).
bibtex: '@article{Hoyer_Rosenkranz_2018, title={ Determinants of Equilibrium Selection
in Network Formation - An Experiment}, volume={9}, number={489}, journal={Games},
publisher={MDPI}, author={Hoyer, Britta and Rosenkranz, Stephanie}, year={2018}
}'
chicago: Hoyer, Britta, and Stephanie Rosenkranz. “ Determinants of Equilibrium
Selection in Network Formation - An Experiment.” Games 9, no. 4 (2018).
ieee: B. Hoyer and S. Rosenkranz, “ Determinants of Equilibrium Selection in Network
Formation - An Experiment,” Games, vol. 9, no. 4, 2018.
mla: Hoyer, Britta, and Stephanie Rosenkranz. “ Determinants of Equilibrium Selection
in Network Formation - An Experiment.” Games, vol. 9, no. 4, 89, MDPI,
2018.
short: B. Hoyer, S. Rosenkranz, Games 9 (2018).
date_created: 2018-10-29T10:27:40Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:01:33Z
ddc:
- '000'
department:
- _id: '280'
- _id: '475'
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: ups
date_created: 2018-11-02T15:15:21Z
date_updated: 2018-11-02T15:15:21Z
file_id: '5296'
file_name: games-09-00089.pdf
file_size: 492018
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-11-02T15:15:21Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: ' 9'
issue: '4'
language:
- iso: eng
main_file_link:
- open_access: '1'
url: http://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/9/4/89/
oa: '1'
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
publication: Games
publisher: MDPI
status: public
title: ' Determinants of Equilibrium Selection in Network Formation - An Experiment'
type: journal_article
user_id: '42447'
volume: 9
year: '2018'
...
---
_id: '1029'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: We present a game-theoretic model of the repression–dissent nexus, focusing
on preemptive repression. A small group of instigating dissidents triggers a protest
if each dissident participates. The dissidents face random checks by security
forces, and when an individual dissident is caught while preparing to participate,
he or she is prevented from doing so. Each dissident can invest in countermeasures,
which make checks ineffective. For large benefits of protest, higher preemptive
repression in the form of a higher number of checks has a deterrence effect and
makes dissidents less prone to invest in countermeasures, decreasing the probability
of protest. For small benefits of protest, higher preemptive repression instead
has a backfiring effect. Both myopic and farsighted governments avoid the backfiring
effect by setting low levels of preemptive repression (velvet-glove strategy).
However, only a farsighted government is able to exploit the deterrence effect
by maintaining a high level of preemptive repression (iron-fist strategy).
author:
- first_name: Kris
full_name: De Jaegher, Kris
last_name: De Jaegher
- first_name: Britta
full_name: Hoyer, Britta
id: '42447'
last_name: Hoyer
citation:
ama: 'De Jaegher K, Hoyer B. Preemptive Repression: Deterrence, Backfiring, Iron
Fists and Velvet Gloves. Journal of Conflict Resolution. 2018;63(2):502--527.
doi:10.1177/0022002717750450'
apa: 'De Jaegher, K., & Hoyer, B. (2018). Preemptive Repression: Deterrence,
Backfiring, Iron Fists and Velvet Gloves. Journal of Conflict Resolution,
63(2), 502--527. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002717750450'
bibtex: '@article{De Jaegher_Hoyer_2018, title={Preemptive Repression: Deterrence,
Backfiring, Iron Fists and Velvet Gloves}, volume={63}, DOI={10.1177/0022002717750450},
number={2}, journal={Journal of Conflict Resolution}, publisher={SAGE Publications},
author={De Jaegher, Kris and Hoyer, Britta}, year={2018}, pages={502--527} }'
chicago: 'De Jaegher, Kris, and Britta Hoyer. “Preemptive Repression: Deterrence,
Backfiring, Iron Fists and Velvet Gloves.” Journal of Conflict Resolution
63, no. 2 (2018): 502--527. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002717750450.'
