@phdthesis{20240,
  author       = {{Hoof, Simon}},
  title        = {{{Essays on Cooperation in Differential Games}}},
  doi          = {{	10.17619/UNIPB/1-1047}},
  year         = {{2020}},
}

@techreport{2565,
  abstract     = {{This note deals with agreeability in nontransferable utility (NTU) differential games. We introduce state feedback Pareto weights to enrich the set of efficient cooperative solutions. The framework is particularly useful if constant weights fail to support agreeability, but cooperation is desired nonetheless. The concept is applied to an adverting differential game.}},
  author       = {{Hoof, Simon}},
  keywords     = {{NTU differential games, variable Pareto weights, agreeability}},
  publisher    = {{CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University}},
  title        = {{{Feedback Pareto weights in cooperative NTU differential games}}},
  volume       = {{112}},
  year         = {{2018}},
}

@inbook{3742,
  author       = {{Hoof, Simon}},
  booktitle    = {{Static & Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations & Applications}},
  isbn         = {{9783319929873}},
  issn         = {{2363-8516}},
  pages        = {{13--23}},
  publisher    = {{Springer International Publishing}},
  title        = {{{Dynamic Voluntary Provision of Public Goods: The Recursive Nash Bargaining Solution}}},
  doi          = {{10.1007/978-3-319-92988-0_2}},
  year         = {{2018}},
}

@inproceedings{203,
  abstract     = {{We analyse the economic interaction on the market for composed services. Typically, as providers of composed services, intermediaries interact on the sales side with users and on the procurement side with providers of single services. Thus, in how far a user request can be met often crucially depends on the prices and qualities of the different single services used in the composition. We study an intermediary who purchases two complementary single services and combines them. The prices paid to the service providers are determined by simultaneous multilateral Nash bargaining between the intermediary and the respective service provider. By using a function with constant elasticity of substitution (CES) to determine the quality of the composed service, we allow for complementary as well as substitutable degrees of the providers' service qualities. We investigate quality investments of service providers and the corresponding evolution of the single service quality within a differential game framework. }},
  author       = {{Brangewitz, Sonja and Hoof, Simon}},
  booktitle    = {{Service-Oriented and Cloud Computing: 5th IFIP WG 2.14 European Conference, ESOCC 2016, Vienna, Austria, September 5-7, 2016, Proceedings}},
  editor       = {{Marco Aiello, Einar Broch Johnsen, Schahram Dustdar, and Georgievski, Ilche}},
  pages        = {{201--215}},
  title        = {{{Economic Aspects of Service Composition: Price Negotiations and Quality Investments}}},
  doi          = {{10.1007/978-3-319-44482-6_13}},
  year         = {{2016}},
}