@phdthesis{32856,
  author       = {{Endres-Fröhlich, Angelika Elfriede}},
  title        = {{{Essays on Industrial Organization and Networks: Retail Bundling, Exclusive Dealing, and Network Disruption}}},
  doi          = {{10.17619/UNIPB/1-1581}},
  year         = {{2022}},
}

@techreport{44091,
  abstract     = {{We study the effects of product differentiation on the bundling incentives of a two-product retailer. Two monopolistic manufacturers each produce a differentiated good. One sells it to both retailers, while the other only supplies a single retailer. Retailers compete in prices. Retail bundling is profitable when the goods are close substitutes. Only then is competition so intense that the retailer uses bundling to relax competition both within and across product markets, despite an aggravation of the double marginalization problem. Our asymmetric market structure arises endogenously for the case of close substitutes. In this case, bundling reduces social welfare.}},
  author       = {{Endres-Fröhlich, Angelika Elfriede and Hehenkamp, Burkhard and Heinzel, Joachim}},
  keywords     = {{Retail bundling, upstream market power, double marginalization, product differentiation}},
  pages        = {{43}},
  title        = {{{The Impact of Product Differentiation on Retail Bundling in a Vertical Market}}},
  year         = {{2022}},
}

@article{80,
  abstract     = {{Models on network formation have often been extended to include the potential of network disruption in recent years. Whereas the theoretical research on network formation under the threat of disruption has thus gained prominence, hardly any experimental research exists so far. In this paper, we therefore experimentally study the emergence of networks including the aspect of a known external threat by relating theoretical predictions by Dzuibiński and Goyal (2013) to actual observed behaviour. We deal with the question if subjects in the role of a strategic Designer are able to form safe networks for least costs while facing a strategic Adversary who is going to attack their networks. Varying the costs for protecting nodes, we designed and tested two treatments with different predictions for the equilibrium network and investigated whether one of the least cost equilibrium networks was more likely to be reached. Furthermore, the influence of the subjects’ farsightedness on their decision-making process was elicited and analysed.

We find that while subjects are able to build safe networks in both treatments, equilibrium networks are only built in one of the two treatments. In the other treatment, predominantly safe networks are built but they are not for least costs. Additionally, we find that farsightedness –as measured in our experiment– has no influence on whether subjects are able to build safe or least cost equilibrium networks. Two robustness settings with a reduced external threat or more liberties to modify the initial networks qualitatively confirm our results. Overall, in this experiment observed behaviour is only partially in line with the theoretical predictions by Dzuibiński and Goyal (2013).}},
  author       = {{Endres, Angelika Elfriede and Recker, Sonja and Mir Djawadi, Behnud and Hoyer, Britta}},
  journal      = {{Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization }},
  pages        = {{708--734}},
  title        = {{{Network Formation and Disruption - An Experiment: Are equilibrium networks too complex?}}},
  doi          = {{10.1016/j.jebo.2018.11.004}},
  volume       = {{157}},
  year         = {{2019}},
}

@misc{178,
  author       = {{Endres, Angelika Elfriede}},
  publisher    = {{Universität Paderborn}},
  title        = {{{On the Design and Defense of Networks - An Experimental Investigation}}},
  year         = {{2016}},
}