ieee: 'K. De Jaegher and B. Hoyer, “Preemptive Repression: Deterrence, Backfiring,
Iron Fists and Velvet Gloves,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 63,
no. 2, pp. 502--527, 2018.'
mla: 'De Jaegher, Kris, and Britta Hoyer. “Preemptive Repression: Deterrence, Backfiring,
Iron Fists and Velvet Gloves.” Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 63,
no. 2, SAGE Publications, 2018, pp. 502--527, doi:10.1177/0022002717750450.'
short: K. De Jaegher, B. Hoyer, Journal of Conflict Resolution 63 (2018) 502--527.
date_created: 2017-12-06T10:52:44Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:50:35Z
ddc:
- '000'
department:
- _id: '280'
- _id: '475'
doi: 10.1177/0022002717750450
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: ups
date_created: 2018-11-02T16:07:11Z
date_updated: 2018-11-02T16:07:11Z
file_id: '5323'
file_name: 0022002717750450.pdf
file_size: 335051
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-11-02T16:07:11Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: ' 63'
issue: '2'
language:
- iso: eng
page: 502--527
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
publication: Journal of Conflict Resolution
publisher: SAGE Publications
status: public
title: 'Preemptive Repression: Deterrence, Backfiring, Iron Fists and Velvet Gloves'
type: journal_article
user_id: '477'
volume: 63
year: '2018'
...
---
_id: '1083'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: In actual school choice applications the theoretical underpinnings of the
Boston School Choice Mechanism (BM) (complete information and rationality of the
agents) are often not given. We analyze the actual behavior of agents in such
a matching mechanism, using data from the matching mechanism currently used in
a clearinghouse at a faculty of Business Administration and Economics at a German
university, where a variant of the BM is used, and supplement this data with data
generated in a survey among students who participated in the clearinghouse. We
find that under the current mechanism over 70% of students act strategically.
Controlling for students' limited information, we find that they do act rationally
in their decision to act strategically. While students thus seem to react to the
incentives to act strategically under the BM, they do not seem to be able to use
this to their own advantage. However, those students acting in line with their
beliefs manage a significantly better personal outcome than those who do not.
We also run simulations by using a variant of the deferred acceptance algorithm,
adapted to our situation, to show that the use of a different algorithm may be
to the students' advantage.
author:
- first_name: Britta
full_name: Hoyer, Britta
id: '42447'
last_name: Hoyer
- first_name: Nadja
full_name: Stroh-Maraun, Nadja
id: '13264'
last_name: Stroh-Maraun
citation:
ama: Hoyer B, Stroh-Maraun N. Matching Strategies of Heterogeneous Agents under
Incomplete Information in a University Clearinghouse. Vol 110. CIE Working
Paper Series, Paderborn University; 2017.
apa: Hoyer, B., & Stroh-Maraun, N. (2017). Matching Strategies of Heterogeneous
Agents under Incomplete Information in a University Clearinghouse (Vol. 110).
CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University.
bibtex: '@book{Hoyer_Stroh-Maraun_2017, series={Working Papers CIE}, title={Matching
Strategies of Heterogeneous Agents under Incomplete Information in a University
Clearinghouse}, volume={110}, publisher={CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University},
author={Hoyer, Britta and Stroh-Maraun, Nadja}, year={2017}, collection={Working
Papers CIE} }'
chicago: Hoyer, Britta, and Nadja Stroh-Maraun. Matching Strategies of Heterogeneous
Agents under Incomplete Information in a University Clearinghouse. Vol. 110.
Working Papers CIE. CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2017.
ieee: B. Hoyer and N. Stroh-Maraun, Matching Strategies of Heterogeneous Agents
under Incomplete Information in a University Clearinghouse, vol. 110. CIE
Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2017.
mla: Hoyer, Britta, and Nadja Stroh-Maraun. Matching Strategies of Heterogeneous
Agents under Incomplete Information in a University Clearinghouse. Vol. 110,
CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2017.
short: B. Hoyer, N. Stroh-Maraun, Matching Strategies of Heterogeneous Agents under
Incomplete Information in a University Clearinghouse, CIE Working Paper Series,
Paderborn University, 2017.
date_created: 2017-12-20T16:21:51Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:50:51Z
ddc:
- '040'
department:
- _id: '280'
- _id: '205'
- _id: '475'
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: nmaraun
date_created: 2018-08-15T07:33:12Z
date_updated: 2018-08-15T07:33:12Z
file_id: '3911'
file_name: Matching Strategies of Heterogeneous Agents under Incomplete Information
in a University Clearinghouse.pdf
file_size: 346752
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-08-15T07:33:12Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: ' 110'
language:
- iso: eng
main_file_link:
- open_access: '1'
url: http://groups.uni-paderborn.de/wp-wiwi/RePEc/pdf/ciepap/WP110.pdf
oa: '1'
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
publisher: CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University
series_title: Working Papers CIE
status: public
title: Matching Strategies of Heterogeneous Agents under Incomplete Information in
a University Clearinghouse
type: working_paper
user_id: '42447'
volume: 110
year: '2017'
...
---
_id: '1919'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: We study a game between a network designer, who uses costly links to connect
nodes in a network, and a network disruptor who tries to disrupt the resulting
network as much as possible by deleting either nodes or links. For low linking
costs networks with all nodes in symmetric positions are a best response of the
designer under both link deletion and node deletion. For high linking costs the
designer builds a star network under link deletion, but for node deletion excludes
some nodes from the network to build a smaller but stronger network. For intermediate
linking costs the designer again builds a symmetric network under node deletion
but a star‐like network with weak spots under link deletion.
author:
- first_name: Britta
full_name: Hoyer, Britta
id: '42447'
last_name: Hoyer
- first_name: Kris
full_name: De Jaegher, Kris
last_name: De Jaegher
citation:
ama: Hoyer B, De Jaegher K. Strategic Network Disruption and Defense. Journal
of Public Economic Theory. 2016;18(5):802-830. doi:10.1111/jpet.12168
apa: Hoyer, B., & De Jaegher, K. (2016). Strategic Network Disruption and Defense.
Journal of Public Economic Theory, 18(5), 802–830. https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12168
bibtex: '@article{Hoyer_De Jaegher_2016, title={Strategic Network Disruption and
Defense}, volume={18}, DOI={10.1111/jpet.12168},
number={5}, journal={Journal of Public Economic Theory}, publisher={Wiley-Blackwell},
author={Hoyer, Britta and De Jaegher, Kris}, year={2016}, pages={802–830} }'
chicago: 'Hoyer, Britta, and Kris De Jaegher. “Strategic Network Disruption and
Defense.” Journal of Public Economic Theory 18, no. 5 (2016): 802–30. https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12168.'
ieee: B. Hoyer and K. De Jaegher, “Strategic Network Disruption and Defense,” Journal
of Public Economic Theory, vol. 18, no. 5, pp. 802–830, 2016.
mla: Hoyer, Britta, and Kris De Jaegher. “Strategic Network Disruption and Defense.”
Journal of Public Economic Theory, vol. 18, no. 5, Wiley-Blackwell, 2016,
pp. 802–30, doi:10.1111/jpet.12168.
short: B. Hoyer, K. De Jaegher, Journal of Public Economic Theory 18 (2016) 802–830.
date_created: 2018-03-28T11:30:44Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:53:59Z
department:
- _id: '280'
- _id: '475'
doi: 10.1111/jpet.12168
intvolume: ' 18'
issue: '5'
page: 802-830
publication: Journal of Public Economic Theory
publication_identifier:
issn:
- 1097-3923
publication_status: published
publisher: Wiley-Blackwell
status: public
title: Strategic Network Disruption and Defense
type: journal_article
user_id: '42447'
volume: 18
year: '2016'
...
---
_id: '1922'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: We construct two-player two-strategy game-theoretic models of by-product mutualism,
where our focus lies on the way in which the probability of cooperation among
players is affected by the degree of adversity facing the players. In our first
model, cooperation consists of the production of a public good, and adversity
is linked to the degree of complementarity of the players׳ efforts in producing
the public good. In our second model, cooperation consists of the defense of a
public, and/or a private good with by-product benefits, and adversity is measured
by the number of random attacks (e.g., by a predator) facing the players. In both
of these models, our analysis confirms the existence of the so-called boomerang
effect, which states that in a harsh environment, the individual player has few
incentives to unilaterally defect in a situation of joint cooperation. Focusing
on such an effect in isolation leads to the "common-enemy" hypothesis that a larger
degree of adversity increases the probability of cooperation. Yet, we also find
that a sucker effect may simultaneously exist, which says that in a harsh environment,
the individual player has few incentives to unilaterally cooperate in a situation
of joint defection. Looked at in isolation, the sucker effect leads to the competing
hypothesis that a larger degree of adversity decreases the probability of cooperation.
Our analysis predicts circumstances in which the "common enemy" hypothesis prevails,
and circumstances in which the competing hypothesis prevails.
author:
- first_name: Kris
full_name: De Jaegher, Kris
last_name: De Jaegher
- first_name: Britta
full_name: Hoyer, Britta
id: '42447'
last_name: Hoyer
citation:
ama: De Jaegher K, Hoyer B. By-product mutualism and the ambiguous effects of harsher
environments – A game-theoretic model. Journal of Theoretical Biology.
2016;393:82-97. doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2015.12.034
apa: De Jaegher, K., & Hoyer, B. (2016). By-product mutualism and the ambiguous
effects of harsher environments – A game-theoretic model. Journal of Theoretical
Biology, 393, 82–97. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2015.12.034
bibtex: '@article{De Jaegher_Hoyer_2016, title={By-product mutualism and the ambiguous
effects of harsher environments – A game-theoretic model}, volume={393}, DOI={10.1016/j.jtbi.2015.12.034},
journal={Journal of Theoretical Biology}, publisher={Elsevier BV}, author={De
Jaegher, Kris and Hoyer, Britta}, year={2016}, pages={82–97} }'
chicago: 'De Jaegher, Kris, and Britta Hoyer. “By-Product Mutualism and the Ambiguous
Effects of Harsher Environments – A Game-Theoretic Model.” Journal of Theoretical
Biology 393 (2016): 82–97. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2015.12.034.'
ieee: K. De Jaegher and B. Hoyer, “By-product mutualism and the ambiguous effects
of harsher environments – A game-theoretic model,” Journal of Theoretical Biology,
vol. 393, pp. 82–97, 2016.
mla: De Jaegher, Kris, and Britta Hoyer. “By-Product Mutualism and the Ambiguous
Effects of Harsher Environments – A Game-Theoretic Model.” Journal of Theoretical
Biology, vol. 393, Elsevier BV, 2016, pp. 82–97, doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2015.12.034.
short: K. De Jaegher, B. Hoyer, Journal of Theoretical Biology 393 (2016) 82–97.
date_created: 2018-03-28T11:39:28Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:54:00Z
department:
- _id: '280'
- _id: '475'
doi: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2015.12.034
intvolume: ' 393'
page: 82-97
publication: Journal of Theoretical Biology
publication_identifier:
issn:
- 0022-5193
publication_status: published
publisher: Elsevier BV
status: public
title: By-product mutualism and the ambiguous effects of harsher environments – A
game-theoretic model
type: journal_article
user_id: '42447'
volume: 393
year: '2016'
...
---
_id: '2252'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: "We study the willingness to compete in a cognitive task among an entire cohort\r\nof
fresh man business and economics students. Combining data from a lab-in-thefield\r\nexperiment
with university admissions data, we trace the gender gap in\r\ncompetitiveness
at different levels of high school performance. Our results confirm\r\nthat, on
average, men choose to compete more often. The gender gap disappears,\r\nhowever,
among students with above average high school performance. Female high\r\nschool
top performers are equally competitive as their male counterparts. In fact,\r\nthe
overall gender gap is entirely driven by the group of female high school underperformers\r\nwho
shied away from competition, even when they performed well in our\r\ntask. Overall,
our findings suggest that high school grades are more than just a\r\nsignal of
cognitive abilities, because they seem to influence the receivers selfperception\r\nof
his or her performance in a competitive environment involved in later\r\non in
life."
author:
- first_name: Britta
full_name: Hoyer, Britta
id: '42447'
last_name: Hoyer
- first_name: Tomas
full_name: van Huizen, Tomas
last_name: van Huizen
- first_name: Linda
full_name: Keijzer, Linda
last_name: Keijzer
- first_name: Tahere
full_name: Rezai Khavas, Tahere
last_name: Rezai Khavas
- first_name: Stephanie
full_name: Rosenkranz, Stephanie
last_name: Rosenkranz
citation:
ama: Hoyer B, van Huizen T, Keijzer L, Rezai Khavas T, Rosenkranz S. Do Talented
Women Shy Away from Competition? Vol 16-06.; 2016.
apa: Hoyer, B., van Huizen, T., Keijzer, L., Rezai Khavas, T., & Rosenkranz,
S. (2016). Do talented women shy away from competition? (Vol. 16–06).
bibtex: '@book{Hoyer_van Huizen_Keijzer_Rezai Khavas_Rosenkranz_2016, series={TKI
Working Paper Series}, title={Do talented women shy away from competition?}, volume={16–06},
author={Hoyer, Britta and van Huizen, Tomas and Keijzer, Linda and Rezai Khavas,
Tahere and Rosenkranz, Stephanie}, year={2016}, collection={TKI Working Paper
Series} }'
chicago: Hoyer, Britta, Tomas van Huizen, Linda Keijzer, Tahere Rezai Khavas, and
Stephanie Rosenkranz. Do Talented Women Shy Away from Competition? Vol.
16–06. TKI Working Paper Series, 2016.
ieee: B. Hoyer, T. van Huizen, L. Keijzer, T. Rezai Khavas, and S. Rosenkranz, Do
talented women shy away from competition?, vol. 16–06. 2016.
mla: Hoyer, Britta, et al. Do Talented Women Shy Away from Competition? Vol.
16–06, 2016.
short: B. Hoyer, T. van Huizen, L. Keijzer, T. Rezai Khavas, S. Rosenkranz, Do Talented
Women Shy Away from Competition?, 2016.
date_created: 2018-04-06T07:54:42Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:55:35Z
department:
- _id: '280'
- _id: '475'
main_file_link:
- open_access: '1'
url: https://www.uu.nl/en/files/rebousedp20161606pdf
oa: '1'
series_title: TKI Working Paper Series
status: public
title: Do talented women shy away from competition?
type: working_paper
user_id: '42447'
volume: 16-06
year: '2016'
...
---
_id: '1923'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: How is collective defence by players affected when they face a threat from
an intelligent attacker rather than a natural threat? This paper analyses this
question using a game-theoretic model. Facing an intelligent attacker has an effect
if players move first and visibly set their defence strategies, thereby exposing
any players who do not defend, and if the attacker is, moreover, not able to commit
to a random attack. Depending on the parameters of the game, the presence of an
intelligent attacker either increases the probability that players jointly defend
(where such joint defence either does or does not constitute a utilitarian optimum),
or decreases the probability that players jointly defend (even though joint defence
is a utilitarian optimum).
author:
- first_name: Kris
full_name: De Jaegher, Kris
last_name: De Jaegher
- first_name: Britta
full_name: Hoyer, Britta
id: '42447'
last_name: Hoyer
citation:
ama: De Jaegher K, Hoyer B. Collective action and the common enemy effect. Defence
and Peace Economics. 2014;27(5):644-664. doi:10.1080/10242694.2014.925676
apa: De Jaegher, K., & Hoyer, B. (2014). Collective action and the common enemy
effect. Defence and Peace Economics, 27(5), 644–664. https://doi.org/10.1080/10242694.2014.925676
bibtex: '@article{De Jaegher_Hoyer_2014, title={Collective action and the common
enemy effect}, volume={27}, DOI={10.1080/10242694.2014.925676},
number={5}, journal={Defence and Peace Economics}, publisher={Informa UK Limited},
author={De Jaegher, Kris and Hoyer, Britta}, year={2014}, pages={644–664} }'
chicago: 'De Jaegher, Kris, and Britta Hoyer. “Collective Action and the Common
Enemy Effect.” Defence and Peace Economics 27, no. 5 (2014): 644–64. https://doi.org/10.1080/10242694.2014.925676.'
ieee: K. De Jaegher and B. Hoyer, “Collective action and the common enemy effect,”
Defence and Peace Economics, vol. 27, no. 5, pp. 644–664, 2014.
mla: De Jaegher, Kris, and Britta Hoyer. “Collective Action and the Common Enemy
Effect.” Defence and Peace Economics, vol. 27, no. 5, Informa UK Limited,
2014, pp. 644–64, doi:10.1080/10242694.2014.925676.
short: K. De Jaegher, B. Hoyer, Defence and Peace Economics 27 (2014) 644–664.
date_created: 2018-03-28T11:43:04Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:54:00Z
department:
- _id: '280'
- _id: '475'
doi: 10.1080/10242694.2014.925676
intvolume: ' 27'
issue: '5'
page: 644-664
publication: Defence and Peace Economics
publication_identifier:
issn:
- 1024-2694
- 1476-8267
publication_status: published
publisher: Informa UK Limited
status: public
title: Collective action and the common enemy effect
type: journal_article
user_id: '42447'
volume: 27
year: '2014'
...
---
_id: '2249'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: "The phenomenon that groups or people work together when they face an opponent,\r\nalthough
they have little in common otherwise, has been termed the \"common enemy\r\neffect\".
We study a model of network formation, where players can use links to build\r\na
network, knowing that they are facing a common enemy who can disrupt the links\r\nwithin
the network, and whose goal it is to minimize the sum of the benefits of the\r\nnetwork.
We find that introducing a common enemy can lead to the formation of\r\nstable
and efficient networks as well as fragmented networks and the empty network."
author:
- first_name: Britta
full_name: Hoyer, Britta
id: '42447'
last_name: Hoyer
- first_name: Kris
full_name: De Jaegher, Kris
last_name: De Jaegher
citation:
ama: Hoyer B, De Jaegher K. Network Disruption and the Common Enemy Effect.
Vol 12-06.; 2012.
apa: Hoyer, B., & De Jaegher, K. (2012). Network Disruption and the Common
Enemy Effect (Vol. 12–06).
bibtex: '@book{Hoyer_De Jaegher_2012, series={TKI Working Paper Series}, title={Network
Disruption and the Common Enemy Effect}, volume={12–06}, author={Hoyer, Britta
and De Jaegher, Kris}, year={2012}, collection={TKI Working Paper Series} }'
chicago: Hoyer, Britta, and Kris De Jaegher. Network Disruption and the Common
Enemy Effect. Vol. 12–06. TKI Working Paper Series, 2012.
ieee: B. Hoyer and K. De Jaegher, Network Disruption and the Common Enemy Effect,
vol. 12–06. 2012.
mla: Hoyer, Britta, and Kris De Jaegher. Network Disruption and the Common Enemy
Effect. Vol. 12–06, 2012.
short: B. Hoyer, K. De Jaegher, Network Disruption and the Common Enemy Effect,
2012.
date_created: 2018-04-06T07:44:14Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:55:34Z
department:
- _id: '280'
- _id: '475'
main_file_link:
- open_access: '1'
url: https://www.uu.nl/en/files/rebousedp201212062pdf
oa: '1'
series_title: TKI Working Paper Series
status: public
title: Network Disruption and the Common Enemy Effect
type: working_paper
user_id: '42447'
volume: 12-06
year: '2012'
...